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WHAT *IS* THOUGHT?

WHAT *IS* THOUGHT?

OR

THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY

BY WAY OF A GENERAL CONCLUSION SO FAR

BY

JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING

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PREFATORY NOTE

THERE really was intended a not inconsiderable preface in this place, preliminarily introductive of the work—as though it were thought to involve, perhaps, something of a *Crise*! But casting one's eyes on the book itself, one seems to think that it is unnecessary.

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WHAT *IS* THOUGHT?

CHAPTER I

1. Introductory

Of histories of philosophy there are so many nowadays —"they grow like mushrooms from the ground"—that a general idea of what philosophy is may be assumed as even ecumenically current; with warrant of the further assumption, therefore, that it is to thinking or thought that philosophy as a whole is conceived to be due. We see this to be illustratively so at least among those who, in so many words, directly claim, as regards philosophy in these days, "to be the keepers of the sacred fire, even as it was given to the Eumolpidæ at Athens to care for the Eleusinian Mysteries, or to the island dwellers on Samothrace to preserve for the gods a higher worship" —among the Germans, namely, *Denken* is the word that, specially in the reference, is alone determinative. *Denken*, and again *Denken*, and ever and continually *Denken*, that to them is the name for the organ as organ, for the organ proper of philosophy. Further than *Denken* it is impossible to go. *Denken* is the whole: and with *Denken* all has been completed and concluded, and the last word said.



But what *is* Denken?

What is it to think? What is thought?

That here evidently is what is alone at stake. For, if philosophy is a product of thought, whatever *it* is, whatever thought is, that, too, no less, will be specially characteristic of philosophy as philosophy. Let it be thought, Denken, that realises philosophy, then philosophy must be of thought, of Denken. Now, no doubt it occurs to all of us that we know at once, and very well already, what it is to think, what thought is, what thinking is. To think! why is it not just to consider, to reflect, to deliberate,—to follow some subject, or the question of some subject, in a series of ideas? But, in that point of view—according to the *subject*, namely —to think may be understood somewhat to vary in its nature. In the case of numerical quantities, as subject, for example, to think is only—as the word is—to *count*. In a general sense, as we would take it, however, and apart any or every particular application, may it not be always said of us when we think that we are then in the exercise of a psychological function, just as when we assimilate we are understood to be then in the exercise of a physiological function? To assimilate, as we know, is to convert some alien object into the body itself—say into blood as blood. That is how it is with the physiological function; but is it similarly so also with the psychological function? To think, then, —is it to convert some alien object into the mind itself—say into the very blood of the mind, *thought*?

Let us take a case—let us think the three angles of every triangle to be equal to two right angles. What is it we do then? The "three" angles are not the "two" angles. The separates cannot be directly united —the differents cannot be directly identified. That seems at once an *impasse*. One pen is not another pen;

nor is one ink-bottle another ink-bottle. We look around for help. If this union of separates with separates, this identification of differents with differents, is to be at all effected, since it cannot be *directly* effected, can it, then, possibly, we are naturally led to ask, be *indirectly* effected? Even this *indirectly* we cannot but feel at the first glance, as no more than a reference, or a suggestion, hopeless. What is that but the impossible itself—to abolish contradiction in terms, cancel the steepest contrariety, unite the trenchantly sundered, identify the personally different! The ordinary expedient and resource, *mechanically* to unite, *mechanically* to identify, is without a hint in it to succour us here; for even a *bridge*—such at least as the very state of the case self-evidently demands—seems impracticable. Why, for a bridge, it would require to be itself the most extraordinary of hermaphrodites, at once *this* and at once *that*, one thing *and* another. If it is pretty evident that what we want can be only mechanically—only *bridge*-wise accomplished for us by the means and mediation of some third something, it is not so easy to see where such a commodity is to be laid hands on. A middle that is at once either extreme is alone the necessity to suit, and by the very terms it seems alone an impossibility to find. Let the one separate and the one different be A, and let the other be B, then, evidently, a C that is at once A and at once B, is alone the medium in which both A and B can collapse to unity, can collapse to identity.

That, of course, is really what takes place, for the attainment of the solution in the case of the geometrical problem under regard,—a certain complementary outer angle being fallen upon as the *tertium quid*, the *medium* required. That the square on the hypotenuse of the right-angled triangle is equal to the squares on the two

sides of it, affords similar illustration. The two squares are not the third square; they are quite apart from it, and different; and yet the truth of the case lies in their union, lies in their identification, parallelograms so and so situated, being the *medium*, the *tertium quid*, that respectively serves.

And so it is that we have an example of what is meant by the word *Vermittlung* (mediation). In either of the two cases named the result is due to a process of *Vermittlung*: in both of them we see that what comes out is a *Vermitteltes*; it has been *vermittelt*, mediated or re-mediated, realised, produced, brought about by a *Drittes*, a *tertium quid*, a third something.

Are we to understand, then, that that is the way in which *Denken*, thinking, converts an alien object into the mind itself, or, as we said, into, so to speak, the blood of the mind, thought? In all cases of such conversion, there must be *Vermittlung*, mediation, be-mediation, re-mediation, a process of realisation through interposition of what in Latin is a *tertium quid*, a *medium*.

It may be objected here that angles, triangles, squares, and all other things the like, are not the mind, and that it is difficult to see how they can be converted into the mind, or the so-called blood of the mind either. Nevertheless, if we refer to what we understand by truth—if we refer to the element of truth, we may, through *its mediation* attain to conviction. The mind is the seat and the sense of truth, as truth itself is thought. Now, in these angles, squares, etc., it is certain relations that are alone in question, and alone the truth; and it is they as truth that are to be regarded as united to the mind, and as identified with thought. Not but that, in this reference, we may, by and by, be brought to a closer point of view.

2. Difference and Identity

Meantime this, too, is pressed upon us, what so far concerns the relations of identity and difference. As we know, there is a whole party of logicians who express themselves with absolute ferocity against brethren of their own, who, as in relation to the so-called principium contradictionis,—and that is the *contradictio* oppositorum, —presume to lay stress as well on the contrasting principle or proposition of the *coincidentia* oppositorum. In the Annotations to the *Schwegler* I have said (p. 366) in reference to the horror of any talk of "identity and difference in the same breath," that "it requires simply consideration to see that to *explain* is not to say *identity* is identity, but *difference* is identity." And we have just seen in these angles, and triangles, and squares, and oblongs, an illustration of the truth of this. The three angles were not the two angles and the two squares were not the one square, of which there was respectively question, and yet the whole matter that was in hand was the *explanation* of the respective *differences* as but respective *identities*, and that, too, by the mediation or intermediation of a third something which was referentially at once both—at once both difference and identity. Nay, if we take the two self-identical things, that are yet different the one from the other apart, and look at them separately so, is not the third something, as compared with them, the interesting something, the important something? It mediates explanation: it has movement in it, it has reason in it, while they in themselves are immobile and reasonless. And yet this third something, as the link between, and so including in itself both identity and difference, is so far contradiction. So far, then, is not contradiction, as compared with identity, the deeper, and, as it were, the more living element? How

this is—how contradiction is life, and the movement of life, we shall eventually see, indeed.

3. The Question of a Substantial First

It is no alien consideration here, but one very naturally in place, that it is not the things themselves in their individual entity—it is not the matter, the substratum of them, that is the important element; no, it is the element of relations that is this, the formal element, the immaterial element; it is not the *τί ἐστιν*, so to speak, but the *τί ἦν εἶναι*. Always the meaning it is that is substantial and alive: the symbol, the representation in itself—that is, the external thing itself—is indifferent, null, idle, useless, dead. Alone the ideality is the true reality. "Learn ever," says Athos to Raoul, "to distinguish between the *king* and the *kingdom*. The king is but man, the kingdom is the spirit of God. When you are in doubt as to which you should serve, forsake the material appearance for the invisible principle, for it is this that is everything." In these latter nineteenth century days, men find everything in the *case* (the outside) and nothing in the *works* (in the physical body, and not in the psychical mind). And yet the spore of this universe, the principle from which it grows, and the principle on which it sits, is not a material, but an immaterial one. This, to be sure, is to put on its head the established order of explanation, or what is currently figured for explanation; but this, for all that, may be only to put it right. The spore of this universe—that entity that approves itself as the first entity, the very first thing in existence, the principle from which it grows and on which it sits, as said,—what is that? There are those in this universe who, when explanation is wanted—just when there is question of explanation generally or at all

—think it enough to go back to the lower animals. Solution of every problem of genesis is easily to be found at once in the beasts beside us. Why is it man's *head* that comes first into the world? Oh! just see how it is with your dog or cat, rabbit or cow, etc., and that will settle the matter. But if so, why so in them? Why at all? Why the cosmical problem? (Ah, well, suppose, in our own way of it, we say—*pace* Aristotle—that it is just because *thought* does come first!)

4. God as such First

The common answer to the question of what was the first entity—an answer at which the appellants to the lower animals can only scoff—is God—God is the first entity in this universe, and it is from that entity that all else derives.

To be serious—that is an answer only to be reverenced; and there are those who would think it little less than profanity to ask further. But is it, then, profanity for us to *think*? *Thought* is the constitutive act of a man, his single function and faculty, his essence. To take it so, it is for that we are sent here—we are sent into this world to think. It can really not be impious to think God, then?

When one says God,—when, in reply to the query of a first, one says God, does not one still say something then that, as a first, requires an explanation? God so—that is only an algebraical x, absolutely unexplained in itself, absolutely unacccounted for as there, if there!

Looking at the world, you ask of it an explanation, how did it come? What is the reason of it? But, if you just say, Omnipotence caused it, Omnipotence created it, you have just turned your eyes *from* the world and *to* a problem that is but the same problem under another

name, and not a whit easier. You have but transferred your eyes from *this* world to *that* world; and, so far as questions are concerned, *that* world brings quite as many with it, and quite as hard ones as ever *this* world brought, or brings, or ever can bring. Of course you have lived your life, say till now, till this very moment with God a very sensible presence, it may be, within you and without you. God, you think, why God is just God, the Being who knows all, and sees all, and has made all, to whom we pray, who is over us, and above us, and never possibly absent from beside us! Well, yes. But if you take the existence of God just so, is it not—absolutely—just as reasonable, and legitimate, and inevitable to ask of Him —How? That One Awful Being—how can we think of Him, as up there, say, and alone, without the wonder of Him rising as an apparition within us, and the involuntary questions, What? — Whence? — and again, How? In short, it must be apparent to every thinking mind which *will* think, that we have not touched the problem itself when we have simply transferred it.

5. Aristotle here

We see that this is still the case when religion has made the existence of God a certainty to us, an absolute conviction. For, as it is appointed us to think all, so it is appointed us to think that fact too. Nor if the conviction itself, the certainty of the existence of God, were due to philosophy, would the bare fact of the existence be any way less a problem—and any way less a problem that we *must think*. So far as reason or reasoning is concerned, I know not that any man, ancient or modern, can claim an equal authority with Aristotle in the question. God, as that which could not not-be, as the rigorously inevitable, the absolutely necessary First Mover—no

demonstration of Him in that regard has come from mere man that is grander, truer, more forcible than that of this old Pagan who died three hundred and twenty-two years before Christ lived. "In Him is life," he sings, "for the reality of thinking is life, and that reality is His. Reality that is absolute—that as His life is life best and eternal. So it is we say that God is a Living Being, perfect and eternal. Life eternal and enduring being belong to God. And God is that."

6. *Noûs*

But even Aristotle, with all such conviction as to the fact of existence, finds himself under a necessity to speculate the fact itself, the existence itself; and the result of his speculation is that God is *Noûs*, that God is Thought. For him what gives form to all things is νοῦς; it is νοῦς that moves the all, and is the cause of all; it is the ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς, the principle of principles; it is the purpose of the universe, it is the ἀρχή as we look forward in the beginning, and the τέλος as we look backward in the end: it is impossible for anything to be better or more in power than the soul, and yet to be better or more in power than reason, than νοῦς,—that is still more impossible.

That, then, is evident—so far as Aristotle is concerned, Thought is to him the one principle of the universe: Thought is the First.

7. The Question Remains

But it may be objected, if we must have the *first* of nature, and if even of God we must have a *first*, how is it that thought is to be any exception? If we are to see thought enthroned there as the first of all things, is

there not as much cause, and the same cause, for wonder as ever? How came thought there? Is it not strange that it should be there? Is not thought itself to have a first? Nay, a first at all, a first of any kind—how is that possible?

To this problem, too, there goes much that is said by Aristotle—specially as regards the necessary conditions of a First. Here, however, reference to the eighth chapter of the ninth book of the Metaphysic will probably suffice—which chapter is to the effect, *Actum* priorem esse quam *potentiam* et cognitione, et tempore et substantia—*ἐνέργεια πρότερον τῆς δυνάμεως, λόγῳ, χρόνῳ, οὐσίᾳ*. How that applies to what concerns us at present, the principle of a First and Absolute, will appear from this, that what is potential cannot possibly be a first and absolute, for it may as well not be as be, and also, what may as well not be as be is by very idea doomed to be moveless for ever unless, *deus intersit*, an agency interfere, an agency that is an *actuality*, namely. So it is that, as I say elsewhere, to Aristotle, "still cosmologically reasoning, God is an absolutely actual being. And of this reasoning the angle is that what is only *potential* presupposes a preceding *actuality*; for to be potential only is to be such as may quite as well not be as be. In Aristotelian terms, the *πρῶτον κινοῦν*, what first gives movement to this world, must in itself also be absolute functioning actuality, absolute *ἐνέργεια*; for were it only potential, only *δύναμις*, there were no reason, *so far as it was only that*, that it should become actual. What is potential, what is potential only, there is no reason in such quality for any step further." The *πρῶτον κινοῦν*, therefore, let it be whatever it may, thought, or whatever else, must be an actuality, and never by any possibility a potentiality merely.

CHAPTER II[1]

1. The Ontological Proof—Schelling—Descartes

In the following out of distinctions, Schelling is always most remarkably incisive; and specially, in the immediate reference before us, in the problem, namely, of a first, he is to be found again and again, possibly at his relative best. Of this, it will suit in this place to give a sort of preliminary specimen. What we have in mind occurs in the article entitled "Cartesius," which opens the posthumously published writing, "Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie," in the beginning of the tenth volume of the Works of Schelling.

What leads him to the subject is one of the proofs for the existence of God. Our problem, of course, is not precisely the existence of God, but how account for it, for thought, for existence at all indeed! Nevertheless, for any proper sufficiency of view, all here is relevant; and we can but deal with it as Schelling himself does. He (14) proceeds in this way:—

"Why I have sought to give a general notion of the philosophy of Descartes depends, in the main, on the *ontological argument* the production of which is proper to him. It is by this, chiefly, that he has come to be determinative for the entire course of modern philosophy. It may be said that philosophy in general is still employed in clearing up the misunderstandings due to this argu-

[1] Chap. ii., though pointing to an excellent metaphysical lesson, may very well be passed by a general reader.

ment. . . . Neither Kant, nor any one of his followers, has hit it right. . . . Descartes' own mode of it is this: The most perfect being *can*, not *contingently*, but only *necessarily*, exist (major premiss); God is the most perfect being (minor premiss),—and therefore (he ought to conclude) God *can* only necessarily exist, for that alone lies in the premises; but instead of that he concludes: God exists necessarily, and apparently brings with certainty out in this way that God exists, and seems to have proved the *existence* of God. But it is one thing to say, God can only *necessarily* exist, and quite another that God exists necessarily. From the first (God *can* alone necessarily exist) there follows only: therefore he exists necessarily, N.B., *if he exists*; but it by no means follows *that* he exists."

Schelling goes on expatiating on this gloss of his, or this reading of his, in regard to the argument. It is the "*kind* of existence" he will maintain to be alone in question, and not the existence itself as a fact. Even when Descartes declares that he clearly and distinctly understands that it belongs to God's nature, "*ut semper existat*" —*i.e.* "that he always exists," Schelling can again only have recourse to italics: he italicises the semper! "From that it follows," he says, "merely again that God, if he exists, only *always* exists, but it does not follow *that* he exists. The true sense of the syllogism is always only: either God exists not at all, or, if he exists, he exists *always*, or he exists necessarily, *i.e.* not contingently; but it is clear withal, that his existence is not proved."

To judge of this peculiar gloss or reading of Schelling's in regard to the argument in question, we must first see how it is in Descartes himself. This occurs in the third and fifth *Méditation*; and may be stated (as the latter has it) to run thus:—

"Now, if, from this alone that I can assume from my thought the idea of something, it follows that all that I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that something, does in effect belong to it, cannot I draw from this an argument and a demonstrative proof for the existence of God? It is certain that I do not any less find in me his idea,

the idea of a being supremely perfect, than that of any figure or any number whatever; and I do not know less clearly and distinctly that an actual and eternal existence belongs to his nature, than I know that all that I can demonstrate of some figure or some number veritably belongs to the nature of that figure or of that number. . . . I find manifestly that existence can be no more separated from the essence of God than from the essence of a rectilinear triangle, the sum of its three angles as equal to two right angles, or say from the idea of a mountain the idea of a valley; so that there is no less contradiction to conceive a God,—that is, a being supremely perfect, —who lacks existence,—who lacks some perfection namely,—than to conceive a mountain which is without a valley."

To Descartes, evidently from this, it all comes to what import is thought in an idea. He holds that whatever he clearly and distinctly conceives to be the import of an idea, that import has a correspondent reality to its source. But he clearly and distinctly conceives such reality of import in the idea of God as can only have its source in the reality of God himself. Clear and distinct conception of import in an idea is the whole and sole consideration. It seems very clear that what reality Descartes has in mind is a reality of fact, and not merely a reality of kind. Schelling, however, in his own support (16) continues thus:—

"In his V. *Méditation*, Descartes states the argument in this way: I find in me the idea of God not otherwise than, or just as, the idea of some geometrical figure, or of some number, nec, he goes on, nec minus clare et distincte intelligo, ad ejus naturam pertinere, ut *semper* existat. (Pay attention to this semper [it is Schelling speaks]; Descartes does not say here, ad ejus naturam pertinere, ut existat, but only, ut semper existat.) From that, now, then, it merely follows that God, if he exists, only always exists, but it does not follow *that* he exists. The true sense of the argument is always only: *either* God exists not at all, or, if he exists, then he exists *always*, or, then he exists necessarily, *i.e.* not contingently. But with all that it is clear that his existence is not proved."

It will be observed that the Latin above corresponds (in our translation from the same passage in *Méditation*

V. itself) to this English—"and I do not know less clearly and distinctly that an actual and eternal existence belongs to his nature"; but this English, as an accurate rendering (which it is), shows the French of said semper to have been "actuelle et éternelle" (and the French is for Descartes quite as authoritative as the Latin). When one looks again, then, at the burthen of the extract from Schelling, one can only admire his extrication of such vast antithesis as *necessity* and *contingency* from such so situated semper! But he has been anxious here; and, for what he wanted, necessity and contingency, he has given himself the pains to penetrate to another work of Descartes.

"In an essay which is superscribed, Rationes Dei existentiam, etc., probantes ordine geometrico dispositæ, the conclusion runs thus: Therefore is it true to say of God, existence is in him a necessary one. . . . Descartes is himself perfectly well aware that, in his notion of the most perfect being there is properly question only of the *kind* of existence. And so it is that he says in the same connection: In the notion of a limited, finite being, there is implied merely possible or contingent existence, and consequently, therefore, in the notion of the most perfect being, the notion of necessary and perfect existence."

Now, if Descartes did speak of what "*existence*" was implied in the *finite*, he would naturally, again, speak also of what *existence*—and not of what mere "*notion*" of it—was similarly implied in the *infinite*. It is not Schelling's cue, however, to refer at present to implication in the infinite of existence in *fact*, but only to implication in the infinite of existence in *kind*, and so the word "*notion*!"

We see in these quotations, however, all the grounds which are the warrant to Schelling to infer that, "in several passages," as his words are, Descartes concludes, "*immediately*, or in strictness at least *only*, in the way which has been notified by me." But can it be said

that even the *two* of them have been sufficient to make good the alleged burthen of the supposititious "*several* passages"? To the quotation from *Méditation* V. we should cheerfully accord all possible authority; but its single "semper" does indeed sound less of a nature metaphysical than of a nature actual, besides that the very French for it is *actuelle et éternelle*; while, as for the other (the Essay, Rationes Dei *Existentiam*, etc.), it almost seems too distantly or too loosely placed to be allowed any express authority; at the same time that its burthen—as given—may be apt too readily to suggest a Schellingian paraphrase as to be accepted in genuine avouchment of important Cartesian principles. At all events this is certain that in *Méditation* V. itself, the passage referred to by Schelling will be found to be succeeded by a somewhat long and express reasoning to the effect that it is *not* a necessary *kind* of existence *only*, but, as well, a necessary *fact* of existence that he, Descartes, is minded to prove. It is just possible, indeed, that the two are unadvisedly supposed to go together with Descartes, however it be with Schelling; for, after all, what is the meaning of "existence" quite as "manifestly" belonging to the "essence" of God as, etc. etc.? Descartes himself explains it to mean "that it is not in his liberty to conceive a God without existence" —even to conceive! "Is there anything," he asks, "of itself clearer and more manifest than to think that there is a God, that is to say, a sovereign and perfect being, in whose sole idea necessary or eternal existence is comprised, and who, by consequence, exists." He speaks quite simply and freely of "the necessity of the *existence* of God," that is, as admits not of doubt, of his *actual* existence; he sees "clearly that of necessity God has been before all eternity, and that he is eternally to be." He says again, "the necessity which is in the thing

itself, that is, of the existence of God, determines me to have this thought" (that he veritably exists). A valley is the necessity of a mountain, and yet neither may exist, he says. But that is not so with God—existence, that is, actual existence, is with him necessity. One wonders that Schelling should have been able to bring forward no stronger evidence even for the necessity he wanted than only the two references which are presently at full before us; namely, the passage quoted by him from the Latin essay and that other from *Méditation* V. He certainly gets *necessity* from the one, but only *semper* from the other. He seems to have preferred the *semper* of the Latin to the *actuelle et éternelle* of the French, both being before him; while, in the latter, it is just this "actuelle et éternelle" that turns up too constantly, it may be,—*with* the necessity as well —however abundant this latter may prove all through.

In short, generally, in the face of all, one can only conclude that Schelling (led to him possibly by a certain *forgetfulness*, as may appear) is as inaccurate in failing to see that to Descartes, existence, actual existence, follows, and not illogically follows, from the essence of God, as he is inaccurate in failing to see that, to the same Descartes, *Denken*, thought or thinking, is the *substance* of man. In the Quatrième Partie of the *Discours de la Méthode*, for example, it is said, "I knew from that that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is only to think." In the Preface to the *Méditations*, again, he maintains, at least by implication, "that it follows from this that the human spirit, making reflection on itself, knows itself to be nothing else than a thing that thinks, that its nature or its essence is only to think; so that the word *only* excludes all the other things that we might perhaps think also to belong to the nature of the soul." And in *Princip.* 53, First Part, it is directly

declared that "Thought as much constitutes the nature and essence of the soul, as extension that of the body." That is Descartes for himself; but here is Schelling for him: "This sum cogitans cannot be understood as though I were nothing but thinking, as though I were existent only in thinking, or as though thinking were the substance of my being. Thinking is only a determination or mode and manner of my being; nay, the *cogitans* has even only the meaning: I am in the *state* (*Zustand*) of thinking!"

2. Leibnitz

But inaccuracy to Descartes, let its source be where it may, is, strangely again somehow, relevancy to Leibnitz. This is so much so, indeed, that, both references considered, one is almost apt to suspect, if with some compunction for meanness, that this whole deliverance of Schelling's is conditioned by the substitution (on what motive so ever) of the wrong name of Descartes for the right name of Leibnitz.

Let me first here, however, advert a moment to what Schelling, in the same connection, holds of Kant. Kant's main objection to the Cartesian proof, he says (14), "rests on the incorrect conception that the argument runs thus: I find in myself the idea of the most perfect being, but now existence itself is a perfection, and so, consequently, just of itself existence is implied in the idea of the most perfect being." "I have already remarked," Schelling immediately subjoins, "that Descartes does not conclude in *this* wise," and he then repeats (about a "necessary" existence) his gloss or reading in question. Even so far I do not think that, with what we have before us, Kant will appear to have had altogether "an incorrect conception," or wholly to have failed "to hit the right point"; but it will clear matters to go a little further into what concerns the onto-

logical argument generally before we turn to the reference to Leibnitz.

3. The Argument

As we see, so far as Descartes is concerned, it all comes to "a clear and distinct idea in the mind," that an all-perfect being, God, is, exists—that existence, actual existence, is the inherent presupposition of his very essence. This is an appeal to an *idea* simply, and not strictly an argument, not strictly reasoning. Still, there is the inference involved, that existence, as being a perfection, belongs to what is all, or nothing but, perfection. This inference, however, were not the mere innate (i.e. *à priori*) idea to the same effect, would of itself suffice to rank the Cartesian proof with the proof of Anselm. Schelling is prompt to remark here (14) that Thomas Aquinas "most pointedly," *aufs bestimmteste*, "contradicted" Anselm. Anselm, however, is still credited, on the whole—rather than, and certainly in precedence of, Descartes—with having invented the so-called proof *ontological*. If Aquinas impugned it, his reason, probably, was like that of Descartes, in exception to the contrasting proof, the proof *teleological*. Both objections, namely, arose from tenderness to the glory of God. Descartes, as we know, would not, for his part, with his limited faculties, presume, profanely as it were, to enter into the teleological counsels of the Almighty; while Aquinas would know of nothing earlier certain, or more certainly certain, than the great God Himself: he can turn additionally in that reference, not, like Anselm, to the *à priori* (in precedence of God), but only to the *à posteriori* (in derivation from God).[1]

[1] "Write down—that they hope they serve God :—and write God first, for God defend but God should go before such villains!" As one sees, Aquinas only preceded Dogberry!

Anselm, then, does turn to the *à priori*; and he has in the main just a single thought, and it is this. What is in thought alone must be less than what is both in thought and also in existence; and the latter must, on the same terms, be greater than the former. Now, our idea of God is that of a being than whom nothing can be greater; God, then, must exist: for if he did not, a greater than he—greater *as actually existent*—might be, so that our idea, as being, in truth, *not* of the greatest, would contradict itself. As one sees, this, after all, is but the idea of Descartes: the very thought (in us) of God involves the existence of God. The proposition has given rise to strife enough; and, no doubt, the prevalent opinion is that it involves a fallacy. Impossibly, it is said, can any mere thought in the mind stand for, or be equal to, an actual existence: mere idealities are never realities. Still, what it comes to is this, As human beings, we *must* think existence into a first and one; but if truly we must so think, then truly we just think this first and one to be! Almost innumerable changes have been rung on this single idea; and they will be found to be pretty fully discussed in one of my Gifford lectures. I allude there to this remark of Bacon's: "The Scripture saith, 'The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.' It is not said, 'The fool hath *thought* in his heart.' So as he rather saith it by rote to himself, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be persuaded of it." Now, the common statement, and not an incorrect one, of the ontological argument is, "That it supports itself on this, that in the notion of God as the all-reallest being existence is implied, and that to think the notion of God and deny him existence is a contradiction." But that is just a more explicit way of saying what the fool "saith." The fool says there is no *God*; but if he means what he says—*God*, namely, then he simply contradicts himself.

Once again, it all comes to this, If it is true of thought as thought that it thinks the whole of existence into a first and one as its root, then that first and one, that root—God—*is*. It does not follow, however, that the level of that thinking is possessed by the innate idea of Descartes, and still less by the scholastic quibble,—at least in form, let it be in matter as it may,—the too seemingly external quirk of Anselm.

4. Leibnitz Again

But we have said that Schelling's whole account in this place of the ontological argument was relevant, not at all to Descartes, but certainly to Leibnitz. Leibnitz has conspicuously the references to "major premiss," "minor premiss," and the other such technical terms, which are no less conspicuously absent from Descartes, but which Schelling would quite as conspicuously intrude upon him. Nay, there is, to say so, conspicuously present in Leibnitz precisely such an "if" as one might be almost pardoned if tempted to regard as the suggestive prototype of that very conspicuous "*N.B.* if" of Schelling's own. Leibnitz, in a letter of 1710 to Bierling, has this: "It is certain, from the argument of Anselm, that God is, if only he is possible; but the demonstration is not perfect, because it tacitly presupposes something, namely, the real possibility of the divine nature"; and Schelling, as we have seen, has at least a sound of speech on similar lines when he says, "He (God) exists necessarily *N.B. if he exists*, but it by no means follows *that* he exists." Still, even if, by some fault (say) of memory, Schelling shall have transferred to Descartes what he could only have found in Leibnitz, and even if—even if the "if" of the last (Leibnitz) shall have led in any way to the "if" of the first (Schelling),

then this first (Schelling) must very certainly have only misunderstood that last (Leibnitz). A sentence or two will explain.

Leibnitz gives 45 in his *Monadologie* thus (I translate):—

"God alone, or the necessary being, enjoys this privilege, that he necessarily exists, if only there is possible a necessary being, and as nothing prevents the possibility of a necessary being (which, as such, is free from limits, involves neither any negation, nor, consequently, any contradiction); this alone suffices for the *à priori* cognition of the existence of God."

We have just seen these words already on the part of Leibnitz: "It is certain, from the argument of Anselm, that God is, if only he is possible; but the demonstration is not perfect because it tacitly presupposes something, namely, the real possibility of the divine nature." What immediately follows is this:—

"Ens ex cujus essentia sequitur existentia, si est possibile—(or just at once to translate)—A (or the) being from whose essence there follows existence, if it is possible, *i.e.* if it has essence, exists. (This is an identical axiom, standing in no need of demonstration.) But God is a (or the) being from whose essence there follows its existence (the definition); therefore God, if he is possible, exists (by necessity of the notion itself). Thus you perceive how the argument is brought to a certain primitive syllogism."

The "si modo est possibile," or "possibilis," is all, then, that, according to Leibnitz, requires to be added to the argument of Anselm in order to render it, as an argument, perfect. But it cannot at the same time escape notice that the addition in question must be only meant by Leibnitz to give to the argument a certain formal syllogistic completeness—a completeness, indeed, that is even already implicitly present; for Leibnitz himself immediately subjoins "ut certe est" (as he certainly is); and for his own preceding reasons that bear on matter, on "*essentia*"—freedom, namely, from limitation, negation, contradiction, etc. "Ergo Deus, si est possibilis, ut

certe est, hoc ipso existit (conclusio est in optima forma)." And it must be manifest to everyone here how very much the technical expression attributed by Schelling to Descartes really belongs. to Leibnitz. It cannot be said, however, that, with the rest, the "si est possibilis" was also transferred from Leibnitz to Descartes. No; for that point there is no special naming of Descartes: the transference, then, can be only represented, if represented at all, by Schelling's own imperious "*N.B. if.*"

5. THE "N.B. IF"

But, even in that respect, perhaps, Schelling is not so original as he may appear, or as he may have thought himself. Not only Nicolaus d'Autricuria, but Dr. Francis Hutcheson of Glasgow as well, seems to have anticipated him, even in as much as that. One of the condemned sentences of the former, which he was obliged to retract, ran thus: "Dum Deum concipimus, ut ens realissimum tantum, nescimus certe an tale ens existat (Though we conceive God as the reallest being, we know not certainly whether such a being exists)." It is precisely in regard to Descartes, again, that Hutcheson has this: "Only if there be any all-perfect nature is it to be inferred that it necessarily is; but it does not follow thence that there is any such nature" (*Synops. Metaphys.*, p. 116).

Passing so much, and returning to the matter of the gloss itself which Schelling, by his italics, would interpolate into his various expressions, "necessary," "semper," etc., it is to be allowed that the distinction which lies in these—the distinction according as the two words "necessary existence" are alternately italicised (*necessary* existence and necessary *existence*), is not without the hall-mark (such as it is) of its source.

It is a mean thing only to insinuate; but it is to be hoped that what we have just seen of Schelling in relation to Descartes and Leibnitz is to be understood as more than insinuation. And yet what is to be pointed to—Leibnitz with an *If*, namely, transferred to Descartes without an *If* (the *If*, too, being somewhat conspicuously used),—this is itself so mean that one must blush at any connection with it. May it not all be but a matter of casual forgetfulness? Schelling was a man of superior intellect from within, and he was a man of superlative acquirement from without—such a man is to be approached only with respect. Nevertheless, Schelling, his privileges apart, and but as a man among others, was, as every one knows who has followed his history, a very peculiar man, and every man with a call is, independent of his call, but an ordinarily peculiar man.[1] Self-estimation, pride, was deep and intense in him, and yet, like Lear, "he had ever but slenderly known himself": he could but leap to the goad. So unlike he was in that to Hegel, who was as Heraclitus in this, too, that he could say ἐδιζησάμην ἐμαυτόν, and that to him, whose whole life was but the effort to universalise himself, the γνῶθι σεαυτόν was the mandate of more than Delphic prerogative. Nor is it without a reflection hitherward that Schelling tells us, as we have partly seen already, that "Descartes, by what he broached besides in regard to the initiatives of philosophy, has been far less determinative, for the entire sequel of modern philosophy, than by his proposition of the ontological proof: we may say that philosophy is still engaged with the attempt to disentangle and resolve the misunderstandings to which this argument gave occasion." Where we are, too (p. 17), we have these words:—"This argument is now specially that which has been of

[1] This matter is itself a peculiar matter, and would take a volume.

the most determinative significance for the whole future of philosophy." It is so Schelling begins these references to Descartes; and when one remembers that, in Schelling's time, Kant was understood to have put said argumentation so thoroughly to the rout that it had become out of the question even to mention it; while it is also a remembrance that how Descartes began modern philosophy still determines it—with the light of these remembrances, I say, it is not unpardonable to suppose that Schelling is yielding to what is not unusual with him, a mere bias, namely, that suits his intentions for the moment.

What these intentions are cannot well be mistaken if, with what has gone before, we consider in conclusion so far this:—

> "With this critique of the Cartesian" (but really Leibnitzian) "argument, we grant now that, if not the existence, still the *necessary* existence of God is proved—and this Begriff is now properly that which has been of the most marked consequence for the whole future of philosophy."

That is what Schelling conceives he has brought the *à priori* argument up to; and, having once for all established the failure of Anselm, Descartes, and the rest any further, we are to understand that what we have now to see is his own success—his own contrasting success in an *à priori* proof not only of a necessary, but also of an actual existence of God.

6. Schelling Himself Here

But we may first consider one or two of Schelling's decisions otherwise in regard to Descartes' argument—the rather that it is the general interest before us that is concerned.

The single distinction that animates the "N.B. *if* it

exists" of Schelling is that the *idea* of the necessary constitution of an object is not tantamount to the actual *existence* of that object. This is the familiar "*Dass-Was*" of Schelling, as when he says:—

"The ground-thought of Hegel is that reason refers itself to the An-sich, the Wesen of things, whence it immediately follows that philosophy, so far as it holds of reason, only occupies itself with the *Was* of things, their *Wesen*. Reason has to do with the object in its *Inhalt*, its *An-sich*; but it has not to show that it *is*, for that is no longer the affair of reason, but of experience, . . . and reason, far from excluding experience, rather itself calls for it" (2, 3. 60–61). He had already said (x. 15) in the same strain, "A triangle gets no increase of perfection from the fact of existence, or if it did, then it must be granted us to conclude of the perfect triangle that it necessarily exists."

And thus, then, we are to suppose it intimated that, just as it is with the *Was*, the idea, of the triangle in regard of its *Dass*, its existence, so it is with the *Was*, the idea, of God in regard of the *Dass*, the existence of God. But is that so? Must an inference that concerns one idea equally concern also another? Because perfection in the idea of a triangle will not give it existence, must it be just so also with the perfection of the idea and the existence of God? Schelling himself (2, 1. 262) grants necessary existence to follow from the contingency and design in existence, but still only *if* it exists—God, that is, only exists necessarily *if* he exists. Is this only "That the contrary of every matter-of-fact," as Hume says, "is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction," etc? So it is with finites we know; but must it be so with the infinite? Either God does, or does not, exist. But if he does not exist, he could never necessarily exist. And so, a necessary existence that does not exist! surely that implies a contradiction—a contradiction that really is simply the result of a wilful turning of the back on the reasoning itself! At all

events, it is safe to say that the reasoners themselves concerned had conclusively in mind the *fact*, not the *kind*, of existence in God; and so, that the question is of, and the reasoning is to, the *fact* will bring all to its shortest issue.

What Descartes says is only this, that he has no clearer idea of the two right angles in the three angles of a triangle than of that of actual existence in God—and God is alone! There are many triangles, and a million things besides, but there is but one God—there is but one being of whom it is clear to us that actual existence in him cannot be separated from his idea in us. But observe—if you will look at it—to what a length Schelling is hurried in that last reference. Even the *contingency* of the world and the *design* of the world are no more for him than the *à priori idea*—what we are to accept is this: What *exists* infers *so much* (*a*)—This *so much* must be granted necessarily to exist (*b*)—*If* it exists (*c*)!!! (That is, both the *cosmological* and the *teleological* arguments are to be reduced to Schelling's *ontological* "If"!)

7. Schelling's own Argument

Schelling's object at bottom hitherto, then, has been to establish the fact that, in the hands of others, Anselm, Descartes, the ontological proof, as yet, for the *actual existence* of God has failed. This is the necessary premiss to the exposition of his own contrasting success. We have seen that Schelling found it advisable to have recourse to an alternate italicising of the two words necessary existence, according as they respectively determined the meaning. We may have reason in the sequel to lament not only that the same laudable practice had so far ceased, but also, and very much, perhaps, especially that it had not been extended to the little word *Seyn* (being), which, in Schelling's hands

presently, seems somehow to take on, occasionally, a somewhat perplexingly *shot* look. Examples in this reference we see at once in the passage (x. 17), with which Schelling elects to set out :—

"We distinguish in every existence (in allem Seyn)—

"(*a*) *Das was Ist* (*that* that *Is*), the subject of the Seyn, of the existence, or, as is also said, the Wesen.

"(*b*) The Seyn itself [the *Esse*, qualification], which relates itself as predicate to the what *is*, of which, indeed, I may say, quite generally, that it is the predicate as such, that which in every predicate, properly, is alone predicated. Nowhere, and in no possible proposition, is there anything else predicated than the Seyn [the qualifying Esse]. If, *e.g.*, I say, Phædo is well in health, what is predicated is a mode of organic, further of physical, finally of general Seyn ; or, Phædo is in love, a mode of gemüthlichen, of sensitive Seyn. But it is always das Seyn [the Esse] that is predicated. Now, it is free for me to think *das was Ist*, too, *that* that *Is*, alone or pure, *without* the Seyn [the Esse] which I may have previously predicated of it. But if I have so thought it, then it is the *pure* Begriff [the *pure* notion] that I have so thought—that in regard of which there is as yet nothing of a proposition or judgment, but just the mere Begriff (it is absurd to mix up the pure Begriff with the Seyn [the Esse] that is precisely additional to the Begriff, the predicate, namely). The subject is necessarily prior to the predicate (as indeed, in former usual logic, the subject was termed the antecedent, the predicate the consequent). *Das was Ist*, *that* that *Is*, is the Begriff, κατ' ἐξοχήν, it is the Begriff of all Begriffs, for in every Begriff I think only *that* that *Is*, not the Seyn."

Why, we may think here, is *Seyn* to be excluded from the very *Ist*, *Esse* from the very *est*, *Being* from the very *is*, precisely at the moment that asserts it! That Seyn, however, is (as Schelling means it), the predicate Seyn, not the subject Seyn, not the pure Phædo as himself alone, but only the Phædo as in health, in love, etc. That is what is meant as a proposition added, a judgment added. Schelling continues :—

"So far, now, as I think *that* that *Is—pure*, there is nothing that is in addition to the mere Begriff ; my thought is still secluded to

the pure Begriff; to *that* that *Is*, I cannot yet assign or attribute any Seyn [any predicate-Seyn]; I cannot say that it has a Seyn [an esse];—and yet it is not nothing, but very certainly withal no less something; it is precisely das Seyn [*the* being] itself, *αὐτὸ τὸ* ΤΟΝ, *ipsum Ens*—Seyn is still to it or for it in the mere Wesen [inner being], or in the mere Begriff; *it* is the Seyn [the being] of the Begriff itself; or it is the point where Seyn and Denken [being and thought] are [literally *is*] one. In this mereness, I *must* at least a moment think it."

Here we see that Schelling thinks the pure *subject* of Seyn, whereas we may remember, looking close, that Hegel—in his notorious Seyn und Nichts *ist* dasselbe—meant Seyn as pure *predicate*. He, then, who knows what Hegel was to Schelling at last, may suspect that "Seyn und Denken eins *ist*" to signify, with the context, this, That Schelling, subverting his detested rival's Seyn, will set his own in the place of it!

We have to understand, then, so far, that, in every proposition, it is the notion itself that is the main thing, that which, whatever may be said *of* it, is the *Is*, the thing that, specially and properly, now and always, and in the whole of the matter, *Is*. It is absurd, he says, to confound the pure Begriff, notion, subject, itself with that, the predicate, that is adventitious to it. In this way, we see that it is alone the pure Begriff, what has been called the subject, the Wesen—we see that it is this, the pure subject (not the predicate), that is to be refined away, into disappearance, as it were. Phædo is to have neither health, love, nor anything else. He is to be the pure Phædo. As Strato became so thin that, quite unobservedly, he *went out*; so we are to figure, Schelling's Phædo to pass—mira tenuitate—from Seyn into Denken, and yet not to "go out," but to hold of both. Phædo, so qualified, or rather indeed Phædo so unqualified—that is the point where "Seyn und Denken eins ist." And really, if we will but figure the position closely

enough, we shall find ourselves pretty free to agree with the conclusion so far. Surely a mere subject for predicates (but itself without any), a mere invisible line without a vestige of breadth,—surely that, by a very *mira tenuitas*, is quite as much thought as being, and quite as much being as thought. But here now comes the close, the *coup*, the *coup-de-théâtre*, the consummation, for which all that we have seen as yet has been only preparing:—

"But I cannot maintain it [the *Seyn* as a moment ago it (see last extract) was left]—I cannot maintain it in this abstraction; it is, namely, impossible that *what is* (*that* that *is*, *das was Ist*), of which I now know nothing further than that it is the beginning, the title for all that follows but is itself as yet nothing—it is impossible that what is the title, the presupposition, the beginning for all Seyn, for all being, that this not *also* "is"—this "*is*" being taken in the sense of *existence*, that is to say, of a being that is outside, too, of the *Begriff*."

There! we have it now—that is the way, the true way at last, the only way, to prove the actual *existence* that is wanted! Schelling himself cries:—

"And therewith the Begriff immediately converts, transforms itself for us—into its opposite, its contrary: we find what we had established as the *Beënt itself*, das *Seyende selbst*,—certainly *again*, now, *also* as the Beënt, the Seyende, but this time the Beënt, the Seyende, in a quite other—that is to say, expressly in the predicative, or, as we may likewise term it, *objective* sense (*gegenständlichen Sinn*); whereas we previously thought it as the Beënt, as the Seyende, only in the primitive sense (urständlichen Sinn). Here is the most perfect conversion of the subject into the object—as in the pure Begriff it was the mere, pure subject (suppositum, for these two expressions, again, are equivalent), or the pure *first* of being, pure Urstand des Seyns—so it is in immediate *consequence* of its Begriff (just by virtue of its Begriff to be the Beënt itself, the Seyende selbst)—so it is immediately before we can look round, the objectively Beënt, the objectively existent, the *gegenständlich Seyende*."

"*Here is the most perfect conversion of the subject into the object!*"

On these foundations Schelling now proceeds to build further:—

"But if we look closer at this objective Beënt, this *gegenständlich Seyende*, how will it seem to us? Manifestly as that that can not not-be, and consequently, as the necessarily, the *blindly*, Beënt. The blindly Beënt, accurately, is that which no possibility of itself has preceded itself. I act, *e.g.*, blindly when I do something without having previously conceived for myself its possibility. If the act foreruns the *thought* of the act, then this is a blind act, and equally so that existence (*Seyn*) which no possibility has preceded; which could never *not*-be, and *therefore* also never properly *be*; which rather forestalls its own possibility as such—such an existence is a blind existence (*Seyn*). It might be objected: but we have first spoken of *that* that *Is*, and characterised it as the *Prius*, as the First (the *Urstand*), that is, as the possibility of existence, the possibility des Seyns. Quite right; but we also directly added thereto, there is no keeping of it in this Priority, and therefore, although it is the Prius, still it is never *as* the Prius; the transition is an unpreventable one, it (the what is) is *an sich* (*in* itself), consequently there is not a moment's possibility that *what is* (*that* that *is*) should **not** be, —consequently not a moment's possibility to think it as **not being.** But that now, for which it is *impossible* not to be (quod non potest non-existere), for *it*, too, it is *never possible* to be—for every *possibility* to be implies also the possibility *not* to be—consequently that for which it is impossible *not* to be is neither ever in the possibility to be, and existence (das Seyn), actuality, precedes the possibility. Here, now, then, we have the idea, the notion, of the necessarily beënt, of the necessarily existent Being, and it is at once intelligible from this genesis of it, with what force it (the idea), as it were, throws itself upon consciousness, and takes from it every freedom. It is the idea, the notion, against which thought, the mind, loses all its liberty."

Since Schelling's words that closed the critique of Descartes in the present reference, what we have had under eye has been the matter of the three pages 17, 18, and 19 in the original; and it is not unworthy of being a little longer dwelt upon. No doubt, all through, there has been a very real lesson for us in metaphysical subtlety. That, in what concerns these so very difficult thoughts,

must have been so; while as for difficulty the words that conveyed them were probably found not one whit less vexatious of catch than the thoughts themselves.

Of the thoughts the course was to this effect, that while there is in all predication a subject of it, it is possible by successive strainings, as it were, to elutriate not only predication itself as predication, but even also the subject of it as the subject, in the one case into a predication ultimate and pure, and, in the other, into a subject ultimate and pure—a subject that shall *be*, that shall simply *be*, and no more than *be*—pure being, pure Seyn—eben das Seyn selbst, just being itself,—*αὐτὸ τὸ Ὄν*, ipsum Ens.

The conversion that follows now means that this pure subject, as yet only Begriff, as yet only mental, falls into reality, falls into existence outside of the mind even through its own pure predication, pure predication which it itself involves—shall we say, which it itself involves as—to say so—so much flesh of its own!

For the words, it is here perhaps that the chief difficulty comes in—in respect to those, namely, that concern this ens necessarium, that concern the *constitution*, as it were, of this ens necessarium. As regards subject and predicate, and the conversion itself, we shall grant it quite possible to think all this.

This is pure abstraction, and pure abstraction is quite possible for the mind that is, supposititiously, so prepared. But then this is not a First. This subject that —on terms of the ontological problem—is to be a first, is, after all, not, in any respect, possibly a First. All that predication is still before it—all that predication has been simply *assumed*! And with the assumption of predication there has been no less the necessary assumption of the subject and predicate of a proposition; which proposition, let it be even granted absolute, that is, in

its purity absolute, still it is but a residuum from elsewhere. Its subject, consequently, is not *à priori*, but just like everything else, a mere *à posteriori* product. What we have is but a *result*—a result of abstraction. What it all comes to is just that Seyn, existence, has been simply assumed; and Schelling has no more right —in fact, infinitely less right—to see in Seyn a subject of it, than Hegel, Nothing.

But, for the words, we shall, without a doubt, find our best illustration when we draw into consideration what concerns, as said, the *constitution* of the ens necessarium.

What comes first here is that Schelling calls that *ipsum ens* of his a "blind" ens; and as much as that, on the assumption that Schelling's *First* is rightly to be regarded as *the* First, must be allowed to pass as tropically in place. What is concerned, says Schelling, is that "that cannot not-be, and, consequently, the necessarily, the *blindly*, Beënt (das nicht nicht seyn Könnende und demnach das nothwendig, das *blind* Seyende)"; for what *blindly is* means what, unintroduced, unled up to, is just at once, to the fore, *there*,—as it were, *blindly*. For *blindly*, and in precisely the same association, we prefer to say *abstractly*. An absolute First cannot but be *abstract*. It is, as it were, at once into existence; there was no other before it, there is no other on any side of it,—for it there can be no question of another; it is alone and isolated; reason for its existence, apart from itself, there is none,—it is itself its own sole possibility, and its own sole actuality: and all that is to say that it is *abstract—blind*, if you will.

Now such *blind*, such *abstract*, is to be allowed to be a necessarily existent; and a necessarily existent is what could not but be, what, in Schelling's words, "could not *not*-be." And that refers, undoubtedly, to the very first prerequisite in place, a being, an existence, for which as

from elsewhere, cause there is none; and such a being, such an existence, is, very intelligibly, abstract: it is unpreceded by anything whatever. Such phrases, further, as "That that cannot *not*-be," "That for which it is impossible *not* to be," become presently intelligible to us when we realise their application as to something that always was and never was not. It is just that constitution, however, that necessitates on the part of the words describing it, involuntarily, an apparent contradiction, or a very real grammatical one. What never was not, for example, was never even possible; for, unpreceded by anything whatever, it was unpreceded by possibility itself. It is so Schelling conceives it. That blind ens of his did undoubtedly forerun and forestall its own possibility. It could never not be; and neither (so Schelling) could it ever properly be (es nie *nicht*-seyn und darum auch nie eigentlich seyn konnte). That, namely, for which it is impossible not to be—for that it is also never possible to be, and therefore is that for which it is impossible *not* to be, never also in the possibility to be (dem es *un*möglich ist nicht zu seyn—quod non potest non-existere—diesem ist es auch nie möglich zu seyn, also ist das, dem es unmöglich ist *nicht* zu seyn, auch nie in der möglichkeit zu seyn). These, no doubt, are very extraordinary expressions. Ordinary speech, at all events, seems directly set at nought by them. We have named the reason for them; but it is a question, for all that, whether they are allowable. We are given to understand, for example, that there is something of which it is possible to say that it "could never *not*-be," at the same time also that it is equally possible—and for that very reason—to say of it that it "could never properly *be*"! What is "in the impossibility ever *not* to be" is equally also "never in the possibility to *be*"! We have not inadvertently misarranged the

—in grammar—possibility to be! Not only its necessity is a fact, but its actuality is a fact: *aqual. à fortiori*, its possibility is a fact.[1] Is it more than an abuse of language to say that a thing, because it has a necessity to be, is at once neither possible to be nor impossible not to be? Of course, the whole paradox springs from the abstractness of the existence supposed. If it was unpreceded by possibility, it might be permissible to say that it was "never in the *possibility* to be," or even that it was "never *possible* for it to be"; but was it not on the whole "to play it rather low down" to say of what could "never *not*-be" that, just for that very reason, "it could also never properly *be* (darum auch nie eigentlich *seyn* konnte)"? Surely that at least is an expression that, placed as it is, must be allowed to exceed every *possible* bound of any equitable *possibility*—an expression that transcends *possibility* itself.

At all events, the situation is so peculiar that one would have liked from Schelling a little humour over it rather than that apparent earnest! Seriously, however, it is also to be said—indeed, it has been said already—that, in the whole process of that abstract, absolute subject, it may be ours to find an excellent lesson *metaphysically to whet*: nor yet without gains as regards the problem in hand. We have learned, for example, that a First must be abstractly a First; and it [illegible] *ot* be: it is necessarily existent; and it holds [illegible] lds, the ideal *and* the real.

[illegible] wever, the product of demonstration is not [illegible] ing, God—not yet God as popularly believed

[1] not Aristotle himself tell us (23*a*, 16–18), "that, since [illegible] follows the universal, the possible follows the [illegible] lways, as everybody knows, the greater contains the

phrases: in themselves, and in their order, and in their import, they are Schelling's own. He does, indeed, as though in explanation, add once, "For every *possibility* to be implies in it likewise the possibility *not* to be." That is very true, we say, of a thing that is only potential, only possible; but what of the impossible? There is certainly an oscillation of alternatives in the *possible*; but there is no oscillation in the *im*possible—no parting of the ways in it, no looking right *or* left in it. What is only possible will remain so till doomsday, or for ever after. Possibility is the eternal oscillation. Its demur of alternatives, however, is, in the impossible, "summarily truncated." Ought not Schelling here to have been less in earnest with these alternatives? or with the general antithesis of possible and impossible at all? Abstractly used, both expressions are absolutely meaningless. If, in suggestion of his own possibility, Schelling thought at all of the possibility of Leibnitz (not that he could do so if thinking only of Descartes), it is a pity that he did not think also of Leibnitz's "essentia." Leibnitz knew that such terms—possible, impossible—would have no relevance to God unless God had an "essentia" that should give them, so to speak, *purchase*; and such "essentia" he did find in the *nature* of God as free from limitation, negation, contradiction, etc. (Of course, we are concerned with the reasoning of Leibnitz only so far.)

Certainly *necessity*, not *possibility*, constitutes the *being* of the blind ens; but are we to deny for this ens, even by reason of the necessity of its existence, the very *possibility of its existence*? If it was possible to premise for this blind ens, negatively, an impossibility *not* to be, was it not equally possible—and by no more than the force of syntax—to premise for it, positively, a literal possibility to be? *Im*possibility *not* to be is certainly

—in grammar—possibility to be! Not only its necessity is a fact, but its actuality is a fact: *argal, à fortiori*, its possibility is a fact.[1] Is it more than an abuse of language to say that a thing, because it has a necessity to be, is at once neither possible to be nor impossible not to be? Of course, the whole paradox springs from the abstractness of the existence supposed. If it was unpreceded by possibility, it might be permissible to say that it was "never in the *possibility* to be," or even that it was "never *possible* for it to be"; but was it not on the whole "to play it rather low down" to say of what could "never *not*-be" that, just for that very reason, "it could also never properly *be* (darum auch nie eigentlich *seyn* konnte)"? Surely that at least is an expression that, placed as it is, must be allowed to exceed every *possible* bound of any equitable *possibility*—an expression that transcends *possibility* itself.

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So far, however, the product of demonstration is not yet to Schelling, God—not yet God as popularly believed or known.

[1] Why, does not Aristotle himself tell us (23*a*, 16–18), "that, since the particular follows the universal, the possible follows the necessary." Always, as everybody knows, the greater contains the less.

"The first thing in the idea of the blindly existent," he says, "assuredly is that to *what* it is, it is without all freedom. . . . But what, as against its own *being*, is without freedom, *that* is *absolutely* unfree. . . . Were he only the blindly existent, God would not be God. . . . *As* God, he is at the same time that which can cancel its own—of its own self independent—being, transform its necessary being into a contingent, namely, into a *self-set* one so that *au fond* it always remains such necessity, but not so, nevertheless that the effective actual being of God were merely this necessary being. . . . In the idea of God there is absolute freedom of will and act. . . . Otherwise he were unable to move, stir, go out from himself, from his being, in order to set, realise another."

So, "the question is only," says Schelling, "how this antinomy is to be resolved: to show this is the affair of philosophy itself"; and it is thus he leaves it.

In leaving it, too, let Schelling have suggestively expatiated as he may, perhaps he has left more for his reproach than want of humour, and even in regard of that same possible-impossible of his. Was not his conclusion there but a stumble back again into that very potentiality which Aristotle had cogently demonstrated to be impossible as a First? That "blind ens" of his, it could neither be nor not be; and so it neither was nor was not! Necessary actuality itself reduced itself, by an involuntary *felo de se*, into a mere contingent potentiality! When one reflects, too, that he had before him, for a good half-century, the scroll of a perfect veteran "in the art of converting and transforming" categorical (not trigonometrical!) formulas, one wonders that Schelling could have turned for assistance to his own necessary existent one *away from* the category of science and *to* the conception of popular belief. Another had a *Sesame* whereby to open the rock of necessity into the infinitude of free-will and all the treasures of the Begriff; but Schelling could not even see that what has its necessity within itself is sufficient for itself, is without dependence on any other, and so—free!

CHAPTER III

1. The Problem of a First

But now we may remind ourselves that, in regard to our general problem of a First, there was still question of difficulty even with suggestion of Thought, νοῦς itself, as that first.

In view, then, of our more immediate general theme, the problem of a First, it is evident that we are beset, in whatever way we take it, on all sides, with the most uncompromising steeps. There are those who, deciding on nature as a First, lead the flock at present; but they can but envy the faith lavished on them by their own innocent sheep. Marching triumphantly enough,—even vain-gloriously enough, some of them,—at the head as they do, presently they falter, too, as taken diaphragmatically at times with the thought—But how did all that come there? They fall suddenly sick, I say, and they falter under the sense even of the *natural* before them that is the *supernatural*; but a shout of the innocents from behind warns them of where they are, and they resume their countenance of the march with a kick, this kick, It is mere "rubbish" thinking of any origin at all! Of the difficulties of God as a First we have already seen suggestions. The more our wonder grows and glows under the immensity of a God, not the less, but all the more, also, it grows and glows under the incomprehensibility of his *Whence?* his *How?* his *Why?* and his *What?*

Nor is it different with Thought as Thought. To the vast majority of human beings at present, indeed, the mere proposition, of Thought as a First, is meaningless. Thought where there is nothing to think of—Thought before there is anything to think of—that is nonsense! Still, if even with *nothing*, we cannot get rid of the *something* from which it is but the reflection, so, with a "blind ens," we can only come to the idea of eyes.

An object that is not a subject is a null. A creation that does not see itself, know itself, is recreant, miscreant. To see, then, to know, then, is the ***End***; and the ***End*** is the ***First***! Nay, to a logic itself that is a logic, the first dot is at once also the first thought: not a move on the board that is unaware! Besides, thought at least *is*; thought is an *actuality*; thought is *in rerum natura*: and so we are at least bound to inquire into *what* it is; and the *what* may lead to a *how* or a *why*.

Socrates always insists on us telling *what* a thing is; and so it may be well for us to tell what Denken as Denken, what thought as thought, just *is*. We can tell what sensation, perception, memory, imagination, or even higher, what apprehension, judgment, reasoning, *just are*; but can we do the same thing by thought? Can we really tell what thought *just is*?

2. The Ratio

Now, the strange thing is that just what I have got singly and specially to declare here is, that the whole of philosophy, the whole series of philosophies in time, have within them no one question whatever, but this of thought. In simple and good truth philosophy asks, and has, in fact, never at any time asked ought else than—what is thought?

It may come somewhat as a *surprise* to a good many

of us, something of a *revelation* to not much fewer of us, if I say, Thought is the ratio between "*I*" and "*Me*," or, Thought is the ratio that is implicitly within the "*I*" itself. It is just this proposition, however, that I hope to substantiate and, beyond all cavil, prove.

I have talked of the world elsewhere as having been "befooled" by the system of Kant, and have asked, "Where, according to this system, is there a single truth in the whole huge universe?" I am still of the same mind as to what in that reference is concerned. *Action* apart, or apart what *morally* and *legally* is *right*, and leaving what is *æsthetical* wholly aside, I know not that there is anywhere any *truth* accessible to Kant. To him, namely, in consequence of his findings under his three rubrics in regard to (1) *Time* and *Space*, (2) the *Categories*, and (3) the *Ideas*, the entire world of *Knowledge* is but as a soap-bubble between two wholly unknown and merely supposititious *x's*—the *x* of an unknown and supposed Thing-Initself on one side for *Sensation*, and the *x* of an unknown and supposed *Supreme Being* (Thing-Initself) on the other side for *Belief*. Call the second not *x* but *y*, then Kant's world is but a soap-bubble *a* between an *x* and a *y*.

Nevertheless, I say, too, that the whole of philosophy that deserves the name since Kant is so absolutely due to Kant that it can properly and comprehensively receive no other name than his. Fichte has worked, Schelling has worked, Hegel has worked—each of them has worked, no one of them has worked but—in the quarry of Kant. There is no product in Fichte, there is no product in Schelling, there is no product in Hegel, that is not to be named—*Kantian*. Fichte's philosophy, Schelling's philosophy, Hegel's philosophy—each of these, in accurate and precise name,

is Kantian philosophy. And with Kant and these we have in modern times all—all that is capital;—gratefully counting in, as well, an introductory few, and leaving prattle individually to the irresponsible rest.

We cannot say that there is any particular *stratum* in the general section of Kant which has not been tapped and turned to service—philosophy *and* science, idealism *and* realism (the empirical), gnostic *and* agnostic, sobriety *and* subtlety, or even super-subtlety and the spectral; still, the main *stratum* that has been so used—and what is, in point of fact, the main—must be acknowledged to be that which contains the twelve beds of the Categories. Now, what do these twelve beds start from—what is the original principle of them to which they all refer? We have this from Hegel:[1]—

"The Critical philosophy has it in common with Empirical science to regard *experience* as the *sole* ground of our cognitions; which cognitions, however, are to it not truths, but only perceptions of appearances. . . . As the special source of the notions of the understanding, this philosophy assigns *the original identity* of the Ego in thought (im Denken)—(the transcendental unity of self-consciousness). . . . The complex of sensation and perception, in that the Ego refers it to itself, and unites it within itself, as in a single cognition (pure apperception), is in this way brought into identity, into an original nexus. The particular modes of this nexus are the pure notions of the understanding, the Categories."

Kant, at first, expresses himself so depreciatingly of the Ego as in any sense an *entity* that one cannot escape a feeling of distinct and difficult discrepancy, when one finds the same Kant dwelling, with so much breadth of emphasis, on perfectly the same Ego, apparently, but now as the all-indispensable *unity of apperception*. Nevertheless, when one gives a thorough consideration to the whole supplementary deduction of the Categories which the second edition of the *Kritik of Pure Reason* extends to us, one

[1] *Encyc.*, i. 85, 89, 90.

will be apt to conclude that one has not gone very far wrong if one has even named said "modes of nexus," functions of the unity of apperception, and functions therefore of the Ego itself. That is precisely what we wish to bring it to here. To Kant, the Categories are in reality, or at least implicitly, nothing but modes, functions of, or derivations from, the unity of the Ego. That they were such to Fichte is but the single express declaration of his text. Somewhat of a preliminary light of support may be thus thrown on what is our starting proposition and our cardinal point. Thought is the ratio between "I" and "Me"; or thought is the ratio that is implicitly within the "I" itself. As such, indeed, we may even say that it is proprio Marte, the *Ratio* — *the* Ratio — the *absolute* Ratio. Observe, too, that it is a ratio *between*, a ratio *within*; and that already will differentiate it from much.

3. The Ratio continued

But let it be characterised as it may, still we may ask, the ratio of what? Why, then, placed where we have placed it, or as we have placed it, it is the Ratio of Subject and Object.

But this at once grates, this at once almost shocks, repels. One has heard so much in these latter days of subject and object, and of what in this connection is only meaningless or worse, that the impulse of the moment is to turn away in disgust. If one is to hear, again and again, only repetition of that German "clotted nonsense," then one has no hope. And here we have not only "subject and object," but *Ratio* of subject and object! How are we to understand that—in all the world, how possibly realise that? Object! All is an object—the word conveys to us only a vacuum, only what is indefinite

—certainly *magni* nominis umbra! And subject? Subject as subject is not a whit better,—it is, again, a word only of an infinite reference.

Still, the latter word ought easily to have more of individuality and singleness of positive meaning for us.

The subject that is here meant is simply the "I," and you yourself are "I." You say of yourself "*I*," and when you say of yourself "I," you mean that you are then and there the subject. But I, too, when I say of myself "I," mean precisely the same thing—the same thing that you mean; and he, too, when he says of himself "I," means precisely the same thing that we both mean. In short, when I say "I," when you say "I," when he says "I," there is but a single *I* between us. Let us call it x, then this x does not in the slightest differ in either of the three cases: it is absolutely the same in all of them. Every man is "I," and all of us are "I." The question who?—who is it?—so put to any subject—to God himself—can only be answered by "I." To his own self—and we desire to say it without profanity—God himself can only be "I." He, indeed, it is who has said, "I AM THAT I AM."

4. THE RATIO CONTINUED

What all this may come to in the end we shall not say now. We would only emphasise, so far, what the bare word "I" means—certainly, in the first instance, even grammatically so.

And even so, "I" is the universal subject—"I" is *the* subject,—throughout all space and throughout all time there is but one "I."

This one "I" is—*as* "I"—one and the same identical "I"—it is one and the same *self*-identical "I"—it is *the* self-identical "I."

But what does that mean? Is there any "I" that is not the self-identical "I"? or let us just put it: Is there any "I" that is not *a* self-identical "I"?

But whatever is self-identical is but the same thing twice. When I say to myself "I," I simply confront myself with myself—when I say to myself "I," I mean, as it is said, "Me"; but such *Me*, grammar apart, is no more than "I." "Grammar apart," we say; but, inessential, unsubstantial, as it is, that mere *Me* of grammar introduces and makes overt the most penetrating, exhaustive, and ecumenical of distinctions. "I" as "I" is subject; but "Me" as "Me" is object. When I say "I" to myself, I mean *Me*. *I* (subject) mean *Me* (object).

Now that is the *Ratio*; that is *the* Ratio.

And the allegation is that the Ratio is Thought—the allegation is that the Ratio is Thought *as* Thought.

> "My own ratio fills me, which, secerned,
> Apart from me, is no more me, but mine—
> The world:
> One absolute proportion is the whole."[1]

5. Self-Consciousness

"*My* own ratio fills *me*." And what does that mean, but that the filling of self-consciousness ("me") is precisely, expressly, accurately, the Ratio in question? What constitutes and makes up self-consciousness—its stock, its matter, its exact content—is the Ratio of Subject and Object.

"A fulcrum was found in the nature of self-consciousness. Till self-consciousness acts, no one can have the notion 'I'—no one can

[1] From "I Am That I Am," in *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* for October 1877; reprinted in *Saved Leaves*.

be an 'I.' In other words, no one knows himself an 'I,' feels himself an 'I,' names himself an 'I'—is an 'I,' until there be an act of self-consciousness. In the very first act of self-consciousness, then, the 'I' emerges, the 'I' is born; and before that it simply was not. But self-consciousness is just the 'I,' self-consciousness can be set identical with the 'I': the 'I,' therefore, as product of self-consciousness, is product of the 'I' itself. The 'I' is self-create, then! 'I' start into existence, come into life, on the very first act of self-consciousness. 'I,' then—('I,' so to speak, was not an 'I' before)—am the product of my own act, of my own self-consciousness. Of course, I am not to figure my body and concrete personality here, but simply the fact that without self-consciousness nothing can be an 'I' to itself, and with the very first act of self-consciousness 'I' begins. . . . Said self-consciousness is figured, too, not, so to speak, as subjective (as possessed by some one individual), but as objective and general, as substantive and universal."

That is an extract from the *Secret of Hegel* (ed. 2, pp. 87, 48); and the general interest concerned is so much in connection with the subject of that work, that we shall venture to quote from it, still further in illustration, a considerable number of passages of a like relative import.

CHAPTER IV

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS—THE EGO

HERE, in this chapter, these passages follow :—

"The Idea is Thought, self-identical Thinking ; self-identical because in its own nature the Idea is two-sided—an objective side is, as it were, exposed and offered to a subjective side, and the result is the return, so to speak, of the Idea from its *other*, which is the objective side, into its self or subjective side, as satisfied, gratified, and contented Knowledge" (*Secret of Hegel*, p. 22).

"Cogito ergo Sum. That is, Thought is ; it has come to be, it simply *is*—as yet, however, only *in* itself : there is as yet only blank self-identity—it can only say *is*, rather than *am*, of itself, or to itself" (37, 38).

"This is just a description *in abstracto* of Self-consciousness. The Ego is first unal simplicity,—that is, unal or simple negativity ; but just, as it were, for this very reason (that is, to know itself and be no longer negative, or because it finds itself in a state of negativity) it becomes self-separated into duality—it becomes a duplication, a duad, the units of which confront each other, in the forms of Ego-subject and Ego-object ; and then, again, this very self-separation, this very self-duplication, becomes its own negation—the negation of the duality, inasmuch as its confronting units are seen to be identical, and the antithesis is reduced, the antagonism vanishes. This process of self-consciousness has just to be transferred to the All, the Absolute, the Substance, to enable us to form a conception of unal negativity of Spirit passing into the alienation of external nature, finally to return reconciled, harmonious, and free into its own self.

"The *intermedium* is the first step in the divine process (the phase of universality, latent potentiality being first assumed) ; it is reflection into its ownself, and as such only and no more, it is the awakening of consciousness, the kindling, the lighting, the flashing

up of the Ego, which is pure negativity as yet. First, the Ego was only *in* or *at* itself, everywhere in general and nowhere in particular,—that is, latent only, potential only (the formless infinite, indefinite nebula); then comes reflection of this into itself or on to itself, and this reflection is a sort of medium, an element of union, a principle of connection between self and self. In this stage the previously indefinite comes to be for itself; that is to say, in the physical world it is a finite, circumscribed, individual entity, and in the metaphysical a self-consciousness. . . . An Ego in consciousness: Ego is immediate to Ego, focus to focus; the mediacy then leads only to a condition of immediacy. Process is no prejudice to unity, nor mediacy to immediacy; it is a one, a whole, an absolute, all the same" (51).

"From the position that thought is the all and the prius, it follows that thought must contain in itself a principle of progression or movement. Thought's own nature is, first, position; second, opposition; and third, composition. It is evident that, however we figure a beginning of thought, in God or ourselves, it must possess a mode of progression, a mode of production, and that is absolutely impossible on a principle of absolutely simple, single unal identity. The *first*, then, though unal, must have separated into distinctions (opposites, contraries); and these by union, followed again by disunion and reunion *ad infinitum*, must have produced others till thought became the articulated organon which it is now. Reunion, evidently, is a step as necessary as separation" (58).

"We have been desperately hunting the whole infinite, unreachable heaven for an absolute, which, folded up within us, smiled in self-complacent security at the infatuation of its very master. Or what we wanted lay at the door; but to and fro we stepped over it, vainly asking for it, and plunging ourselves bootlessly into the far forest" (59).

"God abstractly is the mere empty word, the infidel God; he is true only as concrete in Christianity, the God-Man" (64).

"Every 'I' is just an 'I,' and so we can throw aside the idea of subjectivity, and think of the absolute 'I': but the absolute 'I' is *Reason*. Reason is ascribed to every man as that which constitutes his Ego; we can thus conceive Reason as *per se*, as independent of this particular subject and that particular subject, and as common to all. We can speak of Reason, then, as now not subjective but objective" (88, 89).

"Subjectivity, however, is the principle of central energy and life: it is the Absolute Form" (112).

"Kant's theory of perception, a theory in which all the three moments of the notion have place: the subsumption of the particular, namely, under the universal to the development of the singular;—(and this is the notion, this is self-consciousness)" (134).

"The notion, the logical notion, the notion as notion, is itself a reciprocity, and the ultimate reciprocity of universality, particularity, and singularity" (139).

"Such, indeed, is the inner nature, the inner movement, the rhythm of self-consciousness itself; and self-consciousness is the prius of All" (140).

"The notion (self-consciousness in its simplest statement) is the one soul, the one spirit—which is life—vitality itself—and the only life—the only vitality" (142).

"The movement of the notion: that, certainly, is the ultimate nerve of thought. This is the nerve of self-consciousness; and self-consciousness is the absolute. Self-consciousness is now identified with the notion: we must now suppose self-consciousness the absolute. Self-consciousness necessarily, and of its own self, is, and is *what* is. Self-consciousness is its own foundation of support, and its own *prius* of origination. Self-consciousness, being but thought, requires evidently no foundation to support it: notions of a foundation on which to support it, or of a prius to which to attach it, are manifestly inapplicable to it. It is *the* necessity. Since there is a universe, something must have been necessary. Now, this something is just self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is the necessity to be. It is in the nature of self-consciousness that it should be its own cause, and its own necessity, and its own world. Thought is a necessity, and the only necessity, and thought is self-consciousness. All that is exhibits in its deepest base the type of self-consciousness, the type of thought.

"Thought or self-consciousness cannot be impersonal: thought or self-consciousness always implies a subject. Why hesitate to name it God? The self-consciousness of the universe is the divine self-consciousness and not the human" (160, 161, 163.)

"The notion, in fact, is the absolute universal of thought, the primal or ultimate nerve, which is the primitive and original form. It is *causa sui* and *principium sui*. The ego is, firstly, the universal; it is identity, it is immediacy. The ego, secondly, surveys itself; that is, it gives itself, or becomes to itself, the *par*ticular, the difference, the discernment, the reflection. The ego, thirdly, returns from survey of itself with increase of knowledge; that is, returning into itself (the universal) from or with the particular, it does not just

resume its old identity, but is now the singular, which is identity, in diversity, immediacy in reflection, the universal in the particular. This is but the form and movement of self-consciousness as self-consciousness, of the ego as ego" (167, 170, 174, 175).

"The notion is the *à priori* synthetic judgment. This is the pulse of self-consciousness; this is the nerve of the ego" (190).

"To perceive that Apprehension itself (or Apperception or the Ego), perfectly generally expressed, constitutes the notion" (191).

"The ultimate principle is the pure negativity; and even such is ego as ego, or self-consciousness as self-consciousness" (200).

"The three cognitive faculties are but the three moments of the notion" (204).

"This evolution *of* thought's own self *to* thought's own self, what is it but the universe? Thus is it that thought is the pure negativity (as negative of all other), and, to its own self, *sets* is own negative—which is the object" (353).

"Thought is the prius of all" (356).

"We can conceive *what* is as the one identical, infinitesimal spore, whose vibration is its difference—and that is the all of thought as *exhibited*. What is the universe if not the one absolute *Voice* inflecting itself into its involved *voculations*—the absolute articulation of the absolute *one*—and that *one* is just thought: thought's own native articulations constitute the all of things" (387).

"The notion is the vital heart of all, and for the notion self-consciousness is but another name" (720).

"The principle of self-consciousness contains within itself both *difference* and *identity*, and a little reflection will make it plain that there can be no possible explanation of this world without a principle that contains both elements. The origin of *difference* in *identity* is the point and focus of the whole problem; but we have that at once in self-consciousness. . . . I, too, like other philosophers, would like to explain existence; but what does that mean? Evidently, I must find a single principle, a single fact *in* existence, that is adequate to all the phenomena *of* existence, to all the *variety* of existence; and this principle, while adequate to all the variety of existence, while competent to reduce into its own *identity* all the *difference* that is, must bring with it its own reason for its own self, its own necessity, its proof that it is, and it alone is, that which could not *not* be. . . . The constitutive movement of self-consciousness is the idealisation of a particular (the object) through a universal (the thought) into a singular (the subject); or it is the *realisation* of a universal through a particular into a singular. . . .

We would find an explanation of all that is in some *actual constituent* of all that is. . . . Self-consciousness is in the world of facts. . . . Self-consciousness is a fact, it is something *in rerum natura*, a principle actually existing" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Law*, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14).

CHAPTER V

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

... limited to those in the last extracts is an ... which is generally assumed to be possessed by ... and not by philosophy at all. For it is ... too much to say that the word philosophy, ... current though it be, has still for the most ... very vague and indefinite meaning. Science, ... explains to us all that we see there around us. ... is, as I suppose is generally assumed to go ... saying that we possess what is called civilisa- ... science—so far at least as that extends—in ... rational life in a finally inexplicable endless- ... Science, too, has principles—truths that found ... structures of knowledge, but which, for all that, ... to the plainest. Now, no doubt, it is that ... philosophy, in current opinion, has hitherto ... And so, one may have been apt to speculate in ... were philosophy seen to grow from a *Fact*, to ... *Fact*—a single principle—a single principle *in* ... *re*, that would give intelligibleness, certainty, ... security to every further progress, to every ulterior ... —were philosophy this, and if philosophy did ... would it not be generally seen into at last, and ... not receive at last that confidence on the part ... bulk of mankind which is at present denied it, and ... so far is reserved for science alone?

Now, it is this which has been at least broached in

some of our last citations; and certainly, if the Ego—Ego as Ego—can be allowed to constitute a single ground-fact or principle, as, say, heat is, or light is, or gravitation is, which fact or principle is capable of being operated on to the extrusion and extraction of a whole system of explanatory and indubitable truth—if I say the Ego, Ego as Ego, can be so regarded, is not the thing done—is it not now for philosophy itself to regard itself as, at long and last, science, simply science?

But now, the absolute self-identity, the single unit that alone founds and grounds—that alone forms and composes—that alone constitutes the infinite resultant compound of this whole vast universe—that single unit is the Ego, simply Ego as Ego. Not that the evolution in proof can be, as those in regard of heat, light, gravitation, etc., in its kind physical. The Ego is not itself physical as these are. It certainly is in rerum natura; but, just as it is in rerum natura, or according to the way in which it is in rerum natura—only so is it possible that it can be treated. The necessity is this, that the single principle of the Ego should be so operated on as to develop to reason its situation in the universe. To all philosophy, to all that is truly philosophy, it is the single question of the universe that is alone the interest: the *what* of it, the *why* of it, the *whence* of it, and the *whither* of it. Man, in that he is of *sense*, is finite: but man, in that he is of *thought*, is a spirit and infinite. So it is that, if he has his week-day of work, he has not less his Sabbath-day of religion. And so it is also that, if he has his scientist to minister to the commodity of the finite, he is not without—never has been without—never will be without—his philosopher to minister to the necessity of the infinite. So, then, as it is to the philosopher and not to the scientist that the development of the principle of the Ego falls, the method

of that development cannot be the physical method of the latter, but can only be the metaphysical method of the former. And yet the Ego as Ego is a principle in rerum natura. It is the ratio of the I and the Me in the Ego that is Thought, and it is Thought that is the foison of the universe. Thought is the business proper of self-consciousness, and the ratio between the I and the Me of self-consciousness—it is that that is the *bite* of the Ego. I as I is the subject, and Me as Me is the object; but both are identically the same. This, then, is the primitive relation—the unit of what is: the unit of what it is to think; and the unit of what it is to be. But, plainly, this unit, or the whole idea of this unit, is not only a *notion* in its *identity*, but it is a *judgment* in its *difference*,—nay, more, it is a *syllogism* in its *totality*, the reflexion (or reflection) of the Me back again into the I, with restoration of the whole, of the All that is. And what is this but Logic? The conjunct act of Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reason! And with this before us we may well repeat here from the "I Am That I Am."

> "Yea, I am one;
> But my own ratio fills me, which, secerned
> Apart from me, is no more me, but mine . . .
> One absolute proportion is the whole,
> One sole relation . . .
> *I* Am, I *Am*, I Am That I Am . . .
> Be thou but Me . . .
> Enjoy
> Thou me, and let my will be thine alone;
> The one is many, and the many one.
> Herein is peace divine and the great life
> That is the all."

2. The "*Voice*"

The whole will be found singularly in place here, and singularly illustrative. That of the "Voice," too, is

excellently illustrative. The conception, I have said, "sounds better in German"; and I have ventured to express myself in a German word or two: "Was ist, ist eine Stimme," etc.—What is, is a Voice; abstract, however, this voice is only *in* itself; but it must also be *for* itself or *as* itself; and to be *for* itself or *as* itself, it must *distinguish* itself; and that is, give itself, as constitutive of it, its native series and system of notes." Now, that is exactly as the Ego with its movement into a series and system of notes of its own, which are existence as existence, which are the universe.

And here it suggests itself to consider what is the precise nature of that very peculiar relation which obtains between the voice and its register, or between the Ego and its so-called system of notes. When we see smoke we surmise fire; and we know that the German Herbart has generalised as much as this into the sentence: So much *Schein* (appearance), so much *Seyn* (reality); at the same time that there is the common brocard, de non apparentibus et de non existentibus, eadem est ratio. And there can be no conclusion in the circumstances but that whatever *is* must also *seem*: whatever *is* must *double* over or *out*. That is just what we see in the case of the voice and its notes, or in the case of the Ego and its notes. Here it is the voice, the Ego, that is the *Seyn*, Being; while, in either case, the notes are but the *shine*, the show, the seeming. The Germans call this world the *Erscheinung*, the Appearance, and that comes to the same thing. If we think of it, the notes of the voice are but individual and finite; and as but transitory, they perish and pass. On the other hand, in such position the voice itself can be figured as infinite: it can go on piping for ever an actual infinitude of notes. The *Seyn*, then, the *be*ing, that which *is*, is always the *reality*; whereas the *shine*, the show, manifest as it may, and

manifest what it may, is but *temporary appearance*. No doubt, it *manifests*; no doubt, it always manifests. But even so, it is always only secondary and never prime. Let it manifest what it may, it itself (the *shine*) is but vicarious, and can never be anything else than vicarious. Now, that is a very curious duplication; and it is a very curious relation that lies between the sides of it. For what is the effect of the one, and what does the other involve? The effect is this, and what is involved is this—that the manifestation, the appearance, the shine, as always only secondary and vicarious, is also always only so far *false*! It is always only *for another*; it is never *for itself*: it itself is never the *it*—the *it* that, as manifested, or not manifested, is alone the *it* concerned, the truth, the reality—the truth that *is*, the reality that *is*. Another reflexion of the situation is this, that concerns the German word Erscheinung. This word, in ordinary usage, as we have just seen, means simply the world without, simply what is in evidence, in appearance around us,—this word, in which, according to the genius of the language, the first part of it, the *Er*, has the force of denoting that what is in hand is the effecting, the making good of something through the second part of it, the *scheinung*, namely,—this word, I say, so regarded, can only represent a *shining through* of the *it*, of the *it* that *is*, the truth that *is*, the reality that *is*; and that being so, it itself (the shine) can be no *it*, no truth, no reality, but only what is no more than representative, figurative, or even, it may be, merely *indicative* of the *it*, the truth, the reality. With this commentary, our *Erscheinung*, then, is but a shine or show *from*; and so the *from*, as only pointing *to* what *shines through*, is alone substantial.

CHAPTER VI

Further Illustration

What we have brought forward from the *Secret of Hegel* forms a considerable body of evidence, and it applies to the year 1864—(I presented a friend with an "early copy" of the book on the Christmas Day of that year). One other quotation I should like to add as from a paragraph that must have been one of the last written then. It is from p. xlvi of the Preface, and runs thus:—

"He has been enabled, through Kant, to perceive that the conditions of a concrete, and of every concrete, are two opposites: in other words, he has come to see that there exists no concrete which consists not of two antagonistic characters, where, at the same time, strangely somehow, the one is not only through the other, but actually is this other."

We have seen this very accurately illustrated by the two moments of Quantity. Continuity is impossible without Discretion—Continuity implies Discretion—Continuity, so far, *is* Discretion: but, equally again, Discretion is impossible without Continuity—Discretion implies Continuity—Discretion, so far, *is* Continuity. Nor is it otherwise with notion and moments in the case of any concrete. Take the abstractest concrete of all—simply Genesis—simply Becoming. Its moments—it itself being *pure*, pure form that is—are pure being and pure nothing. And what are they? Pure being is the abstraction from every particular being that ever was, is,

or can be; and what else is pure nothing? Pure nothing, equally with pure being, is the abstraction from every particular being that ever was, is, or can be; and these, the first abstractions, the first *either-or*, are the moments of the first concrete notion. The German philosopher, then, was not, after all, so very much of a fool when *his* Arma virumque cano and *his* *Μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά* screaked out, raucous in prose, Seyn und Nichts ist dasselbe! Just think of our own I-Me, at once pure subject *and* pure object, or at once pure affirmative *and* pure negative! Ay, that is the first, and the font, and the source of all! And what is the *I* subject as negating into itself the *Me* object—what is that but the "negation of the negation," which, as I think I may take it for granted, has proved but perplexingly a somewhat familiar acquaintance of the most of us? Nay, what is the answer to the one great problem with which the whole business so solemnly set out—what is the reply to the single question which from the lips of Kant inaugurated the whole movement? "The problem proper of pure reason," says Kant, in one of his earliest pages, "is comprised in the question: How are synthetic judgments *à priori* possible?" Now, then, the answer to this problem, the reply to this question, is the single word Ego, I-Me! Ego is the Apprehension that takes up; Ego is the Judgment that is accurate and parts into an *either-or*; Ego is the Reason that, yet more accurate, resumes both into one. The *I* that subsumes the *Me* is Thought: the *Me* that rises into the *I* is Religion. The dividing line between the *I* and the *Me* is the contradiction that creates the universe: the uniting line between the *I* and the *Me* is the solution that resolves the all of things back again into the sole *substance* that *is*, and the sole *subject* that *is*, and the sole *person* that *is*—God, in whom (the infinite) we (the finite)

live, and move, and have our being, but, finite-infinite, are subjects and persons too—the droplets in the drop, the Many in the One. And from this we see that, had Kant and Hegel been but clearer or braver in regard to the Ego, both might have placed their philosophies in such grand, rich focus of unity, and power, and light as would have left but small possibility in advance for complaint of darkness, or difficulty, or unintelligibleness.

If, then, it was in reference to Fichte that there was that first word from the *Secret of Hegel* about "a Fulcrum being found in the nature of self-consciousness," we see now that, as regards Kant and Hegel, what a gain it might have been for the philosophies of both had that "fulcrum" been but in the mind and in the will of either. Indeed, as has been already indicated, if we will but pause upon it, and patiently endeavour to exhaust the implication of it (the Ego), it may be that we shall not a little astonish our own selves—in the general reference—to philosophy at all in short! If neither a *matter* as to the Ionians, nor a *number* as to the Pythagoreans, it (this of the Ego) is still, as to the one, an original unit, and it is still, as to the other, a primitive and prescriptive measure. As to the Eleatics, too, it is what for them alone *was*, and alone was *one*. It never began, neither in what was nor in what was not. It always was, and never was not. Through all becoming, in all becoming, it alone is; and yet, like becoming itself, it is not one but two, or, more properly, it is a one in two, a duplicity in unity. That is the life of the "I," the being and soul of the "I." The "I" cannot say itself once; it must repeat itself, it must say itself twice. Simply to be, it must double itself, divide itself, and set itself against itself. It unites itself only in that it disunites itself. It is Empedoclean love and hate, and strife and peace at once. Anaxagoras said it, and named

it; and had Leucippus and Democritus but thought of it, they would have found it their *plenum* and their *vacuum*, their affirmative and their negative at once, nor less their primitive atom that was independent of shape, place, position. Curious! That it was that the Sophists played with; and it was with that, again, that Socrates was serious. It was the Idea of Plato—surely very literally in its express *ταὐτον* and *θάτερον*, too. And, as for Aristotle, self-consciousness, the Ego, can be very readily seen to come up to and realise the *ὕλη* and the *δύναμις*, the *μόρφη* and the *ἐνέργεια*, the *σύνολον* and the *ἐντελέχεια*, which at the same time are all at once in the *πρῶτον κινοῦν*.

But, if we may please or surprise ourselves by such analogies in the ancients—thus far only illustratively in allusion, we have undoubtedly the same power in regard at least to the best of the moderns, let it be psychologically as it may, generally, with these. Of Descartes, for example, the first word and the last is self-consciousness; and Spinosa, if he had but borne this as earnestly in his mind as the Thought and Extension of his master, might very well, supposably, have reflected his own Attributes into a Subject, God, rather than into selfless Substance. In that case he would, in a way, at least formally, have anticipated these, our recent German Coryphaei in philosophy, who, virtually, only followed their great countryman, Leibnitz, in the prosecution of the same problem—the production of a Monad that was at once All, Mind and Matter, God and Man.

With self-consciousness, as we have very clearly seen,—at all events, with self-consciousness treated as a proposition,—this problem is the Einheit Entgegengesetzter, the unity of contraries, the principium coincidentiæ—the identity of difference. And, after all, there can be but little difficulty in seeing that it is only this last identity,

only the identity of difference, that signifies, whereas the identity of identity is self-evidently null.

In this present connection, Aristotle was mentioned a moment ago: but, unity of contraries! is not any such unity in signal discongruity with what was to Aristotle, of all first principles, the *βεβαιοτάτη*, the most certain, sure, firm, fixed, stable—that, namely, of contradiction?

Now, no doubt, it is quite true that, when there is question of identity, and nothing but identity, then, of *this identity*, only *this identity* can be predicated. That amounts to Sir William Hamilton's quantification of the predicate; but, no less, that amounts also to the untenablest proposal possible—that amounts to the abnegation of thought itself. The paper you look at *is* the paper you look at, the book you hold *is* the book you hold; but to decide that the paper you look at *is* the paper you look at, or that the book you hold *is* the book you hold, does not, for the one case or the other, involve thought. Recognition of sense is not the inference of reason: Recognition has but to look; it is reason seizes. That is as much as to say: there is but *logical* judgment; *existential* judgment is a phrase false. It is impossible to *think* without a stir, a move, a step upward—in generalisation; but to quantify predication—thought!—is to abjure it,—is to strike all into the sterility of a barren self-sameness.

To reason, to think, is not to determine *this* as this, but *that* as this: and there you have at once difference. In a word, through thought, through reason, it is not identity that we bring into identity, but difference. Identity has indeed the name of a relation, but reality of a relation it has none. Difference always goes to a relation; but in identity nothing of difference is. The relation of identity! Is repetition, then, by any possibility a relation? Identity may indeed be com-

mitted to "*Matters of Fact*"; but it is difference that, even as his purse was the soul of the *Licenciado Pedro Garcias*—it is difference that is the soul of the "*Relations of Ideas.*"

It is now a good many years since, in this connection, it was not inapplicably written in the English *Schwegler* (p. 366): "Mr. Lewes is a great stickler for the *principium identitatis*, and believes, as Sir William Hamilton does, that logic is confounded when there is talk of identity and difference in the same breath; but it requires simply consideration to see that *to explain* is not to say identity is identity, but *difference is identity.*" Schelling himself says (*W. W.*, 2, 3. 40): "From the merely homogeneous there is inference of nothing more; *a* and *a* give no possibility of a syllogism." Dr. Thomas Brown was but eighteen and a boy when, as occurs to be said in his first book, the *Observations on Dr. Darwin's Zoonomia*, he saw that "To the *communication of knowledge*, it is necessary that the predicate be more comprehensive than its subject." The "communication of knowledge": that is precisely the interest concerned; and what knowledge do you communicate when you say *this* is *this* and *that* is *that*? Knowledge is the effect of an act: it is something done, and it is something won; but what is there either done or won with this as this or that as that? Knowledge is process, progress, acquisition, purpose,—movement to an end; but to be caught in the stagnation of identity is to have your feet in a slough. If a judgment is worth anything, surely it is to do something, surely it is to add something; but what does "the same is the same" add? The immature Brown was man enough to see what was the spirit of logic; but the perfectly ripe Hamilton, crudely eager for a mark, rushed—manifestly on another's hint too,—rushed to the demonstration of function in a corpse! And that, plainly,

is what quantification of the predicate can alone result in. Of course, no man, let him be alive as he may to what the unity of contraries really means, has ever a moment's motive to deny that such and such a triangle is a triangle, and that the triangle it is, that identical triangle it will remain so long as it does remain the identical triangle it is! Still, in that same triangle, if a side of it be produced, the one exterior angle, though totally, and in every way, different from the two interior and remote angles, is really in a relation of equality or identity with them. Now, that is knowledge, and that is the communication of knowledge; and it is at the same time the identifying of difference.

In fact, what is a proposition—a proposition that is a judgment? It is, in its ultimate, the declaration of unity or identity, so far, between two that are different. The predicate, whatever its relation, is not the subject, and the subject is not the predicate; and yet the purpose of the proposition is, in a certain way, to bring these two that are different into one that is the same. There is an explicit difference of two that are to be implicated, so far, into the identity of a one. The whole function of the predicate is to bring difference of a kind into the subject; and this difference in the subject is there and then alone the meaning of it. Were the predicate to bring into the subject only identity, what advance would there be? There is, as a matter of fact, really no such predicate unless that special predicate which declares of the subject only its own *proprium*. That forms the sole exceptional example of a judgment in which the usual major predicate-term and minor subject-term fall together in equality, becoming therefore, as exchangeable, simply convertible. But to declare of a thing only its own self, is that information? As the case is, we reach quantification only when we *name*; and

what information do you give—say of John—when you only name him? This is to make bare nominalism of the very substantiality of existence; for the logical judgment is the essence of thought.

And it has not been left us moderns either to see or to say this. The ancients exhausted it for us many hundred years ago. We have express instruction in this reference not only from Plato and Aristotle, but from others as well. Plato glances at those who "do not allow us to say that a man is good, but that good is good, and man man";[1] while Aristotle reflects on Antisthenes absurdly maintaining "that one can only be said of one, only its own notion, namely, whence it follows that it is impossible to contradict or even to lie."[2] It is easy to see, however, says Prantl,[3] in immediate reference, "that with said abstract isolation of the notion, the seeing into, or even the existence of, the judgment, would be in the greatest jeopardy." The same lesson, as in reference to Antisthenes, we have also in regard to Stilpo. He, too, would seem to hold by the possibility of identical propositions, maintaining "that he who said man said nobody; for he said neither this one nor that one, and why, then, rather this one than that one, consequently not this one."[4] As was said afterwards by the Christian Nominalists of the Middle Ages: Qui dicit hominem, dicit neminem, nam qui *aliquem* dici vult, hunc vel illum nomine proprio designat. In the same way it is quoted of Stilpo (Prantl, i. 37; Hegel, *H. of P.*, ii. 126) from Plutarch (*adv. Colot*, 22) that we must not say, "The man is good, nor the man is a general, nor ten thousand horsemen, nor the courser runs, but only the man is a man, good is good, horsemen are only horsemen, ten thousand only ten thousand, and so on."

[1] *Sophist*, 251 B.
[2] *Meta.*, 1024*b*, 32.
[3] i. 32.
[4] Diog. L., ii. 109.

All this, plainly, in that it has to do with identical propositions, has to do even so also with the quantification of the predicate; for the quantification of the predicate has no object in view, and no purpose to serve, but the reduction of all propositions whatever, be they A, E, I, or O, to identical ones: and in his first volume Prantl has much that is pertinent and valuable here. His "*subjective particularism*," that concerns the Sophists (i. 12), has no other reference. In it "individual certainty is held abstractly fast,"—"so (13) there is no such thing as a false opinion, and neither, consequently, any possibility of refutation or contradiction." This he also calls (15) "a Nominalism that would have its process abstract; but is never competent to reach a higher notion, and only falls back ever into the empirical details." It is the same thing is meant when (17) he speaks of "a particular Rechthaben" (*will* be in the right) "through means of an abstractum that is held one-sidedly fast" by the "rhetorical Doctrinaire who would insure himself in advance against all contradiction," and where "all scientific presentations of the (logical) judgment is abscinded." P. 19, "a like nominalistic Zersplitterung" is referred to as "a splitting up of every more general notion," as (20) "an ostentatiously paraded lip-sharpness without sense for the genuinely higher universal" and as without understanding "of the meaning and nature of the (logical) judgment"; that "only played with the (25) rhetorically isolated notion,—and that organic plurality in which One notion manifoldly makes good its life."

Prantl continues in the same strain with regard to Antisthenes, the Megarics, and the Stoics, in a like reference. Antisthenes shall have fallen off from the true thinking of his last master, Socrates, and returned to the false rhetoric of his earliest teacher, Gorgias.

"Antisthenes," he says (30), "isolates, namely, notional cognition, with the most one-sided linguistic abstraction, in die zersplitterste Particularität des Einzelnen (into the most piecemeal particularity of the individual)." The general result was (32) a doctrine of the "barrenest nominalism," as "that it was not possible to contradict," etc.

So it is, he (35) says further: "I hold the so-called '*Ideas*' of the Megarics to be nothing else than the same barren nominalism which we have just seen in the case of Antisthenes." He, with the ἀντιλέγειν, rejected (37) the (logical) judgment; and (37) Stilpo "characterised every formation of judgments as precisely an error." "And (38) all the harder the consequence of this nominalism got drawn, quite naturally all the more there must show itself an express polemic against Plato's Ideal doctrine and its Realism, inasmuch as the naming and saying of anything can be effected only at the moment when it lies before us, and can only refer itself to this certain single individual then and there present to us; just this rohesten und zersplittersten Empirismus that asserts only the direct momentary fact, we shall see again as in reference to the Stoa." It is in reference to this Stilpo that Diogenes Laertius is quoted with the ascription to him of having held that it is only possible to say "this man is this man," or "this cabbage is this cabbage." "For the rest," says Prantl (453), "it is easy to see that, according to this definition of the true and the false, there specially results, in fullest consequence, as the single utterly true judgment, this, A est A, or A non est non A; while the contrasting judgment that A est B must, because A non est B, either be immediately pronounced false—or else it forfeits any place in logic."

CHAPTER VII

The Quantification of the Predicate

We have quite naturally been directly led to this point by these considerations in regard to difference and identity; and it is only in prosecution, after all, of the general subject—Thought, if we particularise this chapter as we do: for the quantification of the predicate is nothing less than the wilful repudiation and forfeiture of thought. The quantification of the predicate, indeed, and all that concerns the one single principle of abstract identity on which it rests, is perfectly summed up and impliciter contained in the ἕτερον ἑτέρου μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι of Stilpo, his assertion that those so categorising—ἁμαρτάνειν! In good truth, it is fairly comical to think of anyone seriously proposing any such doctrine; and it is no wonder that Plutarch, who (*adv. Colot.*, 23) reports as much of Stilpo, adds, "But who is there that hears this, does not know that it is only by way of a clever joke?"

It will not be well possible for anyone, however, who knows the references from Prantl, to think otherwise than that the whole matter must have been signally present to him. I know not, indeed, that in his entire gigantic book there is anything more original as precisely his, or more valuable as precisely his, than what, as named "*nominalismus*," or "*particularismus*," or "*individualismus*," or "*empirismus*," is at least one

man's testimony against the doctrine of a quantified predicate. One may own to some surprise, then, when one hears it said by a distinguished logician (the late Professor Veitch, in his *Institutes of Logic*, at p. 327) that "neither Prantl nor Ueberweg has given adequate attention to the point in their historical references." Veitch's express chapter (XXV.), entitled "Quantified Predicate—Historical Notices," ought, as it appears to me, to have been less perfunctory (say) on Prantl; and from a friendly letter[1] in this connection, here opportunely introductory, I quote as follows:—

"There are certainly expressions—perhaps rather on the whole incidental—in Aristotle, referring to the greater extension of the predicate in relation to the subject, as though with the inference that the one term cannot as such be equated with the other; but I confess that, for my part, I fail, for all that, to discern any such consciousness in Aristotle as that of a quantification of the predicate, or even of conversion as conversion. The word *conversion*—of course, never possibly a word of a Greek—first appears in Apuleius, some five hundred years after Aristotle, and the more critical phrase *per accidens* is as late as Boethius, three hundred (or more) years again after Apuleius. I say the 'more critical' phrase per accidens; for I conceive the whole doctrine of the quantification of the predicate not only to be contained, but even, for any value, to be exhausted there. Even in the Aristotelian *loci* cited at the foot of (your) page 327, I cannot find, at most, more than I have said.

"In this connection there is, however, an important point which I recollect to have signalised to Professor A——, fully seven years ago. Waitz, as is known, did not—like the rest pretty well—content himself with Bekker for *codices* or with Brandis for *scholia*, but, in either respect as regards research, largely supplemented both. The fruit of this he has placed at the beginning of his first volume; where, at page 40, we find, as among the scholia, this:—

[πρὸς τοῦτο φησιν the Greek follows.]

"These words I venture to translate thus:—

"'Theophrastus also says that, in certain propositions, unless there be further determination of the predicate, contradictions will be

[1] To Professor Veitch, of date November 17, 1885.

both true; for if we say, "Phænias has science," "Phænias has not science," both may be true.'

"Evidently here, if the master (Aristotle) is, for his part, as I have said, only indirect and incidental, the pupil again—Theophrastus—is direct and express. Nor has the circumstance escaped Prantl, who gives (i. 356) the whole quotation from Waitz in a note, and remarks on it in the text thus:—

"'A peculiar addition to the logical theory of the judgment is proposed by Theophrastus in this way, that, in his opinion, even the predicate should bring with it its own determination of quantity, inasmuch as a judgment in which the predicate were quantitatively undetermined, might be equivocal and not as much as exclude its own opposite. For example, "Caius has science" may, if unaccompanied by "all" or "some," be at the same time true with "Caius has not science." We at once see, however, that this demand does not at all touch the essential function of the predicate, but is dragged in only out of a sophistico-rhetorical interest. If we proceed so, we may hunt up an ambiguity always and everywhere, even in what is of the individualest singular, but just thereby run the risk of losing, for arrant πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα, as well τὰ κοινὰ as also τὰ καθόλου of human thought. It is just so, too, that the Peripatetics have failed to advance speculation proper in Antiquity.'"

Now that I re-read this, I know not that it does not exhaust all that can significatively be said in characterisation of what the doctrine of a quantified predicate essentially is. It will only be respectful, however, if, after such introduction, we shall attend further to what considerations Professor Veitch offers in its support.

Reading with care, in the first place, all that is given us by way of a history in establishment of the doctrine, we cannot say that it impresses us much. It is the suggestion, however, if there is to be a history at all, of that immense relative omission that bears, as we have just seen, on Theophrastus. An introductory story that only begins with Valla's publication of 1530, and, with no more than a paucity and poverty of names between, scarcely goes further than Ploucquet's book of 1753, cannot be described as more than utterly inauthoritative,

and meagre to despair. Aristotle is really given up, though it was something, as we have seen, and may see further, just to name him, but Theophrastus—much might have been made of that, much might have been made of the successor of Aristotle, much might have been made of the date, say, of his death, 287 B.C.! And yet Theophrastus does not say much—not half as much as Prantl, who commits himself to a quite sweeping general assertion, makes him say; for, after all, he says no more than that, "in certain cases" (*ἐπί τινων*), *unless care be taken* (*ἢ καὶ*), ambiguity may occur: intimation or instruction of any formal quantification of the predicate, there is no hint of that in all this Ambros (17*b*, 16). Such mere crumb from a scholiast amounts not by any means to a *rule*; and Prantl, in treating it almost as that, has really given more than "adequate attention to the point"!

Veitch's historical chapter is one of only nine pages, and, with paragraphs on Valla, Coronel, Caramuel, Titius, and a George Bentham, merely mentions five others, Ambrosius Nolanus, Jodoc Trutfeder, Joshua Oldfield, Godfrey Ploucquet, Thynne. Of these latter I can find named elsewhere (in authorities) only Trutfeder and Ploucquet; and, on the whole, they are all there by mere make-weight. In fact, on the whole, the entire business has but a make-weight look,—why mention at all that mere general essay of a Joshua Oldfield for a note or two in another man's book of an unknown Thynne?

Nay, the notice to Aristotle is not a bit better qualified,—it is nothing if not a make-weight. It runs so: "So far as Aristotle is concerned, the principle of quantifying the predicate was rejected by him when he had the doctrine expressly before him" (that is peremptory); "on other occasions he may be regarded" (?) "as having proceeded on the legitimacy of the doctrine, and

thus accepted it in practice." These "other occasions" would refer us to Aristotle's practice in Induction.

No doubt, adherents of a quantified predicate would be glad to support themselves on the analogy which seems to obtain between such predicate and (p. 452) "that form of Induction in which the Universal is constituted through a complete enumeration of the parts." But is that enough to verify the ascription to Aristotle of having "accepted in practice" and "proceeded on"—"the legitimacy of the doctrine"? The two things are expressly contra-distinguished by Aristotle: "the *either* Syllogism *or* Epagogé" is with him constant. In short, *in*directly, not less than directly, it is difficult to see *any consciousness at all, on the part of Aristotle*, of such a doctrine as a quantification of the predicate.

But now Mr. Veitch admits that "the great body of logicians, since the time of Aristotle, have been content to acquiesce in Aristotle's rejection of a quantified predicate, and generally for the reasons he has given"; and, accordingly, we are expected to hail the establishment of this great new discovery, this great new principle, at the hands of these one or two insignificant, and hitherto unknown, mere make-weights, and in the course of a so-called "History," which is itself not a little meagre and scanty, or also again of a feverish-hasty, mere make-weight nature.

Mr. Veitch is evidently a little sore that our great authority, Prantl, refers only to Valla in the history, and one other. That other is poor Jodoc Trutfeder. What Prantl has on him could not have proved comfortable to Mr. Veitch; nor even that on Valla a bit more cheering.

Laurentius Valla's Logic is to Prantl "nothing but rhetoric"; his writing, generally, popular only; his work but roh dilettantisch, Ciceronianisch; and he is

able to find for it no better a Gewährsmann than Quintilian. "His doctrine of Judgment contains in the beginning, with other such, the tasteless (*fade*) simile, that noun and verb are to each other as man and wife"; further, "Valla, with delicious naïveté, defines the affirmative judgment as that that is not negative—he shows a like superficiality in Conversion,—extremely weak, too, are his observations on Negation,—what he says further, indeed, shows that for purely logical questions he has no understanding,—in the doctrine of Opposition he bears himself—which may be just convenient — wholly sceptical; as, by rejection of modal judgments, he extraordinarily relieves for himself the matter of Logic,—no better is his exposition of the Syllogism, for which his comparison of it with bread-baking seems to him a fitting one,—the two premises (see note) are as the meal and the water, the conclusion is the hand that mixes them, and brings them to one,—he lets himself be led by the silly *propos* that just as the second figure is reduced to the first, the first can itself be reduced to the second,—the Sorites is regarded only in a rhetorical interest, as are also the Dilemma, the Example, Induction, and the Enthymeme."

That positively, and pretty well at full—more would only make all worse—is what account Prantl gives us of Laurentius Valla, who really, after all, poses as the sole authority of any weight before Hamilton for the Quantification of the Predicate. And surely, if there be little or nothing of *authority* for the doctrine, just as little or nothing can be said for it on its own account. It is only fair, however, to say for Valla himself, that he possessed popularity as a writer in his own day; with variety, elegance, and wit, he had the charm of style: his, too, were translations of the *Iliad*, of Herodotus, of Thucydides; for he was philologically accomplished.

Living in the very beginning of the *Renaissance*, he belonged to the enlightened, liberal, humanistic side of it, and may be even said to have led in it. Still, in Logic, all in that regard being as it is named in Prantl, he cannot rank at all as a specialist and an authority *generally*, while even, on Mr. Veitch's own showing, any support of quantification on his part is, as indirect, indefinite, unconscious, a very small affair. "He cannot be said to have carried out the doctrine with anything like scientific development or precision"; and "his criticisms of the approved logical doctrines of his day were made chiefly from a grammatical standpoint." These allegations of Mr. Veitch's own being sound, then, Valla cannot be said to have carried out the doctrine at all; while whatever he recommended in this reference had only a grammatical bearing. *And the same bearing is good still.*

The single and sole hook on which the whole doctrine of the Quantification of the Predicate—to look at it in itself—is declared to hang is a certain postulate. "Hamilton has expressed this in what he calls the Postulate of Logic," says Mr. Veitch; and then he quotes Hamilton's own definition of this postulate. "The only postulate of Logic which requires an articulate enouncement is the demand that, before dealing with a judgment or reasoning expressed in language, the import of its terms should be fully understood." I fancy most people will say here, "That goes without saying!" It is not easy to see how it can be possible, even so much as to wish Logic to deal with what it does not understand! Mr. Veitch, however, thinks it necessary to dwell upon the point. "The ambiguities and ellipses of language are thus," he says, "first to be cleared up: neither purely empty terms, nor ambiguous terms—can be accepted by Logic." "A proposition," he says again, "may have various meanings, according to intention and emphasis; it may

be involved, defective, redundant, obscure"; and as long as it remains so, he intimates, "it is unfit to be dealt with logically." "Why not, therefore," he asks, "to remove ambiguity, on demand, state expressly in language what we think and mean?" But is not that a demand for grammar rather than expressly for logic? It was, as we have seen, from "a grammatical standpoint" that Valla chiefly spoke, and from what other than a grammatical standpoint can we meet the "*Postulate*"? Mr. Veitch himself is liberal enough to allow that "It is not necessary as a speaker or writer that one should use the explicit form of thought which logical analysis demands."

But is it even necessary that logicians themselves should constrain or constrict themselves within any such ligatures? Why should I, even as a logician, not step forward in my natural habiliments to say, All men are rational; but should be officially presentable, as it were, only as œdematous in pads.

All men are *some* rational: is not that to force a pad upon me—a pad, too, that, as something alien and foreign, can only cripple and cramp? All men are only some rational. With all my heart! But what, then, are the others? That is, indeed, the new thought with which you have only displaced and dissipated my own. I, for my part, was only glad to think that we men were rational; but you, for your part, quite unnecessarily as it seems to me, insist on my thinking on something all unthought of and quite else! All equilateral triangles are also equiangular. That is what I say and what I mean. But you, when you bid me say all equilateral triangles are all equiangular, only do me violence. That all of the one sort was *also* all of the other sort was no part of my thought: I was content to think that what was equilateral was also equiangular, and had not

even a shade of a thought of that "all" of yours. You say, "Logic cannot begin even to exercise its function" unless there "be explicitly stated" "even the shadow of a lurking meaning in the proposition." But when *I* say All men are rational, or All equilateral triangles are equiangular, you indeed may detect in the proposition "a *shadow* of some lurking meaning," but I must beg to be allowed to disavow with all humility every shadow of a shade of any such meaning, or of any such detection of meaning on my part; and I respectfully claim the right to be permitted to say—even logically—precisely *what* I mean, and no more than I mean. You must not put your proposition into my mouth, but, on the contrary, take mine into yours. That "Logic should exercise its function,"—to that, of course, the way must be cleared for it. But what does that mean? Simply that Logic, for whatever is to be submitted to its question, shall expect in the first place a perfectly intelligible verbal expression. That for Logic is no more than its right: due preparation beforehand for any required intervention of it. Limitation to that effect is always, as is quoted, to be produced "on demand." Mr. Veitch expressly illustrates this by a good deal of reference to exceptive and other particles in Greek. But preparation *for* the function is not itself the function. *You* will *prepare* the dinner, *landlord!* but only for *me* as *guest*, says Logic; as "when my groom has dressed my horse, I can ride him," says Mr. Francis Osbaldistone. And it is extraordinary how incessant is this preliminary need for *preparation*. "I had to wait to learn this from Mr. A., from America"; or (as we lately read), So-and-so "are named or actually quoted in the Notes": here a *preparation* were necessary that Mr. A. was not *from* America, but only his information, or that it was only the *quoting* applied to

the Notes. Suppose I say Laurentius Valla, Ambrosius Nolanus, Jodocus Isenacensis, Gottfried Ploucquet, Titius, Ludovicus Coronel, Johannes Caramuel, Joshua Oldfield, Thynne, George Bentham, are all Quantifiers of the Predicate, and are all that go to make up the history of the doctrine, it is really hardly possible to enumerate all the propositions which it would be possible to explicate here, were it required of us to be literal with the injunction, "If there be even the shadow of a lurking meaning in the proposition, that must be explicitly stated." From the general intimation itself, it would never be imagined that there was nothing or little more in it than a make-weight of mere names!

It is curious that, in his *History*, Mr. Veitch makes no mention of Lambert, who, as Kant's correspondent, was well in the public eye, and who, in his *New Organon*, seemed at least somewhat to favour Quantification. As a writer, too, he was in some degree younger than the Godfrey Ploucquet whom Mr. Veitch does name.

In regard to Ploucquet, we have this from Hegel (*Log.*, iii. 147):—

"The Calculus of Ploucquet has, without doubt, the most consequent expedient whereby the relation of the syllogism can be made capable of being subjected to calculation. It rests on this, that the difference of relation, the difference of singularity, particularity, and generality in a judgment, is abstracted from, and the *abstract identity* of the subject and the predicate gets insisted on, whereby then they are fixed in mathematical equality;—a relation that reduces reasoning to a completely unsubstantial and tautological formalising of propositions. In the proposition: *the rose is red*, the predicate is not to denote general red, but only the particular *red of the rose*; in the proposition: All Christians are men, the predicate is to mean only those men who are Christians; from this proposition and the other: Jews are not Christians, there follows then the conclusion, which has been no recommendation of this syllogistic calculus to Mendelssohn, *Therefore the Jews are not men* (namely, not those men who are Christians)."

Hegel adds further:—

"Ploucquet names as a consequence of his invention, *posse etiam rudes mechanice totam logicam doceri*, uti pueri arithmeticam docentur, ita quidem, ut nulla formidine in ratiociniis suis errandi torqueri, vel fallaciis circumveniri possint, si in calculo non errant.—This recommendation, that the whole of logic may be *mechanically* imparted to the uneducated, is surely the worst thing that can be said of an invention in regard to the exposition of logical science."

I think there can be little doubt that the whole subject of this quantification has been suggested by what is called "Conversion *per accidens*." It was quite natural that it should have occurred to early logicians to be curious as to what might take place if the *terms* were converted, that is, if the subject and predicate were to exchange places. Experiments, accordingly, were doubtlessly made; and they resulted (with scientific insight into the position) in a rule. While *E* and *I*, and *O* as *I*, could be converted *simpliciter*, *A* could only be converted *per accidens*. This is the rule; and, as for the insight, that was into the relative *distribution* of the *terms*. There could be no difficulty, as Trendelenburg has it, si prædicatum an subjecto latius pateat attenderis; but that being attended to, then, with Whately, for illative conversion, the distributed predicate (as in *A*) must be *limited*, and we have "conversion by limitation, or, as it is commonly called, per accidens." Now, that is Quantification of the Predicate; but really, for strict logical interests, one would think that that should be enough. All that *logically* concerns a quantification of the predicate seems to lie there. No doubt, in actual speech, if I am to make my proposition of the moment absolutely unexceptionable, I must have at command quite an infinite limitation. Or, as Mr. Veitch himself has it, "we ought to distribute according to meaning, or enounce as we think"; and that involves, as has already

been discussed, quite a multitude of modifying or "exceptive" particles. Now that refers to Quantification as a whole—to the whole extent or sphere of it as a process proper for the exactitude of meaning. But that is no reason why, for the purpose, I should painfully have ever in thought all those trumpery trumps and trumpets, bugles, bows and arrows, and what not of Hamilton. I must speak as I mean, certainly; but, as I said before, when I say, All men are rational, and you tell me to say, All men are some rational, I must beg your pardon and excuse myself from saying what I do *not* mean.

Perhaps it might seem to some that, if Ploucquet, or another, could in any way supply a means, *through a mere table*, of indoctrinating mechanically into the whole of a science so difficult and extensive as Logic, even the quite unprepared and uninstructed—it might seem to some, I say, that this should be looked to. That it cannot be done is a matter of experience; but what would result if it could be done? Why, this—that there would be no such a thing as Logic, as a Science of Thought, any longer in the world. Surely it is of importance to investigate the operations of the human mind as they exhibit themselves in reasoning,—surely the science that realises as much as that is a science of value! Now, it is matter of experience that, on the whole, the young, when they have been submitted academically to a course of Logic, issue therefrom as if new made—as if new made, too, in the very best of their natural powers. The one question of our writing at present is, What is Thought, and for us, so far, this is quite certain, that whatever *is* Thought, this Quantification of the Predicate is *not* Thought. Would the application of tables like those of multiplication or addition be Thought?—would a merely arithmetical

method be Thought?—would *counting* be Thought? I know not that all the dreadful things suggested by Prantl would result, or do result, from actual acceptance, so far, into general Logic of the subject as a part—all that may be, or it may not be; but it certainly does seem to me that the Quantification of the Predicate, for any use as yet, has been, on the whole, little more than an express plea for exact speech—a formal warning to us to stroke our t's and dot our i's! Further than that, it is more than to be suspected that all that mere formalism of lines, figures, letters, numbers, as in Ploucquet, Lambert, *al.*, is but nauci, flocci, pili, nihili. Elsewhere, it may be only as though a craving vain-glory, sowing where it had not much earth, was followed by growth that suddenly shot up and as suddenly died down.

No: quantification of the predicate is not thought; and it is thought alone that is the grand interest—nay, at bottom, properly looked at and truly seen into, it is thought alone that is the *sole* interest. Even for action and the world of practice, will, it is thought that is essentially *the* interest. The will that would do the right, and rightly the right, must *think*. Only that is free that is free *from* all other, and *to* itself alone. Free will *is*: but it is only the will that wills the will. And there can no will *will* will, but the will that has universalised itself into thought, given itself for element thought, *made* itself thought. That is "Liberty"! And that alone is "Liberty"!

CHAPTER VIII

The Question Recurs

...so the question recurs. What is Thought? Or, more particularly to us now, if the difficulty remains, and ...is not lessened, when we say God—of this that is, ...the First, what difference does it make, or in ...respect is it better for us, that we say Thought—"Thought is the First"?

...—The First must be—can only be—as a ...Self-Create. That is the one necessity. We ...the universe created itself—God created himself—we may only *say*: we do not understand—... Will it be any better if we say Thought created ...?

...plain. If we are to explain this universe, we ...a First, and a First can be only Self-Create. ...intelligibly see—intelligibly explain to ...how the Universe can be a First—how God ...First—can we discover anything in this whole ...were more intelligibly a First—that were ...all a First—can we discover in this ...Self-Create—that is, that were *perfectly* ...a Self-Create?

...only one thing in the universe, intelligibly, ...evidently to us, self-create.

...said to itself *I*; and the moment ...it said "I" was.

Pooh, nonsense! That is rubbish—you need not attempt to try that on! Why, we have every opportunity of seeing the very beginning, the very first of your First in every child that is born into the world and reaches the age of three or four or more years.

This is a thought that must be to every one pretty well inevitable. Nevertheless it need not prove final. Aristotle tells us of the *νοῦς* being "alone divine and alone entering from without (*θύραθεν*)"; and that is just as it should be as regards the *finite* subject and *its* Ego—a regard that seems to have been pretty much the same to Kant. He says: "It is remarkable that the child that can already pretty well fluently speak begins first to use *I* only somewhat later (perhaps a good year later)"; and this seems, he adds, "as though it were *the going up of a light* to it." Of the Ego as Ego, too, on the great scale, though we have ere this seen Kant contradictorily at one time in low respect and at another time, as it seemed, in high respect of what was to him the "I think,"—of the Ego as Ego, too, on the great scale I say, he has here (in the very first words of the *Anthropologie*) only affirmative mention:—

"That man can have Ego in his apprehension exalts him infinitely above all the other living beings on earth. Thereby is he a *person*, and, by virtue of the unity of consciousness, throughout all mutations that may happen to him, one and the same person, *i.e.*, compared with *Things* (such as are the reasonless brute beasts, with which it is ours to deal at will), a being, in dignity and rank, altogether different, even when he cannot yet speak the Ego, inasmuch as he still has it implicitly, just as all languages, if using the first person, must at least think it, although indeed they express not this *I*-ness of it by any special word: for this capability (namely, to think) is the *understanding*."

Kant, with all his peculiarities of doctrine, has, no doubt, always the same respect for the *Understanding*. This faculty he certainly identifies at times with the

mind, with consciousness itself; and, in fact, he will be found at one time or other to speak so that, sense apart, all the terms for faculties of the mind are to him synonymous: Einheit des Bewusstseyns, Einheit der Apperception, Urtheilen, Vernunft, Denken, Selbstdenken, Verstand, Bewusstseyn.[1] Early in the *Kritik of Pure Reason* (sec. 25), and later (*à propos* of the Paralogisms, *W. W.*, ii. 278, 285), Kant regards the Ego as a mere psychological *position* entirely empty. Ego, for all that, in respect of the Categories, had for Kant, but, in a way, somewhat vaguely, the function which, in Kant's regard, we have seen ascribed to it by Hegel. It was only after Fichte that the Ego received fully and clearly its significance proper; and to him it was not only selbstgesetzt, self-create, but absolutely selbstthätig, absolutely self-productive.

Still, whatever contradiction may seem to show itself anywhere, it must be said that, in its vital function (as seen specially in regard of the Categories), the Ego that was explicit to Fichte was certainly implicit to Kant. In fact, as much as that must be acknowledged to be overt in the close of the quotation which we have just made from the *Anthropologie*. There it is expressly intimated that the implicating of Ego, unnamed, in the first person of the verb in all languages, is synonymous with Denken, as Denken with Verstand.

Now, all that being so, the appearance of a sense of Ego only at a certain age in the actual finite individual cannot be admitted to be of any sufficient cogency against the notion of Ego as absolutely regarded. We return, then.

If we are to explain this universe, we must have a First, and a First can be only Self-Create. But is there such a requisitum, within or without, anywhere discover-

[1] See *W. W.*, ii. 733 n., 69, 70, 79; i. 390 n. For Hegel, see p. 40.

able in this universe?—A self-create, and intelligibly a self-create?

In this whole universe there is only one thing that is *intelligibly* self-create. And it is the Ego.

Until *I* said *I*—set *I*, *I* never was: But on the moment, it *was*. And this is *intelligible* to every one.

But if I set I, that is Thought. This we have already seen:—The constituent ratio, the essential ratio of the Ego, that is Thought. But I, in this universe, is what is First and Self-create. Therefore Thought is in this universe First and Self-create.

But I that sets I—that is the I Am, and that

I Am That I Am!

Nature, — Thought, — God: That is Eternity — the "*Species Æternitatis*":

Die grosse Anschauung des Juden—the mighty intuition of the Jew!

He had it in the rough: but that is the diamond.

Thought, God, Self-create and First: Nature the Emanation, and with it the Finite.

Is it, then, that Coleridge was, after all, not so far wrong when he dreamt that Kant had raised the veil for him and disclosed the infinite *I Am*, in whom we live, move, and have our being? Ah, but that *I Am* to Coleridge was only the "reine Apperception" to Kant—the just mentioned "mere psychological *position*" that was "entirely empty"! Nevertheless, Coleridge shall have been—as belonged to the seer—simply prophetic!

We have just had the subject generally of a quantification of the predicate under notice, and it may be only fair to suppose some adherent of the doctrine to object here, And what of this "I" of yours?—what of your own self-consciousness? If your self-consciousness is a pro-

position, is it not a proposition of identities? Is not "I" "I," or "I" "Me," or "Me" "I," just the same thing twice? If your Brown did say, "To the communication of knowledge it is necessary that the predicate be more comprehensive than its subject," how is it with self-consciousness—how is it with the proposition on which you are going to found and ground the whole wealth and foison of the universe? In your "I-Me" now, is your "Me" "more comprehensive" than your "I"?

This is a toss back of the ball: the identitists in their turn throw identity at *us*! But we have still *difference*, and the last thing for us to do would be to quantify it—to quantify it out of existence. Our point is *quality*, and not at all mere *quantity*. It is by its *quality*, the quality of its difference, and not the quantity of it, that the predicate, Me, expands into the whole compass of the Idea, the Internalè; and it is by virtue of an equal quality that the Idea awakes into Nature, the Internalè bursts into the Externalè. Is not that what *predication* is,—is it not the whole function of the predicate to bring difference into the subject—difference into identity—particularity into universality?—and is not that difference in the subject alone the meaning of it?—is not the particular in the universal alone the singular?

But, if the singular thus is the result of mediation, does not that indicate the importance of a middle term?—and of what, of all middle terms, is *the* Middle Term? I have said in *Darwinianism* (p. 16): "*It is alone the Middle Term that is the entire secret of the universe*"; and again (p. 18): That must remain so—"*unless we can find the one ultimate middle term that explains all, and is the single principle of the universe.*" It was this, too, I may acknowledge, that I had in mind when I said some time ago: "It is certain relations that are alone in question,

and alone the truth; and it is they as truth that are to be regarded as united to the mind, and as identified with thought,—not but that, in this reference, we may, by and by, be brought to a closer point of view."

That middle term—and this *is* that "closer point of view" which I had then in mind—that middle term which explains all and is the single principle of the universe,—that middle term that is the entire secret of the universe—is *the Ego.*

And so I repeat, as in place here, what I have said elsewhere. Self-consciousness necessarily, and of its own self, *is*, and is *what* is. Self-consciousness is its own foundation of support, and its own *prius* of origination. Then Thought, Self-consciousness, cannot be impersonal: Thought, Self-consciousness always implies a subject. Why hesitate to name it God? The self-consciousness of the universe is the Divine Self-consciousness, and not the human; which is but the necessary finite.

Descartes tells us (*Prin. Phil.*, i. 51) that he understands by *substance* nothing else than what ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum; and when Spinosa defined his substance to be that which has no need of anything else (non indiget conceptu alterius rei), he was, plainly, only repeating his master. Nor is the God of Spinosa, the being absolutely infinite, the substance consisting of infinite attributes, each expressing eternal and infinite essence, different from the God of Descartes, who is the only substance quæ nulla plane re indigeat. There is support here in such references, and they will not be found irrelevant. Nay, when the very first word of Spinosa is:—

"Per CAUSAM SUI intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura non potest concipi nisi existens:

"By Cause of Itself I understand that whose essence

involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless as existing."

Is there any one, prepared as we may hope him to be now, who reads this, and who does not instantly burst out with the cry, Spinosa, when he wrote that, must have had the Ego in his mind!

The *causa sui*, that that is its own cause: is the *I-Me!*

And what else can Leibnitz's primitive monad, his Monas Monadum, be—what but the Infinite Ego?

Compare the concrete reach of this with the Quantification of the Predicate! Yet—that (by Veitch) it should be spoken of as glory to be "one of the first to clearly conceive and assert that a proposition was only an equation of the subject and predicate!" Valla, it is said, "recognises the equivalence of subject and predicate in such expressions as *the lion roars* (rugit), *the horse neighs* (hinnit), *man laughs* (ridet)"; and one can only applaud the sagacity of the proceeding, with special appreciation of the value of the consequent logical gain as indicated in the next words: "The predicate here" (rugit, hinnit, ridet) "is coextensive with the subject, and *precisely convertible*." Equally admirable is the erudite precision that decerns, as we have seen, not that the rose is red, but only as strict truth requires, rose-red; and, similarly, not that All Christians are men, but only that All Christians are Christian men!

Surely, then, it is not the equation of the subject and predicate, but only the relation of them, the Ratio of the Ego, that is the thing of value, the consideration superlative, when it is Logic, the substantiality of Thought, that is concerned: "that middle term that explains all, and is the single principle of the universe." And, no doubt, this is remarkable: for it is the absolute reversal of all that, at this moment, is believed. The belief now, namely, is that the Ego is

the outcome of mere material evolution; whereas the truth is that it is *of* the Ego, and *for* the Ego, and *in* the Ego that the universe is: it is of the stuff of the Ego that the universe is built. The Ego, in its identity of subject and object that is at the same time the non-identity of subject and object, is alone the true *dialectic*, and the true dialectic is alone *philosophy*.

So be it, says the materialist, have it all your own way, but you may depend upon this, that for what you mean by dialectic there is no dialectic in what you call the universe but wind and weather! Suppose there was only one plant upon the earth, mere wind and weather would be quite enough, in millions and millions of years, to turn that one plant into the whole countless Flora and Fauna of the present,—mere wind and weather, no lever but wind and weather—incredible as it may seem. But of this again.

Where we are now in regard of our question of What *is* Thought is no farther than the position of our universal, we have not advanced as yet to the particular or the particularisation of it. We have said, however, that this question, which, explicitly with us, is now the universal—we have said that this question implicitly underlies the whole history of philosophy, and is vital in every period of it.

Now, on the one hand, to give at full the entire particularisation of our universal would amount to a complete production of the whole system of philosophy thereon relatively founded, and therefrom relatively derived; as, on the other hand, thoroughly to track and trace our main question—the universal—throughout all the systems of philosophy as they have appeared in time —that, again, would amount to nothing less than the History of Philosophy as such,—themes both that self-

evidently would necessitate volumes, while here we limit ourselves to what we hope may prove at least sufficiently suggestive, if only in the form, so far, of a sketch or sketches. Accordingly, only cursorily and *carptim*, as intended for no more than illustration, shall be our historical references, until, with Kant, and after him, we shall conceive it our duty to be, at all events—less perfunctory.

CHAPTER IX

The Reference to History

It is evident from what precedes that, with whatever *reference*, there can be no contemplation here of a *history* of philosophy itself.

Though the *out*, which is Nature, is but the convexity of the *in*, which is the concavity, Thought; still, it is the object, nature, the *out*, that first impresses the subject, thought, the *in*: and if, with our question in view, we are to begin in philosophy with a *first*, we must, as recorded, see that in the *Ionics*. Turning naturally to Nature, what they saw there was, in the end, simply the four elements, fire and water, earth and air. Still, in a sense, that was the beginning of Thought, and not without assonance to the express principle in speech. Any one of the four—so conceived—is at once the one and the many—with *in*volution of the many into one, with *e*volution of the one into many: a universal, at once identity and difference, ideality and reality, form and matter, thought and thing, and still in rerum natura. And there is here a *trine* also. For example, identity and difference, ideality and reality are two: but difference is resolved into identity, reality into ideality; and there is thus a *third*. *We* can see from this that the Absolute must be self-constitutive, self-organised: as ultimate truth there is, substantiated, realised, materialised, only the Absolute Form. There was thus, implicitly at

least, and in what the suggested state of mind involves, if not quite a "great," yet not altogether a "disproportioned" initiation of precisely that organic close which has been ascribed to philosophy. From Diogenes Appolloniates Ueberweg, we may remark in passing, cites what somewhat applies here, that, namely, "the unity of substance is proved by plants assimilating the inorganic, and then animals, plants"; but the Greek, less modern, says only that, "unless it were so made as to be the same, there could not either plant grow from the earth, or animal, or anything else be produced."

In water, earth, air, fire, it was still at bottom *Quality* that was in question—matter had only gone into its *kinds*; and it is a point to interest that it is *Quantity* follows. After the *Ionics* come the *Pythagoreans*. But if the Pythagoreans are a certain stage of the purification of matter into mind, of reality into ideality, it is to be noted as well that quantity, *how much*, is, in effect, a *particularisation* of quality, *what kind*; for that which modifies quality, intensifies or diminishes it, is quantity. In the whole position of the Pythagoreans there was much that fostered an unusual activity of mind. To search into and record the numerical proportions and relations that were everywhere present in the world, and in the things of the world, was a matter of the richest and most important significance: it made an era. Numbers constituted nature, it was said; and they were parental of all within it. Nay, the 1 was the single γονή and the fruitful source of all. Virtue, health, the soul —God himself was a harmony, one, and not outside of the world but within it. And yet every one number, isolated to itself, seems an individually single, self-subsistent, fixed, fast, independent abstract: 1 is 1, it is not 2; and 2 is 2, it is not 1. Shake all numbers into a bag, and they seem just so many separate, unconnected,

discrete discs. Nevertheless, they are all vitally bound, the one to the other, but only from within, through the soul, the soul of the idea. And this we have to see everywhere in philosophy. If 2 rises from 1, or 3 from 2, they do not do so bodily, as it were, but only ideally. Always between numbers as such, corporeally so to speak, there is but an impassable hiatus of a quite indifferent difference; as has just been said, nevertheless, they are together in the idea—they live together in the idea, they live together a single life in the idea. Nor, to illustrate what we have called the common fact, is it different with such differences as, say, mechanism, chemism, vitalism. You will never *literally* extend the *nature* of any one of these into the *nature* of any other of these. Each is itself and different from the rest; and yet, no doubt, they are all connected organically from within by the idea. That *is* an evolution; but what is Darwin's proposal — that the one is just manually moulded—*squeezed* into the other from without, as the Bear into the Whale by swimming among insects—or a bush into a tree by the weather!

Further, it belongs to the Pythagoreans to say that in the Trias the Monas comes to its reality and completion; as also that the world takes birth, not in time but the idea. Sextus, in this connection, says: "There are thus two principles of things, unity, as first, through participation in which all other unities are unities; and, similarly all duads, duads"; for the one as the other is an essential moment of the idea, and towards its evolution.

It is really extraordinary how some of the very earliest propositions seem to be already pregnant with the latest principles. *Beginnings*, as such, are always fresh, alert, eager, keenly alive and indefatigable: see Hegel himself at his start, say even here in Greek philo-

sophy, but specially, signally in his great *Logik*. Why, there his very first section, *Quality*, contains pretty well his entire battery of means.

And so, where we are, it is sufficiently noticeable, and not unsuggestive perhaps, that, if the Pythagoreans can be regarded as quantifying the quality, or particularising the universal, of the Ionics, it is equally possible to see singularity or individuality in the Eleatics that follow. What *we* call the All, they call the One. That is, they are so impressed by the All, that they can only see in it a One—*a* life, *Being* itself, that which *is*. So much is this so to them—so much are they centred and concentred in this *One*, this *Is*, that for them *other* (say as multiplicity, movement, change) *exists* indeed, but *is* no more than a juggle of the eye. Here, then, there is already almost a modern idealism.

Arrange it as we may, one can see, on the part of the Eleatics, the advance in the use of the formal faculty, the art of pure thinking. If for the Ionics we should assume a stage of simple apprehension, and for the Pythagoreans a stage of judgment, we might similarly be allowed to assume for the Eleatics at least something of an approach to a stage of reason; not but that on the part of Zeno (who only set moment against moment) what acted was not reason, but reason-*ing*, judgment, or rather understanding, the now patent "*Verstand*."

As noted elsewhere, that the Eleatic One should have been described as neither infinite without being at the same time finite, nor finite without being at the same time infinite—this has not always seemed in reason; but the *absolute voice* in the *Secret of Hegel* that would illustratively substantiate, in its *continuum* of sound and in its *discreta* of notes, the complete community of finite and infinite, may, not inexcusably perhaps, be here referred to. One finds as much as this, indeed, to be the very theme of

the *Parmenides* of Plato—the coincidentia oppositorum, namely, as between one and many, being and non-being, finite and infinite, etc.

It is in discussing Heraclitus that Hegel gives a general touch or turn to this:—

"Each particular *is* only in so far as its opposite is implicitly contained in the notion of it. Subjectivity is thus the other of objectivity, not of a piece of paper, which were senseless; in this, that each is the other of the other as its other, there precisely lies their identity. This is the great principle of Heraclitus. Dark it *may* seem; but it is speculative; and it is that that is always difficult and obscure to him whose understanding is asked to grasp at once being and non-being, subjective and objective, real and ideal."

And this pretty well names the advance of Heraclitus in the march of thinking to the goal that, to us here, sums it. *Τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον*—contrarium identidem—diversity in identity, and identity in diversity: that is the sentence of Heraclitus. He told the Eleatics that if the one half of their truth was true, the other half, their false, was true also. What was the whole truth was precisely change, the movement and multiplicity, which they denied. Heraclitus was a man very rich in the social dicta he had derived from life: no doubt fate, fortune, vicissitude, were very familiar to him; and so there was his philosophy, with fire, as also with time, for symbol of it. It is not strange, then, that in reading his fragments what strikes most, perhaps, is the shrewd experience which might well have entitled him to take up his place, an eighth, not as the lowest of the *Seven*, beside these, the Wisest of his countrymen. It was only mature sagacity that led him to say: "It is more to quench insolence than to extinguish a fire." "Presumption, conceit, is the sacred malady." "Unless you hope, you will not find." "Most men know not what they do when awake, as they forget what they have

done when asleep." "The dull are but absent when present." "A people must fight for its law as though it were its wall." "Who have reason must abide by the universal, as a city by the law, and more; for all human laws rest on the one divine law."

What was constantly exposed to this concentrated observer was but the transitoriness of all things. Living at the time of the Eleatics, then, it was no wonder that he opposed to their immutable one the ever-changing unrest of all that the world revealed to him.

Empedocles, for his part, now, seems to have had his consideration claimed by all that preceded him. He is occupied not only with the four elements, but his two forces, which we may now modernise into attraction and repulsion, were really the preceding principles of accord and discord — accord with discord, and discord not without accord; and so it is that his contribution to the common proposition is rather a mechanical one. Mechanical also would seem to have been, on their own part, what the *Atomists* themselves sought. All, in their way of it, was to be material and positive: there was to be nothing for them either immaterial or negative. And the strange thing was that all that they proposed did, in point of fact, simply turn round and reverse itself. There are particular matters in *existence*, each for itself and as such; but matter as matter does not *exist*: it *is*, but it is only a universal of thought, an entity in the intellect, or, as the word is, an *entitas rationis*. Then, as for their very *positive* element of the *Atom*, where could it be, or what good could it be, but for their own *Vacuum*—the absolutely abstract element of the *negative*? Nay, the Atom itself was but a thing of thought, and sensibly in existence nowhere; as Lord Bacon said, centuries and centuries after them: Atomum nemo unquam vidit. If the Atomists were the first,

too, to make the well-known and important distinction of Qualities into Primary and Secondary, their industry there again was in the same ideal direction. While both classes of qualities are in the mind, it would be hard to say, if you took away from any body its primary qualities, extension, etc., what would then be left to it in the guise of body at all!

If of the *One* that, so far, was on the whole common to them all, the Atomists, not unnaturally, would make a physical *one*, an atom, it was certainly quite in nature, as it was in reason, that Anaxagoras, in further manipulation of the general theme, should operate finally on the One its own idealisation proper. The One now is the *νοῦς*; and the *νοῦς* (*nous*) is the Noumenon of the Phenomenon, the Being of Existence, the Principle of the Universe: and the principle of the universe is the principle here that we have generally in mind.

Our proposition at present, then, is precisely this: Mind is the formative element of all things.

And it was like the boyish, over-hasty, over-clever forwardness of Greece, that the Sophists took mind, once it was given to them, *literally*; and rushed to the front with it, almost as though it were for each of them to make a *personal* application of it. Against this Socrates saw that *principle*—ethical principle—could never be *individual*, but must be *general*. And so it was that now under Plato and Aristotle philosophy became, as it were, *formal*—an *institute*.

It is to be borne in mind, too, that by this time in Greece another influence had come to bear. Knowledge had advanced: there was now quite a new stage of information, education, of generally informed opinion, generally educated opinion—*Bildung*. The popular gods were seen through, and an Aufklärung was in full force. This acted on the Sophists—this acted on Socrates, Plato,

and Aristotle. The νοῦς of Anaxagoras became the τὸ θεῖον. The ἀντίξουν συμφέρον, contrarium identidem, of Heraclitus, *which implicitly figured or prefigured the Ego*, once received into the νοῦς, could, in such circumstances, quite impossibly escape a theological investment. That is, the secular thought, through all these thinkers, from Thales to Anaxagoras, had now imbued, intenerated, and illumed itself with the feeling, the vision, and the assurance of religion. So that now, with Sophocles and his fellows beside these, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, there was in Greece the cinque-foil of knowledge and will, poetry, philosophy, and religion, even as with us at present in Kant, Fichte, Hegel, in Carlyle, and in Emerson.

Still, with whatever formal generality, there were the same principles—there was the same principle employed and implied. If to each Sophist νοῦς had become simply his own Ego, no less an Ego had it become for Socrates —*sub specie æternitatis!* That, too, was the scope and the mark whether of Plato or Aristotle.

To the former of these, to Plato, it was the *Idea*—the universal that held the particular, and as holding the particular was at once the singular; nor to the latter, to Aristotle, was it different with his *Entelechy*; which, too, was the μορφή that had gone into the ὕλη, and as well the ὕλη that had been taken back into the ἐνέργεια (ἐντελέχεια). Neither can we regard—for we hasten, so far, to a close now—the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics that followed as other than the separated moments of the principle itself. The last, the sceptical moment, did but reduce, negatively, into its own singular, the universal and the particular which, together but apart, confronted it in the others. And what was the Neo-Platonic *one* here—what but the same reduction affirmatively? Absolutely in the intensity of a one

identity the Neo-Platonic mood was sole self-consciousness—Ego! the universe in Ego!

And the universe in Ego—that was Christianity—and Neo-Platonism came thence.

That was the Trinity: that the Father passed into the Son; and the Son, in the Spirit, returned into the Father.

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made. In him was life, and the life was the light of men."

"In that God, now, in our finitude exists, or manifests himself, *he offers himself up*, and in us annuls himself; *for we are null.* And he has even offered himself, and annulled his null, made dead his death, that *we* might not remain mere nothings, but might *return to* him, and in him *be.* This event of God's self-sacrifice is not an event for mere memory and reflection: it is to be in us *lived.* And what comes to pass in every one of us, that comes to pass for all mankind in Christ."[1]

These are Solger's words; and it is so that Solger seeks and finds the *Heil* of his spirit; so also that he would "vindicate the creed of Christ for the spirit that *thinks.*" And Hegel, in regard of just such experiences in Tieck, eloquently and with conviction affirms (*W. W.*, xvi. 460): "If one is conversant with the nature and movement of thought as thought, then he knows also that, at least on from Plato, not, to say so,—not any, nor yet the fewest, but rather most philosophies, have, with reason and understanding, given statement and

[1] Böhme, too, has this: "The true, saving faith in Christ is not cold historical credence, but living, seizing, and grasping of life from the spirit of God."

account of just such substantial content"—that, namely, as in a reference to Christianity by Tieck.[1]

In this matter of the reference to history there is not much to separate us now from the moderns. What concerns thought in the Middle Ages, all, as Schwegler has it, being then "within the presuppositions of a positive religion," there could be nothing but a useless and wooden discussion of equally useless and wooden distinctions that were within the authorised limits only of formal articles and stereotyped dogmata. That is the surface breadth; nevertheless, there was here and there exceptional depth in the Middle Ages, too. Always and everywhere, God, naturally, all comprehending, was the one thought; and on the part of the greatest thinkers, it constituted from time to time the single theme. God, that is, was not thought by them merely indefinitely as the Etre Suprême; there was truly the attempt to *think* him—concretely to think him. If thought was the one quality, the essential attribute, still it was not to them, so to speak, as a brute impersonal element — no!—it was to them as the attribute of spirit, and in such wise also that creation was of thought and still in vital connection *with* spirit. That in the thought of their thinking any consciousness of our proposed principle, of our one form of internal necessity, can be traced, we cannot, of course, expect to recognise; but again and again there are suggestive phrases.

Perhaps what first strikes in this connection is an unconscious but irresistible tendency to pantheism.

[1] Once come to a life within, Tieck felt, "That worldly occupations were incompatible with it, and so there were many hours in which he sighed for the seclusion of a cloister that he might live all-in-all to his Böhme, and his Tauler, and the *wonders of his emotions.*"

Nor is this to be wondered at when we think of the nature of the "presupposition" under which thought now is. No thought could now fill and fix the mind of man, but the thought of God. So it is that in all the earliest of these thinkers, Augustin, Erigena, Anselm, Abelard, *al.*, it is God that, in his possible nature and relations, is almost alone held before us. Now, then, if God was decerned to be, as he was decerned to be, the single truth of the universe, how was pantheism, or some measure of pantheism, to be prevented? Deus, already says Erigena, est omne quod vere est, quoniam ipse facit omnia, et fit in omnibus: omne enim quod intelligitur et sentitur, nihil aliud est, nisi *non-apparentis* apparitio. God's ideas, too, just as though they were conditioning mental categories, are referred to as the productive forms of all things: the notion of things, even as it appears in the mind of man, is vera substantia, and so, as it was in the divine mind, the substantia incommutabilis of the things of the universe. If intellectus aliquis se ipsum intelligit, profecto Deum intelligit; for there is but one intellectus omnium.

The same doctrine is as strong in Anselm: Ubi summa essentia non est, nihil omnino est. Ubique igitur est, et per omnia et in omnibus. Ipsa enim est, quæ cuncta alia portat et superat, claudit, ambit, et penetrat. That summa essentia is mens summa, vivens, sapiens, potens, vera, justa, beata et æterna.

We have emphatic utterances to the same effect in Abelard: Omne quod naturaliter existit, aut æternum est, ut Deus, aut coepit ab illo summo principio quod Deus est.—Deum potentem prædicamus et omnia quæ agimus, ejus potentiæ tribuimus, in quo vivimus, movemur et sumus, quique omnia operatur in omnibus.—Patet divinam substantiam omnino individuam, omninoque informem perseverare; utque ideo eum recte perfectum

summumque bonum dici et nulla alia re indigens, et sibi ipsi sufficiens, omniaque a se ipso habens, nec ab alio quidpiam accipiens.

This doctrine, indeed, seems to have gone on in the Church, and only come, so far, to a certain end in Almarich of Bena and David of Dinant, when at last there met it the dread fulmination of *Pantheism*. What was said by them was hardly stronger than had been already said. Still, such utterances as follow were on the whole, perhaps, fully more overt:—

Omnia sunt Deus et Deus est omnia; creator et creatura idem Deus. Deus sicut fons est et principium, ita finis est omnium, quod omnia reversura sint in ipsum.

David, indeed, as regards overtness and undeniable literality of expression, would seem to have gone to the very ultimate extreme, or—apparently, at least—even beyond it. He attempts a formal proof, Deum esse principium materiale omnium, and concludes, relinquitur ergo, quod νοῦς et materia prima sint idem. Nay, he adds, ex hoc videtur relinqui quod *Deus et* νοῦς *et materia prima* idem sint (italicised so!).

When one thinks that it could not be denied even to piety the most orthodox both to believe and proclaim: Omnia sunt in Deo, et Deus est in omnibus, imo ipse est causative omnia; one could not very well expect, on the part of men whose daily business, as it were, forced them to have God perpetually in their thoughts and on their lips, that expressions at least more or less accusably pantheistic would, during the following centuries, cease. The rigour of the Church had its effect, however; and the speech of the simplest grew to be cautious. Almost we may say that the deeper theosophic views of the Middle Ages were brought to their sum by a poor persecuted shoemaker and rebel from the Church, Böhme.

Propositions at intervals, in some degree philosophical, may claim attention amid the theological lucubrations of the Church. When Augustin, for example, discoursing of the Trinity, declares "that this triplicity in unity, the form of the divine essence, reveals itself in all the things of the world, for everything has in it three — something of which it consists, a form by which it is distinguished, and an end — we recognise at once an assonance to our general doctrine, nor less its repetition when we come to hear Böhme say, "All the things of the world are made in the likeness of triplicity in unity, that is, in the likeness of God."

This, again, on the part of Augustin, is somewhat in the same way philosophical: "The divine spirit is the fulness of eternal and immutable ideas, which are the forms and types of all things. These things, then, are only through participation in the ideas, as finite reason is itself only through participation in infinite reason." Abelard's follower, Johannes Parvus Sarisberiensis, seems to have participated in the general theistic or pantheistic tendency of his time, "The creative and life-giving spirit of God," he says, "fills (implet and replet) not only the mind of man, but also every creature which is contained in the universe. For the substance of the creature is not without God; everything that is is what it is only by participation of him." Much later, the theosophical mystic Tauler takes, like Augustin, the Christian Trinity into the triplicity of the notion when for him, "God remains within himself, goes out from himself, and returns again into himself": so symbolising the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Latter still, Raymund of Sabunde has it that "No creature is aught but a letter written by the finger of God"; and that "The universe of things ought to be believed ordained principally for this, that, through it,

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as though a highway, pathway, or some natural stair provided with steps firm and fixed, a man might proceed and ascend within the sanctuary of his own self, where he may see and know himself, and find, with wonder and surprise, his own infinite value, power, and the inestimable riches hidden within himself." It is the conviction of Bruno, "That all that is is filled with one spirit, and that all that lives is properly only one life that pervades all and is in all." Zorzi of Venice asserts the world, in so many words, to be "an infinite living individual that through a soul is maintained in the power of God." Nay, centuries previously, Aquinas had almost said the same thing: "All creatures stand in certain relations to each other and to God; and so they belong, then, through this order, to one and the same unity, and constitute, consequently, only one and the same all-world." To Campanella, "The end-aim of Nature is Man—the end-aim of Man, God." He believes in knowledge through experience, even outer experience; but there is for him also "an inner experience—not only a natural, but also a supernatural Revelation—truth, as it were, through an inner touch." Of the world, Vanini echoes some ancient voices which we may have already heard: "The world is, as God, one and not one, all and not all. It is like to itself and unlike; immutable and mutable, of birth eternal and of birth in time." These are contraries, and it is remarkable to hear another schoolman (William of Auvergne) giving in his adhesion to as much: "All that is consists of contraries; and so the world is composed not only of corporeal, but also of spiritual beings: for no member of the antithesis were capable of existing without the other—if, then, there is, as is undeniable, what is corporeal, there must be, and just there*for*, also what is spiritual?" We see the same

doctrine in Böhme, as when he speaks of light and of fire: "See! if light were taken out from the fire (which, of course, cannot be);—then it would lose, firstly, its essence, whereby it shines and lights up; secondly, it were become impotent and had forfeited its life." An ingenious *propos* of Aquinas illustrates the involuntariness of this antithesis in nature: "He who denies that truth is, grants that truth is; for if truth is not, it is still true that truth is not." Most wonderful are the innumerable expressions of Jacob Böhme that go home to the very deepest depths of such theosophic vision. "Liftest thou thy thoughts to God and truly thinkest thou him, then breakest thou through the heaven of heavens and hast in thy hold God himself by his heart of holiness: The universe is nothing else than the creaturely made substantiality of God himself: God is hid in the centre of the inmost birth of every creature, and is not known unless only in and through the spirit of man as by him enlightened: Sin proper comes from the arrogance of one's self-will: Enterest thou with the spirit of thy will into the love of God, then abidest thou a holy spirit in the will of God: Man with his inmost spirit shall labour solely in the Mysterium of God; and so, then, the spirit of God helps him to search out and understand likewise all that is without: But the soul has also its own life and a centre of nature in its own power; God's spirit and the soul's spirit are two persons, then, which have each its own will."

The assonance of all these passages from the history of ages, even when indirect, is still ready to be seen: I specially quote the last little extract in memory of my own illustration of the *water-drop* that is to be found in my annotations to Schwegler (p. 442). By way of application, I may conclude here, so far, with a

reference to Linnæus, who relates it of himself: "All things went unhappily with me so long as I was minded to resent injustice; but when I changed my mind and left all to God, then everything went well with me ever after." Penalty, he says, is the judgment of God from which there is no escape; and he calls repeatedly to his son, as the very legacy he has to bequeath him, Innocue vivito: Numen adest!

What we have last belongs, no doubt, chronologically to the modern world; still, presumably, it will not really derange its place. To the modern world, indeed, I know not that there can be any lengthened relative reference until we approach Kant and his followers. Descartes, Spinosa, *al.*, did, in truth, treat philosophy (so to speak) imperially; but Locke presently deflected it into a mere *Erkenntnisslehre*, or theory of perception; and this remained pretty well (even Berkeley and Hume not apart) the whole aspect of philosophy in Great Britain till—possibly!—1865, and the *Secret of Hegel*. In short, there are only four men into whom we have to look for contributions here—Bacon, Descartes, Spinosa, and Leibnitz. And from the first of them, Bacon, we have more to acknowledge than at least in England we are usually taught to expect. The sterility of that vestal virgin has been often enough dinned into us—Causarum finalium inquisitio sterilis est, et tanquam virgo Deo consecrata, nihil parit; nevertheless, a deliberate consideration will show Bacon not to have been averse to final causes, truly such, in themselves, but to the injury done to true physical causes by the speciosis et umbratilibus causis introduced in fanciful, study-chair interpretation of natural phenomena. Bacon is certainly to be given his place at the head of all modern experimental science and of general inductive philosophy; but that is no reason

why his attitude to—say at once *metaphysic*, should be either reversed or ignored. In what he says himself at least there is as much respect for metaphysic as for physic itself: only that the hope of rescuing the latter from neglect (due to a barren Logic) and into profit (refused by the same) has been the means of directing attention, specially, to the investigation, commendation, and encouragement of the one (physical) side rather than the other (metaphysical) side. Nay, there is some reason for saying that, after all, it was the "natural magic" of "*forms*" that had most power upon him:[1] qui formas novit, is, etc. For Bacon, too, there was "a triple object of philosophy, God, Nature, Man."

The very start of Descartes is at once our principle itself; that is his single *πού στῶ*—*cogito*—the self-conscious subject. It is in self-consciousness, too, that for Descartes the single criterion of truth lies. The very definition of substance in Descartes, as well as in Spinosa, actually *names*, as we have already seen, the Ego. By substance Descartes says he understands rem quæ ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum; and that is identical with the id of Spinosa, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei. That is the causa sui, the cause of itself, which, like the Ego, is of "an essence that involves existence or of a nature that cannot be conceived unless existing." Then we have in both the three which for Bacon constitute the universe. For him they were Deus, Natura, Homo; for Descartes, Deus, extensio and cogitatio; and for Spinosa we have only to substitute for God, Substance. Later philosophers, as it may occur to us at once here, claim for themselves *Geist* as the true name of Substance; and it is the custom of Spinosa at least to *call* his Substantia, Deus.

[1] But see my *Gifford Lectures*, pp. 51 sqq.

Spinosa's prescript, To see all sub specie æternitatis, may be referred to here as an assonance very much in point. It means precisely what, later, the so perpetually recurrent *Speculative* means: That we are to see all from the standpoint of *the eternal necessity*, not as in time, but as in the Notion, through which notion is the All, and the All is God's eternal revelation. I am not to see my thought as *my* thought, not my being as *my* being, but as the thought and being of God—concrete spirit. The Neo-Platonists, not negatively, like the Skeptics with the Stoics and Epicureans, but affirmatively in their absolutely concentrated Ego, brought themselves into unity with absolutely concentrated thought itself, a living person, the Absolute. That is the one Eingeschlossenheit.[1]

This Eingeschlossenheit of abstract self-consciousness is what constituted *Hamann*; and to see it in him well illustrates the general indication. It is impossible to conceive of anything more singly ingrained than that self-consciousness of his. An abstractly intense ego, centred and concentred in the one point, the very vitality itself of his own pineal gland—that was Hamann. So much a self and self-righteous was he that, even when flagrantly wrong, convictedly and self-convictedly wrong—a sinner, he would not for a moment hear of a question, he would not for a single moment, for all that, hear of as much as a doubt: he was a saint still, and he had still his patent of commission direct from almighty God. He knew that he was Christianly orthodox. "It seems to me," for example,

[1] This they effect in America, as it seems, by what they call, "The Anæsthetic Revelation." Mr. Benjamin Paul Blood is the authority here; and there is a letter of Tennyson's to him (but with omission of Mr. Blood's name) in the second volume of Tennyson's *Life*.

he says, "that without the so-called mystery of the Trinity there is no possibility whatever of any teaching of Christianity at all: both beginning and end fail." And so it is that, in the parrhesia of his intense orthodoxy, he calls *the pudenda of religion* what are to him its most sacred doctrines, at the same time that he reprobates as ultra-piety any syllable of a word to *be*-snip (prune) them, and equally as rabidness any syllable of a word to *de*-snip (castrate) them (Aberglaube selbige zu *beschneiden*—Raserei sie gar *auszuschneiden*)! Evidently such a man, in ordinary life, could, in the stubbornness of his self-will, only prove strangely double-edged and, whether for the right or the wrong, curiously unsatisfactory; but still, with all, he was Hamann—*der Magus aus Norden*, the friend of Kant, almost more than friend to Herder and Jacobi, quite a marvel of the most peculiar genius to the demigod Goethe,—and even from that intense narrowness, that condensed intellectualness, he drew wealth—wealth which was a breadth of subtlety and wit. And so, as it was self-concentration that acted on Plotinus, Proclus, and the rest, similarly, too, though with a difference, it was self-concentration that acted on Hamann. Nay, I know not but that, nearer us, self-concentration was the vital point both in Carlyle and in Emerson,—in Carlyle as with the bite of fire, in Emerson as with the caress of light.

And yet, again, what of the other side?—what of the *Aufgeklärters*—the chosen few in whom alone was knowledge, truth, the precious peculium of eyesight? Was it not self-concentration that made them too? Was there one single thought in their whole soul but the one single thought—the "lie"? Fire-eyed, mobile-lipped, spasm-breathed, nervous-gestured, agitatedly inarticulate, or, with a pant, only demi-semi-articulate,

the Aufgeklärter of the adverse Walter Scott period had a crouching look, as though he glared at all in the lurid light of that "*lie*." Shakespeare was, but too commonly, livid in that light, and Milton. It very visibly brightened on Pope, or on Hume, or on Voltaire and the French generally. Aufgeklärters approved very much of mathematics and political economy; they were partial to science—physical science, and preferably astronomy, as it so contrasted with the "lie"! What a relief it was to each of them when a few of them got together! There was a cheerful hum in the air then; and the room was comfort. No breast but felt relieved as of a Bramah-press. They were erect, and moved easily; they were self-possessed and ready-worded. So grandly superior they were in the loftiness of their sneer, as, in the grace before meat or the thanks after it, greatly grave, they murmured, O God, if there be a God, and in the name of thy son, if thou hast a son! Then they were so polite: what Aufgeklärter, when you entered to him, but got up from his seat with a breath and graciously waived you to it! for did not *politesse oblige*, and what could be more politesse than to offer what was his, as what could be more his than what you saw was last his—the very chair he sat on?[1]

We pass to Leibnitz: and late illustrations will be excused, we doubt not, in view of the single theme which we would alone present—concrete *Geistigkeit*, concrete intellectuality, mind, soul, spirit, self-consciousness, Ego: *Idealism—true* Idealism!

Now, the single distinctive scheme of Leibnitz is simply constitutive of all that.

[1] In leaving Spinosa I may remark that Ueberweg (iii. 81) speaks of the *natura naturans*, etc., as to be found "in the Scholastics" (no one named) as well as in Bruno. Of the Scholastics, I have seen "*natura naturat*" in Lull alone.

Time and Space are to Leibnitz only confused intellection; and what is real in the world is but a mass of Monads, each incorporeal and each a soul. What can be called real itself, then, is, as in every member immaterial, self-evidently nothing whatever but a single ideal point; and if my water-drop, as in the Schwegler annotations (p. 442), be taken at once as the mass *and* the point, not only will the general idea come more clearly and closely home, but the relation of God, as the divine monad, to the rest, will, in a flash, leap to the eyes, and with much more ease and satisfaction of intelligence than as it appears in Leibnitz. God, then, will be transparent as the Ego of the egoes.

The successive degrees in the monads are instructive: —"Un tel vivant (qui possède, c'est à dire, une perception accompagnée de mémoire) est appelé *animal* [ζῶον], comme sa monade est appelée une *âme*; et quand cette âme est élevée jusq'à la raison, on la compte parmi les *esprits*" (*Principes de la Nature et de la Grace*). It is thus we are to understand the distinction between *soul* and *spirit*; at the same time that we are to carry it with us also that there is *life* everywhere, in all the monads, even before the *animal*.

It may be useful to add here as regards *immediate* when applied in cognition, this from the *Nouveaux Essais*: "Tout ce que nous connaissons *immédiatement* est réduit ou à des premières expériences de fait; ou à des premières lumières de raison; les unes et les autres sont incapables d'être prouvées et peuvent être appellées *immédiates*."

As is known, Leibnitz added to the principle of contradiction that of sufficient reason; and his motive was the necessity of this latter in order to pass from mathematics (where the former held good) to physics (where it was insufficient). It was for the dynamical element of

fact, then, existence, event, that the new principle was added. That is, consequently, this: the old principle being *analytic*, the new was *synthetic*. But this latter word was not used then; it is the result of much later findings. Kant will be found to say as much as this when (*W. W.*, i. 479), against Eberhard, he is obliged (with some indignation) to set his own principle (of the *à priori* conditions of the possibility of experience) in quite another region. It is *jetzt*, only "now," he says, that the principle added by Leibnitz is seen to be capable of being characterised as, in its application, synthetic. "When his adherent," he adds, "gives out this hint for something that was then a want, as the (now found) principle itself (of synthetic cognition), wherewith Leibnitz shall have been supposed to have made a new discovery, does he not but expose him to derision, while thinking that he was delivering his eulogy."

There is a sort of doing justice both to Leibnitz and to Kant here, in bringing them together, as we pass from the former to the latter.

CHAPTER X

The German Reference—Kant[1]

1. Hume and Causality

We may say that Kant, for his part, opens thus:—

"I freely acknowledge that the questionings of David Hume were what, many years ago, first broke my dogmatic slumber and, to my inquiries in the field of speculative philosophy, gave a wholly new course. I was far from giving ear to him in his conclusions, which had only this source, that he did not take up his problem as a whole, but hit only on a part of it, without the possibility, consequently, of a complete resolution. To start from a well-founded thought which a first man shall have left unfinished warrants the hope that another with renewed consideration may go further than the first, though it is to him we owe what lay in the suggestion.

"I tried, then, first of all, whether Hume's point in view were not capable of being made general, and presently discovered that the idea in the correlation of cause and effect was by a great deal not the only one through which the understanding *à priori* thinks connections of things, but rather that metaphysic as a whole just consists of such. I sought, then, further, to ascertain their number, and as this succeeded to my wish of finding it to depend on a single principle, I proceeded to the *deduction* of these ideas themselves, assured now that they were not, as Hume had apprehended, derivatives of experience, but primaries of pure understanding. This deduction, which to my acute-thinking predecessor seemed impossible,—which no one but he had ever even thought of (though every one contentedly made use of the ideas themselves, without

[1] As simply the key to all philosophy as such at present, attention is specially invited to this chapter.

asking on what their objective validity founded),—this, I say, was the hardest task that could ever be undertaken for the sake of metaphysic, and, what was worst of all, metaphysic, as much of it as was only anywhere to be found, could not of itself be of the slightest assistance to me, inasmuch as just said deduction was to make *it* (metaphysic) even first of all possible! As now it succeeded with me to solve Hume's problem not merely in one particular case, but in respect of the entire faculty of pure reason, I was able to take sure, though always only slow, steps, in order to determine at last the whole compass of pure reason, as well in its limits as in its content,—completely and on general principles; which was precisely what metaphysic required for the completion of its system on a sure plan. I apprehended, however, that it would prove with this, the completion of the problem as a whole (namely, the Kritik of Pure Reason), as it had fared with it when it was first proposed"—misapprehension, etc., namely.

To answer Hume's question, then, was for Kant to complete the entire transcendental philosophy—the Kritik of Pure Reason. And what is the transcendental philosophy? That is transcendental that is an element of the *à priori* provision for the possibility of experience. Then experience means our ordinary life—leave alone feelings within—of perception without. That is, the Transcendental Philosophy, on the whole, is—Kant's Theory of Perception.

2. Kant's Theory of Perception

But what is that Theory?

We have sensations, impressions of sense. They, so far, are all that we know. With perfect conviction we assume that they are due to things without; but in knowing only their impressions on us, we know not at all these things themselves. If the impressions, by their presence, so far reveal these Things-in-Themselves, they further also, even by that, their presence, altogether conceal them. We know the bite, but not what bites.

The skin knows the scratch; it knows nothing of the thorn.

But now, Time and Space are not impressions: time is not the impression of an object; space is not the impression of an object. Nevertheless, *objects* necessarily and universally presuppose *them*,—not, however, that though necessary and universal, they are not themselves objects, but only merely general notions, merely general ideas. No; they are still *sensibilia*, not *cogitabilia*,—*percepta*, not *concepta*. They are general forms of sense, innate, native to the mind, *à priori* endowments.

3. Schemata

So far we have indeed cognitions We have the privilege and the freedom of a whole world of impressions in time and space. But that whole world is still within: the Universals of it, Time and Space; and not less the Impressions, the Particulars of it. Is it so, then, that we are thus cabined, cribbed, confined, bound in to our own internality, restricted to subjectivity alone —the subjectivity of ourselves? Not so: if we are cramped into subjectivity by sense, we shall be enlarged into objectivity by intellect. It is the Categories shall set us free—it is to the Categories we shall owe complete Experience, a finished Perception. The Categories, namely, out of the manifold of time—the manifold in its series of moments, shall construct so many pure sense-schemata, into which received, as into *à priori* moulds, the subjectivity of impression will be realised into the objectivity of perception—even this perception which is to us the *Perception* of things, the *Experience* of a world.

But how does this apply to the problem of Hume, and how is it that it is the solution of it? We shall presently give Kant's own express, direct answer here;

but, for a full understanding, it may be necessary to premise something of his own preliminary explanations.

The most important of these certainly concern the mentioned pure *sense-schemata*.

"It is clear that there must be a *tertium quid*, which shall be on the one side, homogeneous with the category, and, on the other, homogeneous with the sensation, and so make possible the application of the former to the latter. This mediating condition must be pure *intellectual* (*i.e.*, be without anything empirical) on one side, and, on the other, *sensible*. Such a condition is the *transcendental* schema. . . . Thus there will be possible an application of the category to sensations, by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the categories, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former. . . . The general process of imagination to give a *notion* its symbol—I call this the schema to the notion" (ii. 123, 125).[1]

4. Certain Schemata Fail

The interest now, then, is for us to see these schemata, but still not more particularly than the reference to causality requires.

We shall hardly be wrong if we say that, even in this peculiar schematism of his, Kant's general machinery went for a long time smooth. Quantity had come first, and in Quantity it had been manifest at once that constitutive categories of unity, plurality, and totality would, as à priori *unities* (form), have no difficulty in finding for themselves, whether in pure space or pure time, quite an abundance of correspondent à priori *manies* (matter). There *à priori* sense and *à priori* understanding could be accordant at once. In Quality, too, if it took explanation, it did not take a long one to satisfy one's mind, on Kant's own terms, that there as well the constitutive categories (reality, negation, limitation) might quite well

[1] Transcendental determination of time, however Brobdignagian it may look, means here only pure time.

supply themselves with a pure correspondent filling from the pure sense quarries of time and space. Even a seventh Category, inherence and subsistence (substance and accident), was not without its demonstrable parallels whether temporal or spatial: both time and space, that is, were as substance to their own units, inasmuch as these units respectively inhered, subsisted in each as a whole. With the eighth and ninth Categories, however, there surely came a check. As one sees, we name, with time, space; but that is scarcely Kant's own way, who, on the whole, drops space, and confines himself to time. Now, it is impossible to discover any many in time as such that will correspond to the respective unities in dependence and community (causality and reciprocity). The moments of time, as the parts of space, are in an indifferent succession, the one to the other; but it is impossible to see in either any order of constituents that will correspond to the characteristic order, whether in dependence or community. In the one, the *order* may not, as such, differ; but in the other it differs out and out. Antecedent does indeed precede Consequent, as moment precedes moment in time; but still the respective relation is an altogether different one. The antecedent determines the consequent; but one moment of time only follows the other in an all-indifferent continuity.

And the incongruity, as just said, is still more glaring in the case of reciprocity. There the constituents are all at once and together; they act and react mutually: you can take them in any order, forwards, backwards, this way, that way; but the order of the units in time is the most inflexible in the universe. Surely it would be a very vain thing to seek to find a schema of reciprocity in time as time, make it as *à priori* and as pure as you like!

5. An Insufficient Remedy—the Rules

Here, then, there was at once an *impasse*: to turn one's face from causality and reciprocity to time itself was suddenly to come short up against a dead wall. What was to be done? Were we to be stopped half-way, and a so happily reached half-way? Intolerable! Still, turn it and twist it as we like, there was no help for it. No ingenuity in the world could make anything, in the way we wanted, of pure time; while as for impure time, to turn for help to it would be so plainly an attempt, as Kant himself says elsewhere, to milk the he-goat, that there were scarcely a possibility of its being ever at any time for a moment thought of. What! an *à priori* schema in the *à posteriori* of time—as well set sail to bring home square circles and round squares! Nevertheless, if schemata were not to be found—and thus far on our road, they *must be* found!—if schemata were not to be found in pure time, it was only in impure time that, at any possible time, they could be found. So, really, it was out of impure time, as alone at least is to be construed from the facts, that Kant did in the end construct, both for causality and reciprocity, his schema. Denied abstract time, he had nothing to fall back upon but concrete time. What of the *contents* of time—could he construct a schema out of them? Reflection here in the end could only come to this—long reflection in the end could only come to this. So long as these contents were impure, the thing was clearly impossible. But what if they were purified, cleansed—into an ultimate abstract? Such ultimate abstract would be an ultimate generalè, an ultimate universalè. But such fruit of an ultimate generalisation, of an ultimate universalisation, might itself be regarded as an *à priori*. So far, then, of an *à priori* validity, it

would be perfectly in case to be allowably used as *à priori* matter for *à priori* form. This, now,—let the heuristic reflection have been, short or long, quite as it might,—is precisely what Kant, in effect, did do. I say *in effect*; for Kant himself gives no hint of any generalisation, but names at once "a Rule."

"The schema of the cause and the causality of a thing in general is the Realè on which, when it is at any time given, something else always follows. It consists, therefore, in the succession of the units of the complex, in so far as this succession is under the control of a rule."

"The schema of the community (reciprocity) or of the mutual causality of substances, in regard of their accidents, is the coexistence of the determinations of the ones with those of the others, under a general rule."

These are Kant's own words, and they will probably substantiate all that has been said, hypothetically, of Kant's relatively heuristic proceedings. Rule! a rule!—there could be no such rule in time itself—where else, then, could it be but in the contents of time? The pivot of the schema relatively could no longer be placed in the abstract moments of time, but possibly only in the concrete contents of time, but—generalised: a something so and so qualified *of itself*—certainly *in* time (like everything else!), but not, by one iota, *from* time. Put shortly, on this understanding, what the schema of causality (with which we have more particularly to do) comes to is this: Something which, when it is, Something else always follows. In fact, Kant himself (iii. 6) puts it in this short way to Hume: "Because Something is, Something else, also, must necessarily be." It is repeated, indeed, only a little more fully, when he adds: "Hume challenged reason to answer him with what right she thinks to herself that there can be something such that, when it is given, something else is also

thereby necessarily given; for that is what the notion of a cause says."

The challenge, then, specially to Kant, which is our affair at present, is to explain, as we may now name it, How there can be Something such that, when it is, Something else also necessarily is; "for that is what the notion of a cause says."

"That is what the *notion* of a cause says"! But that is precisely what, at this very moment, Kant says, the *schema* of a cause says: are we to understand, then, that the two are identical? It is hardly possible to suppose that Kant himself, if the question were put to him so, would answer, Yes.

6. Kant's Causality a mere Fiasco

Still, we see that Kant unconsciously admits here that his schema adds nothing to his category: that is, his category must go at once into the facts, unmediated into them by any *tertium quid*.

Now we have to confess that, in what Kant writes as regards causality in his so never-ending pages of the *Kritik of Pure Reason*—to confine ourselves thus, and not to mention reciprocity—we seem to have nothing before us but a veritable imbroglio of doubt and difficulty; and that we cannot help suspecting the cause of this to be, confusion in the mind of Kant himself under an irresistible dread of foredoomed failure precisely in that one point in which to fail would bring mere ruin on the whole.

And surely it was natural that there should be some such horrible sense of impending bale under the consciousness or semi-consciousness that must have again and again haunted him, even as he involuntarily expanded and expanded what, as critically determinative, ought, in its decision, to have been critically brief. But

be that as it may, it is certainly not well possible, after —as we have just seen (in the quotation from ii. 123) —the clearness and emphasis with which Kant has asserted the necessity of a *tertium quid* between the category on the one hand and the things of special sense on the other, not to wonder at the exceptional disproportion of length with which he seems unable to cease prosing, this way and that way, and so unsatisfactorily, on causality. And these same few words, be it said, just quoted (p. 112) from ii. 123, completely represent the whole Kantian mechanism by which there is the infusing of necessity and objectivity into the contingency and subjectivity of sense under action on it of categories, through schemata of time as time. That, then, these schemata, we have to recognise as the *tertium quid* concerned; and it is precisely because of what concerns that *tertium quid of time* that Kant fails to satisfy his reader or—himself! Not but that in the end, as we shall presently see, Kant regained, or seems to have regained, complete equanimity, or at least assurance of speech,—by simple forgetfulness, it may be, or by a somewhat intentionally blind confidence in time as still adequate to the schematisation of causality after all, the rather that he never failed to repeat to himself that what we had in consciousness were not things in themselves, but only the impressions of such, while it was not causality alone, but the whole general problem, that he had in hand.

7. Closer Explanations—Sense

The general title to the Analogies of Experience runs: "Experience is only possible through the conception of a necessary connection of the perceptions of sense." In the first edition of the *Kritik* the same title was thus different: All perceptions of sense, in regard to their

wholly unknown to us—utterly hidden from us by the veil of its very impressions themselves. As already said, we know the *bite*, but not *what* bites: the skin knows the scratch; it knows nothing of the thorn. So to speak, my general space-and-time sheet within my consciousness is butterflied all over with sensations, impressions; and it is the single object of my transcendental philosophy, of my Kritik of Pure Reason, to disclose the machinery by which these mere appearances within are converted into the actual things of perception in experience without. This—all through—is fundamental with Kant.

And why it is fundamental with Kant that things should, in the first place, be such mere appearances is plain from this, that were they not so, were they things in themselves and brought with them their own, so to speak, determined and determining concrete, there would be no room for my machinery, there would be no need for my machinery: they would be there a machinery of their own, to which my machinery could not apply. "*Things-in-Themselves*," he says (ii. 755), "would—necessarily, and independently of any understanding that might cognise them—bring their own *Gesetzmässigkeit*" (their own statutoriness, or constitution on rules of their own). Whereas, so long as they are mere sensations, mere impressions, mere appearances, mere random butterflies on my white sheet within, from whence I know not, they are in the clutch of my machinery within, into which they are received, and which can thenceforth arrange them as *its* own laws dictate (see here, too, iii. 53).

8. Categories—Construction and Connection

Passing now, then, at once to the Second Analogy (Causality), and remaining by it, we observe here, too,

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conditions. It is this we have to see as regards the Second Analogy, Causality.

9. The Second Analogy—Categories

And here the passage with which Kant prefaces, in his second edition, the exposition of his first, begins pretty nearly by saying that the Erscheinungen, the units of sensation (which constitute the first part of the relative consciousness), cannot themselves *connect*, and if or when connected, must have received connection from elsewhere. That elsewhere, he then says (and it is a recognition on *his* part of *the state of the fact* on which *we* lay weight peculiarly as regards time if attempted to be made a constituent of the special categories, or their alleged schemata, of causality and reciprocity), *cannot be time itself; it is not time that shall determine their order*! What, then? Why, he says, one or other must be determined as first, and one or other must be determined as second; and that can be attained solely by the action of a pure notion of understanding—here the category of cause and effect: only as so determined are the sensations *objects of experience.*

That may be; but where is the rationale? Hume says custom connects, and Kant says—here at least restrictively (*i.e.*, without reference to schemata, etc.)—a category connects. So far, does not one feel that there is something of intelligible suggestion in Hume, while Kant—even granting him to have made good a whole table of *à priori* mental categories, of which causality is one—has only asserted, in no way reasoned out, any superinduction of the category on to the sensations?

After all that he has argued about the necessity of a *tertium quid* to mediate between notion of understanding (category) and impression of sense, are we to find Kant

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let us proceed to business—
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from the eventual concrete

ship driving down stream. My
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apprehension of these appear-
n down stream and then again

up. The order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is here, therefore, fixed, and to this order these perceptions are bound. In the previous example of a house, my perceptions in the apprehension of it could begin with the top and end with the bottom, or, equally well also, begin here and end there. They might, for that matter, quite as well also follow the complex of the empirical object from right to left, or, again, from left to right. In the series of these perceptions, then, there was no fixed order—no order which necessarily prescribed where, in the apprehension, I should make my beginning, in order to convert its complex into the due empirical synthesis. Such necessity of rule, however, is always present in any case of an *event* [as that of the ship], and the order of the consecutive perceptions (in the apprehension of the sensible facts) is thereby rendered necessary."

He may be speaking in the above from an objective or from a subjective point of view; that is so far, after all, indifferent, considering what we have to hear next:—

"I shall therefore, in this case, necessarily derive the *subjective consequence* of the apprehension from the *objective consequence* in the event, because the former, for the rest, is quite undetermined, and distinguishes no affection from the other. Alone it proves nothing of the connection of the affections (the units of complex) in the object, for it is quite indifferent (beliebig). This connection will consist, therefore, in the order of the units of affection, according to which order the apprehension of the one (that happens) follows on that of the other (that precedes)—on *a rule*. Only thereby can I be warranted to say of the event itself, and not merely of my apprehension: that there is a consequence to be found in that former, which signifies as much as that I cannot otherwise place the apprehension than precisely in that sequence."

I cannot blame myself for the translation here. It certainly does not convey a bit more lamely than the original that which it is intended to convey. Elsewhere (*Text-Book to Kant*, 299 and 502) I interpret the first words of the same passage thus: "In this case, therefore, it is from the *objective suite* of the facts that I must infer the *subjective suite* in apprehension; for this latter suite (of mere units in sense) is, as such, quite undetermined." Evidently, in either rendering I take the meaning to be

that every full-formed case of causality must, as a consciousness, have had first the mere constituent sensations, and *in such wise* that on their rule the category acted. I do not know that the rest of the passage will be easily found to be in consistency with this interpretation; and I do not know that many readers will be well satisfied with the general exposition all about here, involving, as it does, particular reference to most essential details of the whole theory. There is, to call it so, a ragged prolixity for the most part present, which, let its source be, or let it not be, some confusion in the mind of Kant, is, at least, not ill adapted to confuse others. And yet, Kant has just said—"but now, fairly to take up the problem before us (nun lasst uns zu unserer Aufgabe fortgehen)"!

But, be all as it may, I hold Kant's ruling on the point immediately concerned to be precisely as I put it. It seems somewhat of an inversion to be asked to derive what was first, the crude embryo, from what was last, the finished tree. Nevertheless, to proceed so brings out perfectly well the state of the case. Such and such a form of the end necessarily implies such and such a form of the beginning. The suite of the notions guides to the suite of the sensations; and the latter must have been what was first—namely, certain awarenesses of sense, and in a certain order. But that amounts to Kant's first "rule," the rule in sense, the rule subjective—or, in a word, that amounts to the state of the sensory which is precedent to, and wholly determinative of, the state of the intellect and the rule of the intellect, the state categorical and the rule categorical.

But why is not sense enough,—where is the necessity of a category at all?

To this we have Kant's own answer in the above. "I derive," he says, "the *subjective suite* (Folge) of

apprehension from the *objective suite* (Folge) of the Erscheinungen, because the former, for the rest, is quite undetermined, and distinguishes no Erscheinung from the other." That the subjective suite of apprehension is quite undetermined—that is the answer I mean, and, no doubt, *involves* that, only subjective so far, they require a category any further. But I fear that no reader of the German will—without assistance—at all succeed, within any reasonable limits of time or patience, in making clear to himself what, in all these pages, Kant exactly means by "Erscheinung," or what he exactly means by his "Regel." Again and again this astonishing Regel is surely spoken of as only subsequent to the category, and again and again, no less surely — if occasionally for nothing but the common sense of the position—as *precedent* to it. In fact, I honestly believe that any final determination of the difficulty would have been quite impossible—but for the *Prolegomena*!

10. Reference to the "Prolegomena"

We quote at once, and in Kant's own italics and small capitals:—

"*Empirical Judyments, so far as they have objective validity, are* Judgments of Experience; *those, again, which are only subjectively valid, I name mere* Judgments of Sense-Perception. The latter require no pure notion of the understanding, but only the logical connection of the sense-perceptions in a thinking subject. The former, however, always require, in addition to the units presented in sensuous perception, *special notions à priori generated in the understanding*, which just make it that the judgment of experience is objectively valid.

"All our judgments are, in the first instance, simple judgments of sense-perception; they are valid merely for us, that is, for our *subject*, and only afterwards do we give them a new reference, namely, to an *object*. . . . That the room is warm, sugar sweet, wormwood bitter, are judgments merely subjectively valid,—I call them judgments of sense-perception. . . . But before a judgment of

perception can become a judgment of experience, it is necessary that the sense-perception should be subsumed under a category. . . . The judgment of experience must, to the sense-perception, and its logical connection in a subjective judgment (when, through comparison, it has been made universal—*allgemein*), add something which determines the synthetic judgment as necessarily and universally valid. That something is the category. . . . When I say, experience tells me something, I always mean only the sense-perception which lies in the experience; *e.g.*, that, on the shining of the sun on a stone, heat *always* (*jederzeit*) follows. . . . Logic gives me *à priori* the form of antecedent and consequent. There may, possibly now, in *a perception of sense*, be found *a rule of relation* which declares that on a certain impression of sense another (but not conversely) *constantly* (*beständig*) follows, and this is a case to make use of the judgment of antecedent and consequent, and, for example, say, when a body has been *long enough in the sun* it becomes warm" (pp. 58, 59, 60, 61, 65, 67, 71, 75).

"I may have ever so often, and others may have ever so often, perceived the circumstance [that a stone in the sun warms]: the sense-perceptions, so far, find themselves only *usually* (*gewöhnlich*) so connected (62). Sense can only show us that *often*, and, when it rises high, commonly (*gemeiniglich*), on one state of things another follows" (80).

It is not difficult to see that the exposition above is to this effect: that causality, that the usual inference in daily life to the universality and necessity of connection between the effect and its cause, rests on two rules: a rule in the understanding (a category), and a rule in sense. Of these two rules the latter, as in nature the actual process is constituted, must precede the former. And we remind here of how it was the exigency of the facts that drove Kant to this rule in sense; which, really, is matter of positive statement as certainly in the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, as here in the *Prolegomena*, though most assuredly in the latter much more distinctly and clearly, much less obscured or effaced by the perturbed involution and disconcerted circumlocution of a suddenly seen and unexpected difficulty. It was a prime necessity

with him that a *tertium quid* of pure time should mediate the facts of sense into the notion, category, of the understanding. But, after he had gone on quite triumphantly with pretty well all the other categories, he was all at once pulled short up by those of causality and reciprocity, in regard to which it was absolutely impossible that there could be found anything in pure time that would at all suit. And so he was forced to feign a rule or rules in the conceivable contents of time. I have said that by strict generalisation it was possible to exhibit an empirical fact, so that it might pass as to that extent *à priori* that it was general, that it was a universal. By no other way than by such generalisation could Kant come to the rule in the sense-units that would be characteristic of either causality or reciprocity. Kant, however, even in *declaring* the rule, says no more of a possible generalisation than that a logical comparison produces the rule, and afterwards speaks of this rule as that it *may possibly* be *found* in a perception of sense. One can only speculate that he may have recoiled even from the mere mention, so far, of—*a universal in sense*, simply because to grant a universal in sense would be to render the use of any category idle—would be, in fact, just to stultify his whole enterprise in advance. He may have thought, too, if I grant the possibility of universals even in sense that shall be as good as anything *à priori*, that shall be substantially *à priori*, how can I argue that time and space are *à priori*? Might not these, too, quite as reasonably be maintained to be similar empirical universals?

In the quotation above, further, we see that it is ruled that the judgments of sense-perception "require no pure notion of the understanding, but only the logical connection of the sense-perceptions in a thinking subject." This gives to think at once, What can this *logical* element be, that is not to have anything to do with any notion of

the understanding, and that is still involved in units of sense alone! Presently, however, we are informed that it is a "logical connection in a subjective judgment when, through comparison, it has been made ***allgemein*** (universal)." And then we are directly further informed that the result of this logical connection, this logical comparison, and this logical universality is the rule, the first rule, the rule in sense, the "*rule of relation*, which declares that on a certain impression of sense another (but not conversely) *constantly* follows, in which case I have reason to apply the judgment of antecedent and consequent, and, for example, say, when a body has been long enough in the sun it becomes warm." From this it is evident that the judgment of antecedent and consequent is the second rule, the second rule that follows the first—that is, the second rule depends on the first; the second rule would act only *after* the first acted. The second rule would not act at all unless it had a reason to act. The relation implied is given as *logical*; it is even by logical *comparison* given as *universal*—undeniably a *logical universal* therefore. Here, then, there is at once, in the bare situation, a relation of antecedent and consequent. Nay, more! Here there is at once, in the bare situation, *doubly* a relation of antecedent and consequent! Even in sense there are two units given, and these two units are given—*actually given*—in no other relation than in that of antecedent and consequent. The antecedent always determines the consequent; and the consequent is always determined by the antecedent. Now, with sense alone, or in the first stage or fact of the situation, it is *given* that one unit *must* precede and the other *must* follow. That *must* be so, or else there would be an utter absence of the very thing that was wanted, the *sine qua non*, the single essential, the indispensable necessity of the case—the logicality and universality of

a connection in sense that determined the logicality and universality of a connection in understanding (through a category). The first unit, therefore, is the necessary and universal, the *apodictic* antecedent of the second unit, which is the necessary and universal, the *apodictic* consequent. It is in vain to say no: Units of mere sense in such mutual relation the one to the other—that is the absolutely postulated premiss and *prius* of all.

11. A Category not Required

Here, then, we have already in sense all that is wanted: what need is there of a category at all? The first rule, the first judgment—namely, that "logical connection of the sense-perceptions in a thinking subject" is itself the judgment, and the whole judgment, of causality.

Concurrent expressions of Kant's may, for opposition, be taken advantage of. And, in all fairness, I really believe myself to have quoted every one of these, and in an exact rendering of Kant's own words. As against the universality and apodictic necessity which we have represented to be involved and implied in the relation or connection of the units even when confined to sense, it may be said that Kant regards this connection or relation not by any means as universally, or necessarily, or apodictically, but as only *usually*, or at most *commonly*, occurrent. That is true—he does say that; but, again, he also represents it as "*always*" occurrent, as "*constantly*" occurrent, as "*by a rule*" occurrent; which rule is the rule of a connection susceptible of being made, by "*comparison*," "*universal*," and "*logically*" so. He also states it as a condition or reason for the expression "*rule*," as for those in addition of "*always*" and "*constantly*," that the connection of the mere sense-units should have been—"*long enough*." If the connection

has been long enough, then surely all that about "rule," and "always," and "constantly," and "universality" follows, and cannot but follow! Surely all that is meant!—or what else *can* be meant? Surely it is that, and that only, which "determines the synthetic judgment" with its further "necessary and universal validity"—which, as I say, in such circumstances, is a staring surplusage! (Of course, that there should be the possibility of a rule in mere contingency at all—that is Kant's affair!)

The only possible conclusion is that that "usually" and "commonly," against that "always" and "constantly," etc., is but a window into the confusion, and anxiety, and *Qu'en dirai*, still present in the mind of Kant, here in the *Prolegomena*, as much as two years later than the *Kritik of Pure Reason*. Surely it has come veritably to a *Qu'en dirai*—what, then, *am* I to say?—in the mind of Kant!

But there is the *more than this* in the *situation* already spoken of—the duplicity, namely. There are in it the *two* stages; besides the one in which, as we have just seen, there is question only of the units of sense in the apprehension of sense, there is the other of the category, which, too, has been partly seen already. Now, if we can prove in this first stage the presence at once, full-fledged, of a relation of antecedent and consequent, there is nothing to hinder us from equally proving the same thing of the second stage. That is the stage where on what concerns the *sensation* there follows all that concerns the *notion*. The first stage is the antecedent to the second, and the second is the consequent to the first. The first rule is the necessary and universal, the apodictic antecedent of the second rule; which is the necessary and universal, the apodictic consequent of the first rule. Now, the antecedent always determines the consequent;

and the consequent is always determined by the antecedent. It follows from this, then, that the first stage, the stage of sensation, which is *given* as determinative of the second stage, the stage of notion or category, is even thereby *given* as antecedent, at the same time that the second stage, the stage of notion, is not less *given* as consequent. That *must* be so, or else there would be wanting—simply the relation itself that alone constitutes the single question in hand.

Thus, then, whether we look to the first stage or whether we look to the second, there must be, for the determination of nexus, a necessary antecedent which is wholly of sense. In the first stage a sense-unit necessarily determines another sense-unit; and in the second stage the necessity that is concerned in it depends on a relation of sense; and it is that relation of sense that is determinative of the relation of the understanding, the relation of the notion, the relation of the category.

Of course, Kant *will* have the first stage to hold only of sense, and consequently, therefore, to be only contingent and subjective, and never possibly necessary and objective unless through a category; but even in asserting this to be the state of the case, he is involuntarily compelled latently to admit what he overtly denies. When he says (iii. 75), "but it is possible that there gets found in the perception a rule of relation," etc.; or again (ii. 186), "but so soon as I perceive or assume that there is in the sequent a reference to the precedent from which it follows on a rule," etc.—why, then, in both cases he virtually acknowledges that the first stage is a necessary and indispensable precursor of the second. Nay, more than that, if the first stage or judgment be in itself contingent, it certainly follows that the second stage or judgment, as founding on the first, must share its quality, and convey no authority that is not contingent likewise.

Kant admits, too, the necessity of each category being supplied with a sense-cue of its own. Things, he says (iii. 67), are brought under categories "according to the diverse form of their perception": and we read again (iii. 66) that the category determines the perception "according to one form of the judgment rather than another": and this is only repeated when (iii. 63) it is said that the categories act "according to certain general conditions of the perception." It is evident, indeed, that this must be so, or how should it be possible for a category to act at all—to act only in its own place and at its own time without confusion of categories, and without the possible interference of the one with the other. And that, too, only suggests another wonder, this: how is it possible that only twelve categories can serve—without confusion—all these innumerable sensations? If categories are such indispensable necessities of cognition—necessities without which perception itself, what we call perception, would be impossible—must not the very number of them follow in some way, and be accordant in some way, to the number of sensations? Twelve categories, but twelve—"one halfpenny worth of bread to all that intolerable deal of sack!" True, there is a time when Kant speaks of *derivatives* from the twelve, with a special name or two also; but will, on his part, any actual naming, or will any possible imagining, ever at all equate the bread to the sack? And so one wonders what would become of any stray sense-units that might chance to have no categories to meet them—poor wandered and forlornly wandering orphans with nobody to take them home! As one can see, there is at least no guarantee against such a mishap.

Of course, for all difficulties, or in all difficulties, Kant can and always does, fall back on this, that sense is only sense, sensations are only sensations, impressions are only

impressions, Erscheinungen are only Erscheinungen, and that with such alone we have only a "Spiel der Vorstellungen," only "a play of the apprehensions," in regard to which "I cannot say: that in the consciousness two states follow one another, but only: that one apprehension follows another, which is merely something *Subjective*, and determines no object" (ii. 165). But is that sufficient? Surely the impression of the stone and the impression of the sunlight *are* two states of consciousness. Still subjective, I grant. But what, then? Is not the one established as always preceding, and the other as constantly following, and this, in both, even by no less a force than the operation of a rule—a rule, too, that, let it be as subjective as you will, is still an absolute necessity, *if* there is to be any talk at all of a rule objective, a rule for the admission of a category; which, again, say what you like of it, is but a consequent—a consequent, too, that must of necessity share the very virtue of its antecedent; for it is evident that that antecedent itself must be either necessary or contingent, and if it is contingent, then, as already said, its consequent must be contingent also.

12. Categories in Two Classes

And the strange thing is that Kant himself—as is not difficult to show—was perfectly aware of what all this comes to: take, for instance, his division of his categories into two classes, one mathematical and the other dynamical. And this occurs even in his first edition—as see under the section that is headed "Systematic Idea of all the Synthetic Ground-Propositions" (which, by the bye, suggested, six years later, the sec. 11 of his second edition!). If Kant, indeed, ever sought an expedient whereby to turn the flank of his difficulties here, then his first step must have been this division of the cate-

gories into halves: there shall be a half "*Mathematical*," and there shall be a half "*Dynamical*." *Mathematical* suggests, and is no doubt suggested by, the usual figuration in space so familiar to us in geometry. *Dynamical*, in its mere etymological meaning, refers to action, and explains itself. Accordingly, we can accept at once *Mathematical* for categories of Quantity and Quality, and, with as little difficulty, *Dynamical* for such categories as Causality and Reciprocity. We may even smile to ourselves in passing, with the thought of Kant's real reason for the step. We have specially to see this, however—namely, how he will differentiate, in *position* and *validity*, the latter categories from the former ones. The difference in either respect is a very tell-tale one. We are to understand at once, for example, that while the mathematical categories are "intuitive," "constitutive," "apodictic," the dynamical ones are only "discursive," "regulative," and even "contingent." Such a difference as this strikes us at once as ominous for the champion Kant with the glove of Hume in his hand. How, "in all the world," will he be able to replace the *subjective custom* of Hume by an *objective necessity* of his own, if his expedient for the purpose is acknowledged at once to be neither intuitive nor constitutive, no, only regulative and, above all—contingent? Why, if causality is only to be contingent, what is the use of the whole huge, extraordinary, and extraordinarily artificial structure? Is Kant to profess to demonstrate necessity, and to be allowed success, when his own result he can himself only name contingency? So far for the *validity*; and, while referring for full light on the whole matter to all the relative sections of the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, we may quote from p. 140 to this effect:—

"The mathematical categories will address their synthesis to the *perception* [as it were, the visible shape], the latter to the *relative*

existence [the simple connections], of objects of sense. The *à priori* conditions of *perception* are, in regard of a possible experience, out and out necessary ; while those, again, of the *relative existence* of the objects of a possible empirical perception are in themselves only contingent. Hence the propositions that arise in the mathematical application will be unconditionally necessary, that is, apodictic ; while those that are of dynamical name will bring with them the character, indeed, of an *à priori* necessity, but only under the condition of the *empirical* thinking that shall be found in an experience of actual facts of sense. These latter, then, will exhibit this character only mediately and indirectly ; and, consequently (without prejudice to the general certainty introduced by them into experience), they will not possess the same immediate evidence which is proper and peculiar to the others. But this will come better to be judged of at the conclusion of this System of Grundsätze." (The *Text-Book to Kant*, with its Translation and Commentary, may be profitably consulted here.)

This quotation will probably suffice as concerns the *invalidity* of Kant's dynamical categories—but "without prejudice to"—their effective *validity* all the same! Here, too, of what we mean by *position* in regard of these categories an edge is shown. This edge is of what concerns an "*empirical* thinking" which is conceived to take place in some experience of actual facts. Now, by this he means his first "Regel"—a rule, which is found to present itself in certain ordinary experiences. This "Regel," as only subjective and so far contingent when presentant in sense, he will, by application of a category, raise at once into necessity and objectivity by the looking-on intellect which receives (or perceives) it.

But as concerns *position*.

In our quotation what is referent is the "*empirical* thinking," the "empirical thinking" of some certain actual empirical fact—which issues in a recognition of a complete failure on the part of the categories of relation (at least of the two of them, causality and reciprocity) to find for themselves, as required, and even alleged! any

schema in the abstract moments of *pure* time, and of their consequent compulsory resort—as it were, on second thoughts—to the *contents* of time. This is the difference of *position* between the two *classes* of categories. While both are *said* to have their schemata in time, and that a *pure* time; only in the case of one of them is there any such position, while in that of the other there is none such. Only in *empirical* rules of *the ordinary events* in time is there any possibility of finding a schema to suit, whether for the exigencies of causality or for those of reciprocity. Nay, far from taking shame or guilt to himself in such a mess, Kant, even as he keeps company with the difficulty (so far as not yet slurred out of sight by the phrase "without prejudice," etc.), waxes bolder and bolder in his recognition of, and complacency with, it. As something quite remarkable (noch merkwürdiger), he notes in his second edition (ii. 778), that, for realisation of the categories, even "*external* perceptions" are necessities—say motion for cause, and actual conditions in space for reciprocity. And yet, if he grasps so with his left hand, his right still grasps time —still grasps, for every category, time!

"One sees from all this that the schema of each category contains and makes manifest—*e.g.*, that of Quantity, the genesis (synthesis) of Time itself in the successive apprehension of an object; that of Quality, the synthesis of sensation (sense-perception) with the concept of Time, or the filling of Time;—that of Relation, the relativity of the sense-perceptions mutually at all times (*i.e.* according to a rule of the determination of Time); finally, that of Modality and its categories, Time itself as the correlate of the determination of an object, whether and how it belongs to Time. The schemata are therefore nothing but *Time-determinations* à priori on rules; and these relate, in the order of the categories, to the Time-*series*, the Time-*content*, the Time-*order*, finally the Time-*implex*, in regard of all possible objects" (ii. 128).

These, then, are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing but principles of determination in regard to the existence of

objects in Time, of which they follow the three *modi*: the relation *to* Time itself as a magnitude (the magnitude of existence, *i.e.* duration); the relation *in* Time as a series (succession); and lastly, the relation *of* Time as a sum of all actual existence (the simultaneity of things). This unity of Time-determination is wholly dynamical; *i.e.* Time is not regarded as something in which experience of the fact directly determines for each existence its own place, which is impossible, inasmuch as absolute time is no object of the perception of sense, whereby things might, as it were, be kept together" (ii. 181).

There is surely in these sentences the formal, deliberate, and perfectly conscious assertion of Time as Time forming, composing, or being an actual element, a basal element, almost an exclusive element, in the indispensable schemata which must of necessity be within call to mediate the objectivity of understanding, through the categories, into the subjectivity of sense; and thus convert the flies of sensation, which are really only *within* me, as though, too, in a spectral Time and Space, which are really also only *within* me—and thus convert, I say, my own mere flies of sensation within into all those infinite awful, astounding, and appalling interests and objects of the whole vast and immeasurable universe without. When we think, consequently, say, particularly of the categories of causality and reciprocity as not intuitive but only discursive, as not necessary but only contingent, as not constitutive but only regulative, etc. etc.—nay more, and a great deal more, when we think of all possible causalities and all possible reciprocities as having absolutely no more to do with time than this page you look at or that chair you sit on—that they are *in* time, that is, only as the page is, and as the chair is, and as everything else is—when we think of them, nevertheless, as being actually named essentially dependent on constitutive *modi* of Time,—is it to be wondered at, I say, that we should think further also—if you will kindly pardon one expression to escape a worse—as it were, of the *cheek* of Kant in assertion

and reassertion of the very house which he himself, in so many words, has so effectually undermined and removed? There is, of course, a whole world else to speak of, but it is he himself has told us (ii. 769) that "Time cannot itself be perceived: in such wise, namely, that, in its reference, as it were empirically, what precedes and what succeeds may be determined—*in the object*" (and that means simply that Time does not itself, or of itself, empirically in any way act on objects). Nay, as we see, even this is the literal deliverance of our very last quotation in its very last sentence.

Now, what can be the reason of this stubbornness of persistence in the insistence on the reality of relations which he himself has in so many words declared void, declared null? What but the simple pedantry of the innocent-minded professor, who, chalk in hand, regards, with infinite self-complacency, on the blackboard before him, that so perfect professional tree of antithetically exhaustive DISTINCTIONS: Time-*series*, Time-*content*, Time-*order*, Time-*implex*; and again, Time *to*, Time *in*, Time *of*!

13. A MOST CRITICAL POINT—DOUBLES IN SENSE

We come now to a point of very special mark, which Kant himself faced, indeed, but faced only, all unwittingly, to turn his back on it, without a thought of what lay in it. It is a point, nevertheless, which even alone might suffice, as is now to be shown, to prove crucially determinative in regard to the whole question which is at present in issue:—

"The *object* remains *in itself* always *unknown*; but if the *connection* of the *impressions*, which are given by it to our *senses*, is determined as *universally* valid, then is the *object* also determined by this *relation*, and the *judgment* is an *objective* one.

"We will illustrate this: that the room is warm, sugar sweet.

and wormwood bitter are judgments merely subjectively valid. I do not require that I, or that everybody else as I, should always find it so;—as judgments, they express only a relation of two sensations to the same subject, namely, me myself, and that, too, only in my sensational state for the moment, and are not to be held valid *for the object*. These I name judgments of *impression* or *apprehension*. Quite otherwise is it situated with a judgment of *experience*. What *experience* in certain circumstances teaches me, it must *always* teach me and as well *everybody else*, and its *validity* is *not* limited to the *subject* or his *state* at the time. Therefore I pronounce all such judgments *objective*. For example, if I say the air is elastic, that is, in the first instance, only a judgment of impression: so far I only refer two feelings in my senses, the one to the other. If I desire it to be a judgment of experience, then I require this relation to stand under a condition which makes it universally valid. I desire, therefore, that I, and everybody else, shall always, in the same circumstances, of necessity, so connect the impressions" (iii. 59).

"I willingly admit that the above examples (the room, sugar, wormwood) do not represent such impression-judgments as could ever become experience-judgments, *even if there were the addition to them of a notion* (*a category*), because they refer themselves merely to *feeling*, which everybody acknowledges to be merely *subjective*, and which, therefore, can never be ascribed to the object, and so then also can never be *objective*. I only wanted (*in their case*) for the moment to give an example of a judgment that is merely subjective, and without claim to apodictic validity, and thereby objectivity of reference. *An example of the impression-judgments which, through addition of a notion, do become experience-judgments* (the elasticity of the air, namely), follows" (note to the above on iii. 59).

Remarking in passing that the first words here define an object, as to Kant, to be, not any alien thing (thing-in-itself) elsewhere, but only categorised sense-impressions (Erscheinungen) of our own, I desire to call all attention to the examples given by Kant of two contra-opposed sense-impressions, both subjective, but the one capable of becoming objective, while the other, incapable of becoming objective, must always remain subjective. Warmth, sweetness, bitterness, are impressions, but they are wholly subjective, and so subjective that they are quite

incapable of being made objective even by any category. What is meant by the elasticity of the air, again,—and Kant is not sufficiently illustrative in that regard, but say, out of many possible illustrations, that in a blown bladder we feel the air to yield to pressure, but to recoil to its remission,—*is a something that depends on two impressions*. These impressions are quite in the same way subjective as the others are, but still, *altogether unlike these*, they are capable of being made *objective*. In consequence of the reception of a category, the air (for example) is said to be objectively elastic.

Kant, not quite satisfied with his illustration so far, adds in a note:—

"As an easier example to understand, take this. When the sun shines on a stone it becomes warm. This judgment is a mere impression's judgment, and contains no necessity,—I may have felt this ever so often, and others may have felt it ever so often, too: the feelings find themselves only usually so connected. But if I say the sun *warms* the stone, then there comes further to be added to the feeling the category of cause, which, with the idea of the sunshine, *necessarily* connects that of the warmth, and the synthetic judgment becomes necessarily and universally, consequently objectively transformed from a mere *feeling* into an *experience*" (iii. 62).

Kant perfectly well understands precisely what is the distinctive difference between these two classes of subjective propositions; but it is evident that it has never once struck him *why it is that there is the susceptibility of a category in the one case and not in the other*. Just to ask, however, is at once to see, the reason. We have only *singles* for the warm, the sweet, the bitter; but for the air and the stone we have *doubles*. Singles, however, even as singles, do not properly admit of a judgment: to judge is to decide at least one thing of another. A judgment implies comparison; and comparison, for its part, again, implies plurality. But the award of a judgment, what a judgment pronounces, is

always, in point of place, just *a category*. But another point, and the essential point, is this. The plurality, under comparison, as in the cases of the air and the stone, is already *a connected plurality*: it consists *in* a concrete *unity*; it does not consist *of* abstract *units*. Abstract units are independent units, isolated, each by itself: as such, relation, intrinsic relation, there is none between them. But in a concrete unity there already is relation: *concretion* means by itself simply a relation—to say so—*done*; and just to name, say, speak, a relation *done* is to judge. Concretion is but judgment in deed; judgment is but concretion in word. But it is concretion in deed that *constitutes*.

Now, in what in the two cases before us (air and stone) does the concretion consist? In both the concretion consists in a *change*. A change is a natural concretion; and a natural concretion is already a natural judgment, and, as said, *constitutes* such. That is, if we turn to the examples in hand, the judgment concerned is not in me, —it is not in that sense subjective,—it is a judgment already in the impressions themselves, already in the Erscheinungen themselves, and let them be Erscheinungen themselves, even so they are still things, for *Erscheinungen* are all the *things* that a Kantian can have. "How is it," says Hume, according to Kant (iii. 30), "that when a notion is given me, I can go beyond it, and connect another with it?" But if it is possible to name this a difficulty in regard to the notion *A* and the notion *B*, it is equally possible to speak of the same difficulty in regard of the sensation *a* and the sensation *b*. And, as we see, *no such difficulty exists*! The *a* and *b* as impressions—*a* as yielding air, *b* as recoiling air; *a* as sunshine, *b* as a stone — are not abstract, isolated, independent units: they come in connection, they come in a relation, they come in a judgment. And what else does Kant

himself say? What does all that come to that is said about a body—"when it has been long enough in the sun," "as I have ever so often, or others ever so often, may have seen," "usually," "commonly," "constantly," "always," and "on a rule,"—and through "logical comparison,"—becoming "warm": what does all that come to, even for Kant, but a *judgment*, and a judgment that, even for him, is in no want of a category? He, indeed, calls it subjective, but it is no more subjective at first than it is subjective at last. It is not, even at first, as bitterness and sweetness are, only in me: it is in the objects, call them impressions as you will, Erscheinungen as you will: it is in them, I say, and not in me; and as in them, it is objective, and as not in me, not subjective. *Had Kant but made himself aware* of the *differentia*, the *distinctive difference* between the *two classes* of judgments which were *both* to him *subjective*!

14. Kant on Hume

We shall return to this; but let us just see now what Kant himself, of his own self, says directly, and in regard, specially and distinctively, to the one problem as it is in Hume:—

"Here is now the place," he says (iii. 73), "for a definitive removal of the difficulty of Hume. He maintained rightly enough, that we in no wise see through reason the possibility of causality, *i.e.* of the relation of the existence of one thing to the existence of something else as necessarily implied. . . . Nevertheless, I am far from regarding these notions [the categories] as merely taken from experience, or the necessity they seem to bring as but imputative, and a false show which length of custom plays on us; I have sufficiently made good rather that they, and the axioms from them, stand *à priori* fast before all experience, and have their undoubted objective truth, but, still, only in regard of experience. . . . Indeed, we *à priori* know that unless we regard the idea of an object as determined in respect of one or other of these notions, we could

have no knowledge at all which would objectively apply, and it it were a thing-in-itself we thought of, then there were possible not one single character to enable us to perceive the determination of it by the one notion or the other, say substance, or cause, etc. But the question is not of things in themselves, but of things in the experience of sense; and then it is clear that I perfectly recognise not only the possibility, but the necessity to subsume all impressions (Erscheinungen) under these notions, *i.e.* to apply them as principles of the possibility of experience."

The whole reach of the general *Theoretical* (not yet *Practical* or *Æsthetic*) scheme of Kant is so clearly and summarily put in the above that its citation was irresistible. Causal necessity, a mere customary association to the analysis of Hume, possesses for Kant an *à priori* rationale in a schema and a category of an apodictic validity. It is the absolutely necessary precondition, however, of the very possibility of this *à priori* rationale that all the objects or things which we suppose ourselves to perceive and know are not the objects or things that really act on us, but only the effects or impressions of that, their action on us. Indeed, it is just this peculiar and real nature of objects or things which is the very occasion of the rationale in question; or it is the fact of all objects or things being but, subjectively, effects *on* us, or appearances *to* us, or inherences *in* us, that constitutes the single necessity for said *à priori* rationale and said *à priori* apparatus.[1]

[1] The date of Hobbes's dedication in his *Tripos* is "*May* 9, 1640." From p. 5 there we extract this: "Image or colour is but an *apparition* unto us of the *motion* which the object worketh in the brain. As in *vision*, so also in conceptions that arise from the *other senses*, the subject of their *inherence* is not the *object*, but the *sentient*." That is sixty-nine years before Berkeley, and more than twice as many before Kant, and it is not a doctrine peculiar to them. We still have it, or something like it, in such sensationists as Mill, Bain, Lewes, to leave out all reference to idealism, ancient or modern.

To criticise Kant so far, then, it is obviously necessary for us fully to consider: (1) his doctrine of the categories; (2) his doctrine of objects; and (3) his doctrine of experience. So much presently. In the meantime we have to finish with Kant on Hume, as follows (75):—

"In order to make an attempt at Hume's problematical notion (this his *crux metaphysicorum*), namely, the notion of cause, there is, firstly, *à priori* given me, in Logic, the form of a conditioned judgment as such, namely, to apply a given cognition as ground, and another as consequent. It is then possible that there is found in a perception of sense a rule which says: that on a certain impression another (though not conversely) constantly follows, and this is a case for me to apply the hypothetical judgment, and say, *e.g.*, when a body is long enough shone upon by the sun it becomes warm. Here now there is, of course, not yet a necessity of connection, not yet a notion of cause. But I go on and say: if the above proposition, which is merely a subjective connection of impressions of sense, is to be one of *experience*, it must be regarded as necessarily and universally valid. But such a proposition would be: The sun, by its light, is the cause of the warmth. The above empirical rule is now then regarded as a law, and that, too, not as good merely for sense-impressions, but for these in behoof of a possible experience, which requires universally, and therefore necessarily, valid rules.

"This complete solution of the Humian problem, therefore, though a result contrary to the expectation of its originator, rescues for the pure notions of the understanding their *à priori* source, and for the general laws of nature their validity as laws of the understanding, and yet so that it limits their application only to experience, in this way that their possibility has its ground merely in the relation of the understanding to experience, but still not that it derives from experience, but that experience derives from them, which wholly reverse mode of connection never once came into the head of Hume."

15. The Categories Again

One wonders! but one cannot but admire the modest self-complacency of the good old man in this his victory

over—den berühmten Hume! When one, again, thinks, however, of what, a short time ago, it was only eligible action on his part to rank as "merely contingent," and so seclude from the "absolutely necessary" and "apodictic"; and that now he has never a misgiving to name it a principle among the rest, a principle as universally, necessarily, apodictically valid as the rest—when one sees *this* and thinks of *that*, I say, one remembers how he, 63 in 1787, laments then of being schon ziemlich tief ins Alter fortgerückt (of being already somewhat stricken in age), but one remembers also that 1781 was some seven years ago, and so one cannot help doubting but that Kant, while still not so very old, must at times have fallen obliviously into maunder! Surely, when he so very certainly claims conquest, he must have "*dis*remembered" the fourth paragraph of his Systematische Vorstellung aller synthetischen Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes—ay, and not less, how he was put to it for a schema to causality as for a schema to reciprocity!

Nothing can be clearer than that he fondly fancied pure time would give him a schema for all the categories, to intermediate each of them into its own correspondent sense complex. "There must be a *tertium quid*, which must be on the one side homogeneous with the category, and on the other with the sensation." This shall be "the transcendental determination of time, on the one side *intellectual* (pure, unempirical, *à priori*), and on the other side, *sensible*." So, then, "without detaining us further with a dry and tiresome scrutiny of what is required for transcendental schemata of the pure notions of the understanding, we will rather just tabulate them in connection with the categories, and following their order!"

It was all very well to say this, and intend this, and begin this; but when it came to the turns of causality and reciprocity, there came also a stop, a shock—perhaps

a cold sweat! Then it was that he came to see—and how long it took him to see, one knows not—that if ever he was to find a schema for either causality or reciprocity in time, it was not to time itself that there was any use to apply. But if not to time, to what then? It would be difficult to see that at once; but whatever it might be, and wherever it was to be found, it was plain that if it were to correspond to causality, it must be something such that *when it was*, something else *followed*; as again, if it were to correspond to reciprocity, it must be somethings such that the one acted on the other, and the other on the one back again, mutually. The next thing was that these *desiderata*, if they were to be at all, must be, or representably be, *à priori*. Now, any universal, as being solely in thought, and consequently, therefore, wholly unempirical, had all on its side for the title at least, if not quite at full for the quality, of the *à priori*. Let it be so, then, with these—with causality and reciprocity. Let it *be* so, but we need not *say* so! That a universal, simply as a universal, should be held to be *à priori*—that any such faculty, function, or privilege should be granted to generalisation as generalisation—that would be dangerous. Why then we might have to part with all the other categories—Quantity, Quality, Modality, Substance itself—if they were to be called *à priori* pures! Nay more, and absolutely out of the question more! Why then in that case, even Time and Space, the very canvas, frame and all, of our entire panorama might be taken from us, and our whole show ruined, only in its boards! There is nothing for us but to talk indefinitely of a rule in sense. Impressions themselves shall be feigned such that some must follow, and some must not only follow—but follow back. That is, there shall be two feints of rules to that effect; and as

absolutely general, and said to be in sense in general, they will quite well pass as *à priori*, the rather that they will be seen in the formal tables of all these other *à prioris*, quite equally with any of them! No wonder that Kant, the longer he dwelt here, got freer and freer, bolder and bolder, quietly to smuggle in (einschleichen), once in a while, a trifling article or two of empirical contraband! No wonder that he could point, without the slightest apprehension, at last, even to actual externalities ("äussere Anschauungen") as necessities for the stuffing out ("objective Realität") of the categories! The lucky thing, too, is this, that we can still speak of them as in time: all things are in time; and *they* are in time, too. And so we can still beautifully lay out, beautifully conjugate, as it were, our exhaustive sum of distributed relations and correlations: *relations* of time-series, time-content, time-implex, and still time-*order*, too; and *correlations* still (of the last) *to* time, *in* time, and *of* time. So beautifully, indeed, does the whole huge structure, with all its complicated, infinite appliances, rise and spread round Kant that he comes, positively,—as was said already indeed,—utterly to forget how it was with some of his earliest layers. We have no reason whatever to suppose that Kant, long before he had done, was in the least aware that he had been in his proceedings any time at fault. He absolutely believed that all he said was true; he absolutely believed that he had conquered Hume. Not but that the extraordinary vagueness and tremulous inexactitude of all further discussion of causality and reciprocity may half allow us the suspicion of a haunting sense of something left behind as only suppressed and latent: it is all very well to speak as though something were a matter of fact,—again and again, for instance, of time itself being an actual analogue to a relation whether causal or reciprocal,

—when this same something is really known all the time to be utterly impossible. There certainly are such relations of the *things* in time; but of *time itself* in its *moments*—none. The relative discussion in the *Prolegomena*, two years later than the *Kritik*, is undoubtedly, in its very much improved clearness and articulateness, good evidence for some return to tranquillity and confidence; but neither is *it* satisfactory at last, and the second edition of the *Kritik* is no better than the first.

Our perception of the relation of cause and effect is surely instantaneous—so instantaneous that Kant's dividing of it into two halves, with quite a process between them, strikes one as but an improbability in itself; and it is this that in the *Prolegomena* is rather dwelt upon.

"It is not enough for experience, as is commonly supposed, to compare impressions, and connect them in a consciousness by means of judgment; thereby there arises no universal validity and necessity of the judgment, on account of which there can alone be objective validity and experience. There still precedes a quite other judgment before from impression of sense there can be experience. The given impression must be subsumed under a notion, which prescribes the form of judgment in regard of the impression, connects the empirical consciousness in a consciousness generally, and thereby procures for the empirical judgments universality; such a notion is a pure, *à priori* notion of understanding, which does nothing but merely determine for an impression the mode in which it is to serve for judgments" (iii. 61).

This translation, one may be assured, fairly represents the original; and it is certainly not a bit less clear. Kant, as is usual with him, again and again repeats, and again and again re-repeats, the burden of it. It takes a time to write it; so that, though certainly habit greatly hastens processes of mind, and the thinking it points to may really bear no proportion to it, we cannot help saying that the writing was long!

Altogether—with Kant's own statement and acknow-

ledgment of the facts before us, namely, that, as he might count them, there are two sets of them present in every actual case of causality: For example, there are facts that concern the apprehension, and there are facts that concern the category. There is a relation of facts within the apprehension itself; and there is a relation of facts between the apprehension and the category. Within the apprehension, that is, there is "usually," or "commonly," or "always" and "constantly," and so, as indeed is about as good as *said*, *universally* and *necessarily*, a "rule," under which the first unit of sense *is* first, and the second *is* second, but not "conversely." In the other regard, again, the rule within is the rule that conditions the rule between. The rule of the units becomes a rule to the apprehension as determinative of the rule of the category—Altogether, Kant's long process contrasts with *instaneity*!

16. Hume Speaks

On the whole, as I say, or with every estimation of the particular and all summation of the general, one may be pardoned if one fancies Hume, when, in such circumstances, he welcomed brother Kant to Hades, taking opportunity, after the usual compliments and initial ceremonials, to remark: It was really very good of you, Herr Kant, to name the problem at all "the Humian Problem"—very good of you to speak at all in my reference when you were able to announce, at last, your perfect solution of it,—"contrary to all expectation of its originator,"—and "in a wholly reverse mode of connection which never once struck him in the head." You are quite as I on the units of impression; but, on the question of the necessity that is imputed to them, while you say it is borrowed from an analogy, I say it is

borrowed from an inveterated custom: For, or against, I shall not pursue argument from the point of view of either; but I just ask, since the necessity is to neither of us domestic, but to both of us a borrowed one, which of us has the best of it—in a reason for it?[1]

17. The Critical Point Again

We return now to the "point of very special remark" which we left behind us at pp. 138–142. We said then of it that, even alone, it might suffice to be crucially determinative in regard to the holding of Kant. Kant's own distinction, namely, the force of which he never himself saw, can be made to show the single knuckle that controls. That distinction, as we saw, of two subjective judgments, opposes the one which can be categorised to the other one which can not; and the reason—Kant's own reason—is that the one is wholly in feeling, while the other is that, and already also *something more*. It is because of that something more that it is capable of being categorised. It is that something more that invites the category;—that something more is the "cue" to the category. Now, that here is simply all that we have got to say:—That, and that alone, has

[1] One recollects here how Schelling once said (*W.W.*, x. 77): "I shall not ask, as I might, was, then, for the refutation of Hume's doubt, such a huge apparatus as the *Kritik of Pure Reason* precisely necessary?" But one recollects also, as on the part of Schelling himself, author of a complete philosophy of the absolute, such innocent *propos* as these: "I am persuaded, *none* of us will be inclined to grant a time when the human race had not judged according to the law of cause and effect. . . . Hume himself would feel that the man from whom he had withdrawn the judgment of cause and effect could never any longer seem to us a *man*. We may therefore be fully certain that the first man, on the very first day of his existence, judged so. . . . Nay, the infant in the cradle," etc. etc.

the virtue of the category; — that, and that alone, renders the category unnecessary;—that, and that alone, if you like, *is* the category! That, namely, is already a relation; and as already a relation it contains the whole. Even to Kant it is already a relation,—even to Kant it is already a special and peculiar relation,—even to Kant it is already a relation so special and peculiar that it is already independent of the category; and, at all, without the need of it. Kant, that is to say, fairly names the relation as a relation in which "on a certain one unit of sense another constantly follows, and never conversely"; and as a relation, too, which it is possible to find given by a "rule" (iii. 75). Or, as he has it otherwise elsewhere (ii. 127), this relation is that of "a *reale* which, whenever it is, is always followed by something else—a succession of units in so far as it is subjected to a rule." This rule now, evidently, must be either contingent or necessary. But if it is contingent, it is impossible for it to be determinative of the necessity of a category; and if it is necessary, it is already independent of the device. It is, in fact, expressly declared by the very wording of Kant, *necessary*.

And here, of course, if required, all the other argumentation comes in that concerns any further opposition of Kant in still holding that the relation can be rescued from the subjectivity of sense only by the objectivity of a category—surely here, with all my heart, one may cry:—*if* a category is necessary, or *if* a category can do it.

The counter argumentation of course has been copiously to the effect that the category is, in the very rôle assigned to it, inapplicable and idle; while what we have seen latterly has had its whole direction towards the independent necessity of the facts themselves in themselves and at first hand.

As the case is, it is pretty well Hume's due to be allowed

summarily to put an end to the discussion even in the manner which we have presumed to suppose; and we shall venture to intervene only with a word or two in explanation.

We have supposed Hume to say that, after all, so far as necessity in the causal relation is concerned, Kant can do no more than he himself does, and that is simply *borrow* it. If Hume borrows it from *custom*, namely, Kant only borrows it from *analogy*. This, as said at once by Kant, can not be denied. The three categories under the general title of Relation are *named* Analogies. Even by direct general name, then, the law of causality, so far as necessity is concerned, appeals to, founds on, an *analogy*; but we have also these direct words (ii. 156): "We shall, through these principles, be authorised, therefore, to conjoin the units of sense only as in *analogy* with the logical and general unity of the notions [categories], and in the principle itself indeed employ the category, but in practice (the application to the units of sense) set in its place its schema as the key of its usage." Only to refer, in passing, to this word schema, we would simply remind or remark that it is wholly a "mere matter of words" to talk of a schema at all in connection with causality: for what is brought forward at all in that reference is a "rule"—still *called* schema certainly—which is no more than the *fact* of causality itself, wholly and solely, in so many words described, and really in so many words described as it only can be described. To take a schema as it is defined by Kant himself, schema he has none—in his treatment of causality!

18. Analogy

But what we have, as immediately before us, is how Kant himself sums up in a single word the whole of the rationale which it is his to propose in explanation of

the problem. That single word is, as we see, the word *Analogy*. It is by an analogy, only an analogy, that he himself professes to decide that single question as regards causality, which is *our* single question, and, at least, as he himself places it, *the* single question, or the single key question in the *whole* of his relative industry. That question, or key question, is *Necessity*. Kant would establish the necessity of causality by the pith of an *analogy*. But what is that *pith*?

Analogy means some similarity or other in respective difference: according to Aristotle (1016*b*, 34) it concerns the reference of ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο; and he exemplifies this by describing "intellect in the soul" to be as "sight in the body" (*Eth.*, i. 6, 12). This from Aristotle is the sort of general illustration of *analogy* that we may be apt to see everywhere. It has also been formally defined to be "a certain relation and agreement between two or more things, which in other respects are entirely different: thus the foot of a mountain bears an analogy to the foot of an animal, although they are two very different things; and so it may induce to error." Quintilian (i. 6) has a word on analogy—in another reference, truly—which *verbally* seems to go against Kant, but with Hume: "It was not sent down from heaven," he says; "and it is not founded on *reason*,—so that nothing but *custom* has been its origin!"

Now, if Hume gave custom as his reason for the necessity he borrowed, what reason did Kant give for his? All that, plainly, lay in the particular nature of the apprehensions of sense that preceded the call for the category; and, as plainly, even as the quality of these varied, so must the quality of the call vary. This concerns what Kant has called the "rule" in the impressions of sense; and that rule referred to an *a b*, a succession of a first and a second. Accordingly, if that

a b was only, as he says once, "*usually*" *a b*, or, as at another time he says, only "commonly" *a b*, then the analogy itself, or whatever had to apply it, must have felt itself in a state of—unhappy hesitation. It might feel the call, but if what called only *balbutiated* "usually," "commonly," it might find itself in a difficulty rather, or even in an impossibility, to make its mind up. Exceptions, many exceptions, any exceptions at all, in the call must have proved a very bogie to the analogy as it looked to the category, which, on receipt of the countersign, it was its business to pass. In short, as we say, the quality of the analogy must have been completely at the will of the quality of the call.

But that being, it follows that, when the *a b* was an *a b* fixed, an *a b* that was "always" an *a b*, "constantly" an *a b* and "never" a *b a*, an *a b* on a "rule" that by "logical comparison" was logically "universal"—it follows, I say, that then, so far as a call was concerned, the analogy, as an analogy, must have felt itself blessedly relieved from every difficulty. Imperfection must have varied with imperfection; exceptions must have proved well-nigh fatal; and perfection alone sufficed. And at the very last it was only perfection that, in order to work, could have been in the head of Kant. He does not, for example, forget the distinction he has drawn between the mathematical and the dynamical categories: that the former are apodictic, or unconditionally necessary, while the latter have only indirectly and mediately their reference to evidence and necessity. But he absolutely forgets the *force* of it: he intimates (ii. 140) that the latter categories have still "also" (*auch*, and that *auch* means *equally with the former*) "the character of a necessity *à priori*," and "without detriment to their universal certainty when applied to experience." Now that is really as much as to say that, though the

dynamical categories are "merely contingent," "merely discursive," "merely regulative," etc. etc., they are still, for all that, quite as universal, quite as necessary, quite as apodictic, quite as *à priori*, as the very best of the mathematical categories themselves; and we have not the smallest reason to suppose that Kant, having once made the distinction, was not reposefully at ease with himself there*for*, or that he ever suffered a moment's anxiety under the contradiction of it!

But again, that being,—an *a b* fixed, that is,—what need would there be for a category at all, why appeal to, or lug in, an analogy that could only be superfluous or idle? In fact, that is the peculiarity that comes out here: it would be precisely when the analogy was perfect that an analogy would be useless. And that is as much as to say that the moment there is a "rule" in sense, not only *as* Kant conditions it, but as Kant *must* condition it, a category at all is dismissed from service. That, truly, is evident at once; all that holds of sense is described by Kant on the whole as already necessary, why then should he trouble about a category in any way? Nay, unless it were necessary, could the category find a cue at all for the compulsion of itself? Or, if the first half of the relation were contingent, could it assess more than contingency from the second? Actually in the circumstances surmised there is scarcely a limit to the suggestion of alternatives: First, sense to guarantee understanding; second, understanding to guarantee sense. But the great point is this—What is the good of the mere capping by a category at all? Can it really do what it is said to do? It is said to superinduce necessity; but is that possible to the extrinsicality, the externality of a mere analogy? Permanent association, the custom of Hume, is really a principle in rerum natura; but Kant's category is something foreign,

mechanical, artificial — a generalisation from another region. Even if necessity could be borrowed from such a principle—did one but see one's way to as much as to borrow—such necessity were no necessity,—it would be only pinchbeck,—it would want the hall-mark: it could only be a necessity of fiction, arbitrary conversion, substitution: letters of nobility, patent of nobility, it would bring none. The most we can allow Kant in it is, That he has, of his own will, set an *a b* of *sense* and an *A B* of *intellect*, not logically, but analogically, beside each other.

The decisive points, so far, are that, on Kant's own terms, we have, as regards sense, a relation dictated to us, a relation which we have only to receive; as regards a schema,—here in causality, namely,—none whatever, but, in its stead, a repetition, or rather, a mere description of the same relation; and, as regards category, nothing nearer than an alien analogy.

Kant, by his category, would ennoble *sense*; but necessity is already there and—reference to analogy is idle!

So, again, the best that can be said for Kant is, that he has before him a private whom, for his good behaviour, he would make a corporal of—but only by brevet, as it were!

19. Conclusion so Far—Kant and Hume

With all before us that has been now said, it is beyond a doubt that any pretensions of Kant to the credit of having produced a solution of what he calls Hume's problem, the problem of causality, are absolutely and, as Hamilton might say, even "curiously" groundless. All the more charming it is to see the good old man so modestly taking up his stand upon the "spot where the Humian doubt is to be destroyed from the root," and hear him then, so bashfully shy under such a blaze of

glory, only meekly mention "his complete, though strikingly unexpected solution, which would have been a surprise to the very originator of the problem himself, Hume, into whose head the very idea of such a method by reversion never once entered!"

Hume, as we know, takes the problem as everybody else does, and *simply* asks, Why is it that, when we see a cause, or that when, contrariwise, we see an effect, we think of the one as necessary to the other? appealing for an answer then, as *simply* to experience, in which he can only find Custom to apply. Whereas, for his part, Kant goes in quite another manner to work. In his own intention, no doubt, his proceedings shall be so thoroughly calculated beforehand that it will be impossible to oppose them. He will begin, for example, from the very foundation of experience and cognition—sense. That we know not *things*, but only the *impressions* of things—what he calls Erscheinungen, which we may translate Appearances, reminding that we saw Hobbes name them "Apparitions,"—this shall be the bed-rock on which his whole stratification shall rest. The general doctrine of the mere subjectivity and contingency of sense as sense he will take to himself in its extremest literality, and make his own in its utmost length, breadth, and depth of detail. Our consciousness within was to be conceived, as we have already seen, only as a white sheet (of Time and Space) butterflied by impressions—each impression but as a single insect, good for itself, but only for itself, and unconnected with any other; each, too, such and such as it *is*, but not such and such that it *must* be such and such as it is, and cannot be otherwise than it is. Each is a bare fact, once for all there, but why or whence it is, or what further it is than there it is, we know not at all. We simply receive all impressions, and, as they come, they also *are*.

Now, this understanding, not so far different from expressions of Hume in regard to impression, simply as impression, being constitutive of our consciousness through sense, gave opportunity to Kant at once to go on the contrary tack to Hume. Hume, namely, said, simply from such a state of the case, it was impossible that these facts of sense themselves could manifest to us the necessity which we attributed to them, and which, therefore, could only be an imputed necessity of our own, due, so far as it was possible for general reflection to discover, to *custom* alone. On the contrary, said Kant, that necessity which we attribute to the facts of causality is, as is plain to be seen, of a far other validity than the subjectivity of custom can supply; it is, in reality and truth, of a validity objective. But such validity, again, Kant continued, is not possibly in contributions of sense, as all cases of causality are; for they are all, as we have abundantly been made to see, subjective in position and *à posteriori* in source. Anything that comes into my subject *à posteriori* I can only know in its contingency, not possibly in its necessity: it only so happens; it only *is as* it is, and I know no more. Where, in all the world, then, can this strange necessity come from? Come from whence it may, it cannot come from sense, and it cannot come from the *à posteriori*; but besides these—besides sense, there is only the understanding, and besides the *à posteriori* there is only the *à priori*! And then, thought Kant, that is precisely what the contingency of sense requires. Were there nothing but that, we should only have a sport of impressions, in a lawless succession of apprehension, without an atom of an objective knowledge, of a knowledge of objects. But we do have an objective knowledge, we do have a knowledge of objects; and we are forced by the exigencies of the case to ask whether we may not find the elements

of all this objectivity that is required, and of all this objectivity that *is*—whether we may not find them all *à priori* and in the understanding?

So far, then, it is obviously contingency that calls upon the thinking of Kant, with eventual resort to a category of the understanding as sole source of the necessity which what we have called the butterflies of the impression of sense require, in order to objectify them,—concrete them, that is, into the *quasi*-fixed objects of daily life and experience. Thus it was the contingency of sense that, with its call to Kant, gave him also his opportunity. Sense was but so much material rubble-work,—it was for him, in the categories, to find for it form. The subjectivity of sense, the contingency of sense, was the very essential, the single *sine quâ non* that lay at the root of the whole general operation of Kant. And how loudly and unintermittedly he proclaims this, we might almost say, every one page of the *Kritik* and the *Prolegomena* is there to attest.

"Were things things in themselves (iii. 53–56, 76), we should never know them, neither *à priori* nor *à posteriori*. We have, however, not to do here with things in themselves, but merely with things as objects of a possible experience. The categories are entirely without meaning if, leaving experience, they would refer to things in themselves. They serve, as it were, only to articulate (buchstabiren) impressions, in order to read them as experience. The principles which spring from their reference to the world of the senses are only of use to our understanding in application to experience: any further they are but arbitrary combinations without objective reality."

That constitutes the whole of Kant's doctrine so far: That we have no knowledge, namely, but what regards *experience*; and that we have no knowledge of any *objects* in experience, but what are mere *appearances, apparitions, Erscheinungen*, of *sense*. That, however, relatively determines all; for that, in Kant's regard, is his πρῶτον

ψεῦδος. Things are not in any respect the ghosts which Kant would make of them.

20. Philosophy Strange at Times

There have been so many strange things from time to time said in what is called philosophy, that the public, possibly, is not always so much in fault when it is heard to mutter that so-called great philosophers are to common folk, now and then, also great fools.[1] And, certainly, the idea of making all these common things we see, touch, and handle to be only ghosts of certain invisible other things within them, or under them, or Heaven knows where else in their neighbourhood, is about the most foolish of all ideas which have been ever, at any time, anywhere, or by anybody, broached. That shoe on your foot, or that hat on your head, is not the real shoe on your foot or the real hat on your head; the latter is but the ghost of the true hat, as the former is but the ghost of the true shoe. Of either hat or shoe we know the ghost only: what the true hat may be, or what the true shoe may be, we know not. We know this only: That it is the culmination and perfection of knowledge itself to know only what we know not at all. What is the *Thing-in-Itself* of that boy's marble, or of this pebble I pick up?

What *can* be the *Thing-in-Itself* of this mere *seeming* that drops from my pen into this blot on the paper? Nay, of the paper itself, what can *be* the thing-in-itself? The lint has been sown, and grown, and pulled, and steeped, and skutched, and hackled, and spun, and woven, and bleached, and calendered, and boiled, and starched,

[1] Rosenkranz remarks on "the fun which Law, Medicine, Theology, and other professors make of the blunders of philosophy and philosophers—to the delight of themselves and their students"!

and blued, and beetled, and lapped, and pressed, and made a shirt of, and worn by a man into a rag, and ground into pulp, and sieved, and actually converted into this bit of paper which we now touch,—and yet, for all that, the thing-in-itself, stubborn through all these processes and a thousand more, has never once, even for a moment, allowed itself to come to the surface, but, in very truth, has always instead only given its ghost up, —its *Erscheinung*,—its *apparition!*

Can it really be that that Greek Testament is not a thing-in-itself, but only the ghost of one? Nay, if exception be taken to manufactured articles, we have plenty of natural objects to hand, as coals, and wood, and straw, and metal, and salt, and gum, and oil, and water,—what of all these, are they, too, all of them, but ghosts that only look to us like things? Here is an orange in my hand—I think I know perfectly well its rind, and its liths, and its seeds, and its juice, and its pith, but it itself, it seems, for all that, I do not know at all! I do not know my own father! He, too, has a character in him which I do not know at all; and yet it is that, in him that, that I believe I know, that I think I know, that I know I know. I am to understand, for all that, that the reality I *should* know is altogether different from the actuality I *do* know! No doubt, circumstances can be conceived in which I do not know how he might have acted, as I do not know what this unknown object which you offer me might do if exposed to fire, or water, or acid, or alkali: nay, the very object most familiarly *known* to me, I do not know how it might act in circumstances quite strange to me. But what then? Does it follow that it is but the *apparition*, the ghost of a Thing-in-itself?

All that is very sorry stuff, poor skimble-skamble stuff, all that that poses and proses about the impossibility

of knowing what substance is. Of course, even as used, substance has a meaning, and, of course, even as used, thing-in-itself has a meaning; but the true meaning of either the one or the other that is common to the whole of us as ordinary human beings, it would seem impossible for us as *philosophers* at all to recognise! Now, why should we feign, and figure, and invent all this difficulty? The simple truth of the matter is this, that there are subjects and that there are objects, and that subjects as subjects know and must know objects, and that objects as objects are known and must be known by subjects. These things that we see, and touch, and handle are really, and in very truth, the things in themselves, and the only things in themselves, that we *can* ever see, or touch, or handle, that we *need* ever see, or touch, or handle, that we *shall* ever see, or touch, or handle. In one word, these things are *the* things in themselves; and so much are they *the* things in themselves that they do act on each other, and do *substantially* act on each other. They are not appearances; they are *things*. Were things really only *Erscheinungen*, only appearances, only, as said, butterflies on my white sheet within, they would indeed be irrespective the one of the other; and any action that might be simulated between them would be only an action at second hand, only an action of the subject, and so only an action borrowed. But once for all a *creation* is just that: an *ensemble* of the innumerable reciprocal parts of one immense systematic whole, for which there are subjects to give it meaning, as so constituted that they are there to apprehend it itself and not less the parts of it as so many *objects* in it, which really act and react mutually, and are utterly beyond servitude to any alien influence that has been only borrowed. And this expression brings us back to the side of the categories.

I know of no objections, on the part of the Germans

themselves, to this side of the subject, unless what concerns—possibly their number—but particularly their single source of formation and derivation, the received classes of the technical judgments, namely, in School-Logic. As for the Erscheinungen on the other side, they seem, I should say, to have been allowed generally to pass. No doubt that is quite true, that mere school formulæ are the source of the categories; but what we have to say here takes another course.

Kant follows up what we have cited from the *Prolegomena* as said of Hume's problem, by a passage, long to excess perhaps, but so decisive as to Kant's belief in his own machinery of sense-appearances and understanding-categories, and so clear as to the whole general holding, that we think it of importance enough to be quoted at full:—

"From this, now, there comes the following result of all the previous investigations: All synthetic *à priori* ground-propositions are nothing further than principles of possible experience, and can never be referred to things-in-themselves, but only to sense-appearances as objects of experience. Hence, too, pure mathematic, as well as pure natural science, can never hold by more than mere sense-appearances; and only bring forward either what makes experience possible, or what, in that it is derived from such a principle, must be always capable of being conceived presentant in some possible experience. And so, then, we have once for all something positive which we can grasp to in respect of all metaphysical adventures, which hitherto, boldly enough, but always blindly, have applied themselves, without distinction, everywhere to all things. Dogmatic thinkers have never for a moment thought it possible that the goal of their endeavours should ever be so summarily set up for them—not even those who, presuming on their own supposed sound reason, ventured, with notions and principles of pure reason, legitimate indeed and natural, but intended merely for application in experience, to advance to conclusions and acquisitions of knowledge, for which they neither knew, nor could know, any ascertained limits, because, as regards the nature and even the possibility of any such pure understanding, they had never either reflected or could

reflect. Many a *naturalist*[1] of pure reason (and by this I mean any one who trusts himself, without the due relative knowledge, to decide in questions of metaphysic) might, no doubt, pretend that, as regards what has here been brought forward with so much preparation and labour, or, if he will, with so much verbose and pedantic pomp, he has already long ago, merely by the prophetic spirit of his own sound reason, not only guessed, but even seen and understood—namely, 'that, with all our reason, we can never transcend the bounds of experience.' But yet, whenever he is questioned on his principles of reason, as he must admit that, among them, there are many which he has not taken from experience, and which, therefore, are independent of it and *à priori* valid, how and with what reasons will he bid the dogmatist or his own self pause in carrying these notions and principles beyond all possible experience, and just because it is independently of experience that they are acquired? And even he, this adept of sound reason, despite all his self-assumed, cheaply gained wisdom, is not so certain himself not unconsciously to stray beyond the objects of experience into the field of the breed of the brain. Nay, commonly, he is already deeply enough in the thrall of such, though, to be sure, he gives to his groundless pretensions a certain colour of popular phraseology in representing them all as mere probability, reasonable conjecture, or analogy" (iii. 77).

As we say, there is no mistaking Kant's belief here. He is, all unconsciously, blindly, convinced that what we call experience, or simply life, consists of no more than so many butterflies of impression on slides within us, projected into objects without us, by the light from our own internal machinery. It is the absolute certainty within him of all our possible sensations being nothing but these subjective butterflies—it is this that, as it were, has wrung from him the invention of all that wonderful machinery for the conversion of these butterflies of internal *sensation* into the objects of external *perception*. Forgetful of all his years of labour, of all his own enormous difficulties, he smiles at the astonishment of his fellows on sight of the definitive

[1] Aristotle, *οἱ ἀγύμναστοι, ἰδιῶται*, *Meta.* i 4; *Eth.* iii. 8, 8.

finger-post which, as he says, he has at length so *summarily* reared for them! Really, we can ourselves but sympathise with him when, with so much bland comity, he good-naturedly condescends to chaff the simple conceit of that unfortunate "*naturalist*" of reason, to whom it does not offend him to know that his own vast achievement will seem verbosity and pomp! Ah! could he have thought, that naturalist or say even that dogmatic thinker, of that erscheinenden subjectivity and these objectivirenden Begriffe! For that is the whole. There must be for the realising of these *appearances* some resource found. And it has been found in the foil to sense,—the understanding.

It is to this we have now come—the invention of Kant in countervail of subjectivity which he has called "*possibility of experience*"; and that is the "pure understanding" as above named, or, as it was afterwards so notoriously echoed and re-echoed, "pure reason."

21. Time and Space

Now here, before we take up the categories themselves, there is an ingenious link of mediation—and mediation is a strictly necessary device in all truly logical systematisation always—that, clasping together with itself sense (the Erscheinungen) on the one hand, and the understanding (the categories) on the other hand, is in the first place to be carefully and considerately looked to. That link is Time and Space. Imagination, as we have been early taught in the *Kritik* (secs. 24 and 26), holds as much of sense here as it holds of understanding there; and it is in imagination that for Kant, Time and Space are laid up. In a word, Time and Space are at once *sensibilia* and *intellectualia*: at once things and ideas. As schemata, they are so far of

far of understanding.
are from our birth
eneral *à priori* forms
And his arguments in
so that it would be
ments, anywhere else.

gs that they are mere
derstand now of Time
appearances also. Will
that, unless some German
boos? However it was to
is certain, quite as much
common sense, that Time
es without, even as the coat
n my feet are; and that,
from the earth, an actual
would remain behind, even
ne, were I dead to-morrow,
dispose of them. Kant has
must—meaning what shall
will think in independence
but were there ever more
-weavings) than that spectral
time in the head of Kant

AS CATEGORIES AGAIN

last that shall be as so much
of all these thin appearances,
and the rest, into the solid realities
have to see at once that, even
the curdling is already there,
the rennet is quite uncalled for.
all that it could do would be to
succession into an objective relation:

but, in all cases of cause and effect, even in the Erscheinungen, the appearances, the mere impressions, an objective relation, as we have seen, is already present. The actual facts are always *a b*; they are never *b a*; and it is a mere matter of nominal ornament and *luxe* that would convert them into *AB*. Kant might object here that the "always" is only a *so far* "always." That is quite true; but it is not for Kant to object it. Unless the stage of sense were necessary, it could not be necessarily followed by a necessary stage of the understanding. Why, the very *analogy* would fail. The category *can* act only when it gets its cue; and sense can guarantee the understanding only if it is itself complete. An unguaranteed understanding were itself subjective; and so also any category that only on such terms acted. But no! Kant himself does not wish any category so to act. Even to him there is first a logical comparison instituted, and then an inference through judgment to a state of the case declared "allgemein" (general or universal) even before the category is called upon, and is in fact the *sine quâ non* for that calling itself. But I need not dilate here, as we have amply seen already (at pp. 125–29) Kant's own admissions as to the state of the case, and I have fully discussed (at pp. 138 and 150) how Kant, in failing to see the difference between such judgments as sugar-sweetness and wormwood-bitterness, and such others as sun and stone, room and fire, etc., may be said to have actually missed what was specially vital and essential in the entire problem. In fact, on the whole, just one general consideration (iii. 63) is enough: "The impressions of sense are subsumed under the categories, gemäss gewissen allgemeinen Bedingungen der Anschauung." And that means, What would happen were these conditions not there? which means in turn,

What precedes the category supersedes the category: there is a relation dictated to us—a relation which we have only to receive. Or say that this is not so, then there follows an irresponsible alternative which is only worse. "When (67) I say experience tells me something. I mean always only the impression, the apprehension of sense, that lies in it, *e.g.*, that on the lighting of the stone by the sun always warmth ensues, and this, as a proposition of experience, is therefore so far at all times contingent. That this warming necessarily ensues through the lighting by the sun is implied, certainly, in the *judgment of experience* (by virtue of the notion of cause), but that I do not get to know by experience; on the contrary, experience is only then first produced through this addition, to the impression or apprehension of sense, of the notion of the understanding (cause)." There is no necessity, no notion of cause, in the facts of sense so long as they are only the facts of sense; in order that causal necessity may lie in them, the notion of cause must in some way or other be *added to* them—must in some way or other be thrown into them. Now, what can do this, or who can do this? It is only I that can do this, and I can do this either only *with* a reason or *without* a reason. If I act *without* a reason, I act arbitrarily, —and what is there by any possibility in all Kant's machinery to justify this or other *arbitrariness* of mine? And if I act *with* a reason, then this reason must have come to me only from the facts of sense. That is, plainly, there must have been a reason already in the facts of sense, which was the necessary occasion for the call on the category to intervene; and that being, was there any necessity for any such intervention of the category at all?

Surely it follows from this that the appeal to a mere

analogy was something supervacaneous and idle. We have seen, in the last words of our last quotation, Kant himself chaff his opposite, the "naturalist," for seeking refuge for himself in the colour of "analogy," can he in truth vindicate his own resort to the same expedient, though, very certainly, it was thorough conviction and anything but fear that prompted it? At the same time, no doubt, the admission is due, that Kant may, not without reason, be righteously indignant that two such analogies should be even mentioned in the same breath together! Still, it is quite true that, if the facts of sense themselves give no authority for the call on the category, then it is *I* add it—it is a mere external annex—it is but an arbitrary addition of mine. To categorise, without a reason, the mere feeling of a sense-succession into the grave necessity of antecedent and consequent in the intellect is, for arbitrariness, not to fall far short of the fatuity of categorising the snap of a pop-gun into the thunder of the clouds.

But, finally now, here, we come to this definitively determinant question, What does Kant demand for his categories, and what are they? As said, we do not intend to reflect here on the number of the categories or on their derivation from mere school logic: we ask this question in another sense. What his categories are: Kant asserts that they are direct notions of the understanding, *à priori* and native to the mind of each of us; and what he demands for them is: a necessary, universal, apodictic validity, capable of being transferred to the contributions of special and general sense. This last consideration of transference, as already abundantly discussed,—without further comment, we leave; and as for validity, that plainly must be contingent on what they are and are not. Now we assert at once here: We have not an understanding that, as Kant supposes,

thinks, in *à priori* pigeon-holes of its own, the connections of things. Such pigeon-holes, under the name of the categories, Kant would fain believe to exist in each of us; but such physiological endowment of the brain is but a crude invention, let it be worked out with what fond faith, with what interminable pains of ingenuity, it may. Physiological pigeon-holes of such a quality, no man has any. For as to what they are, the categories: they are but so many generalisations from experience; they are but so many common notions—generalised notions.

Take the category of Quantity, for example, as instanced by Kant himself at iii. 62. After stating that no synthetic judgment can be objective unless it contain a category, he continues:—

"Even the judgments of pure mathematic in its simplest axioms are not exempted from this condition. The proposition: The straight line is the shortest line between any two points, presupposes that the line is subsumed under the notion of Quantity, which certainly is no mere perception, but has its seat solely in the understanding, and serves to determine the perception (of the line) in respect of the judgments that may be quantitatively pronounced upon it," etc.

Does any man believe this? Is it not certain that whatever can determine any judgment of a line already lies in the line itself? Have I really passed the line through any pigeon-hole of my brain whatever, in order to make it, as it were, fire-proof, objectively valid?

But in regard to Quantity, Kant again gives us perhaps even a better illustration in sec. 26 (ii. 754). He tells us there, for example, of the synthetic unity of the units in space, that "precisely the same synthetic unity, if I abstract from the form of space, has its seat in the understanding, and is the category of Quantity." Had space been a Thing-in-itself, and only *brought* its

characters, there is no doubt that Kant would have acknowledged the notion Quantity to be quite obviously, even objectively, derivative from it. But let it (space) be only an appearance, what difference does that make? The *appearance* (or what is called the *appearance*) has precisely the same constitutive characters as the *thing-in-itself* (or what is called the *thing-in-itself*), and, than this latter, is not one whit less in consciousness; why, then, should a notion that is derivable from the latter not be equally derivable from the former? But, this being, we have in the category a superfluous duplicate. Space is *à priori*, and quantity, as a character set in it, must be equally *à priori*: why, then, the categorical excess? Is not space enough? It actually *is* quantity —quantity in bodily form! Space, says Kant (ii. 126), is "the pure type of all external quantities"; and so (142) "all objects, as in space, are extensive magnitudes."

As for Quality, Kant, to get it, finds himself under a necessity simply to borrow it. "Reality," a being in time, he says (126), is correspondent to pure "feeling" (and so, Negation is as non-being in time). He did not need this: Time and Space have already separate—*Qualities!* At least, if it is always a what sort, a *qualis*, that is determinative of quality, it cannot but be granted that the *qualis* of quantity is not the *qualis* of quality. But so, we can ask of Quality as we asked of Quantity: in what pigeon-hole of my brain, then, does Reality lie, or Negation lie, or Limitation lie?

Then the Postulates of Empirical thinking—in short, there is not one of these twelve categories of Kant that does not lie in experience and may not be perfectly well generalised, necessity and all, from experience. The innocence of Kant here is quite touching at times, as when he cannot restrain expressions even of wonder at

actual, supposed "anticipations of experience"![1] Surely an apparatus to such effect in each of us could not fail to be to us of quite a magnetic virtue! Yet surely, also, as said elsewhere, "there is hardly the tip of a feather concerned"!

23. Causality at Last

So, now, then, it stands with the problem of causality. Hume's solution, Custom, we grant to be inapplicable, and for the reason suggested by Kant. Custom, as a principle only subjective, may perfectly well account for associations that are themselves only subjective, only subjective and contingent; but it cannot, in the least, or in any way, account for others that are objective, objective and necessary. How does a schoolboy lay off to his master of a morning his *penna, pennæ, dominus, domini*, etc., or his *amo, amavi, doceo, docui*, etc., but by having learnt them overnight? He has so often repeated the words in their sequence that, in the same sequence, they stick together in his memory. But it is not repetition, it is not custom, that keeps his knife in his pocket, or lets him lose no less than three marbles by a hole in it. When the stone he flings breaks not his enemy's head, but unintentionally a window, he flees. He knows well, however, that the stone has not broken the window by custom; and he would even turn on his enemy, it may be, if that enemy cried "Coward!" It is custom that binds together the A B of the alphabet; but it is not custom that necessitates the A B of causality. And

[1] "All the same, this Anticipation of Perception has, even for one of the transcendentally accustomed and so made cautious inquirers, always something *Auffallendes* in it, and calls to reflection," etc., etc. (ii. 151). Kant is fain to think that *degree* (density), in his way of it, dispenses with the usual hypothesis of equal volumes being variously "vacanced" by pores (see *Text-Book to Kant*, p. 279 sq.).

if it is so with the simple single principle of Hume, it is not otherwise with the complicated plural principles of Kant. I know well that the key that drew my tooth was no mere appearance; nor yet are appearances the fire that heats the water, the water that scalds, the blanket that comforts, the ice that cools, the food that feeds, the poison that kills—not these, nor thousands and thousands, millions and millions more. Nor if these, and all such, are mere appearances, is it ever once possible for me, by any one category of the twelve, or by the whole twelve together, to solidify them into reals —not, in fact, that Kant himself expects as much of me. —No! as Hume can give us no more than a sham necessity through custom, Kant, too, at the last, is quite content if we shall accept from him the no less sham necessity of analogy!

But neither custom nor analogy will give true necessity. And so the original question remains—Since there *is* true necessity, what is it that *does* give it?

I have approached this subject, in the course of a number of years, not once, but many times, and from a variety of directions.[1] I do not suppose, therefore, that there are many or any other philosophical crises with which I am, on the whole, more conversant.

In putting together, *logically*, as he says, the items or elements which severally occur to constitute in consciousness any actual case of causality, Kant expresses himself at different times thus: "There is, first, the Wahrnehmung (*perceptio*) which belongs merely to the senses. But, secondly, there belongs also to this the

[1] See *Secret of Hegel* (new edn.), pp. 105 *sqq.*, and 329 *sqq.* Schwegler, p. 455. *Essays*, p. 178. *Protoplasm*, 61–70. *Text-Book to Kant*, Index. *Gifford Lectures*, Index. *Darwinianism*, 12–19. Articles in *Mind*; *Journal of Spec. Phil.*; *Chambers's Encyclopædia*; *Princeton Review* for January 1879.

judging (which pertains merely to the understanding). This judging, now, may be twofold: firstly, in that I merely compare the items perceived in my then consciousness; or, secondly, in that I conjoin them in a one consciousness as such. The first judgment is merely a judgment of *sense*. . . . The judgment of *experience*, again, must, to the sense-perception and its logical conjunction (after that, through comparison, it has been made allgemein), add something," etc. (the act of the understanding or category). "Allgemein," of course, can only be translated by *general* or *universal* (the quotations are from ii. 60 and ii. 65, and they will be found repeated again and again in the same neighbourhood). Now, that first judging or judgment of Kant is merely the conscious perception of the two items that constitute the first and second, the 1, 2, the *a b* of any case of causality. To Kant it is the cue in sense of the category in the understanding; but what is it in reality? That consciousness of logical conjunction and comparison in sense is, *in reality*, the perception of the *identity* which lies in or between the items—which, in its own way, is present in the first as in the second, in 1 as in 2, in *a* as in *b*; and it is that perception, as a perception of identity, which at once prompts, which at once *is*, the judgment of a necessary antecedent, or cause, and of a necessary consequent, or effect. That is the whole.

How is it that this perception of identity escaped Kant, and at least seems to have escaped Hume? Kant says (iii. 30): "Hume asked, How is it possible that, when a notion is given me, I can pass from it, and join to it another which is not at all contained in it?" That is quite honest in Kant as to a sole and implicit belief on his part. Hume says (*Enquiry*, iv. pt. 1):—

"Were any object presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect which will result from it, without

consulting past observation; after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event which it ascribes to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. *For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it.*"

In the words italicised, Hume, doubtless, quite endorses what is ascribed to him by Kant; but is he as honest as Kant in the reason by which he precedes them? It would, of course, be rather hard to expect a man to tell off-hand all that would follow as effects from any object whatever, isolatedly presented to him as a cause; and, without disputing Hume's honesty, we may at least allow ourselves to fancy that Hume's sceptical ingenuity would be rather delighted by the idea of posing that single object in the face of any man. But that is not the question: the question is not of any one object, but of two certain known and given ones. And on that supposition I have no hesitation in affirming that no man who had any usage of thinking and was given time to think, would fail to answer in the great bulk of cases: Why, the effect, in some way or other, only *repeats* the cause. That is, his answer would be: The secret of the relation and the secret of the inference would be—Identity

If any man will search the passages concerned in the two works, the *Kritik of Pure Reason* and the *Prolegomena*, I think he will find, as illustrations on the part of Kant, no less than nine actual cases of the usual conjunction of a cause and its effect. We have, in the former work, as early as sec. 26 (ii. 754), Frost and Ice. Then, under the "Second Analogy," we have the Ship in the Current, the Room and the Stove, the Bullet and the Cushion, the Glass and the Water, and, much later (under the Methodenlehre), the Sun with Wax and the

Sun with Clay[1] (see respectively, ii. 164, 171, 172, 591); while, in the latter work, we have Air and Pressure, and the Sun and the Stone (iii. 61, 62, 67, 75). Suppose we take these examples as they come.

How is it that there is any relation of identity between the general temperature and the formation of ice? We may say at once here that we are simply in presence of the law that, at 32° Fahrenheit, water freezes. That, however, is, so far, but a *fact*. We may say that we know that it *is* so; but we do not know *why*. We know that it is simply an experience; but we know also that it is an experience such that, with full general consent, it may be named a universal experience and a necessary experience; and that, therefore, it concerns a relation which, as held, is as good as apodictically valid. We even feel this, and have no doubt of this, that the cold congeals the water, quite as much as I compress my handkerchief into a ball in my hand. Hume, no doubt, we can understand very well at the same time, might say, and with perfect truth say: Still, if you come to an ultimate reason for this your understanding of the fact, you can only say, *custom*: you have no warrant for asserting that the freezing of water follows 32° Fahrenheit but—custom. I grant the universality of the fact,—I grant even the universality of the belief in some certain real and perfectly intimate connection between the two facts,—I even say as others say, that the freezing of water is the *action* of the cold on it; but, with all that granting, and, with all that saying, neither you nor I know more than that the one fact, the freezing of the water, *follows* the other fact, the quicksilver standing at 32° on the scale Fahrenheit.

No doubt this is the perfectly reasonable way in

[1] "Limus ut hic durescit, et haec ut cera liquescit
Uno eodemque igni" —Virgil, *Ecl.* viii. 80.

which Hume would have us understand his understanding of the general fact. So far, that is,—to name what in final analysis the position amounts to,—Hume sees only the *difference* that is present, and has never a thought of *identity*. And, certainly, there seems only difference between 32 degrees of cold and the freezing of water: identity there seems none—identity, indeed, there seems not *possibly* any. For all that, there *is* an identity here; there is the same identity here, though in another form, that there is between the billiard balls: that identity is motion. It seems certain that what is called latent heat is simply latent motion: degree of heat is degree of motion. All bodies are, just as they are, in intimate motion. When a cannon ball is stopped by a dead wall, it becomes markedly hot: its motion of translation has been transformed into a motion of vibration. So at 32 degrees water has not motion enough to preserve its fluidity. Why bodies may be variously solid, fluid, and gas, depends on their heat. The why of the *forms* themselves we are not asked to be able to tell, simply because all *individual* forms we must just take as we find them. We see the sun and the moon, and know of Mars, Mercury, and the rest; and there we stop: we must be just contented to take water and wine, beer and tobacco, as they come to us. There is no final account of personal being in the whole of Natural History.

How it is identity that has to do with the relation of cause and effect in the case of the ship that drifts in the current, no one will have any difficulty. The current flows down and simply takes the ship with it, as it would a dead leaf, a splinter of wood, or say a bubble of its own. The heat in the room is the same heat that is in the stove. The pressure that is in the compressed cushion is the same pressure that is in the compressing bullet. As for the water and the glass, that concerns the natural law of capillary attraction; and if in gravi-

tation there was an identity in the case of bullet and cushion, there is a like identity in that of the glass and the water. It is the same with the air as with bullet and cushion, a yielding to pressure, etc. Then, that the heat of the sun should warm the stone, soften the wax, and harden the clay, is, very evidently in all, a matter of identity, as are full shoots after rain. Shadows from the clouds, or eclipses, are no less simple stoppages of light than are window-shutters, or blinds, or curtains. The thunder that follows lightning is but the same effect of vibration that follows the stroke of a hammer. Hume himself would have rather stared if he had been told that the necessary connection between footstep and foot, watch and maker, lay *à priori* in his own mind; and I think he would have listened to the suggestion of identity.

Here, too, I cannot but think of another somewhat starched, man-millinery position which, at least to my mind, would have also made Hume stare, if by any possibility he could have heard of it. I mean that pragmatically all-wise position on the part of the supposed, and self-supposed, followers of his own, in regard to which the historian Burton in his *Life of Hume* (i. 82), as late as 1846, has these astonishing words in a note: "This refers to the notion, which now may be termed obsolete in philosophy, of an inherent power in the cause to produce the effect"! I spoke once before of common people not being always without an occasion for speaking of great philosophers as great fools; and here, surely, is another one. Most writers on philosophy in Great Britain since Hume have thought themselves only faithful to their master when they denied *efficiency* of a cause, and asserted of it only customary constancy—constancy so far as known.[1] Of course, many names are here

[1] Any possible ambiguity of meaning is to be set aside here. 'Efficiency" must be taken to mean, not *volition*, but simply *action*,

relevant; but we shall take only Brown's. He, Brown, held that causation means no more than "invariableness of antecedence"; and power is "only another word for expressing abstractly and briefly the antecedence itself and the invariableness of the relation." Power, that is, so far as it shall be held to be synonymous with "efficiency," is altogether denied by Brown. There is "invariableness," he says, and that is the "efficiency"; if more or other efficiency is wanted than invariableness, then efficiency there is none: "the feeling that one object will never appear without being followed by another"—that is "the essence of our idea of efficiency." It is even because of these extraordinary conclusions that Dr. Welsh, the biographer of Brown, pronounces him "the first of modern metaphysicians," "and in subtlety of intellect and powers of analysis superior to any metaphysician that ever existed," discoverer of principles which "will constitute an era in the history of metaphysical science," "an era in the science to which it belongs, as much as was done by the *Principia*"! Really, now, is it not extraordinary the mistakes into which positively very sensible men will sometimes quite innocently tumble? Certainly Kant, however it may be with him elsewhere, has very much the *pas* here of all the distinguished Mills, and Buckles, and Grotes, that supposed themselves to follow Hume in regard to what he said on causality. Now that was this: "Having found, in many instances, that two objects have always been conjoined together; if the former one of them be presented anew to our senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect the latter one of them." So far, then, as there is suggestion of *invariable-*

or say *rationale* of action. Assertion of constant conjunction, with denial of any mediating reason, is what I call *abstract a b*; an abstract *a* and an abstract *b*, abstractly beside each other. Of course, rationale, actual or ultimate, is not always explicit.

ness here, it amounts only to an invariableness of customary expectation in the mind. I know not, then, that Mr. Mill can be held to be strictly correct when he asserts cause (as I quote him elsewhere) to mean, with Hume, "the invariable antecedent": "This is the only part of Mr. Hume's doctrine," he adds, "which was contested by his great adversary, Kant." To say Hume held a cause to be "the invariable antecedent" of an effect is to assume for him a positive peremptoriness as well of judgment as of statement, which his own words are all insufficient to support; while we, for our part, are at no small loss to understand how it was that Kant, who only saw a *want* of invariableness (or necessity) in the doctrine of Hume, yet found *in*variableness the only part of the doctrine which it was for him to contest! That a cause was an invariable antecedent, this was the only part of Hume's doctrine which was contested by Kant! This is so curiously wrong—diametrically wrong, that I wonder if I shall be pardoned for being unable to help finding it almost comic even on the part of a Mill!

It is certainly true that that is the doctrine of Brown: *cause* means for him "the invariable antecedent"; and I do not think we shall be wrong if we couple with him, besides those others, the great Frenchman, Comte.

Now, Kant did have invariableness in his doctrine, and was very far from contesting it; but he found it necessary to add to it, and it was just by what he added that he had, as a philosopher, very much the better of Brown and the rest. They, for their parts, never got further with their theory than what was to Kant the sense-stage in his. What Kant says in that stage is, *e.g.*, "if a stone is long enough shone upon by the sun, it becomes warm"; and it is precisely in that stage that *they* say, the sunshine on a stone is the invariable ante-

cedent of the stone becoming warm. But so far, says Kant (iii. 75):—

"There is not here as yet any necessity of connection, and not yet, necessarily, the notion of Cause. But I continue and say further: if the above proposition, which is merely a subjective conjunction of units in sense, is to be a proposition of experience, it must be regarded as necessarily and universally valid. But such a proposition would be: The sun is, through its light, the cause of the warmth. The previous empirical rule is now regarded as a law, and that, too, as holding good not merely of units of sense-impression, but of these in behoof of a possible experience, which requires thoroughly, and by consequence necessarily, valid rules. I perfectly well see, therefore, the notion of cause as a notion necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience, and its possibility as of a synthetic union of the sense-impressions in a consciousness generally."

This is just as though we were listening to a critique on the part of Kant that held invariableness to be quite insufficient if conceived to be itself the complete and entire constitutive characteristic of causality, and not merely the preliminary process of sense that simply conditioned it. And that is as much as to say that without the necessary and universal validity or efficiency of the notion cause—in a word, without seeing and saying in the circumstances *cause*, these *circumstances* themselves would be mis-seen, mis-understood, and altogether mis-named. To Kant, all these *circumstances* being granted, with the perfectly free inclusion of *invariableness*, there is yet, for all that, no *cause* at all present. Only when the mind, consciously or unconsciously, is absorbed by the conviction that, in the *a b* of sense, the *a* is a necessary *a*, and the *b* a necessary *b*—and this really amounts, in conclusion, to the relation of antecedent and consequent, though not quite as though something called a category had sprung out from its watch-box in the brain (pigeon-hole) and absorbed it—then, and then only, is there *cause*. If Kant, here, indeed, instead of saying, "the sun, through

its *light*, is the cause of the warmth in the stone," had only said, "the sun, through its *warmth*, is the cause of the warmth in the stone," we should certainly then, pretty well at last, have had, all and whole, holus-bolus, the entire case before us!

But, surely, that denial of efficiency on the part of a cause is one of the very strangest warps that has ever been witnessed in humanity—in *educated* humanity, and just because of its *educatedness*! The water that falls on the mill-wheel is no effective of its motion—no, only the invariable antecedent. It is not the current carries the ship, the fire that warms the room, the bullet that indents the cushion, the sun that heats the stone and dries the clay—there is no efficacy or efficiency in any one of these agents—in fact, there is no agency at all in question;—no, no agency at all, even when we see that agency itself *grow*, as in moving the mill and the ship, warming the room and the stone, drying the clay, etc.—no, oh no! there is no agency at all, there is only antecedency!

A man in a difficulty often turns to look about him for help—a pile of stones, a wall, a paling, a tree, a piece of wood, an oar, a rope, a knife, a stone, a pencil, a pen, a piece of chalk, a sponge, a handkerchief, a boat-hook, a boot-jack, an umbrella, a blind, a curtain, a pin, a nail, a hammer, a stick, a cloth, a pail of water, a plank, stepping-stones, spectacles, a string, a thread, a thimble, a glove, a button, a half-brick, a piece of paper, etc.—I wonder if it would set him up to be told that he was only philosophically looking out, then, for "invariable antecedents"! Razors would hardly be the invariable antecedents for clearing a forest, but axes might. Still, there is no such thing as efficiency in causes, in the flood that breaks up a culvert, or carries off a bridge, in the storm or the sea that brings down a cliff, Shakespeare's, or other! Flood and bridge, storm or sea and cliff, the

cause and its effect are to be conceived as only abstractly side by side: there is no such thing as action, no such thing as a grip of the one upon the other. Causality is not to become an organic concrete—common sense is not to be vindicated—your doctrinaire white neckcloth is the only wisdom![1]

[1] I have remarked elsewhere (*Text-Book*, 23): "It is a fact that everybody who in this country has come after Reid (I do not speak of Beattie or Oswald), namely, Stewart, Brown, etc., have on the whole taken their causality—very absurdly—from Hume." Reid says once (*W. W.*, 76): "Modern philosophers know that we have no ground to ascribe efficiency to natural causes, or even necessary connection with the effect: but we still call them causes, including nothing under the name but priority and constant conjunction, . . . a kind of abuse of the name, because we know that the thing most essential to causation in its proper meaning—to wit, efficiency—is wanting. . . . Bacon seems to have thought that there is a *latens processus* by which natural causes really produce their effects, . . . but Newton, more enlightened, has taught us"—to see, in short, such effects as dependent on "laws of nature." No words could more completely than these endorse Burton's allegation that "the notion of an inherent power in the cause to produce the effect is now obsolete in philosophy"—an allegation certainly quite to the mind of those who take their causality from Hume. Nevertheless, he who carefully considers all that Reid relatively writes (say *W. W.*, 57–59, 65–67, 73–79, 455, 456, 521–27, 603–8), will see that any doubt as to Reid really holding precisely the contrasting view wholly depends on expression merely, and in connection with a certain distinction of Reid's own. To Reid there are first causes, active causes, metaphysical causes, animate causes, spiritual causes; and, *e contra*, there are second, passive, physical, inanimate and material causes. The former are to him the only true causes, while the latter have but the name; for to Reid it is *mind* alone can constitute cause—*the* cause, before which, properly, nothing finite can be cause. Still, of what are called finite causes, he has no different view from that which is named of common sense. He certainly would wish to ennoble even finite causality by making it law of nature, and so due only to the one true cause; but he sees quite clearly, for all that, the insubstantiality of mere law that itself acts not, but only names *how* what acts *does* act: "There must be a *real* agent to produce the effect

It is just such wisdom in starch that admires the greatest as but the effect of the smallest. Sarah Jennings spots her cousin Abigail's court-dress, and the effect is a revolution in Europe. But the touch that sends the mightiest warship into the sea is not the vast machinery of the launch. The revolution really had its causality in the weariness of the nations; as the machinery, it was that no less really was causality to the

according to the law—a malefactor is not hanged by the law, but by the executioner, *according to* the law." "*Laws* cannot be the efficient cause of anything; they are only the rule according to which the efficient cause operates";—"a *law* cannot be an *agent*" (57, 66). So here, in the case of the law of causality, we are entitled to ask for the secondary agent; and accordingly, that, with Reid's consent, brings at once up to what is in causality the finite agent, not the first agent, but the second agent, the executioner, so to speak. And now, with this question before us, we are in presence of any fact of ordinary, Reid's *physical*, causality. It is precisely here, however, that we have the unsatisfactory point in Reid. He is so bent on recognising no "*proper*" efficiency and power unless in a mind and will, that *verbally* he denies "*efficiency*" in physical causes. No doubt, also, Hume's analysis of the constituents of causality has had its effect on him. Still, we can but recollect that to him (Reid), too, a cause has its own efficiency, with proviso only that it is an efficiency secondary, an efficiency *lent*. That every change, every effect, has its cause, and in necessary antecedence to its effect, is to him, as to all of us, a natural first principle. He expressly agrees with Hume as to constant conjunction being essential in causality: the effect is a necessary consequent even in the merely physical and inanimate. "The most accurate thinkers," he says, "apply to physical causes the words *agent* and *action*, not less than *cause* and *causation*"; and this is only incorrect to him in so far as the proviso may be omitted that "nothing can be an efficient cause, in the proper sense, but an intelligent being"; as he says, "active powe[illegible] in the inanimate, I know not." I shall not give examples; but it [illegible] really only in consequence of his [illegible] mind, that we have from him o[illegible] seem more or less incoherent [illegible] case. Only, by statement of [illegible] expression (above), as on

launch. It is not so that the identity between the cause and its effect is lost. Neither can the series that obscures, efface in fact the identity that strings. Still, it is not always brute identity that is to meet us. The food that feeds does not simply repeat itself in the veins: the organism itself has made its own of it. The finger of a child may touch a sluice that frees a cataract, and a pin's point may let life itself run through; but

ing "no ground to ascribe to natural causes even necessary connection with the effect," that even this is wholly conditioned by his having in his eye at the moment only what to him is a true cause, namely, "intelligent will"; for to him, then, even such "connection" is, directly, due only to said will.

It is to be acknowledged, so far in conclusion here, that Reid's own prepossessed distinction confuses his criticism of Hume's "doubts" as to causality; which criticism otherwise, and as in general, may be named too exclusively categorical and peremptory, and quite insufficiently speculative and, as at bottom the matter was in Hume's mind, interrogative. We may refer to such salient examples in this direction as that it would be only correct to shock the vulgar by telling them that "the sun does not shine nor give heat," that "the moon does not cause the tides," and of this more; meaning by as much that it is only the First Cause that is veritably operant. Wherein, for these days, Reid, alas! is only too theological —days in which, on the doctrine of physical evolution, matter, only *as so and so put*, successively "*evolves*" itself, and physical causes are consequently First Causes; at the same time that, that being, Reid would have to own, what he denied then, knowledge of something "in an unthinking inanimate being that might be called active power"—not, however, that even such something could yet exhibit Reid's own test of active power, that "power to produce an effect supposes power not to produce it," which, for its part, clearly is a presupposition of will. "In intelligent causes," says Reid, "the power may be without being exerted, but, in inanimate causes, we conceive no power but what is exerted." Nowadays, of course, unlike Reid, we may say that it is quite possible to see active power in the inanimate, as in a watch mainspring, for example, and even reserved power, as in suppressed action of steam, water, electricity, etc. etc.; but, in the latter case, the weight suppressing were still a determinable power. That, however, is true: "Nothing external

the identity that was first in either case was there only to wake a second, and trifles to wake are numberlessly variable. Identity itself must be identity of element: it is perhaps in mechanism alone that identity is brute; chemism, vitalism, intellect, are all rises of level. It is prodigious what life, what mind, can make of a motive. A cause itself, too, may comprise various identities: the hangman himself may play the flute or beat the drum; he is only the hangman when he hangs. The poison

can introduce into the human mind anything further than the general notions of priority and constant conjunction,"—unless, with Hume, we add *necessity*, which, with him, means efficacy, power, etc. (see *Treatise* (ed. 1817), p. 115 and p. 217). But, whether in the animate or the inanimate, causality is to Reid "a first or self-evident principle," "a law of thought," "a necessary truth"; and that, as such, it admits not of logical proof by reasoning.

Hume, too, to whom Reid refers here, equally holds that (118) "it is impossible to *demonstrate* the necessity of a cause," instancing such attempts thereto as those of Hobbes, Clarke, and Locke. But if, as is held by us, the solution of causality lies in identity, there is room now for another opinion; and, indeed, it is perhaps possible to find a reference to identity in one or more of the attempts named. It may appear that identity can never suggest an absolute first; but further thinking will only end in finding, even in this respect, what must solely certiorate the suggestion. When Reid writes to Gregory, "You seem to think that there are different kinds of causes, each having something specific in its relation to the effect," may we not construe that very "specific" in the relation into simple Identity?—aware, too, of essential differences according to the stage on which causality is taken, as mechanical, vital, intellectual, etc. Reid himself very properly objects to the applying of the laws of matter to those of mind, as though *motive* were but *impulse*, and as though, consequently, the strongest motive, just like the strongest impulse, must prevail!

Very curiously, Reid (at p. 199), even when occupied in the denial of "proper causality or efficiency in any natural cause," gives direct expression to the principle of Identity. [illegible] ions," he says, "upon which all our knowledge of [illegible] *same* kind must have the *same* ca[illegible] a more complete admission?

that kills is the elixir that cures: the breath that blows in a flame, blows out a candle. The cause that has an x for an x in one effect, may have a y and a z for a y and a z in others. I have seen a cobweb to catch flies stop a clock; and, by the bye, the truth of invariable antecedents is only glaring there—the pendulum and the web that caught it time after time till it stop-stop-stopped, were only side by side, they entered not the one into the other! "The effect," says Hume, "is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it" (*Enquiry*, sec. iv. pt. i.). No man can beat Hume in power of countenance to put a merely plausible *propos* as though with the most innocent conviction; and Kant, quite taken in by Hume (ii. 23, but better in ed. 2), only repeats this. And yet there is no one in this world who would not have seen in the cobweb the necessary stoppage of the clock the moment he had looked into the latter,—nay, there is no one in the world who would not have *à priori* seen the burden of as much on the supposition that a spider was to build in the corner of the case just where it stopped the pendulum. But Kant quite followed Hume when he asked: "How is it possible that, when a notion is given me, I can go beyond it, and connect with it another which is not at all contained in the former?" It is by Hegel, as I have said elsewhere (and in connection with the Hindoos), that the *analogy* of Kant, as well as the *custom* of Hume, somewhat casually it may be, is suggestively supplemented by *identity*. Not that Hegel, for all that, is one whit less serious with the *category*, and the necessity of it, than Kant; on the contrary, he is infinitely more so. *That*, so far, it is proper to say at present, though it would be out of place to expand it.

24. Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact —Necessity

If *consequences* are to be spoken of here, it is now in this immediate connection that one of some importance shows. It may be worth while, namely, to turn back one's attention for a little special consideration of that criterion of necessity which, in a propositional regard, is so prominent in Kant. As such, this criterion is a turning-point too in that so prevailingly authoritative, and so universally believed infallible, distinction between *Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact.*

As at once perfectly conspicuously placed and equally explicitly stated in Hume, perhaps we may be allowed to point to his particular notice of it as notably the express *locus communis* for general reference to the distinction as a distinction. This, indeed, is the rather recommended to us here in that it is with this distinction Hume opens his inquiry into the relation of cause and effect.

"All the objects of human reason or inquiry," it is so he begins, "may naturally be divided into two kinds, *viz. Relations of Ideas* and *Matters of Fact.* Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. *That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the squares of two sides* is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty* expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a true circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. Matters of Fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary possible; because it can never ceived by the mind with equal so conformable to reality. *Th*

less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmative *that it will* rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and would never be distinctly conceived by the mind. It may, therefore, be a subject worthy curiosity to inquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses or the records of our memory. . . . All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded in the relation of *Cause* and *Effect*" (*Enquiry*, iv. pt. i.).

Leibnitz preceded Hume, the former dying when the latter was only some five years of age. He, too, distinguished, like Hume, between Ideas and Facts, though hardly with an equally explicit clearness. At least, it is only thus he expresses himself in the *Monadologie*—

"There are two species of truths: those of a Fact, and those with a Ground. The latter are necessary, and their contrary is impossible; the former are contingent, and their contrary is possible. When a truth is necessary, we can find the ground (reason) for it in analysis by continuing to resolve it into ever simpler ideas and truths, till we reach the ultimate (or first) one. . . . At last we reach simple ideas which can be defined no further. There are axioms, primitive principles, which cannot be proved, nor require any; these are *identical enunciations* the contrary of which implies an express contradiction. . . . A truth is *necessary* if its contrary implies a contradiction; if it is not necessary so, it is called *contingent*. It is a necessity that God exists, that all right angles are equal to one another, etc.; whereas, it is a contingent truth that I am in existence, and that there are in nature bodies which have an actual right angle" (*Monad.*, 33, 35, Letter to Coste).

It is specially interesting in the above that even to Leibnitz, however indefinitely, identity seems to have emerged as ultimate principle; but for the distinction before us, we find it in Locke as well, *e.g.*—

"General . . . be found but in our ideas; whenever . . . in experiment or observations wit . . . beyond particulars. . . . We

cannot know certainly any two ideas to co-exist any further than experience by our senses informs us. . . . We cannot tell what effects bodies will produce; nor, when we see those effects, can we so much as guess, much less know, their manner of production. . . . We can go no further than particular experience informs us of matter of fact, and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce" (iv. 6, 16; iv. 3, 14. 26. 29).

Evidently, from the above, Matters of Fact are to Locke, as they are to Hume, particulars only and incompetent to universals; contingent only and inadequate to necessity. Like Hume, too, Locke knows the co-existence of a cause and its effect only by the experience of sense; and neither can he see, whether before or after experience, the special tie that binds them. Nor is that less remarkable, namely, that, long before Kant, Locke should have held inference beyond the particular case of causality to depend on analogy.

Before Locke, Hobbes has it in his *Tripos* (*Human Nature*, iv. 10) that "Experience concludeth nothing universally." Later than Kant, we have the same doctrine in Schelling and Hegel; the one saying (x. 76), "Experience can certainly afford nothing universal,"—and the other (*Propaed.*, 9), "Experience tells only how objects *are*, not how they *must* be, nor yet how they *should* be." Lastly, we may crown all so far by the authority of Aristotle, who (*Meta.* 981*b*, 9–13) says, "The senses yield not intellectual knowledge, though express source of that of the particular: they declare not the *why* of anything, as *why* the fire is warm, but only that it *is* warm."

Now, it is abundantly plain that on this express view of the matter it is that Kant supports himself (*Prol.*, 54—) he says, "Experience tells me what is *necessarily* so, and *must* not be [illegible] involving, as it does, the Matters of Fact, points t

Relations of Ideas. Kant continues indeed: "We are actually in possession of a pure *natural* science which, *nevertheless*, for prescription to nature, contains laws that are *à priori* and have all that necessity that is required for apodictic principles"; and then he calls in witness that "Propaedeutik" of General Physics which usually precedes expositions of natural philosophy. But from the Substance, Causality, and Reciprocity which we know as there appertinent, he goes on to separate certain principles, mostly included with them, namely, Motion, Impenetrability, and Inertia, assigning for reason that these latter are "not quite pure and independent of empirical sources." Moreover, they give no example, he adds, of a "universality" psychical as well as physical, but "concern solely objects of the external senses." Now, I do not know that it has ever been pointed out, as certainly, I am disposed to think, it well may, that there is *not* the difference alleged whether in the one respect or the other. The three latter principles are *not* different from the three former, either as, first, concerns Matters of Fact, or as, second, concerns Ideas of Relations. *Impenetrability:* one body cannot occupy the place of another. *Inertia:* a body, uninterfered with, retains its state of motion or rest. *Motion:* Newton's three laws of motion are: (1) Every body must persevere in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless compelled to change it; (2) Every change of motion must be proportional, etc.; (3) To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction. Here this last is evidently, in so many words, Kant's own law of action and reaction; why, then, should the other two, which are but one with it, be rejected? Substance, causality, and reciprocity, if they have a validity inwards, have all a look outwards; and the three latter principles of impenetrability, inertia, and motion

are in no respect different: why, then, should Kant *make* them different?

Was not his only reason this,—that he could not find categories to suit?

Extension, Figure, Divisibility, Attraction, are usually enumerated in the same "Propaedeutik," as it is given us; and might not really a like validity be vindicated for all of them?

But more! Might not the general consideration be extended?

What of all Relations of Ideas—even in Matters of Fact?

What we have seen in causality, if we will but think of it, may prove to us highly suggestive. What came out there was this. Causes and effects themselves might be, and were, Matters of Fact; but still the references between them were possibly not of the same nature, and might very well be Relations of Ideas. And just that was the case. The relation between them was a relation of identity, and to prove identity between any two was to prove a necessity that made them one. In short, it was one thing to refer to existences as existences, and quite another to refer to relations as relations. Existences simply as existences could only be known empirically and *à posteriori* as just such and such facts that were then and there present; but a relation, by very necessity of its own proper nature, appealed to the intellect and was discerned by it. Here were differences, and differences even diametrically opposed. Relations held of intellect; but existences held only of sense, and what held of sense could not pretend to th[redacted] as what held of the intellect. W[redacted] seen was surely something na[redacted] than what was only sensuor[redacted] tingent and probable only;

sary and apodictic. That has been the one error all the time, then, to fix oneself into the *existences* and so blind oneself to the *relations*: lost in the belief that as the former were, the latter must be. Kant made much to himself of the happy thought: Was causality the sole example of something that, as known, was only matter of fact and contingent, at the same time that in its authority it was as apodictic, universal, and necessary as any relation of ideas? were there not others? But, in the special regard, it was after all only a fiasco for Kant that, failing to distinguish between the existence and the relation (though all these additional examples from the first principles of Physics might have prompted him otherwise), he came forward to the front to proclaim, publicly, his very triumph! For, in simple and good truth, that is still the fact: it is the categories that are his triumph.

But, first of all, it seems to have been the mathematics that led him to this. He saw (as he said) that "mathematical judgments are all synthetic," at the same time that they are all of "an *à priori* necessity," and, again, that they are all capable of being "exhibited in perception" (*Kritik of Pure Reason*, Introduction, V.). It rather pleased him, in his own success, to regret (VI.) that Hume's good sense was not led to see in mathematic what he (Kant) saw. The proposition, That the straight line is the shortest, is apodictic; but it is not more apodictic than that Every change must have a cause. It was these, and other propositions like these, that led Kant to perception, and perception of synthesis. Straight concerns quality, but shortest concerns quantity; and, consequently, it is incompetent for analysis to derive the one from the other. Hegel makes a somewhat prominent point in rejection of this. He (*Log.*, i. 241), against Kant, holds the transition from quality to quantity to be quite

analytic. "The simplest, said of a quantum, is the least, and the least said of a line in space is the shortest." This is Hegel. Nevertheless, the truth is rather with Kant: there is really a synthesis in the case and through perception. We have, here, in fact, an exemplification of Locke's pregnant remark of how the mind may "change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment." The *sensation* straight of the line is changed into the *judgment* shortest. In fact, it is just an instance of what we have been talking about; we *sensuously* perceive the *existence* (line), but we *intellectually* perceive the *relation* (shortest). Nor, as will be very obvious now, is it in any respect otherwise with the proposition that Every change must have a cause. The *change* itself we can see only sensuously; but the cause that is implied we can equally see only intellectually.

And this brings us to our last consideration here. Mathematics, quite as much as physics,—nay, quite as much as experience, depends on an element double—on *the* element double at once of *existence* (Matter of Fact) and *notion* (Relation of Ideas). This amounts to saying that even in mathematics, if, on the one hand, we see intellectually, we also, on the other hand, see only sensuously: even in mathematics there is eyesight sensuous quite as well as eyesight intellectual, and the difference between them is, that while the one is but sight, the other is *in*sight. Still, to sight lines—ay, parallel lines,—circles, triangles, squares, oblongs, angles, points, are quite as much in sense, and of sense, and sensuously sensible—really and at bottom—quite as much as any amount of bricks and mortar, a Rome of them, or a whole London of them! [redacted] never were a true circle or tri
demonstrated by Euclid
certainty and evidence,"

the same way said before him: "Whether there be any square or circle existing in the world or no—the demonstrations which depend on their ideas are the same"; and, no doubt, this has been, and still is, the universal belief, parallel lines, triangles, circles really being always put as *à priori* beside such empirical things as water and ice, bullet and cushion, ship and stream, sun and stone, etc. etc. But, for all that, lines, triangles, circles, etc., are but abstractions from empirical things—are but abstractions from the things of sense, only that and nothing more. Hume and Locke say, were there never a circle or a square in existence, its truths would remain; but I say, were there never an ordinary thing in existence, such abstracts as squares and circles, lines and triangles, the whole estate of geometry, would still be on the black-board, as it were, *blank*. No talk of, were there never a square in existence, can make an *à priori* of it. We have veritably such indefinite vague *ideas fixed* within us, and we do separate such things as triangles, etc., in the thought that they are *à priori* and ideal, from all manner of ordinary bricks and paving stones, as though these latter were alone empirical and real. But if we but look at it all in daylight, we shall find it quite otherwise. We do see with eyesight the figures in the book; they are sensible, and they are sensuous. The conclusion is, therefore, that Mathesis, if it is apodictic and, so to say, *à priori* in its relations, is in no wise less contingent and *à posteriori* in its existences:[1] and that that so being in its case, the same may very well be

[1] This contrasts with Kant's (v. 702) sentence: "Mathematical judgments *à priori*, and not empirical; for this, wohlan—have it so! and n, which can not be got from experi- matics, whose notion just has

in the case of whatever ordinary concretes shall, in their existences, imply relations. Kant, with the Persa of Plautus in his head, holds (viii. 116) that "to try to ex-press necessity from a proposition of experience (ex pumice aquam) is an express contradiction." But that is not so certain. Even Kant contradicts himself here, where the "Erfahrungssatz" (the proposition of experience) is elsewhere (iii. 58), as necessary, carefully distinguished from the "Wahrnehmungssatz" (the proposition of perception) which is only contingent (not but that for Kant the contradiction is only one of expression). At all events, we have seen Kant forcibly exclude such physical categories as Motion, Impenetrability, and Inertia from the society of his own physical categories, Substance, Cause, and Reciprocity, for no other reason, as it seemed to us, but that they did not fit into his *Table* (which he was fain to believe complete with only so many, and no more), and not because they were not equally apodictic in their evidence. Accordingly, it is quite in reason to surmise that, if these three or these six physical propositions are of such and such validity, there may very well be others equally valid, and indeed a great many others; for, not so very long ago, Kant's twelve categories seemed to us but a very poor allowance of the bread of necessity for all that sack of the immeasurable sense-contingency. There are laws connected with gravity and the centre of gravity, the mechanical powers, optics, etc., which all involve necessity, and a necessity as assured, as evident, and as much referent to an idea as any one of all Kant's

it that it implies, not empirical, but merely pure perception *à priori*." That there is distinction here is rather dim; but what I say in the text is that these lines, circles, squares, etc., rest on experience at last; for I deny *pure* perception: space is to me an empirical perception.

twelve can in effect evince. Does any one mean to tell me that the weighing down in the balance of the one pound, or of anything whatever less than itself, by the two pound is not a case that implies necessity and an idea with an insight? Is not darkness on the earth the necessity of an eclipse of the sun by the moon, as even night is that—to call it so—of an eclipse by the earth itself? A turtle on its back might lie for ever, an example of the first law of motion. Buttons with button-holes and hooks with eyes are in very truth relations of necessity. And just consider the clove-hitch. You have seen it on your row-boat when you have taken two half-turns of the painter round a thole-pin; and the surgeon is glad of it above the elbow of the dislocated shoulder. The two turns are very simple, but the rope-end between them is only the better and the better clinched the more and the more you pull at the other. It is really a system of necessity that is here, and quite as much so as any triangle is such. If a triangle is a necessity of the Relations of Ideas, so is the clove-hitch. If a triangle is synthetic, so is the clove-hitch. Nay, even say this, If a triangle is *à priori*, so is the clove-hitch! For if the construction of the clove-hitch is a Matter of Fact, and all its lines existences of sense, it is not one whit less so in either respect with the triangle: I have myself constructed it on the black-board or the paper out of lines that are existences.[1]

Mathematically, as we have heard from both Locke

[1] Of course, a *roped* line is, so to speak, more coarsely physical than an *inked* line; and, of course, also the latter needs not, for its realisation in relation, as the former does, the action of a physical force; but the relation is notionally due to construction in both, at the same time that the force where it is wanted is given, and hemp is not a bit more physical than ink or chalk. Sailors' knots, weavers' knots, ordinary double knots, etc., are all similar; and we have already made reference to mechanical powers, centre of

and Hume, existence, as existence, does not enter into consideration. What alone is mathematically in consideration are the relations *of* the figures, let these figures themselves be real, or be they only ideal: "The demonstrations which depend on their ideas are the same," says Locke, "whether they themselves exist or not." We, for our part, suggest only that what is true of relations, ideas, in figures may be true also of relations, ideas in things. But things are matters of fact; and Hume has but this moment told us that, "The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, *because it can never imply a contradiction.*" Matters of fact! Yes; but matters of fact just mean existences, and be as it may with them, may it not be altogether different with their relations- the ideas they imply? We have suggested more than one physical object as in place here; but memories both of work and play combine to make our favourite the clove-hitch. We ask at once of the clove-hitch, would not the contrary of what it *is* imply a contradiction? One end of a line is in the bite of a knot on it, and no force whatever in pull at the other end but will make the bite faster! Would not the contrary of this—the bite looser, that is—imply a contradiction? Though there were never a true clove-hitch in existence, would not the truth demonstrated of it for ever retain its certainty and evidence? Or to take it in Locke's way, Were there now no clove-hitch existing anywhere in the world, yet the idea annexed to that name, would it ever at any time cease to be what it is? And the rationale of this, is it not that to take it otherwise would come to be a denial of identity being identity? For, in all these constructions, whether by

gravity, optics, etc. Then the calculus itself admits the physical element of motion, time, etc.; and neither we nor it have the least wish to say that physical necessity is intellectual necessity.

chalk, by ink, or by rope, the principle of insight is the same: identity—still identity.

And so now, then, we come to this. A category is but a relation; and if identity is the principle of all relations, and of relations as such, will not this same identity prove to be in the end the principle of the categories likewise? That not of causality alone, as we have seen with Hegel, and not even, it may be, of categories as such, but that the single virtue, the single nerve of cogency and validity *in general*—even in sense, even in the ordinary affairs of human life and action—should be simply—identity!

No doubt we have left behind us, we ourselves, more than one reference that opposes, or seems to oppose, difference to identity; and no doubt many others—simply *difference* as such in fact—will occur generally in suggestion. But this we have granted: while it is often difference that is alone explicit, we can only trust in the implication of identity. How difference the most palpable can disappear into identity we see in the triangle in which two angles (the internal and opposite ones), different the one from the other, may collapse into the single outer angle that is itself different from both. The proof there is the abolition of difference, and the abolition of difference is the installation of identity. Analysis itself is synthetic of something in something else; and so it is we can say the effect *is* found by analysis in the cause. That water, that ice, can set potassium on fire—what difference in nature can be greater than that—fire and water, ice and heat? And yet even there all difference disappears the moment we see the torch of oxygen; for we still hope that affinities may be explained. There may be all manner of different existences to sense without, and yet all manner of identical ideas to intellect within. It is sense, externality itself, that is the difference; but it is reason that is the within and identity.

But what now is the ground of identity itself, even as within, even as in reason, even as in intellect?—But of this later.

25. Kant's Theory again—the Mill

With this discussion of an important *consequence* we return to our main theme in regard to Kant generally.

And here, we have no doubt, it must have long ago struck the reader that Kant's materials—even for the perception of a universe *without*—are all of them emphatically *within*. The matter, the substance of the *things* in this universe *is*, in series, (1) but so much inward *Sensation* in my own subject; (2) *Categories* that throw these sensations of my own *out* into *Time* and *Space*—categories, too, that are as ideal spiders in pigeon-holes of my own, ideal also and private; lastly, (3) *Time* and *Space*, themselves as much *my own*, and as much mere subjectivities *within* as the sensations, and the categories, and the pigeon-holes, and my very subject itself. Nay, God himself is relegated to a pigeon-hole not a bit bigger than the others! In short, how is this to be imaged but by—say, a little *wooden mill*, dipped into a stream that sets its wheels agoing, the motion of which wheels of its own it is that seems, but only seems, to throw up around it this vast universe; and all the time the stream, which alone moves it, is *unseen*, *unknown*, and no more than—*philosophically*—at the best *dreamed of*!

It is this little *mill* that to Noack is the supreme result of the sanest and soundest possible knowledge—that, namely, that is due to the experience of the senses; as, after all, it is this little *mill* that, to Kant himself, and the most devoted of his commentators, is nothing less at last than the achieved explanation of nature and the laws of nature. In Ka
of references to his own s

are certain laws, and that *à priori*, which first make nature possible"; this (ii. 181) is quite a usual *refrain* of his, he himself being the fortunate discoverer thereof, and so by his commentators lauded *in excelsis* therefor. It is by him we know how both pure *physics* and pure *mathematics* are *possible*! "The categories," he tells us, "prescribe laws *à priori* to nature; nature, for law and order, depends on the Categories" (774–76).

It is certainly in consequence of this *mill* that Kant is to Schopenhauer the greatest of philosophers: he has given him the *Maya*, he has given him pure Idealism, and so he has given him so "much that is great that his spirit (Kant's) might say to him (Schopenhauer), in the words of Homer: *Ἀχλὺν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἕλον, ἡ πρὶν ἐπῆεν* (I have taken the mist from your eyes which was on them before)."[1] But if Kant, in this way, has made Schopenhauer a pure idealist, he has restored the balance by making Noack quite as pure a realist. And that is strange—the number of contradictory merits that Kant is held good for. He is to some the champion of physical science, and equally to others the champion of metaphysical science,—to these a spiritualist, as to those a materialist. So, as here, an idealist to Schopenhauer, and a realist to Noack.

Noack is nothing if not an Aufgeklärter, pure and simple. We shall see this again, and how wroth he is with Robespierre when, for the consolation of humanity, he (Robespierre) "decretirt" religion in France anew—as well as also, further, in the same way, something of that

[1] The strange thing about Schopenhauer is, that, notwithstanding all his enthusiasm for his greatest of philosophers, whether in Greek or in German, he does not hesitate, for all that, simply to ruin his greatest of philosopher's philosophy. Not one thing that belongs to the sacred temple of the "system" does he leave standing, to be sure, the mist in it—the *Maya*. (See the *Speculative Philosophy* for January 1879.)

other wrath of his (Noack's) against the apparently spiritual proceedings of Fichte and Schelling. But specially now we have in mind what bears on "*Erfahrung*," that *Erfahrung* of Kant, that sane and sound *sensible experience* of Kant, which draws from Noack so many expressions of heartfelt admiration and unlimited applause. Well, now,—if no one else in the world can figure it, picture it, name it, better,—that sane and sound experience, that experience and perception of the special senses as with the rest of us, that experience of common sense, is all to be seen and understood there—in that little mill! God, Freewill, and Immortality, emotion of the Sublime, emotion of the Beautiful—of all these each is but an individual member of the wheelwork that is within; each category is a wheel within, Time and Space are wheels within, and Sensation is the master wheel that moves all, as moved itself by what it is dipped into—the Stream that—*what*, *whence*, or *if*—wholly unknown, is only feigned in supply of the motion, which is the necessity of supposition for consummation at last. Noack tells us (i. 127) that Kant "took his place from the first on the fruitful terrain of *Experience*—experience that sprang solely from the perception of the senses, and was alone by the perception of the senses to be substantiated": and this is experience, and the whole experience that is meant,—To go to the window, namely, and look out.—Now, fancy that the explanation, the philosophy of what you see from the window is that—wonderful little mill! And this to Noack shall be the ultimate of wisdom!—the extraordinary and never to be expected discovery genius and an intellect, which, again and again nder, he cannot but name "gigantic"! It i as accurately typed in o by "*experience*": to h

of certainty is the perception of sense; and it is this that conditions his polemic against the ego of Fichte and Schelling. Reference here to his own pages (i. 119–122) will livelily prove this. Noack, it would seem, has convinced himself of the non-reality of the ego. "In our self-perception," he says, "we come to know ourselves solely in the manner in which" (as Kant very expressly told him) "we appear to ourselves in inner sense. Only by the way in which our inner feeling is affected by the appearance of our own nature do we get acquaintance with ourselves. Only by this, that the inner sense, with help of imagination, combines into the unity of consciousness the complex of our perceptions as concerns our app*ear*ant state—only so does understanding get to the judgment *I think*." The conception of the ego itself is quite empty, he continues (i. 120); "it is something of which, so soon as it is regarded by itself apart, we can form not the least idea; round which, rather, we turn in a perpetual circle, at the same time, indeed, that we must always make use of it, in order to judge something of it, still without being able all the same to make, in respect of our sense-cognition, any further use of it whatever." If this ego is only "as though" the ground to the appearances of sense—only "problematically and hypothetically" so: it itself is nothing "in itself real"; it can be only a mere schema — simply regulative — from which "not the smallest actuality can be drawn." "The phases of this ego are mere appearances of the inner sense, even as nature is the sum of appearances for outer sense."

26. Noack on the Ego

Now, most people will find a good deal that is strange in all that. "To a thought which is in us," Noack says,

with astonishment (123), "we give an independent actuality"—why, what does he himself do with "us"? Who are the "we," pray? Who are the "we" who "appear to ourselves" and have "our own nature," who have "our perceptions" and "our self-perceptions," who have "our inner feelings and our outer feelings," "our inner sense and our outer sense," who have "our imagination," "our understanding," "our judgment," "our unity of consciousness," our "us" that says to "us" "I think"? Who are the "we" that in a perpetual circle turn round and round that funny "I"? What can this "we" be if not this funny "I" itself—this "I" that is only "as though" it were something real, a mere "schema," and "regulative"? A *Tulchan* with the Scots is also a mere schema—a stuffed calf's skin, namely, and also "regulative"—to swindle the cow of its milk! Is this "I" anything more than such *regulative Tulchan*—a mere make-believe to swindle a judgment from us? And a judgment, we may ask, of what? Why, we have nothing to judge of but "Appearances"! Appearances without, Appearances within; and the "I" itself is a mere Appearance also!—But that is the world—these three Appearances together are the world. What an extraordinary world this world must have loomed to Noack! Scepticism! What scepticism could be more of a "Terror" than *this* scepticism? And Noack gives it to Kant! Scepticism! "the spectre of a meaningless universe and illusory human nature"! That is said (by Professor Fraser) of Hume: and we have been innocently thinking that Kant was to refute Hume!

"Sind (i. 120) dergleichen vernünftelnde Schlüsse nicht die Sophistik der Vernunft selbst?"

"Are not such mal-reasonin
Sophistik of reason itself?"

We toss back to Noack his

No doubt, as has been said, Noack saw in the "I" generally only, to say so, the physiological result of his concrete existence; and, no doubt, he distinguished between that concrete existence and the "I" as a mere term, so to speak, that in a generalising way named it. But can it be maintained that any such view is at all true to the facts that are? No doubt, our self-perception as we get up of a morning, or as we lather our chin at the looking-glass, can only be as we find it—that is, something empirical and corporeal, and still an I; but that is not the I-I of our thinking, and the question then is certainly not of how I feel in heart or lungs, in stomach or intestines. It is not to be denied either that this latter I, the thinking I, so far as it can be distinguished from the empirical I, has a singularity of its own. In one way it is just I, simply I, and no more than I, the complete catholicity of which has been already amply established. So far it looks empty, abstract, a mere thought, a mere reflection; but it is not empty—on the contrary, it is *the* full, *the* plenum, the one full, the one plenum; the one foison and the one virtue: it is the all and it is the one. It is the bend of the bow—the *nisus*; it is the nerve, and it is the sinew. If, a moment ago, identity proved to us such a pervading principle, *that* may have struck us as a difficulty—How, as in the case of our other firsts, figure identity as a first, and so ask for an instant whence a first identity could be? Identity of *what*—identity with *what*, we might mutter? Why, with what but with itself? This, the Ego, the identity with itself, the one, single, sole and necessary identity! If only relation can be incorporated with the brain, and not the thing or things in which it is—then this is the one sovereign relation, the universal solvent, the alcahest, that more than transmutes into gold, that creates rather! This that has itself within

itself is all-independent of another: it is freedom's self, freewill's self; it is negative of any other—and so "the pure negativity"! This, that to Noack is but the corner of an address designatively attached, is the principle of philosophy and the principle of more! As self-"*set*," it transcends all difficulty of a beginning, too; and it is the *middle* term! *It alone is the middle term that is the entire secret of the universe!*

How strangely different things are as they are named —how strangely different according as they are looked at!—Say to yourself that He says to Himself:

I Am That I Am!

Noack says once (i. 30), "The ego is but the becoming aware or conscious that we think!" And what, pray, we may ask, would you have more? Good Heavens! just suppose it off!— —"And in an instant all was dark!"— —"The assumption," continues Noack, "that this 'thinking' can only be apprehended as the act of the actually existent unity of a self-subsistent being is utterly incapable of proof." Well now, if ego were not the thinking of ego—if I did not think I, where could an I be? Yet Noack has homage for his intellect who says (*Encyc.*, i. 47): "Every man is a whole world of ideas which are buried in the night of the ego!"

Noack says again (i. 124): "The subject is determined only by what in the predicate is added to it, . . . but we must always go out of our mere idea of the ego to give it existence." Then we have Kant's hundred dollars, which, Though they are thought, not also *are*. By which we are to understand that, as thinking the dollars adds no predicate of actuality to them, so neither does my thinking I actualise I. But the difference is vital. The dollars that I think, are *not*; but the I that I think, *is*. If I exists because I is thought, it is not less true that I is thought because I exists. I think I am because I am:

when I no longer am, I shall no longer think I am. Noack falls short at his very start; for if it is by the predicate, the *esse*, the *Was*, that the subject is determined, then it is just *esse*, *Was*, existence, that the I exhibits as already implied. The I is not only a thought, but a fact. Parallel between the dollars and the I, there is none. The I is not an empty "Tautologie": it is a concrete and full.

It is really astonishing the very small case that Noack makes of the fact—"that I think," dass ich denke (i. 120s.). That I think — that is not much! The thoughts that I think are not mine—it is not I that think them! That I of mine is only "an empty I—never once even a notion, let alone a perception"! What, then, is judgment?—what are the categories? Who or what is it that judges? To whom or what do the categories belong? Who or what is it that sees the case, and instantly fixes it with one or other of them?

It is very certain that Fichte's I is not Noack's I. "An I that through its determination of self is the determination as well of all that is not self"—that to Fichte is "the idea of the Godhead"! How different "the founder of the critical philosophy," cries Noack! He went first, but "how modest and considerate his steps"! Yet what was the ultimate of that founder himself? Why, *Die reine Apperception!* Fichte's und Schelling's *reines Ich!* The unity that was the apperception of Kant is, in simple and good truth, nothing less, ar nothing else, than Fichte's and Schelling's Ego! Fichte, in effect, did take it from Kant; while again, still more in effect, took it from Ficht

And that is as much as to say that Ka who to Noack knew only plain, sober, sens itself—was quite as extravagant, ay, quite as ever a Fichte, or as ever a Schel

himself quotes from Professor Schulze in testimony of this (i. 99); for, "How," Schulze asks, "if we know not things in their reality, and if even our own ego be equally unknown to us, do we know that this ego is the source of that whole body of cognition which is due not to the senses, but to *it*?"—"Man's mind (i. 100) being for Kant the wonderful sea-deep out of which, unconsciously, all the forms of things arose, so that the revelation of self within is the revelation as well of all that we see without."

And that is Kant. "No doubt," says Fichte (*W. W.*, i. 15), "it is just the business of the Critical Philosophy to show that it is perfectly from the mind itself that all that is present in it is to be explained and understood." That is not realism, that is the very essence of idealism. And that it was—that alone it was—that inspired the shout of welcome and acclaim that burst on Kant when he rose. This man has at length proved, it was said, that we do not owe all to what comes from without, but that we do know—transcendentally know—from within. So it was that Carlyle sang of those "deepest of all illusory Appearances for hiding wonder, Space and Time, which were spun and woven for us from before Birth itself, to clothe our celestial Me for dwelling here, and yet to blind it"! So it was, too, that Emerson told his audience: "It is well known that the Idealism of the present day acquired the name of Transcendental from Immanuel Kant." The Transcendentalist further, he said, perceives that "the senses are not final; the senses give us representations of things, but what are the things themselves, we cannot tell: he reckons the world as an appearance." This Transcendentalist of Carlyle and Emerson contrasts rather with that well-advised realist in his sober senses of Noack! But, as contrasted with simple sense, is not that little wooden mill of the

strange world within, enough? Emerson, indeed, goes too far. The Transcendentalist, he says, "believes in miracle, in inspiration, in ecstasy." I do not take Immanuel to have believed in miracle, in inspiration, or even in ecstasy—poor man! he was never married.

When one hears Noack vaunting how it was only by "erfahrungsmässige Beobachtung" that Kant proceeded, one wonders if it was only by "observation" that Kant came to his Time and Space, or his Things-in-themselves? "Bewährung, authentication through Erfahrung, experience grounded on perception," that is the whole test, and source, and measure, and fulcrum of truth, and yet with all this experience we never get once to *reality*! A wonderful consummation of the thinker who only "continued the experimental philosophy of Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume"! They founded on sense, the *à posteriori*; and it was just his *peculium* that, like Fichte and Schelling after him, he founded on the *à priori*, on naked intellect, on "pure apperception," which, as said, is but "Fichte's and Schelling's pure Ich." Ay, and that is *the* foundation. I care not that the empirical ego should be temporary and pass. Pass! of course it passes. The finite ego passes—as every other finite passes; but every finite that passes—bread, water, wine—still was. Neither do I care that the empirical ego should have fibres in and from atoms of the material. *This* is the truth: The last is the meaning and the purpose of all the rest. All *that* that is, alone is that *I* might be,—all *that* that is, alone is for that *I* is! A world at all is only *for* I—the Finite I: a world at all is only *by* I—the Infinite I. I as I is the first and the last: it is the *cachet* of creation.

Kant has an enormous vogue at present. Not a volume appears now that, if it have any pretension whatever to speak of mind, attempts not to give it face

by use of the name. From Germany itself for long we have heard no call but to go back to Kant. Kant's great critique, however, was in the main an answer to the questioning of Causality in Hume; and we cannot so fail in self-respect as to doubt the results of a life-time's reflections—at least, in so far as concerns truth. We hope at the same time that, in criticism as lately of Noack, we have not grudged quotation from that strong contrasting testimony of his. Noack was in the position to speak; and we have no desire unfairly to derogate from either the man or his words. His opinion of Kant is conspicuous on every page, we may say, of the volume we quote from. As regards the quality of Kant's work, we can hear (i. 112), for example, of "his punctual accuracy of anxious inquiry—his constant cautious circumspection, that questions every step, that will not entangle itself in any false show of deluding fallacies, that will throw itself into no spurious discovery." And, no doubt, the findings of our own, as above, sufficiently contrast with this: we ask only that they be compared. Of the man Kant himself, Noack can be quoted (i. 22) as speaking thus in the midst of his grief and indignation over the reaction that Fichte and Schelling for a time caused :—

"On the banks of the Saale a reaction began to take form against the principles of the philosophical revolution which the grand old man of Königsberg had originated. In consequence of the new direction which, after Kant's achievement, the spirit of the time had taken, as well as of the predominating vogue of the influences of the day which resisted it, the critical Kant was supplanted and displaced. The pure reflex of his world-shattering intellectual deed was blurred; the clear contours of his critical action had a false transference given them to the foggy region of the dark and ununderstood necessities of faith, whose clouds had already withdrawn the brief illumination of that critique from eyes that were too dull to bear the light all-dazzling as it first shone. Against that light

there opposed themselves the dogmatic interests and hazy sentimental needs of the next generation; and so it appeared that fate had defrauded not only him himself who brought the light, but even his very age, of the best fruit of this critique. In the first heat of one-sided acceptance and appliance of his ideas, the age caught only to Kant's dressing-gown and slippers, and left lying untouched and unnoticed the robe that should deck his heroic form and constitute the true mantle of fame for the giant-magnitude of this great spirit."

I know not that I may not without impropriety venture to quote from an unpublished and uncommunicated letter of Mr. Carlyle's, written to me "8th Octr. 1867" (more than thirty years ago!), which I think is relevant here. What I wish to quote runs thus:—

"Kant, in whose *letters*, etc. I have been reading lately (with considerable weariness for most part), seems to me in *spiritual* stature too, what he was in bodily, 'not above 5 feet 2'! Essentially a *small*, most methodical, clear and nimble man,—very like that Portrait in *Schubert*, I sh[d] think; the fine sharp cheery honest eyes, brow, intellect; and then those projected (quizzically cautious, etc. etc.) *lips*, and that weak receding poor chin. Not an *Alles-zermalmender* the least in the world, but much rather a Gar-manches-zernagender!—Who was it that first gave him the other epithet?—Will you tell me, too, where *is* that ab[t] the *starry firmament* and *sense of right and wrong*: which has dwelt with me many years but only at second hand?"

My object here, naturally, is simply to contrast the quotations. The gigantic hero of Noack was but an essentially small man to Carlyle! And surely, at least in the face of what we have come to see, there is somewhat of a disproportion, apparently, between what Kant was or did and the values, not by Noack alone, but even quite *popularly*, assigned to him,—assigned, that is, without a glimpse of actual discernment and guided only by some half-heard rumour. We read of him, for example, as tended at the last as any best-tended king

was never better tended; we read of his poor body lying in state—lying in such state as could not have been more real had it indeed been a king's (sixteen days unburied!); nay, we read of signs appearing in the heavens at his death, even as we hear of them when great Julius died! No fautor of philosophy but will be pleased at any honour shown to Kant—to him the cheery, good, wise, little soul that passed his innocent little jokes at his chaste little dinner-table—to him, above all, who wrote all that. But, when he thinks of all and realises all, he will be unable on the whole not to acknowledge within himself a certain sense of disproportion. Kant, he will think, wrote a good deal before the *Kritik of Reason*; but he was not great then, while it is not possible to suppose that ever at any time, or ever from any country, there issued a philosophical work with one tithe of the acclaim, intelligent or unintelligent, that welcomed the *Kritik*. Nor have the echoes of that acclaim yet ceased to reverberate whether in the Old World or the New. We are still admonished to go back to Kant. We may bow the knee most thankfully to Kant for all that he has suggested; but, even because of all that for which we bow the knee in thankfulness, is it well possible for us—even from what we have just seen—categorically, as it were, to go back to Kant?

Nevertheless, I do not think it will surprise that my answer to the above letter of Carlyle's was in its tone deprecatory. Carlyle, not knowing really anything either of the one or the other of the three Kritiken, I had not to speak of these, but only of Kant generally. I acknowledged that to see into a man, a bit of his own writing was really often the very best loophole; but I suggested that Kant's letters, as on the whole but products of age, and written for the most part to compara-

tive strangers, with no reference but to the writer's work, which had formed the theme of *their* writing to *him*—I suggested that these letters (and Carlyle seemed to build on them)—that these letters could contain, as in point of fact they did contain, little or nothing that was significative of character. I pointed out (at least, so far as I can remember) that the relative works themselves, though called *Critical*, were not *destructive*, negative, but indeed *constructive*. I referred to the extraordinary fertility of Kant, who had no sooner done with one Critique than he turned to another, and yet another—turned, in fact, to remarkable work after remarkable work, all freshly, frankly written, and with new and original ideas of his own. The "Alleszermalmender" belonged to Mendelssohn, I said; and I indicated where the *locus* of the "starry firmament and sense of right and wrong" was to be found.

In my answer to Carlyle I had nought to say of bodily size. In drawing a man it is not usual to forget his inches; but for the character of Kant, his poor little mite of a person was never in account, unless for praise to its occupant even for the justice he dealt it—justice that made of infirmity health, and of the expectancy of a life short the certainty of a life long.

Carlyle had indeed, for the externality of Kant, text on his side. It is thus Schubert speaks of it:—

"His body seemed to have received from nature the stamp of feebleness as characteristic type. Weak in bone and still weaker in muscle, he was scarcely five feet high; his chest was very flat and almost sunk; the right shoulder somewhat protruded. His body was so dried up that it excited general astonishment on the part even of the doctors: they thought they had never seen before so emaciated a corpse. Kant himself for years often joked about it, boasting to have attained the minimum of muscular substance."

In presence of a life, for eighty years, wrung from nature by the power of the mind—in presence, too, of

the vast rich work which that mind accomplished, it is of that mind, plainly, that, in Kant's case, we must alone think. Very specially, too, it is of that mind we must alone think when we turn our regards to the immediate occasion that is now before us. Far and away the most important crisis in the whole movement towards the Ego was, in his Pure Apperception with its Categories, the critical initiation of Kant.[1]

[1] I may name here Bessel Hagen's very interesting account of the disinterment of Kant's bones in 1880, when the skull was subjected to quite an extraordinary number of measurements. Jachmann says Kant's head, relatively to the body, was *sehr gross*. That again would bespeak *rickets*; but a measure of scarcely more than 22 inches in girth would give only a medium size; and Reusch says that, in a certain great picture, "the smallness of the head with its scanty hair makes no pleasant contrast to the other bearded philosophers beside Kant."

Is it worth adding of these "Singles" and "Doubles," that the former are but as the Matters of Fact, the latter as the Relations of Ideas? Had Kant but seen this!

CHAPTER XI

FICHTE

IT is not the life of Fichte that concerns us at present; but still I may refer here to what has been suggested elsewhere of the nobleness of the man. Birth, school, university, poverty—miserable poverty; family tutorships, Königsberg, Kant, Kant's refusal of the loan and Fichte's own perfectly sweet-souled comment; Jena, Jena and the student troubles, Jena and the university troubles; Erlangen, Berlin, Berlin and grand patriotism; his wife and he with his country's soldiers, his wife in the fever of infection and his nursing of her—his consequent death: the result from all is that we have his *Wissenschaftslehre*!

Some starched-neckclothed Britons might, with society conceptions of this and that, fastidiously fancy a certain commonness! But *he* was noble—a nature's noble gentleman; and *she* was noble—a nature's noble lady.

If such Britons, in such mood, should at any time, have Rousseau in mind, I wonder if they would feel that, if he had ever entered to them, say, in a billiard-room, it would have been their duty to kick him out! And yet this man influenced Kant; and Kant's countrymen attribute to him "such power over his French as Voltaire himself" never possessed, and Carlyle only calls him "ill-cut serpent of eternity." But where in this world could there possibly be found such intense antithesis as Rousseau and Fichte?

There is more [illegible] Fichte than the *Wissenschaftslehre*. There are his popular works, stimulating and enriching, excellently translated by the Mr. William Smith to whom Edinburgh is indebted for its Philosophical Institution. But it is in the *Wissenschaftslehre* that we are to look for that element that more especially concerns us here.

We are even in this element indeed, when we find, with *recognition*, that we are in that "streng-philosophischen Vortrag" of the *Wissenschaftslehre* that every one can but name, with Noack, "a scholastic masterpiece." Schelling has it that "it will always remain Fichte's great, not to be forgotten merit to have been the first to conceive the idea of a *completely* a priori science, product of pure thought": and Hegel calls it "the first *rational* attempt in this world" at such pure deduction. To Noack that scholastic masterpiece, the *Wissenschaftslehre*, "goes forward, with as great logical acuteness and dexterity as inflexible and rigorous consequence, from the now once for all presupposed notion." And presupposed notion was the *ego*.

Schelling represents Fichte (2. 1. 369s.) to have set up the ego as Principle of the entire presentment of things, as acting according to the irremissible call to deduce from that principle the whole of this world; and he even intimates that Fichte, failing even so to produce a completely objective deduction, left that achievement to "another," namely himself, for he adds in a note—"in the System of the Transcendental Idealism." Schelling to the same effect adds (2. 3. 51): "Fichte found the one universal *prius* in the ego," etc.

Similarly, Biese, too, tells us (in his *Aristot.*, i. x.) that the ego was to Fichte, "cause of itself, to itself beginning and end, absolute and free, the single true reality."

Noack, as we have seen, is of a very opposite way

of thinking. He says once (i. 66): "He (Fichte) called his philosophising a developing further of the Kantian philosophy: we call it a throwing away of the entire fruit of Kant's Critique"; and again (127) he has more at length, this: "The originator of the *Wissenschaftslehre* might always entertain the belief that, in aiming at a systematic deduction of all human knowledge from the notion of the ego, he was only developing the Kantian results into a pure system of reason—the truth, nevertheless, remains just this, The *Wissenschaftslehre* is the manifesto of war which Fichte hurled at Kant." With as much as this before us, we are not allowed to doubt, then, as to what Noack thought, but all the more does it surprise to turn to the very opposite views of Schelling and Hegel. The latter speaks (*Hist. of Phil.*, iii. 553) thus: "Fichte's philosophy is the completion and, specially, a more consequent statement of the Kantian philosophy; beyond the fundamental content of the philosophy of Kant he does not go, and he himself regarded his philosophy as in effect nothing else than a systematic carrying out of the Kantian." Fichte's own avowal, as referred to by Hegel, is the winding-up conclusion of his own very first Preface, and runs (*W. W.*, i. 89) thus: "Whatever my system properly is, and under whatever class it may be brought, whether genuine, carried-out *Kriticismus* as *I* believe, or however otherwise they may please to name it,—that does nothing to the business." One, then, is left no doubt in the matter, whether as regards Fichte as author or Hegel as critic. The latter—but, after all, not more than the former—is quite peremptory. Elsewhere (486) he says: "From Kant's philosophy sprang Fichte's, which took the *Wesen* of self-consciousness, speculatively, as concrete egoity," and (557) "is a construction from the ego of the determinations of cognition."

Fichte himself names the ego with just such a rôle in and from the very earliest pages of the *Wissenschaftslehre*: "this was the aim," says Noack (131), "of the whole circumstantial logical *Apparat* that occupies almost two-thirds of the entire *Wissenschaftslehre*."

Publicly, Kant, as is known, formally rejected Fichte's supposed following out of his system; and Noack, when he would make Fichte not Kantian, but simply the front-to-front adversary of Kant, may be allowed, so far, a certain show of countenance from Kant himself. But it seems that the aged Kant had (*W. W.*, xi. 153), "*in fear of the suspicion of Atheism and under the representations of others*," been over-persuaded so to express himself. There can be no doubt nowadays of the truth of the affiliation of Fichte to Kant, claimed by Fichte himself and acknowledged by all others.

Fichte's principle is the Ego, and the whole spectacle of the world is to him but a deduction from it.

Now, this sounds immense. Worse: it sounds extravagant, monstrous, preposterous. Worse still: it sounds ridiculous—a farce! No man of ordinary intelligence in his senses, when he hears this, but laughs, assured that what he hears can never be earnestly intended, but must be mere wit, alone by itself, that will try itself in the air.

It *is* earnestly intended, nevertheless. Fichte is a man just terribly in earnest. On this ground, at least, he cannot for an instant laugh—not so much as even smile. He believes in himself; and in what he proposes, he believes—absolutely!

However that may be, indeed, there can be no question of the value of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, if even no more than a discipline. All are agreed about that. Noack, the enemy, is not less sure of the scholastic perfection of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, its rigorous logical

consequence, than is Schelling, the instantaneous adopter, adapter, and follower. Hegel, as we know, goes further than that. He may not conceive it to succeed, but the attempt itself seems to him at last just what the world was waiting for. "That is the first *reason*-attempt in the world to derive the categories" (566), "to develop the differences out from the *I think*," "to deduce all the determinations (Bestimmungen) from this point of the absolute certainty" (310).

The student, it may be, for all that, will find in the *Schwegler* quite a sufficiency of the *Wissenschaftslehre* to satisfy him. No English reader, when he first comes to this, but must be struck with astonishment at the hitherto unheard-of, unexampled strangeness of it all—its utterly absolute, unintelligible unsubstantiality. No wonder, he will think, that it seemed to Kant a sort of spectre, something such that, when a man thinks he has caught it, he finds he has caught nothing, only himself, only the empty hand indeed that is baffled to catch. I say myself in the *Schwegler* (427), "it is impossible not to wonder at the busy, eager, never-doubting Fichte, who will develop the world from a process, so to speak, of *in and in*."

Our point at present, however, is the fact of the ego having been at last *explicitly* made the single principle of philosophy. *Implicitly*, Kant, for all his wondering disapprobation of Fichte, had, with his pure unity of apperception and his categories of judgment, been actually doing quite the same thing as Fichte. And surely it was very much to improve Kant and advance the problem, to put everything at last above-board and in express name. It was an enormous improvement and advance out and out properly to name the problem, and to fix the ego as the one unity in this world that was sure and single, inderivative and prime. That was not

his error—the *One*: and neither was his error the *Many*. The *ego* was the one: and the categories derived from it were the many. Neither was that rigid logical menstruum of his, that moved all and united all, by any means *in itself* an error. His logic was good, and it was supremely applied.

Fichte's error was this: his spring of movement was an expedient from without and not a principle from within. He put hand on a solely external dialectic, and had not a dream of the internal dialectic that was vital heart in the thing itself. *Limitation* of that by this, and of this by that, was the *externality* of which Fichte would fain have made an *internality*.

Of Fichte's Ego as Ego we have to see again what occurs to be said later as in reference to Noack and under Schelling: something of this has been already noticed indeed.

CHAPTER XII

SCHELLING

I TURN here from quite a volume in MS. on the Life and Works of Schelling to confine myself, on the whole, so far, only to what of main interest we have in hand.[1]

1. SCHELLING'S FIRST LITERATURE

Schelling's religious position connects with his philosophy; and, in that regard, his first (non-academical) public production was his essay "On Myths, Historical Sagas, and Philosophemes." Alert spirit and vivid eagerness as of genuine literature new born—that is what gives movement to all the earliest works of Schelling: the activity to absorb and assimilate, the re-activity to reproduce and repeat. That, however, cannot be said to be so manifestly and livingly present here as we find it in the (Fichtian) essays that immediately follow. It *is* present, however; what the youth had learned in regard to the Myth in Genesis (referring to his academical essay thereon) is still motive of the composition

[1] No doubt, such comprehensive and summarising work on Schelling is very much of a want at present—and no doubt, also, people who write would like to see what they write published. Still, it may be that, in this particular instance, there is now—as indeed there is—some room for hesitation. The MS. itself, naturally, may have occasion of further allusion in course.

now. Generally, however, we have simply to note any further that Schelling's own son and biographer characterises diese bald vergessene Abhandlung as showing not even a dream on the part of Schelling of that reality of which he was convinced later in regard to Mythology and Revelation.

It is thus in a way suggested that it may be not unusual to assume one belief for Schelling when young, and another belief for Schelling when old. In the general reference, plainly, then, the Myth idea certainly characterises his first belief.

It is in this connection we hear that, with Schelling's application to the Bible of the Myth idea, the academic authority in place did not allow himself to be quite at one. And so we may say that at Tübingen a critico-theological direction of study, or even say *aufklärende* (*rational*) tendencies, on the part of Schelling, came to be well known. So it is that Hegel, prompted to write his former fellow-student on seeing him in print, is to be quoted as saying that he finds him (Schelling) on his "old way of rationalising important theological ideas, and so helping gradually to set aside the ancient leaven."

And it is here that Noack (in i. 83 of his "*Schelling*," etc., Berlin, 1859) breaks in with his, "And a strange fate ruled it that," of these two—the same Hegel who writes this, and the same Schelling who receives this,—"the one, in scarcely twenty years, is attempting speculatively to renew the foundations of Theology, while the other proves to have found it advisable in the end to put back into the haven of Revelation."

As (p. 201) already referred to, we may remark on Noack as very singular here. He is a German professor perfectly *instruit* in all that concerns his *Fach*—Greek, Latin, Ancient Philosophy, Modern Philosophy, and he is himself nothing—literally nothing—if not an *Auf-*

geklärter: Kant is his God, and actually for nothing that he ever did *positively*, but only for what, to Noack's belief, he did *negatively*—negatively, that is, as regards religion generally and Christianity in particular! A reference or two will explain.

Kant, he says once, "acknowledged openly the principles of the Aufklärung. He continued the empirical philosophy of Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and carried it out into its logical completion, in the result, namely, of his irresistible Kritik, that human reason is in no condition to prove even the possibility, let alone the actuality, of Free-will, God, and Immortality." "Men," says Kant, "are not yet of age, but we work now to make them so." "Kant does not conceal his true opinion; he only, in prudent reserve, leaves it to honourable and intelligent readers to spell out the true Kant from between the lines" (i. 18, 19).

So much of an Aufgeklärter is Noack, indeed, that (21) he scarcely disguises something of regret that Frenchmen, after having "deposed Christianity by formal decree,"—after having seen "that it was time to discover the truth and abolish all religions; for all religions are products of need, mere casual formalities simply understood," — after having "recognised no religion but that of the Law, the apotheosis of the sovereign will that is law to itself, as the thinker of Königsberg had, ten years previously, announced it"—so much of an Aufgeklärter is Noack, I say, that, after Frenchmen had done all this, he scarcely disguises his regret that Robespierre, even in another year, should ask in the Convention, "Why should ideas which console and ennoble humanity not also contain truth"; so that, by his authority, "God and immortality were *decretirt* anew"! And from just such a state of matters it is that he (Noack) presently deplores the reaction against Kant,

which had returned, after his "world-shattering exploit of intellect," into "the cloud-land of the dim and unintelligible necessities of belief." "We forget utterly," he says, "in our attempts to prove the existence of an unconditioned necessary Being, whether then it is at all possible even only to think him." And so it is that for Noack, Schelling, "despite his pretensions to complete the critical philosophy, remained by its shell, unable to make himself master of the proper core and inmost motive force of the thinking of Kant." "So also Jacobi failed to see, just as Fichte and Schelling failed to see, that Kant's inferences from practical reason towards Freedom of the Will, God, and Immortality, were for the all-pulverising thinker himself only fallacies, sophisms, and empty show." "Jacobi, indeed, took, as his (Kant's) own seriously meant opinion, Kant's mere *connivance* at the form of moral consciousness then once for all in vogue." Noack (i. 21, 22, 32, 36), of course, is to be refuted in this.

It has been already admitted that Kant did belong to the Aufklärung, even if he belonged to it only as its end. No doubt, he saw in the "*discrepancies*" the justification for its negative, but where even at these is there in Kant the Aufgeklärter's sneer and jeer? It is not with a negative at all that Kant comes to Christianity, but only—in reverence, in awe—with the sincerest affirmative.

It is more than a hundred years since Kant wrote, and we are not without evidence, from time to time yet, that there are those in the pulpit even of whom it would be good to think that they were as much turned *from* the Aufklärung No. 1, and *to* the Aufklärung No. 2,—as Kant was!

Surely it was only ingrained, inveterate Aufklärung that could bring a Noack to the prodigious supposition

that it was not in good faith, but only in "irony," that Kant propounded his moral argument for God, Immortality, and Free-will—a supposition that at least seems altogether at feud with the relative criticism of Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and, just generally, all!

Even Schelling's young unorthodoxy, which is presently before us now, is not so certainly to be characterised as such, in any, so to speak, absolute, "death *sans phrase*" style. In his "Lectures on the Method of Academic Study," which, delivered 1802, published 1803, were twice re-edited "unaltered," first in 1813 and again as late as 1830, he says he "cannot help thinking what a hindrance to Christian completion the so-called Biblical books were, which in true religious import bear no comparison, even from afar, to so many others, earlier and later, especially the Indian." That is, truly, unorthodox enough, and, quite as truly, unapt, inept, unhappy enough; and Schelling, when it was last uttered, had no longer the plea of youth, for he was then fifty-five. Let him have returned, then, when he might to the haven of Revelation, it would seem that, judging from this so very questionable *propos* on the Bible, he was not orthodox in 1830. Still, for all that, even while as yet at Tübingen, his Aufklärung had measure in it. The preface to the projected "historico-critical essays of the years 1793–94, with "commentary on the childhood of Christ" of the same date, proves this; and it gives us, says his son, "a clear view of the standpoint which Schelling took up, now that he was in the middle of his study of Theology."[1] In general, "he would discuss all theological ideas, in their origin and matter, just like every other human idea—psychologico-philosophically," namely. We learn, too, from the said "commentary" that he treats "as Sagas"

[1] Schelling's *Life*, i. 39.

all that is said of the early life of Christ. But if Strauss is suggested in these respects, there are insisted on at the same time some most important differences between him and Schelling. "All in the Gospel narratives, namely, that surpasses the ordinary measure of human occurrence, thought, and action,—this, openly and without reserve, Strauss makes criterion of the Mythical; he allows nothing whatever *factual* to remain as concerns the person of Christ, with which the origination of Sagas might have naturally connected itself." "With Schelling, on the contrary, Sagas began from a divine core in the life of Jesus himself, and were to him, therefore, only accessory." This is further explained at some length in Schelling's own words. All is well worth reading here; we make room for this:—

"Not with dogmas or even moral monitions would the Apostles begin their teaching, but with narrations of what they had seen and heard (1 Joh. i. 1), and among these, only the Resurrection of Jesus would remain for long the main fact. . . . Now first, as suddenly *a* fact—*the* fact that the crucified Master was again risen in life from the grave, exalted them all—as with a single stroke—into that loftier enthusiasm which, from now on, shines forth from all that they say or do,—now first fell the veil from their eyes,—now first appeared to them all that Jesus had done or said, in a new light,—now first they learned to interpret his hidden words and deeds. Every word, every sign, every glance of their Master had meaning for them," etc.

"To Schelling's historical sense, the explaining away of the fact that Jesus was again risen in life from the grave was intolerable." So earnest was Schelling in this that, having, in those Prelections at Jena in 1802, lectured in—as we have seen—no so very orthodox a vein, he repeated at Würzburg, in 1804–5, some other Lectures (specially on Art), belonging to the Jena period, in which we can read of "the unexampled event that Jesus conquered the death of the cross and rose up

again in life, a fact which, to seek to explain away as though an allegory, and to deny *as a fact*, is historically insane." In short, as is said, "With Schelling, the historical, as well as the mythical, has its right: the child is not to be washed out with the bath, as is quite specially the case with Strauss." As late as the delivery of the thirty-third lecture of the "Philosophy of Revelation" (*W. W.*, last vol. of all, page 232), Schelling himself claims for the same view of Christianity which he represents then the early date of 1831; and his son (in Pref. to last vol. but one of the *W. W.*) would seem to more than hint at an earlier date still. The fact is, in short, that it is difficult to decide whether the Christianity of Schelling was not very much the same when he was to Noack a heretic as when he was to Noack orthodox. This, however, we may easily regard as very certainly decided, that at no period of his life was Schelling the Aufgeklärter that Noack was, and at no period of his life did Schelling reject, as Kant was supposed to do, dogmas of Christianity that, as its fulcra, were vital to it.

2. The Two Fichtian Essays

This may suffice as to what is to be understood at present on the religious side.

As we have said, "Alert spirit and vivid eagerness, as of genuine literature new born,—that is what gives movement to all the earliest works of Schelling: the *activity* to absorb and assimilate; the *reactivity* to reproduce and repeat." This, it was said too, is what we have to expect to find in the formally philosophical first works of Schelling, to which we now come, —the two essays, namely, on the Ego. Noack (96) expresses this, in the same reference, thus:—

"Schelling's youthfully mobile nature was possessed of a high degree of susceptibility of sense for new scientific directions which might reformatorily crop up—eagerly to grasp to such, and precipitately to throw himself forward as competitor for the laurels of renown which were then in sight, without having first, with considerate distrust, assured himself, through scrutiny, of good grounds for the tenableness of the new."

Now, this perfectly names the position of Schelling to Fichte in these two essays. That is, the whole material *discussed* is the *material* of Fichte. Still, it would be only ungracious spleen that would deny the *discussion* to Schelling. The fuel was Fichte's, and, most assuredly, it stood in need of no fire for its kindling but Fichte's own. Nevertheless, it is to be acknowledged that Schelling did take the fuel to himself, and did in his own way fire it. Fichte's nobility of acceptance to that effect here is, as is usual with him, admirable. He writes to Reinhold in July 1795:—

"Schelling's writing, so far as I have been able to read it, is altogether a commentary on mine. Why he does not say this, I do not quite see. Deny it he will neither wish to, nor can. I rather think I have to conclude that he would not like, if it should happen that he has not understood me right, to have his mistakes laid to my account. I am glad of his appearance. He has perfectly hit the matter, and several who have not understood me have found his writing very clear."

There is in that testimony of Fichte's own to some said specialty of fire on Schelling's part. But for a moment we can see only the magnanimity of Fichte himself. He is ungrudging in his acknowledgment and praise, and ungrudgingly glad of Schelling's appearance and support. So gently he interprets his reserve as to himself,—no doubt, Schelling does this, he says, not to commit me! And what is it really that Schelling does? Why, in the very first words of his pamphlet, this!—

"The thoughts which are expressed in this *brochure*, after the author had for some time borne them in his mind, were lately

stirred afresh by the newest appearances in the philosophical world [they are not at all *Fichte's* own express and singularly peculiar thoughts]! He had been led to them by the study of the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, in which, on from the beginning, nothing seemed to him more obscure and difficult than the attempt to found a form of all philosophy, without having anywhere laid down a principle, through which not only the one first form underlying all the other forms, but the necessary connection of the former with the latter dependent on it, should have received their support [*Fichte* shall not have said this first]! This want was made to him all the more striking by the constant—most frequently specially directed to this side—attacks of the opponents of the Kantian philosophy, and particularly of Æsidemus [and so! we are to have again all that which we have already had from *Fichte* complete, about Æsidemus, and Reinhold, and Solomon Maimon, but generously, nobly, wound up into this magnanimous acknowledgment]: In this judgment, as to what had been still left to be done by the theory of the 'Vorstellung' for the future completion of the 'Elementar-Philosophy,' the author of this *brochure* received the strongest confirmation yet, through the latest writing—des Herrn Professor Fichte!—which all the more agreeably surprised him!—the easier that, with his previous thoughts, it became for him—[in short, to enter into it, and he winds up all self-denyingly modest thus]:—Made aware by Maimon's latest publication,—a work that well merits a more thorough consideration than the author has been yet able to afford it,—that the need of a final solution of the *entire* problem, which has hitherto lain in the way of all attempts at a universally valid philosophy, has come to be more generally felt than seemed to be the case till now.—He believed himself to have discovered, through the mere explication of the *Begriff* of said problem, the only possible way of its solution; and the thought that a general statement of it might here and there serve by way of preparation for the working out of the whole idea, determined him to submit to the public this attempt thereat! May those, whom philosophy itself seems to have called to this work, soon, through complete accomplishment of it, render all mere preparation useless!"

All that is said is, after all, so young that I suppose it had better be forgiven to the youth, who was still not twenty!

Schelling's second pamphlet, on the Ego, a considerably

bulkier one, followed its forerunner in only six months; but, though really at bottom quite as much *borrowed* from Fichte as the former one, it does not even once name the name Fichte! The son, indeed (see here the *Life*, i. 56–59), against the natural surprise at this, directly, in so many words, says, "Schelling *has* named Fichte in the preface"; and then he quotes: "To bring in this great day for science (when, for all sciences there shall be but one) is reserved for only few—perhaps for only one, but to the individual who presages the coming day, may it be vouchsafed him to rejoice in it beforehand"—which words "refer," he says, "to nobody but Fichte, by the one Schelling understood *him*." Now, unless I have strangely missed it, the name Fichte assuredly does *not* occur in the preface; then, as for the words quoted, I do not deny that they *may* point to Fichte, but I certainly mean to say that this may be disputed. The individual ("der Einzelne") that is to enjoy the presentiment of the great day coming is surely Schelling; and if he is "der Einzelne," may he not, defensibly, be also "der Eine"? Nothing more possible than that that so heated young head should have had at least in thought a clutch at such a glory! But it is also quite possible that Schelling may, with express intention, have suppressed the name Fichte,—I do not mean now in the interest of his own glory, but for another very natural reason. Schelling sent his first pamphlet to Fichte, together with a very proper letter. But it is said, "Whether Fichte answered Schelling is not known." Now, *if* Fichte had taken no notice of Schelling, why should not Schelling have replied by taking, similarly, no notice of *him*?

Of course, even in that case, a good deal may be said on the side of Fichte. The young man's essay must, with its pretensions, have simply shocked him. The

accompanying letter, as I say, was a very proper one; but then, even in it there was a *tone* of the same pretensions. "Perhaps the annexed tractate has even some right to be communicated to you in this way, that it has been in the main written in relation to your last work (which has opened to the philosophical world great new views), and has been actually in part occasioned by it." That "in part," "zum Theil," was scarcely calculated, in the circumstances, to commend itself to the gizzard of Fichte. Nor even for the same gizzard was it at all likely to be pleasing to hear that in that same work "something still remained dark, but more, and especially what seems to be its main thought, has at the same time become to me, if I do not altogether deceive myself, clearer"! Then who was it that wrote to him, Fichte, all this? Why, a mere student, unknown to him, from the *Stift* at Tübingen! Surely the state of the case was such that sympathy here must fall entirely on the side of Fichte, even if he were silent. We have already seen the expression of Fichte's mind after appearance of Schelling's second pamphlet. He cannot help giving vent to his surprise, in the midst of praises and mitigating suggestions, at Schelling's non-declaration of the true state of the case relatively: "Why he does not say this, I do not quite see; deny it he neither will, nor can." As the son (56) points out, however, Fichte, in a second edition, does, in 1798, take up and by implication recognise at least this latter offspring of Schelling. The temptation to signalise and illustrate the stupidity of contemporary prints, so apt, as they are, to be surprised and to laugh at new views, destined as these views may be to future pre-eminence, is too strong for him, the rather that he has to hand an instance that concerns Schelling even more palpable than another that concerns himself. Further, Schelling, indeed, is by and by for Fichte,

"Dearest Schelling"—(no matter that somewhat later "Dearest" declines to "Dear"). Nevertheless, we can very well see Fichte's real mind in the whole matter when, in the preface to that same second edition of his little work on the *Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre*,—the *Beilage* of which associates, so far, Schelling with himself,—he characterises that same said little work as "till now the only writing in which, on the philosophising in the *Wissenschaftslehre*, there is itself philosophising, and which therefore serves as an introduction to this system." Here Fichte, with mention of himself, has none of Schelling—no; Schelling's little pamphlets, after all, shall not have been introductive to the system! Till now, introduction to the system, there has been none but Fichte's own—none but that single little tractlet on the Begriff, etc.! This, too, shall have been said late in 1798, whereas Schelling's pamphlets were published in 1794, or early in 1795!

It is to be observed that, while exposing here the fact of the whole *matter* of Schelling as having been but an unblushing appropriation from Fichte, we were still, again, not slow to put all its own weight on the *discussion* as, at all events for its part, Schelling's. If very certainly he was a pirate in matter, he was quite as certainly a producer in form. This, too, followed him through life. For inspiration, suggestion, he seems ever to have turned his eyes without,[1] but then, while at work to have had them, on the contrary, ever within. So it is that we are told of his successive debts to Fichte, Spinosa, Plato, Plotinus, Jacob Böhme, and who else! Still, Schelling, for all that, while a *great writer*, is also an *original writer*. Even now, as regards these little pamphlets, it would be difficult to exaggerate the excellence of their writing. They do not carry the scholastic

[1] Even in the *Naturphilosophie*!

rigour of Fichte; but they are more generally acceptable. For the more usual mind, they have a more encouraging ease of approach. But more than that, they have all the marks about them that denote an original writer. Power of quotation, power of illustration, power of words, power of sentences, "the phrase"—all are his. In short, he has absorbed into himself the whole material; has re-thought it there; and has re-issued it—alive in flesh and blood of his own, and its own. And that is his excuse. This matter, this Fichtian matter, for example, has proved entrancing to him; he so delights in it that it enters into his very self and becomes one with him: he must give it body, he must give it voice, and this so livingly that he cannot distinguish it from himself; it appears to him his own, and he thinks it his own. Really, when we look at it in that way, we cannot at all take it so ill of the young man—of the young man then, of the so susceptible, so re-actively susceptible quasi-young man always.

Still, as lying there palpably to sight—another man's goods in his very shop-window—the little that was made of this then is what is fitted to surprise now. The surprise now, in fact, is the want of surprise then. Whatever may be done now, nobody but Fichte himself seems to have expressed surprise then. Schelling's pamphlets seem to have been accepted as equally original, as equally authoritative, as equally instructive —or even as more instructive, than Fichte's own books. We are apt to think how different it would have been with us in Britain—why, the culprit would have been instantly detected as a culprit, and as a culprit *named*! Have we not Professor Ferrier and Sir William Hamilton at once on the traces of the "literary reaver," Coleridge, in whose crib they found the pillage of Schelling, pillaged in his turn—who, by the bye, as though in fellow-feeling for the pilferer, is so mild with

him![1] Schelling, indeed, is so complimentary to Coleridge here that he seems hardly to get vent for all his gratitude to him—even as though for the robbery itself. I suppose the opium of Coleridge was to Coleridge very much what the first young literary ambition of Schelling was to Schelling, in a sort of spiritual haze for result. At all events, let English literary honesty be what it may, his countrymen would seem, on the whole, to have condoned to Coleridge his larceny, even as the insensibility of the Germans at the time failed, on the whole, to see in Schelling his. The truth at work, however, in the latter case was not improbably this: To us now these matters are all so loud that it gives us a new turn to be told that your Schelling and Fichte literature in Journals, Annals, Year-books, and what not, never *sold*.

It is the case of the American "Dial." Half a dozen men seemed to have made a great noise together. But they *paid* for it—rather, just, they *paid* it! Germans as Germans, Americans as Americans, knew nothing at all about it.

Schelling's matter in these pamphlets being really Fichte's is not for criticism here; but a word in passing may be not out of place, especially the whole subject being in regard, as to its criticism by Noack. The gravamen of that concerns (partly, 202, seen already) the Ego, when proposed as the fulcrum on which to found,

[1] Schelling (2. 1. 196), in borrowing from Coleridge the expression "tautegorical," has a long note upon him. He is extravagantly grateful to the "much-endowed Briton" for having understood, as Germans did not, his "Gods of Samothrace." "I give willingly up to him his borrowings from writings of mine without mention of my name, which have been so sharply, nay, too sharply, animadverted on by his own countrymen. The severity of such censures in England proves, nevertheless, what a weight is put there on literary property, and how strictly the suum cuique in letters is observed."

or the certiorated point from which to start, in philosophy.

3. Noack on the Ego of Fichte and Schelling

Noack begins his criticism with what, after Kant, first led to this Ego. Reinhold, namely, construed Kant's *first* and fundamental position, his reasoned basis, into the bare fact of *Vorstellung* as such, into the fact of a perception in Consciousness. A Vorstellung, he said, was between an object, a thing in itself, without, and the subject, consciousness, within. The former was *matter* passively received; the latter was *form* actively bestowed. Reinhold insisted on *a* "Grundsatz," *a* first principle, as the necessary *first*; and that was it. His Satz that concerned the Vorstellung, his Satz des Bewusstseins, was the *Grundsatz*; and that Satz, as self-certain prime, would, he said, be universally allowed.

Reinhold was still of Kant's mind here—that the Vorstellung in the middle was something *known*, a *fact*, an *a*; but the Thing on the one side, and the Ego on the other, were both *unknown* and *unknowable*—call the one on the outside an *x*, then the other on the inside was a *y*.

There appeared now the "Aenesidemus" of Schulze, with some objections to the propositions of Reinhold. He accepted the necessity of a first fact of consciousness, but disputed the reference of *a* to an *x*, of the Vorstellung, the perception within, to an object without. He urged, too, the impossibility of the *x* without and the *y* within, of the Thing in itself on the one hand, and the I on the other, both, namely, as constituted by Kant,—he urged the powerlessness of either to realise the rôle assigned to it by Kant. "If our understanding" (so he reasoned as quoted at p. 208), "through its thinking, can not reach the actual reality of the things, and if even our

own Ego remains in its inner being wholly unknown to us, as Kant maintains, how do we know that this Ego is the source of the veritable existential contribution which our cognitive faculty is to be supposed to derive, not from the perception of sense, but, on the contrary, from its own self? And yet, it is maintained further wholly without proof, that all our cognition or perception begins with the action of actual things on our senses, which things, for all that, are, for our thought, to be supposed unreachable in their real nature!" (Here Schulze must be acknowledged to bring forward such contradictions and impossibilities as reduce the theory of Kant to a system which is either without truth of fact in itself, or, at best, without any truth in its presentations!)

After Schulze it is Maimon that is here to be noticed. He, for his part, makes conspicuously obvious that conclusion from the premises of Kant,—this, namely, that the Thing in itself, with its maintained operation on our senses, is an arbitrary and unproved assumption, due to our imagination as influenced by the inference from the effect to its cause, and that, consequently, we know only appearances, not things themselves. The remarks of both Schulze and Maimon, if Kant is named, still concern Reinhold.

We are now quite prepared to see emerge the Ego of Fichte. To him Reinhold's Grundsatz does not combine or exhibit all the indispensable constituents which a Grundsatz necessarily demands, and he proposes his Ego in its place; for he, too, demands a Grundsatz.

Noack reasons or inveighs against this Ego of Fichte's, partly from himself, but mainly from most of the positions of Kant in which, as it would seem, he implicitly believes. The great argument that is his own, we may say—and (202) it was said before—he derives from what we may call the

psychology of the Ego; but he expresses his astonishment, just, as it were, beforehand, that any such idea, generally and at all, should have entered the heads of any human beings, especially of men who, like Fichte and Schelling, pretended or intended to continue and complete, as alleged, the philosophy of Kant. "How, in all the world, could the two Titans, Fichte and Schelling, come to set up and deck with the fresh colours of living actuality—such a phantasma!" The mere suggestion of the necessity of a primary Grundsatz is to Noack a phantasma, but still more a phantasma the analysis of it into an entire system of philosophy — "through logical abstractions!" To begin by setting up a problem and then developing the notion of it,—that is to Noack the glaring delusion of a false *à priori* method. How, if the problem, however, were an acknowledged want? and how better set about finding the object in solution and fulfilment of that want than in considering beforehand the conditions which, in and of itself, it necessarily involved? Noack forgets that, when (i. 98) he blames Reinhold, "in the endeavour to find the *one* which, after Kant's great discovery, was all that was still necessary for philosophy in order to render thinkers perfectly agreed together," — Noack forgets, I say, that when he blames Reinhold, in these circumstances, "for forgetting to consider the question, what characters, simply generally, such a primary Grundsatz should of necessity possess in order that there might follow from it something fruitful for actual knowledge"—forgets that, precisely because of their observance of such a preliminary, he has no patience with either Fichte or Schelling! And certainly one does not well see beforehand that either the one or the other of them did wrong when, having preveniently considered the case, he brought forward what appeared to him to suit it—the Ego, namely; while, as for having

preparatorily considered the case at all, it is just such reflexion that Noack, when he blames Reinhold, does, in point of fact, justify.

Of course, Noack is still free to except, if it so pleases him, to *what* is brought forward; and accordingly he does except to it. An object that to him is so very palpably only psychologically, or even physiologically, situated as Ego is, can never play the Absolute! "The conception," he says, "that the Ego is not an idea that takes birth only in and with man's development—is reduced, through later researches, to its empirical ground, where it had been already placed by Kant's great critical achievement." It is, he says further, "really only something that arises and appears in the course of the development of man's being." "It is remarkable," says Kant, "that the child which can already sufficiently fluently speak, still only pretty late (perhaps a good year later) first begins to say I."[1] Now, one hardly likes the idea of a human being as, in the first instance, so much mere opaque mechanism which can go on working, working, blindly, till suddenly one fine day, one knows not how, the idea "I," like a fly, alights on a wheel—without any difference of the working, working, except only this, that, ever after, strangely somehow, this fly becomes the centre—the functioning centre—of the whole business! One is tempted to ask, is not this just an instance in its place of the one cosmical fact that a spring becomes at last *overt*, which, though long *latent*, had, all along, alone worked? But properly to canvass this point of view, we should first see, perhaps, what constitutes on Noack's part the bulk of his writing here, —namely, his relative references to Kant.

As we may not inexcusably suppose now, almost a

[1] Noack quite well knows this quotation from Kant. We may see this again; meantime let the reader consult our own pages 79 and 80.

mere *ipse dixit* of Kant will prove to Noack authority enough for pretty well any conclusion whatever. His way here is to quote Kant, first, as against any such possible Grundsatz as has been proposed, and second, similarly, as against any such possible use of Ego.

4. Kant according to Noack here

The Grundsatz is, as defined (98): "A highest principle that, certain in itself, and intelligible of itself, stands in need of no other prior ground or proof for itself, and which shall necessarily give foundation to all philosophy, and not less to all science."

"This idea of such a possible science was for Kant now a merely systematico-formal question, which, with the content of the construction itself, had nothing to do: a system is nothing else than a unity of a number of cognitions under an idea.—To deduce the content itself from the idea of such unity, in this way, that this idea was not merely a rule and measure, but also a quarry ready beforehand for the obtainment of actual cognitions of experience themselves—this, for Kant, came not only not into his mind, but he declared such an attempt to be an unwarranted and adventurous transgression of the right use of reason.—Such first Grundsatz was not necessary; nay, even, it was absolutely impossible—unless Kant and the critical philosophy were to be wholly abandoned.—Of a highest Grundsatz from which knowledge of experience, in matter and in form, is to be won, Kant knows nothing, and will know nothing.—Kant brought the whole force of his intellect to prove that our human understanding is certainly in every way a conditioned one, and that for the cognition of the unconditioned our faculties are altogether incompetent.—Sole source and sole measure of certainty for us is the perception of sense — a consciousness empirically instructed—Kant emphatically declares that the idea of the unconditioned has existence and meaning only in our thought as a thought, but not outside of our thought" (Noack, i. 101, 102, 113, 114, 116, 117).

This, truly, has very much the look of faith in an *ipse dixit*; for Noack himself, however, it is conditioned by

his apparently prostrate devotion to the whole system of Kant. And that system certainly *professes* to be founded in fact—to be founded and grounded on the empirical facts of sense,—which, however, are only *appearances*! The common faculty of sense has indeed within it the *à priori* forms or schemata of Time and Space; but that faculty and those forms are only for the appearances of Sense. Of Understanding, too, as equally of Reason, the acting powers are within; but these powers, all the same, have no purpose whatever unless to subserve Sense —to work up and finish off its appearances into objects— and so to complete and round off experience, knowledge, as a whole. Whatever concerns Will, and whatever concerns Æsthetic Judgment—all similarly is for no other end than to complement and complete. All that, certainly, is the warrant of Noack (for his shout of experience, experience, in Kant),—so far, namely, as there is in all that, and in all that as so put, *the least particle* —it is not much—of those actual objects and of that actual external experience in which—surely with very few exceptions—most people believe. We have already seen the "little wooden mill." That *is* Kant's experience; and is there more than a mite of actual experience to be found in it? But what of Kant's testimony to Noack against the Ego?—

"The Ego's self, says Kant, is, in the conception of it, quite void of content, the constituents of our *state of being* itself are not taken up and filled into it; it is, consequently, not even a notion, let alone a perception, but only the awareness or consciousness that I think, which accompanies all our perceptions and ideas."

This, no doubt, is Kant's Ego (summarily put) as we have it early in the *Kritik of Pure Reason* (sec. 24), and, later, under the "Paralogisms." This Ego "is but a logical copula,—it is wholly without matter of contents —it is but a point, but a bare logical idea, that is itself

void, that has nothing to show for itself," that is, in fact, "nothing but a mere reflexion falsely converted into a thing." This, of course, is a very curious finding or conclusion to come to, but it is really fully expressed here as Kant himself names it. Noack, however, would seem unable to satisfy himself with any single name, description, or exposition which, with every groping, he can discover in Kant for it (this Ego), or which, with every effort of his own, he can himself construct for it. It is with surprise or even compassion that he comes to remark:—

"For Fichte," in this regard, "the deep-seeing discovery of the paralogisms and fallacies that lay hidden in the notion of the Ego, which constituted one of the most brilliant parts of the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, was altogether lost from memory, and he himself and his ape, Schelling, wholly entangled themselves in that same net of sophisms whose deceptive glitter their master had, all in vain for them, exposed. The Ego is not a self-existent being. A unity—a mere abstraction—thought simply in behoof of a possible experience is confounded with, and assumed to be, a reality apart! Such subtilisations of conclusion are the Sophistic of reason. Very certainly we have in our seeing of self solely a perception of the manner in which we *appear* to ourselves in inner sense: we get a knowledge of ourselves only in the way in which our inner feeling is affected by the *appearance* of our own nature. Only in that inner sense, with the help of imagination, combines the particulars of our perceived state into the unity of consciousness—only so does our understanding attain to the consciousness,—*I think*. The idea of the Ego is only the act of the referring of the internal perceptions of our own state to their underlying cause. The idea of Ego is something of which, so soon as we take it apart individually in itself, we can have not the least notion, round which, rather, we turn in a perpetual circle, in that, of necessity, we constantly make use of this idea in order to judge something of it, without our being empowered by it, all the same, to make of our experience-cognition any further profit whatsoever. This Ego altogether, consequently, can be taken, not as something really and in itself actual, not, that is, as a self-existent entity, but must be understood solely problematically and hypothetically as a ground, in order that our empirical perceptions in their connection may be regarded *as*

though they had in this Ego their ground; that is to say, it can be a mere schema of a solely regulative principle, out of which not the least thing can be actually deduced. As Kant also teaches, philosophy is to be freed from the craze of a dead *Sein* (*esse*), external and alien to human cognition, the pretended Thing in itself, which is as an unknowable something behind the appearances of sense: all our knowledge reaches only to appearance; every *Sein* withdraws itself into our perception of it: as for objective things in themselves, things more than merely appearant, that remain alien and external to consciousness—there are none such: nature is simply the aggregate of sense-appearances. How could both, Fichte and Schelling, if they desired to think consequently as Kant did, believe in a dead *Sein* as Thing in itself that was the Ego of our appearances to sense? With what right did they take these—perceived by internal observation—actings of the Ego, as anything else than as mere appearances to internal sense in the same way as nature is equally the aggregate of appearances to external sense? With what right could they permit themselves to dissociate the Ego from the series of the Conditioned, and assume, in the Ego conceived in the entire range of inner states, but abstracted from them, an Unconditioned, isolatedly apart? The fallacy of the conclusions of Fichte in regard to this Ego is to a hair the same false show which, as a whole, has by Kant been again and again exposed in reference to the conclusions of reason as concerns the Ideas of the Unconditioned" (119-122).[1]

We have here a goodly number of sentences of Noack in purposed explosion of any reality in the very Ego of our consciousness, in the very Ego of our thoughts—in the very Ego with which we think that we think our thoughts—in the very Ego of our consciousness which is to us our consciousness, which is to us, us! A goodly number! And we have passed more; and there are more to come. Ego is but a "wretched tautology," he says, and "no thinking of it as actual can make it actual, no thinking it to exist can make it exist"; "we can think what we like, but reality for what we think in a possible experience for us is another question";

[1] Passages quoted before are here together: what Noack says must be fully seen.

"the Ego that only thinks itself existent, if it should have had no authorisation thereto in the wise of the perception of sense, stands on feeble feet; the doctors of the Ego have a double Ego; a finite and conditioned one, the human Ego, and in and over it an unconditioned and absolute one, which cannot be the human one, but still somehow is to be the human one" (*ib.*).

But all this, as on the part of Kant, is of such determinative importance in its bearing on every side of it, that we cannot but briefly look back upon it again.

In regard, first, to a necessarily determinative and necessarily systematic Grundsatz, a self-evident first principle, a self-complete primary proposition, what is Kant's own call for "*architectonic*" procedure anything else than that? Noack himself refers to it as it stands by itself at the end of the *Kritik of Pure Reason* (641), and it runs thus:—

"I understand by an *Architectonic* the art of systems. Under the control of reason our cognitions must not be a *Rhapsodic*, but a system, in which alone they can support and promote the ends (Zwecke) of reason. I understand, too, by a system the unity of the constitutive cognitive particulars under a single idea; which is reason's own idea of the form of a whole, so far as through this idea there shall be *à priori* determined as well the totality of the particulars as the place of the parts. Such scientific idea of reason comprehends, therefore, the end (Zweck) and the form of the whole. The unity of the end, to which all the parts (mutually together under its idea) refer themselves, makes it that every part may, in cognition of the rest, be missed, and that there takes place no contingent addition, or indefinite amount of completeness, which has not its *à priori* determined limits. The idea requires a schema for its realisation; that is, an essential number and order of the parts *à priori* determined by and from the principle of the end (Zweck). The schema which is not devised according to an idea (the final end of reason), but empirically, according to ends contingently presentant (not possibly to be enumerated beforehand), gives *technical* unity; whereas that which springs only in consequence of an idea (where reason *à priori* prescribes the ends, and

not empirically expects) founds *architectonic* unity. What we call science, the schema of which must, accordant to the idea, i.e. *à priori*, contain the ground-plan (*monogramma*) and the division of the whole into parts, can arise, not *technically*, because of the similarity of the particulars, or of the contingent application of the cognition *in concreto*, to all manner of external ends at will, but *architectonically*, because of the affinity and the derivation from a single highest and inner end (von einem einzigen obersten und inneren Zwecke), which first of all makes the whole possible."

Would not one think that here in Kant was the precise receipt from which Reinhold and Fichte had constructed that "*obersten Grundstaz*" of theirs! And would not one be surprised at the mere *à posteriori* externality which Noack had read into its glaring *à priori* internality! Noack, namely, has evidently no thought here but of so many alien particulars brought into formal unity and arrangement under an alien idea, or at least an idea that, as only formal, need not be domestic. This, too, as it appears, is to him the doctrine of Kant — a systematico-formal idea, which, with the contents to be subsumed under it, "had nothing to do." As one sees, this is to stand by what to Kant is only "technic," and not at all "architectonic." Noack, then, though referring to this very section in the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, is certainly not in harmony with the words of it. Convenient arrangement of particulars under a convenient unity, and both— arranged many and arranging one — quite possibly external and alien the one to the other—"*Architectonisch*," is something more than such mere "*Technisch*." It is internal; while the subsumed Many in relation to the subsuming One, and not less the ones of the Many reciprocally, are homogeneously, or even, to say so, homogenetically placed. Noack ignores that.

This may sufficiently dispose of Noack's reference to Kant as in comment of a possible Grundsatz; while

a like reference to a possible use of Ego has been already, at pages 203, 235, 239, pretty fully discussed. A note on page 238, again, refers back to pages 79, 80, and concerns Kant's remark on children quite usually fluently speaking a year or more before they get to use "I." At 79 the words immediately preceding this remark of Kant's are also quoted from the *Anthropologie*, and they are sufficiently remarkable. Noack, too, quotes the passage on children and the Ego, and in support of the latter being a mere development; but he elects to quote it (i. 199) only in a late, distant, summarising paragraph that but refers to the discussion proper of the "Fichte-Schellingian Ego"; where there might have been no wish for even a hint to emerge of the very first paragraph—the very first words, indeed, of the *Anthropologie*, containing, as they do, an opinion of Kant's on the general subject of the Ego. We, for our part, are quite used to Kant's relative contradictions; but Noack, probably, preferred silence on this one. When one thinks of the empty—not notion, not perception—reflexion merely that elsewhere ego is to Kant, one is rather pleased to think of this passage, and even, as now, one ventures to repeat it:—

"That man can have ego in his apprehension exalts him infinitely above all the other living beings on earth. Thereby is he a *person* and, by virtue of the unity of consciousness, throughout all mutation that may happen to him, one and the same person, *i.e.*, compared with *Things* (such as are the reasonless brute beasts, with which it is ours to deal at will), a being, in dignity and rank, altogether different, even when he cannot yet speak the ego, inasmuch as he still has it implicitly, just as all languages, if using the first person, must at least think it, although indeed they express not this I-ness of it by any special word: for this capability (namely, to think) is the *understanding*."

But this, critical as it is, will suffice as concerns, specially, the two Fichtian essays of Schelling. They

have no principle but the single principle, the Ego of Fichte. The fire of young ambition was not to be contented, however, with this only ambiguous eminence; and there were soon *Ideen* in the air *zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, "Ideas towards a Philosophy of Nature." The greatest work of Schelling's earlier period, nevertheless, remains his *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*; and of that the principle was still the Fichtian Ego. In these days, after Kant, system followed system with unparalleled rapidity; and that on the Transcendental system there should follow immediately yet another system, the Identity's system, though on the part of the same originator, would only appear natural. Not, however, that it was not, on the whole, perhaps, only Hegel's daring peremptoriness of gratitude in the famous "*Differenz*" that prompted the claim in advance.

But as a decisive picture of pretty well all that belongs to this brilliant Jena period and its import generally, I would fain have it excused to me that I interpolate here—"Schelling and Hegel: Their Union and Disunion."[1]

THE LECTURE

Schelling and Hegel: Their Union and Disunion

What is meant by the *union* of these two men sums itself up in all that is indicated by the publication, in 1802 at Jena, of Schelling and Hegel's *Critical Journal of Philosophy*. Hegel's father, "a decided aristocrat," was Secretary of the Exchequer at the seat of Government in Stuttgart; while the father of Schelling was Cloister Professor and Preacher at Bebenhausen, not far from the University of Tübingen, to the Protestant Seminary of which it was ancillary. It was for the education and

[1] This was a Lecture delivered to the Philosophical Society of the University of St. Andrews, on the 15th of February 1896.

qualification of this Seminary that both Hegel and Schelling were finally intended; and both, accordingly, were very similarly disciplined beforehand. At school Hegel had approved himself a quiet, steady lad, simple and naïve, but diligent and industrious, who took to his books, and liked to walk with his seniors, from the first. Schelling, again, was precociously quick in learning, almost to the consternation of his teachers; for they naturally scrupled to place him, as was the order of his progress, side by side with hobbledehoys who, years and years older than he, could only look askance upon the boy, though they were to find themselves not seldom very glad in the end to propitiate his help, apt as he might be, in an instinct of intellectual superiority, to play them tricks at times. For this *præcox ingenium* is described to have been, if *hilare*, also *petulans*; and his sister is understood to have admitted that Schelling as a boy was troublesome, and teasing, and mischievous enough. Something strange, at the same time, was the acquirement of this boy. He wrote admirable Latin and Greek at twelve, and even at ten years of age; and it was by special licence, as it were, that he was admitted to the Seminary at Tübingen two years younger than was the rule,—after a year's waiting, so to speak, on the outside, too. As he had been at school, so was he in the University—quick beyond his years, and, even at risk of a scandal, on the occasion of an examination, slyly helping with a false answer some appealing oldster at times. No doubt, a certain degree of procacity can hardly be withheld from such precocity as was that of Schelling. *Over*wise is apt to be *over*weening; and overweening can only express itself by being overpert and malapert. Otherwise, so far as conduct is concerned, Schelling's precocity seems to have made itself manifest, on the whole, by a marked tendency, as has been said for Hegel too, to associate preferably with his elders.

As for Hegel, again, "Hegel," says the biographer and son of Schelling, "by all accounts did not make himself remarkable at Tübingen by the depth of his learning in any branch of knowledge, but, as he had been brought up

in the Residence, so he possessed without doubt a more finished knowledge of the world (indeed there was something *Gestandenes*—something stand-offish—naturally in him), which gave him the advantage over Schelling and most of the stipendiaries who had come thither from the seclusion and the innocence of the cloister schools." This is a valuable testimony on the part of the son of Schelling, whose bias in the circumstances cannot be supposed to lie on the side of Hegel, whose University position, for the rest, he must not be understood to undervalue. There is a word, *schwerfällig*, which the general reader will find not unfrequently applied not only to the writing, but to the individuality of Hegel. As for the writing, a certain difficulty which may be so characterised will not be impossible to suggest itself; but how this man, with a knowledge of the world and a natural bearing to suit, should have been also *schwerfällig* (heavy, slow, dull) is something hard to realise. He may have been shy, and even, in a certain way, awkward, both of speech and gesture; but a well-featured, middle-sized man that looked *business*, as has been said of him, could not have been a lout. For the rest, socially, he had evidently been a great success at Tübingen. He was a welcome companion at all festive meetings; and he was to several an intimate, much-valued, and much-loved friend. That was the result of his *Rechtschaffenheit*, his *Biederkeit*, his *Lustigkeit*, and, applied to a man, it would be difficult to find three finer characteristics; he was loyal, he was true-blue, he was merry-hearted: he was a good student, too, in class, without effort, third; and reading variously and greedily out of it.

It was here, then, at Tübingen, that the two men first met; and there are one or two things recorded of them which undoubtedly speak to a certain familiarity of friendship between them. Nevertheless, on the whole, it seems that the friendship of Schelling and Hegel at that time must be considered to have depended rather on the *professional*, so to speak, than on the *social* interest, for which latter, says Schelling's biographer, Hegel "went elsewhere." They were at Tübingen together for no less than

three years indeed; but, academically two years in advance of Schelling, Hegel was also by four years and five months his senior—a difference of age that, at that time of life, made the one comparatively old, and the other, similarly, a boy.

Still, such intimacy can be so readily understood to have been produced between them by their intercourse at Tübingen, that we do not wonder that Hegel should have been moved, some fourteen months after he had left Tübingen, to open a correspondence with Schelling, who had yet nearly another year to remain there. What moved Hegel will, with the state of the case, be apparent from its first words: "Berne, December 24, 1794, Mein Lieber!—My dear friend, I should have been glad long ago to renew with thee the friendly relations in which we formerly stood to one another. This feeling lately awoke again afresh as I happened to read, only the other day, the notice of an article by thee in Paulus's *Memorabilien*." What moved Hegel, we see, was Schelling's appearance in literature; and that already says something for what special interests Hegel had latently at heart. And it is really on these interests, religious and philosophical, that the entire correspondence turns, in the course of which, though it (the correspondence) was only of less than a year's duration, Hegel has to speak of some of Schelling's earliest works; and on these, it must be acknowledged that Hegel does not stint eulogy. In other respects Hegel gives excellent expression to all that Schelling has seriously an interest in; and Schelling cannot but write to Hegel warmly and encouragingly in return. It is this correspondence, in effect, that goes the furthest to found the friendship between them which, for some time at least, seemed as that of brothers. Hegel must have been satisfied that it left on Schelling, in his budding authorship, the pleasantest of impressions.

Hegel's last letter to Schelling so far was dated August 30, 1795; his next, written to him on the 2nd of November 1800, indicates, on the part of the two men, a silence between them of some five years. And, no doubt, it was only what was felt by Hegel to be dire necessity

that compelled him at that time to write to Schelling at last, and break then the silence for which, as it seems, the blame was his.

To explain.—Hegel had, since leaving Tübingen in the end of 1793, been for six years occupied in the irksome and undignified position of family tutor to children. Kant, Fichte, Herbart, Hamann, had all been family tutors, not one of them, probably, very much to his own liking; and, almost certainly, in his case, the least to his liking was the house-experience of Hegel, particularly in Switzerland, where he was when Schelling once wrote him: "Thy present situation is unworthy of thy abilities and just pretensions." Even after Schelling so wrote him, Hegel had still another half of the like penal course to drag through. It is to be assumed as characteristic of Hegel, however, that, though in the beginning of 1799 he came into the possession of the inheritance from his father which, in his own mind, was to alter for him his whole plan of life, it is not till the end of 1800 (nearly two years) that his preparations are ripe for the first move in the new direction. Now, that first move was this same letter to Schelling of the date mentioned (November 2, 1800), and which, as said, broke the long silence of five years. During these five years, while Schelling has come still further to the front, Hegel has remained in obscurity. And so it will, presumably, prove somewhat against the grain that Hegel finds himself writing to Schelling. Still, it is not from what situation was even to Schelling then an unworthy one that he (Hegel) applies to the latter now. No;—by this time Hegel, if still without a public, has been more than three years in Frankfort, and in much improved circumstances. They, the circumstances, are not here so lonely and ungrateful, in the house of the merchant, as they were in that of the Swiss Von. Hegel has dear friends now who, gifted and accomplished themselves, can love and admire him as not less gifted, not less accomplished. He has now both the leisure and the means of study: his "system" grows daily in his hands—the system which henceforth he carried by him. Nevertheless, externally, he was as much as ever the mere family tutor.

Schelling, for his part, on leaving Tübingen when not yet twenty-one, became almost directly Hofmeister, tutor, to two young barons. Then for the first time in high society, he was made aware, presumably, of any college or cloister deficiencies in his manners, as well as of the necessity to render himself, for intercourse in the new sphere, a fluent Frenchman. That from the exterior was something; but now—now when Hegel turned in mind his purpose to write to him—there was from the interior, so to speak, more. Schelling was now Schelling, Schelling the professor, Schelling the rival of Fichte, Schelling the friend of Göthe, of Schiller, the Schlegels,—all the great. And now Hegel wished to write to him—Hegel was come into his property (some £250)—Hegel after mature consideration would embark at last and finally on an academical career. But where? Ah well, where? Where but *there*—there at Jena—the centre of philosophy, the centre of literature, the centre of genius, the centre of all the talents! Who was it that in the reference could advise?—who was it that in the reference could help? Why, Schelling; and he was now so great a man—and now, too, there was between them the separation of seven long years personally, of five long years epistolarily!

There was certainly sufficient matter here to take the breath away in hesitation and doubt. But Hegel, too, was not without confidence in himself. He was not now the man who had addressed, as his superior in knowledge of and contribution to the philosophy of the day, his so much younger University friend, Schelling, in 1794. No; he had repaired all that. He had behind him these, his theological, his historical, his political studies,—as at Berne, so also at Frankfort. And more: in philosophy itself he knew himself a master. To say nothing of the classics, nothing of Plato or Aristotle, he was perfectly at home now with all the men in repute,—he had thoroughly studied, thoroughly fathomed them all, Kant and Jacobi, Fichte and Schelling. Nay, he had actually in his desk —an accomplished fact—his *System*. He had taken time enough. He had made his preparations, he had studied

his precautions, his mind was fixed, he had his £250 in his pocket. It was a professor of Philosophy he would be, and it was Jena was the goal. He must write Schelling—there was no help for it. Accordingly, he does write Schelling on this 2nd of November 1800—a long enough letter, too—but it is with bated breath. He does not alarm Schelling by any directness of attack, whether on Jena or himself,—he only asks for an introduction or two to Bamberg, where he knows that Schelling himself, not so very long ago, had some time resided. "I think," he begins,—"I think, dear Schelling, a separation of several years should not cause me hesitation in appealing to thy kindness in regard of a particular wish. My petition relates to some addresses in Bamberg, where I should like to stay for a time." He goes on to say that he is now in the circumstances and the mind to apply himself to the completion of his studies. He very delicately and adroitly only alludes to Jena, "before trusting himself to the literary riot and revel of which he would like to strengthen himself elsewhere." "Thy public great career," he tells Schelling, "I have followed with admiration and delight." Then he alludes to that paper in his desk, and the encouragement he would like for it. "Of all men whom I know around me," he continues, "I see only in thee him in whom, even in respect of publication and of influence on the world, I should like to find my friend," and so he throws himself on him "in full confidence," as his words are, "that thou wilt recognise and find a value in my disinterested endeavour, though its sphere were lower."

Schelling's answer to this most winning letter has not been found: but what effect it had on him can be understood from the fact that, in the course of no more than a month or two, Hegel already stood in Jena. One can quite well conceive, however, what series of considerations might have acted to bring from Schelling an invitation to Hegel to come at once to him at Jena.

Schelling at Jena, in the end of 1800, was no longer what he had been at the same period in 1798. Two years had been enough to develop against him, publicly as well

as privately, a most harassing opposition: and in January 1801 he had only reached the still tender age of twenty-six. His great friend, August-Wilhelm Schlegel, had left; other such friends might write him, might visit him; but, in Jena, he stood alone now—his flank was turned, his side was unprotected; he had need of a man that would indeed be a friend. Why should not Hegel be that man? The correspondence of five years ago was a most agreeable one—it left the most pleasant memories of one who was in full accord with himself, and, evidently, so far as that went, not *insupportably* an attached friend. Hegel was an able man. Schelling could recollect what a prestige personally he had for himself at Tübingen; for, as Schelling's own son declares, "he (Hegel) was to all who more intimately knew him then one of the sensiblest, widest awake, and most serviceable of heads," a man proficient in classics, extensively read in literature, and already the student of Kant. *That* in the past, and *now* in the present, he was a devotee of philosophy itself, and beyond all doubt a most accomplished one. Schelling might have reflected, with some complacency, too, that he was asked to become the patron of a man so much older than himself, who, as brought up at the Residence and as the son of a Government official, had had so much the *pas* of him and other cloister rustics at the University. Nay, he might have cast a thought on that something "*Gestandenes*" (stand-offish) in Hegel's *Wesen*, in Hegel's very nature, whereby respect and trust were involuntarily infused into others.

Still, the credit is due to Schelling of almost unexampled generosity: he set at once the absolutely unknown Hegel on the very height of heights—he gave him at once the elevation he coveted—he opened to him at once all the distinction and all the resources, as it were, of his own dwelling-house. Not that Hegel was slow on his side to acknowledge the debt, and offer what compensation for it he could. He gave himself up for six months to the writing of that article on the "Differenz" of the Fichtian and Schellingian Systems, which took Schelling from beneath Fichte and placed him side by

side with Fichte, a Corypheus in Philosophy, as original as Fichte himself. The *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, in the name of both, was set up too, and it was largely in the same direction that Hegel wrought even there. And so it continued for some two years and a half, till Schelling, heartily disgusted with Jena, was glad to be able to transfer himself to Würzburg.

After leaving Jena, we find only six letters in four years to have been written by Schelling to Hegel: and the last of the six is, on the part of Schelling, the first of the disunion between the two; and it is also the last of the correspondence. After the 2nd November 1807, which was the date of it, these two close friends never exchanged a single letter again, and only once met. After the long interval of twenty-two years they were once again unexpectedly and accidentally thrown together at the hot wells of Carlsbad. When we know that, of the five letters preceding this critical last letter, all of them on the part of Schelling are written in the freest, frankest terms of the most unsuspecting friendship, then we are aware that a most sudden and violent wrench has taken place, and that the blame of it, in Schelling's eyes, has been something done by Hegel. Than Schelling's letter to Hegel that immediately preceded the last, a more supremely friendly letter it would be difficult to devise. Its very first sentence is in such terms as these: "How very glad I was to receive thy letter, it were hardly possible for me to tell thee without at the same time expressing to thee how much I have lamented the being for so long a time out of all intercourse with thee: I was in hopes, by sending thee my Anti-Fichte, of putting myself again in thy remembrance, and, see!—I have succeeded." The letter goes on to say how very much he would like to be of any assistance in getting Hegel placed in some professorship near him. Of the great forthcoming work, Hegel's *Phaenomenologie*, Schelling speaks thus: "As regards thy work, now at last about to appear, I am full of the intensest expectation. What must be the end, if thy maturity still takes time to itself to mature its fruits! I only wish for thee fur
and leisure requisite for the com

as it were, time-less works." Of course, though these words sound well, one can perfectly well understand how Hegel might see in them the suspicion of a gibe on the part of his more distinguished friend at his own comparative slowness. The letter is continued, however, and at some length, in a vein of perfectly friendly gossip, and winds up with, "Farewell, and don't let the friendly communication between us be again so long interrupted. Be assured of the most inviolable and sincere friendship by thy Schelling." Even allowing a little quip from his own quickness to his friend's slowness, there cannot be the slightest doubt that, *so* far, in his last letter but one, namely, Schelling is perfectly cordial, perfectly single-minded, towards Hegel. Less than a year brings an utter revolution. His very next letter, that is the last of all, has such expressions as these: "Thou hast for long received no letter from me. In thy last letter thou promisedst me thy book. After I received it, I wished to read it before writing to thee again. But the many hindrances and distractions of this summer left me neither the time nor the peace which were desirable for the study of such a work. So, till now, I have only read the preface. In so far as thou thyself (in thy letter) makest mention of the polemical part of it (the preface), I should, with a justifiable self-measurement of myself, assuredly think too little of myself did I refer that polemic to myself. It may, then, as thou hast declared in the letter, always concern only misapplications and only one's imitators, though in the writing itself this distinction does not appear. Thou canst easily think how glad I should be once for all to get rid of these." Then, after an indifferent sentence or two further, the letter ends politely and friendlily enough, but it was the last. Schelling, as I say, never again wrote Hegel; but from this time on to the very end of his long life, a period of nearly fifty years, with the death of Hegel in the middle of them, to Schelling Hegel was a name for his bitterest detestation and intensest hate.

And what had Hegel done to cause really such blind, ·ning fury?—such lifelong, unmitigated, vindictive

His *Phaenomenologie des Geistes* was pub-

lished in 1807, and in the preface to that work Hegel had taken leave to speak of the *Naturphilosophie*,—and the *Naturphilosophie* was Schelling. We have gathered from that last letter of Schelling's that Hegel had in the reference felt uneasy, and had sought, in writing him, to excuse himself to Schelling by intimating that it was not Schelling, but only the ineptitude of Schelling's imitators, that he presumed to blame. Now, that was a blunder on the part of Hegel. What he had said in his book was either true or false. If it was true, he ought to have stood by it, silently, without the necessity of a single word,—very certainly without doing himself the indignity of an apologetic deprecation and stoop in private letters. And no doubt it was true,—true, too, not only as against the tag-rag and bobtail of his followers, but as against Schelling, as against the Corypheus himself. It is, indeed, against the *Naturphilosophie*, and as such, that all that grim humour is directed, explosive and annihilative of mere formalism and schematism. "That one perception," says Hegel,—"that one perception that, in the absolute, all is alike—to oppose that to the cognition in demand of distinction and completion, or to make one's absolute the night in which, as we say, all cows are black, is the very naïveté of intellectual vacuity." "What a stupid head that must be in which a quarter of an hour would not fix the theory that there are asthenic, sthenic, and indirect asthenic diseases, and just so many methods of cure, and which, seeing that, not long since, such initiation sufficed, might not itself, in quite as short a time, be transformed from a routinier (an empiric dabbler, a quack) into a theoretic doctor!" These are but small specimens of the merciless satire with which Hegel scatters to the winds the Schellingian pretension; and, with a little reflection, one can manage to picture to one's self the effect on Schelling. It was with the meekest complacency that, vis-à-vis of Fichte, he had his rights given him by Hegel. In the *Critical Journal* he had accepted also, not without an internal chuckle, doubtless, so far as he could read it, the reduction to his feet of all the rest of them that stood near him, Krug, Schulze, Jacobi, Kant; but that he him-

self, subjected to the same searching and irresistible scoff, should be tossed, as lightly, as surely, and as relentlessly, aside as they, and by him who had been allowed to speak of "our" philosophy, thereby only fixing his place as an humble but favoured second to himself—at this, all this! there were no bounds to his astonishment, indignation, mortification, rage. It was as though the man to whom he had implicitly believed himself a god, had suddenly turned round and, drawing a string, caricatured him into a jumping-jack! Ay, and there was worse than that—*there was an open insult.* Schelling, in that last letter of his, had told Hegel that their differences might be easily adjusted, "Eines ausgenommen,—one thing excepted." Now that one thing might, as referred to, be the insult.

The Schlegels and the *Naturphilosophie*, both, had carried Schelling into equivocal positions.

As for the Schlegels, it was with them, almost exclusively, that Schelling, from the first identified himself at Jena. Not very friendly in course of time with Friedrich, he seems always to have been as affectionately related to August-Wilhelm as to a brother. And as for the two ladies of the family,—Caroline, August-Wilhelm's wife, and Auguste Böhmer, her daughter by her former husband, from whom she (Caroline) was separated by divorce,—these two ladies, it seems, quarrelled about him, ugly little man as he was. It is Schelling's own biographer says *this*: "That there reigned not always full concord in the house itself, was mainly the fault of Schlegel's ladies"; and this state of the case we readily realise when we are told that "Schelling's heart soon turned to the lovely Auguste Böhmer," and know that, after her death, he was consoled by her mother, who became practically his wife till a second divorce enabled her to become also legally such.

Auguste Böhmer died, then; but there followed a scandal. Schelling, no doubt with a reference to his *Naturphilosophie*, strange as it may seem to us, had been made by the University of Landshut, that is, plainly out of nothing but favour, grace, actually an M.D., a Medicinæ Doctor. The presentation or award of this diploma or degree was indeed subsequent to the death of

Auguste; but already, at the date of that event, Schelling had so given himself up to the Brownian theories of disease, sthenic and asthenic, that he did not withhold himself from an actual dabbling in practice, from an actual dabbling in drugs. So it was that he had something to do with the treatment of the illness of Auguste; and, worse than that, so it was that, after her death, it was rumoured, and eventually in a public Journal printed as a rumour, that, with the improper administration of opium, Schelling had killed Auguste Böhmer.

Now, with this before us, we may be pardoned for considering it not unlikely that Schelling would take to his own self Hegel's sneering words about quarter of an hour sufficing to teach any blockhead the whole art of medicine, and of no more time being required to make a quack a graduate. A degree in medicine to one who had not been taught medicine—that and the Brownian words sthenic, asthenic, etc., were in the said Preface glaring. We can scarcely be wrong in seeing an insult to Schelling in the whole allusion, and in identifying that insult with the significant *Eines ausgenommen*, the significant *one* thing, excepted of that last letter of Schelling's.

And is Hegel to be allowed to go free here? No, certainly not! A disinterested judge might now see, or might then have seen, the absurdity of that impromptu medical art and the veritable scandal of that impromptu medical doctor; but for Hegel, so personally and peculiarly the private friend of Schelling, to do what he did, was to do what no man of honour would have allowed himself to do.

It is just possible that, all this time, Hegel may have had a secret grudge to Schelling. He could not but recollect their different standings at the University—Schelling so much younger than he, three years behind him in class, the country-bred cloister student beside the privileged Bureaucrat's son of the Capital! Taken with seeing his name in print, and so far with praise, he had corresponded with him from Berne, and again, after a long silence, his occasions had compelled him to sue for his support. It was true that h [illegible] also

that he had returned it. I fancy Hegel might have often enough ruminated on this, that, after all, Schelling, in the last resort, was really as a man not so very much to his mind. He was everything that could be desired in knowledge, and he was certainly quick enough; but he was light, vain, forward, pert, and then there was no doubt that, though it was only with quiet self-complacency, he yet did take the big over him. He, Schelling, was not to him, Hegel, what Hölderlin had been: it had been "Liebster Hölderlin," but Schelling had only been a cold "Mein Lieber." Yes, Schelling had taken the big over him—look to that letter that ordered him about for Madame Schlegel: "To write thee from Berlin was quite impossible, dear friend. Even here at Leipsic something or other has still come in the way, so that I can start for Jena on my return only to-morrow morning. I shall arrive towards evening with Madame Schlegel. Be so good, if at thy first request, in the name of Madame Schlegel, the furniture and other things have not been got into the house, as soon as possible after receipt of this letter, to beg of Madame Niethammer this promised obligingness, that to-morrow, Monday evening, Madame Schlegel shall find her things, at least on the whole, particularly sofa, chairs, some tables, and specially a bed. To the Erkhards also, to whom the house belongs, send Nelly to tell them that Madame Schlegel will arrive to-morrow evening."

I really do not think that such a letter as that would have commended itself to Hegel, or that he would have liked to be ordered about in that way, on such affairs, and for a Madame Schlegel, a divorced wife, then living for a second divorce with poor Schelling, who, just in all respects, was led by the nose by these Schlegels. We recollect there was something *Gestandenes*, something stand-offish, in the very nature of Hegel, and we know, too, that moral principle was the very stalk of carl-hemp in him. To him the family was the prime cell of the State, and purity of the marriage relation its first essential;—he could not but have despised and pitied his friend in such a [illegible]ection, and resented his own involuntary compromise.

[illegible]hen Schelling, about a year afterwards, writes

Hegel, from Cannstadt, at the very end of a letter (four printed octavo pages long): "To thy friendship it will not be indifferent to know that since a short time I have been married to my Freundin"—indeed, when Schelling writes Hegel that, I say it is itself almost already a proof of a whole position in the past of reprobation and remonstrance on the part of the latter to the former, on the part of Hegel to Schelling.

We have here, then, a good deal suggested as to a possible half-heartedness always in the feelings of Hegel for Schelling. That may help to explain, but it will never in the slightest degree justify, the attack of the *Phaenomenologie*. Schelling may have felt, and not always hidden, his social superiority to Hegel at Jena; but there can be no doubt that, the relative position being allowed for, Schelling entertained a most sincere, never-doubting, and all-unsuspicious friendship for Hegel, whose wickedly suggestive sneer at all that concerned his medical doctorship in the past was as astounding as a sudden blow in the face from one's own best friend, and seemed all at once to disclose unexpected hatred in a heart that was believed true, but was now proved as false as, self-evidently, it was hard.

I may say that this aspect of the question, the medical suggestion, with perhaps all the relative psychology, indeed, seems to have escaped the German authorities here. All of them refer, on the whole, only to that picturesque naming of the *Naturphilosophie*, and rather enjoy the joke of it. But as for Schelling himself, we have now to see at least an example or two that may suffice as evidence of the way he took it.[1]

Some eighteen months after the date of his last letter to

[1] still to be said for Hegel, however, that if he did give vent len grudge against Schelling, it could not have been, as usual ignoble position of a new and greater relative en the *Phaenomenologie* of 1807 and his enthrone- it so, at Berlin in 1818, the lot of Hegel—one verty and humiliation—was always one of compara- It is to be said, too, that, even at Jena, he was s own expressions.

Hegel, he writes to his friend Schubert: "Right delightful it was to me to see how truly and well you have handled Hegel. The ridiculous side is really the best, though not the only one. Such a pure example of inner and outer prose must, in our hyperpoetic times, be held sacred. Sentimentality comes over us all here and there; and against it such a negative nature as his is a capital corrective, as, on the contrary, it is diverting so soon as it will take its flight above the negative." He tells Cousin, in 1828: "You have got your information of the system which derives from me, only in the form that it has received in passing through the straitened head of a man who thought to take possession of my ideas, just as the creeping insect may think to appropriate to itself the leaf of a plant which it has entangled in its web." He assures Weisse, an admirer of Hegel, a year after the death of Weisse's master: "The so-called Hegelian philosophy, in what is proper to it, I can regard only as an episode in the history of later philosophy, and only indeed a melancholy one. In order to come again into the line of true progress, we must not continue it, but wholly break off from it, consider it non-existent." When Weisse talks of the method of Hegel and of its discovery as his immortal merit, Schelling assures him that it was his own special, original invention. He does not hesitate to call the followers of Hegel to Cousin actually assassins: "In order to make their master great, they must make me small. It is the *mot d'ordre* which has been given to them by their chief, who, like the Old Man of the Mountain, without ever quitting his retreat, knew very well how to call his instruments into play; but the imprudences and indiscretions of these fanatics have betrayed him since his death. You will hear fine things of this if some day I shall speak publicly of it." His system had been only stolen by Hegel, and his followers had only begun to vaunt when he himself, its originator, was long beyond it. As late as 1841, ten years after the death of Hegel, he writes to Dorfmüller: "I do not understand what could be unintelligible to you in the words, 'who eat my bread.' In effect, really, it is Hegel that is meant, who in all these people

properly speaks. Of course, you cannot know as precisely as I, who have known him from his youth, what, by himself, and without me, he would have been fit for, though it can be easily seen from his *Logic* what, left to himself, he would have sunk to. I may safely say, then, of him and his fellows, that they eat my bread."

We have an interesting little picture at the hands of Rosenkranz of how Schelling and his audience looked in his lecture-room, apparently in the year 1838, at Munich. On that occasion Schelling, he says, spoke with cutting sarcasm against Hegel's philosophy. He said that he (Schelling) had given his hearers an example of the actual speculation which dominates the world and the positive Powers of it, so that they (his hearers) had, in the fact itself, the best measure for that artificial filigree work of the Begriff which now so frequently passed current as true philosophy. But, with a venomously contemptuous glance which went to my soul, he added: "This philosophy is but the product of a hectic consumption wasting away into itself."

Evidence in the same direction might, to a considerable extent, be accumulated further; but from what has been already said, perhaps a sufficiently complete idea may be formed of the smouldering hatred which the Preface to the *Phaenomenologie* left, after 1807, in the soul of Schelling. After this date, too, as has occurred to be mentioned, only once did these two men meet in life; and of that meeting each of the two wrote an account to his respective wife.

Hegel's letter is to this effect:—

"CARLSBAD, *Friday, Sept.* 4, 1829.

"YESTERDAY evening, I had a meeting with an old acquaintance—Schelling—who had, a few days ago, likewise come here, alone, as I, in order to, as I not to, go through the Cure. He is, so far as that goes, very well and strong; the use of the water is with him only a preservative. We are both glad of this, and are like cordial old friends together. This afternoon we have been together for a walk; and then to the coffee-house, where we have officially read, in the Austrian *Beobachter*, the taking of A[illegible] the evening both. Yesterday, I was well, dined with Schelling, a[illegible]

Schelling, again, to *his* wife, writes thus:—

"CARLSBAD.

"FIGURE to yourself—Yesterday, I am sitting in my bath, and I hear a somewhat disagreeable, half-familiar voice asking for me. It was Hegel from Berlin, who, passing by, will put up a day or two here. In the afternoon he came a second time with much *empressement* and uncommonly friendly, just as though there were nothing between us. Since, as yet, however, there has been no professional talk, into which indeed I will not be led, and he, moreover, is a very discreet person, I have sufficiently enjoyed with him the two evening hours. I have not yet called upon him; it is a little too far for me to the Golden Lion."

It is in reference to this meeting of the two men that Noack remarks that, during the short interval of it (the meeting), Schelling "forgot all the rancour which fermented for years in his soul, and lost it in old cordial friendship with Hegel." "Cordial" translates at a venture the unusual, un-dictionary word "*cordater*." Now this word (translated), as we have seen, is said by Hegel; and Noack, forgetting the state of the case, seems wrong in the way he attributes it to Schelling. Hegel, of course, as he uses the phrase—and, evidently glad at heart, he uses it, in his letters, at once, to two of his friends, Daub and Förster—speaks for this old friend as well as himself; but it is difficult to see that this old friend of his, who wrote to *his* wife the letter which has been quoted last, had such a word as *cordater* in his mind, or had really either forgotten or lost all the "rancour" that Noack thinks of. In so many words, at least, he intimates that, as for himself and the man with the disagreeable voice, whom it is too far for him to go and see, there is still *something* "between them"!

These biographical details, while episodically something of a relief and a remission, it is possible to hope, may, even philosophically, prove not unillustrative; but it is to philosophy that we now directly turn.

CHAPTER XIII

SCHELLING—(*continued*)

1. THE GENERAL COURSE

WE have seen that Schelling began his campaign in philosophy, so to speak, with the intrepid assumption to himself as his own of the position of Fichte. Once in that position, it came to suggest itself, doubtless, that he was there and then, and that Fichte was, there and then, only in one of the alternatives, the first one, namely, whether of Descartes or Spinosa: he was secluded to ideality only, *Thought*, with simple exclusion or suppression of its equal or co-equal, as classed, reality, *Extension*. It was to remedy that that Schelling, stepping hastily to the front with nature, set up the *Naturphilosophie*. And it certainly held of the situation itself, though Schelling could hardly miss the not impalpable hint of Hegel thereto which lay in the somewhat daring *Differenz*, that the consummation presently followed of the precipitation of both alternatives—both Extension and Thought—into the community of the *Absolute* (with Schelling himself at first only the *Indifference*).

So, then, was Schelling. Finishing with his Transcendental Philosophy on the one side, he gave himself up to the prosecution of his Natural Philosophy on the other. Not but that there cropped out in the general work slants all between, accord lity

of Schelling yielded for the nonce to the lure of Spinosa, or to that of Plotinus, or of Leibnitz, or Böhme, or of one or other of the Gnostics, etc. etc.

Now, be that as it particularly may, the general position of Schelling, from boyhood at Tübingen till the professorship at Berlin ten years after the death of Hegel, will be allowed to stand pretty well before us now, miscellaneously, in sketch; and the course of remark may appear indicated according as successive publications shall require. On the whole, however, we may say that the productions of Schelling fall into three heaps, two for his *First* philosophy, and one for his *Second*. Now, of his first philosophy, we conceive ourselves relieved from any further consideration; and for this reason, that while the time that has passed lies as a pall on the body of the *Naturphilosophie*, we have already done all for the Transcendental Philosophy that our special purposes require. As regards Schelling, then, there remains now nothing for us to consider but what has been called his *second* philosophy.

This second philosophy is contained in the four final volumes of the whole fourteen volumes that constitute the Works of Schelling; and even as we see it placed, it is a Division by itself. Division seems pitted against Division, indeed; for the latter bears to the former the relation, on the whole, of counterpart to counterpart, of a positive to a negative.

The four volumes themselves again constitute, two of them, a "Philosophy of Mythology," and the two latter a "Philosophy of Revelation": titles, both of them, which seem to be promising enough; for the one suggests a Philosophy of Religion, and the other a Philosophy of Christianity. Neither of them, however, in itself, leads [redacted] satisfactory result, or is indeed of any—really the [redacted] ubstantial value. The very occasion of them

renders them suspect. It was the offer to Schelling, in his rancour to Hegel, of an opportunity to revindicate his own autocracy, as against the pretensions of a traitor. That opportunity lay in the lectures expected from him on his translation, in 1841, from Munich to Berlin; and Schelling took full advantage of it. These lectures—though only in common with every other scrap of writing, whether public or private (as indeed one may almost say), that emanated from Schelling after the death of Hegel — may be viewed simply as balistæ, engines of offence, hill-placed, for the hurling of stick or stone, of shingle, or sand, or gravel, against that dull thief with "the disagreeable voice," who, after having been nursed in *my* bosom, *conveyed my* clothes, and —ha! at his peril!—made game of ME! I say this deliberately; for even what seem serious scientific labours, there on no account but their own, have still at the heart of them—Hegel. "Pantheism" had been thrown by the ignorant enemy to the herd, and the startled Court took alarm. It was a queer thing to do—still, it was done,—the Court in its panic appealed to Schelling! whose sentiments, special to the case, were possibly not unknown.[1] The result was these so-called "Philosophies," of Mythology or Religion, of Revelation or Christianity,—"Philosophies," for all that, which, with their general aim, were, on the whole, as I intimate, but anarchic bombs.

I proceed, from the considerable MS., as referred to, before me, to characterise, briefly, generally, this remaining matter of Schelling's. There is no completion of that matter, however, with the mythology and revelation alone, which must come for consideration first. For

[1] He had already lectured on "Mythology" and "Revelation," and while at Erlangen he had f[illegible] reputation for Protestant ortho[illegible]

example, it is only the second of the four volumes named final of the works of Schelling that bears title "Philosophie der Mythologie"; while the first, namely, appears but as "*Einleitung* in die Philosophie der Mythologie." Now, again, this Introduction is divided into two books, with ten chapters to the one book, and fourteen to the other book, which latter, for its part, is not mythological at all. This latter book constitutes, according to Schelling's son and editor, das Jüngste was Schelling geschrieben (the last thing he had written);—"at which, indeed, it was the will of God that he should break off without having put the last hand to it." "Its content," the son continues, "is the rational philosophy which here truly only subserves the whole, but is a work *per se*,—the pure rational science, the exposition of which, after he had finished with the Positive Philosophy—lay very near his heart, carrying him back in his old age to the system of his youth—the system which in his eyes was at no time done away with, but was destined rather to rise anew, and only so for the first time find at last its true value as preparatory to the said second philosophy. . . . To the completion of it, indeed, was the publication of all the rest postponed." It is well borne in upon us here that this very specially last and peculiar work is very specially and peculiarly recommended to us—that very certainly in the first place; but we are struck also by that mention of a *positive* philosophy. Ueberweg, for one, takes the word to be but a general name for the two terminal philosophies together. He says (iii. 241): "Positive philosophy, namely, the philosophy of mythology and the philosophy of revelation." Nor, on the whole, do the other authorities differ. Schelling's son and editor, however, tells us (2, 3. vi.) that this [redacted]sitive Philosophy already referred to in the Philosophy [redacted]ology, is to be found treated at full in the

Philosophy of Revelation. The general reasoning involved, we may add, is to be seen, at least partly, in the work on *Free-will*.[1] So, for result here, we propose to consider what material lies before us now under six heads: 1. Mythology; 2. Revelation; 3. Positive Philosophy; 4. Negative Philosophy; 5. The Direction of the whole on Hegel; 6. A concluding word on Schelling.

2. The Mythology

And here, as usual, Schelling begins with the work of those that went before him—of Heyne, and Hermann, and Hume, and Voss, and Jones, and Creuzer, etc. I know not, however, that a general reader will at all find here what he may expect—something, that is, of an interesting and informing narrative. There may appear, rather, as even *de*forming the narrative, something of an uninteresting attempt to philosophise it. The most important result, on the whole, of all is, that the idea of a pure Theism which shall have preceded and given rise to Mythology, even as a corruption of itself, is not an idea that will stand the test of analysis. Generally, it may be objected to Schelling here, indeed, that he quite unnecessarily bestows pages — page after page — on matters for which paragraphs, or even at times sentences,

[1] "In his Berlin lectures," says Ueberweg, "Schelling, substantially, only carried further the speculation which had been brought forward in his work on *Free-will*." The others, historians also, Erdmann, Schwegler, evidently share this view; and Hegel himself, who, dying in 1831, was separated by ten years from the Berlin lectures, mentions this work as "deeply speculative, but alone in its kind, and confined to the one point." Noack, however, names it a work "which, to speak with Christian Kapp, is out and out a plagiarism from Böhme, whose name, nevertheless, it never once mentions" (Noack, ii. 177). Both Ueberweg and Erdmann expressly refer also in this connection to Böhme; particularly does Schwegler.

might very well have sufficed. But in his own regard, which is the main matter here, and that, too, only relatively, it is enough for us to know that mythology, far from being, under any name and in any form, an invention, is to him, on the contrary, an organic production, of which the special chapters of his first two volumes are to constitute the explanation.

Now, this explanation may be said to turn on a three-fold pivot: where there is concerned, firstly, an impure or "*relative*" *Monotheism*; and then, secondly, a peculiar "*consciousness*," realising it in the earliest men; and at last, thirdly, a very special and singular "*crise*" of this consciousness, determinative, that is to say, of the *dispersion* of the tribes. In thus accounting for such an extraordinary manifestation as the whole of pagan Mythology that preceded Revelation, Schelling takes enormous credit to himself at least for the originality and ingenuity of the intricated complexity of the scheme, if hardly, as one must think to oneself, seriously, with any belief of its truth. That, namely, is eminently characteristic of Schelling here—how, almost at once, in that glaring personal vanity of his, he must congratulate himself on his own individual and wonderful ability. "As the question," he says (2, 1. 128), "How did nations originate? first made its way from my lecture-room and spread into wider circles, it found a reception which showed plainly how new and unexpected it was for many, and I have had still more occasion to see since," etc., etc.! In fact, ever after this, as immediately, indeed, in what concerns either his Rational Philosophy or his Philosophy of Revelation, when he has left, that is, Mythology behind him, his pride cannot but exultingly expand at times in the consciousness of a great trick won, as under the feeling

"ictoria Cross upon his chest!

As Schelling schemes it, there is first a community of consciousness between man and his God. This is the primal Monotheism!—This is Paradise! This is the Golden Age! And as difference there is none, this is eternity: this is the true "hyper-historical" era. Still, this is a relation—a relation of two; and *two* is difference. (A step somewhat Hegelian, Schelling, eh?) It is thus, then, that, if Monotheism is ever to pass into Polytheism, the necessity of movement, change, is to be accounted for. The original identity implies difference, and the whole is a process of consciousness—a process not subjective, but, as it were, objective—a process, not in one man, but in all: a process in the peoples; and that leads to the *Crisis* determinative of the *dispersion*—after which all is easy.

Still, there has been another difficulty, another lion in the way. It was a necessity of the beginning that there should be first Monotheism. Now, how was Polytheism to be developed from Monotheism, the plurality of many changeable gods from the unity of one unchangeable God? Why, the first God should be only a "relative" one! The first consciousness should not rise, after all, to an absolute God—the first consciousness should itself be *relative*! And, so now, for the key there is a hole in the lock! Or how the skein is to ravel out, we see! The work has been begun; and, pretty well, also, the work is ended! It is easy to see that to possess a first God that is only relatively *one*, is *potentialiter* to possess once for all, also, the totality of Polytheism.

Ah, but there is yet another difficulty: it is not to be all relativity and change: if Paganism, barbarian or classical, is to be accounted for, what of the Jews? Must not prevailing belief be yielded to—changelessness and an absolute God discovered for them?

Conditions remain so—th be a compromise.

A God absolute there must be; and as well a God relative—with reconciliation between them!

But the perplexity of the position, the to and fro, the turn here and the turn there—in a word, the whole utter failure of every single device and expedient, can only be rendered distinct and clear to any eye that would see by Schelling himself—the light of his own expressions. To save space, however, I must only refer as under.[1]

Of course, let our feeling in regard to truth of foundation be what it may, we cannot but admire the alert ingenuity of Schelling, and be interested in the happy treatment that concerns his various allusions. There is a great deal here (*L.*, vii) that at least pleases in connection with the Old Testament, as the Confusion of Tongues, the distinction between the Elohim and Jehovah, Jews and Gentiles, Noah and the Flood, Abraham, etc., with the conclusion (174): "It is now, then, proved by the oldest document, the received revealed Scripture itself, that mankind began, not with pure or absolute, but with relative, Monotheism"; as, in the same direction, some pages earlier (147), it had been said: "The usual opinion which ascribes to the first man the perfect knowledge and reverence of the true God as *such*, we may assume now to be disproved, and disproved by the Mosaic narrative itself."

Ever and anon, throughout, in season or out of season, Schelling cannot deny himself the luxury of a cross-buttock to Hegel; and as little can he resist hugging himself to his reader on the originality and ingenuity of his various expedients: he was the first to say this, and

[1] (2, 1).—18, 23, 53, 59, 62, 63, 65, 87, 95, 100: where, for the most part, only clauses are concerned. Add 102, 112, 113, 178, 194. More particular moments come to the surface in 141, 175, 3, 197, 187, 186, 185, 181, 119, 126, 128, 130, 132.

the first to say that; no one had seen so and so before him, and no one had seen such and such.

These Gods, too, of Schelling (for to him they are Gods, and not mere gods) are singularly strange: a first God only in an indivisible solid amalgam in the consciousness of a first man, which, however, as needs must, becomes presently only quasi-absolute, and presently, anew and to the full, only relative—a God that repents and sends the flood, but only in repentance to dry it up again (and Schelling most gravely details at length his own most satisfactory rationale of these repentances); and this, all the time, is not yet the true God—Oh no! the true God—now, that is, for us ourselves in these very days—*has still to come*! So true it is that this Philosophy of Mythology of Schelling's is a *Theogony*, a making of God: the whole work is but a—God-factory! And he got the hint from Böhme. He tells us himself (2, 3. 121): "Böhme develops Godhood itself in a natural process — and positive philosophy wants what his Theosophy wants."

And can any man—any man in his senses—follow with faith a single rustle or rush, a single clank or clang of that never-ceasing, but utterly impossible and impracticable machinery? Where is the authentication of that dense and condense *steppe* that was the first co-impenetration of object, God, and subject, consciousness? How did it come, for all that, to prove only quasi-such, and a God relative to be extricated from it? Where, in short, is there a single premiss that, first, or last, or intermediate, does not fail? And if the premises fail, no consequent can succeed, and the entire fabric is simply in the air. The three Mythologies, Egyptian, Indian, Greek, may, though independent, be really "successive" the one to the other, and the group in each form but the *many* of, and derived f the *one*, or, as

Schelling wills it, prove "simultaneous"—the distinction is excellent, and Schelling, as usual, may be allowed to put his mark upon it, not, too, that there is not more than the distinction, that Schelling has not been, in the whole scheme, infinitely industrious, infinitely at pains always. But how is all that chaos to be reduced to the unity and consistency of an understanding?—that population of the Gods and Goddesses that, in the time of Pliny, was greater than that of human beings, and that, even in the time of Hesiod, almost a thousand years before Pliny, was actually ten thousand strong?

When Schelling wants to leave Mythology and pass to Revelation, it is of the Greek Mysteries that he would make a pontoon for himself. But in that, it is to be feared again that Schelling is only following his own self-will, and consulting his own convenience, when, for the step he must take, he can think, for the moment, of only one expedient.

For, even in the position of nexus and premiss to Christianity, *are* the Mysteries really of the validity that Schelling would fain assume for them? Hegel, for his part, has, certainly, no great respect for the Mysteries. "These Mysteries of the Greeks," he says (*Phil. of Hist.*, 301), "are something that, as unknown, have, with the presumption of deep wisdom, attracted to themselves the curiosity of every time," but "it is just as unhistorical as it is silly to expect to find deep philosophies in them." These and a good many other such expressions, both in the locus cited and elsewhere, may, as on the part of Hegel, have only roused the gall and the defiance of Schelling; but he who consults Zeller will find that later authorities all tend to make Hegel's opinion the standard one. Why, Leibnitz (as Zeller notes), long before Hegel, had spoken still more [illegible]iatingly of the mysteries. The transactions in

them, he says, "were often ridiculous and absurd; and it was necessary to keep them secret just to save them from contempt." Still, it is not to be denied that Schelling might discover in them all that he wanted to discover, as, for example, his Persephones, Dionysoses, etc.

3. Revelation

But what Schelling, on the part of Revelation, really attaches to the nexus of the Mysteries is such a chain of particulars as these:—The Serpent, the Goat, the Swine, Circumcision, the Incarnation, Temptation, Flesh of Christ, his Miracles, Death, Resurrection, Descent into Hell, Ascension, the Devils, the Angels—Satan: in regard to which, *as they are treated*, one must wonder not only at what one is to see there of philosophy, but still more, perhaps—and even a great deal more, perhaps—at what one is to see there of Revelation. Satan, for example, he keeps long in front of us, but really, on a matter so deep and interesting, with no result in the end but this—that to Satan he assigns a sublimity of function which he by no means finds to his hand elsewhere. "Milton and Klopstock," he says, "have taken infinite pains to give Satan, according to the usual idea, a certain sublimity, but even the classically trained Milton has been unable to effect it (hat es nicht vermocht)"!

Further, on Satan we have still this (2, 4. 276 sqq.):—

"As sin, falsehood, error, so also disease has come into the world only through Satan. But, as in nature, when one power is excited (*e.g.* in electricity) immediately also its opposite stands out, so the coming of Christ called forth morbid manifestations of a special kind, in the case of which there is one thing remarkable; for, if we look close, we shall find that the most of the so-called *demoniacs* belong to places which were inhabited by heathens—Galilee and Samaria marched with Tyre and Sidon. In Jerusalem there appears none, or extremely seldom, any trace of such. This disease is as

the convulsions of moribund heathendom. It has a real meaning. It was natural that the fight which Christ was destined to fight with Satan should be foretokened by external and physical appearances. Seeing that it was a struggle for life and death, the Enemy stood up against Christ as will to will."

But, says Schelling later (314):—

"Human things are not governed by any simple accidents, and whatever instrumental or mere accessory causes—which, indeed, are not wanting even to the first rise and spread of Christianity—might co-operate, the real causes lie not in these, but in higher laws which a divine will prescribes to every development. All that comes into the world, that realises itself in it and for it, stands in need of a presupposition, a premiss, a beginning that is not itself truth—not that which is specially to be. But it is not immediately seen to be no more. There is a higher power required to free the development from that its mere premiss."

This is a remarkable position, and Schelling further strengthens it. One is pleased to find any truce to a negative with Schelling; and one cannot help making the quotation, suggesting, as it does, all that *false fact*—it really may be so named—which is so much in the ascendant in these days when there is to be no truth but what is physical. Mr. M'Lennan's so triumphantly received *Capture in Marriage*, for example: it is true in its place then and there—as true an occurrence as ever you may like to name it; but is that, then, the whole marrow, and virtue, and reality of marriage? Does it in the slightest impugn the final, and vital, and intrinsic truth of marriage being to us humans *an Ethical Institute*?

With all these topics, as specified to be discussed by Schelling in his Philosophy of Revelation, it is still to be allowed that Schelling's main subject, so far as he would name it, is the Christ.

By referring to the fabled process of consciousness, we are enabled to give something like unity to our account of the philosophy of Mythology; and so it might seem

that reference to Christ would furnish a similar expedient of unity as regards Revelation. But, as one can see from the topics mentioned, no such reference could by any means be so thoroughgoing. Schelling (2, 3. 182) holds that "Christianity was in the world before Christ, —nay," he continues, "it is as old as the world." It is curious that Mathew Tindal, the notorious deist, was quite of the same opinion,—at least, the very title of his book (published 1730) was, "Christianity as old as the Creation." Still, as we say, we cannot for Schelling (who himself knows all that about Tindal) give any account of his ideas on Revelation in which Christ shall be the pervading unity in the same way as consciousness might be made for him the pervading unity in his ideas on Mythology. In fact, the edge of the little contradiction here gives a little difficulty at once. If Christianity was as old as the world, why should it have been Mythology, and not Christianity, that was taken first. No doubt, we are to understand that Mythology, even as a process of consciousness, led on to the revelation of Christianity; but, to say nothing of the untowardness of the whole element of Mythology, there is not, in the entire account of it, one word of Christ. Nay, as we have just seen, it is to the Greek Mysteries that we are expected to look for what, as nexus between Mythology and Christianity, necessarily preceded the latter! But really, Schelling is, in the whole matter, always so true to his self-will and its own specially characterising twist, that it is impossible to think of anyone beside himself finding any satisfaction in it. Redemption, for example, is to all ordinary views the main id a; but Schelling of Redemption has (2, 4. 193 sq not at all the common one

The one truth is just

call to Berlin in 1841 for *his* ends, put himself in bond to the Court for *its* ends: he was bound to give himself at least the appearance of orthodoxy; and—already so far easy for him—these Philosophies of Mythology and Revelation, as *appearances*, passed perfectly well in Germany. One cannot help thinking that its various critical historians must have had, the most of them perhaps, their own difficulties in the reading of this *second* philosophy of Schelling's: is it but one's fancy that seems not to help to hear them only murmur, with a sigh, at the last—in the midst of their darkness—"*Grandiose*"!

4. The Positive Philosophy

By this title we mean here, however, no more than what Schelling opposes as reasoning *positive* to what again is to him reasoning *negative*; and, as concerns the indicated contradistinction itself (which indeed comes to us as the *Familiar* of Schelling's second philosophy), it will be found sufficiently treated in the first Book of his last volume but one, and more particularly there in chapters 4 and 7.

It is very specially in the last-named chapter that Schelling moves to his subject with quite characteristic deliberation. He takes stand at his ease upon it, and, looking round him, *κερδαλεόφρων*, quietly surveys the whole field, in the hopes of taking from it what will give him the support and advantage of an already recognised and established historical authority. Nor does it seem that he need look long: there they are, the "systems" he wants, at once to his hand—*systems* (!) which "oppose themselves, *all*, to the dogmatising rationalism of the earlier metaphysic; so that this latter has never in truth exclusively ruled." He can [illegible] and [illegible] to—as it were, *in the rubric of* Greek

—"*α δευτέρα φιλοσοφία*"! There is, and there always has been, says Schelling, the existence of a philosophy *positive* as against another of name and nature *negative*.

This is the same distinction, so common in Schelling, of what is "*attributive*" and "*discursive*," as against what is "*existential*": it is the "*Was*" of all other philosophers generally, as against the "*Dass*" of him alone specially.

"*Was* existirt (what exists)"—"this (2, 3. 58) is the affair of Rational science, but that (*dass*) it exists follows not; for, as far as that goes, there might nothing at all exist."

"I foresaw very well, as I first threw out this distinction, what would happen. Many, at this simple, altogether unmistakable, but just on that account in the highest degree important, distinction, showed themselves utterly surprised; for they had heard in a previous philosophy of a falsely understood identity between thought and existence. This identity, rightly understood, I shall, naturally, not dispute, for it hails from me; but precisely the mistake itself, and the philosophy that comes from it, I must certainly dispute. At the same time, it is not necessary to read very deep into the *Encyclopaedie* of Hegel in order to find repeatedly, even on the earliest pages, the expression, that reason is occupied with the *An sich* of things."

One can hardly feel surprise, nevertheless, at what surprise is spoken of; for the expressions (leave out the vanity!) with which Schelling chooses to open his distinction are—to all seeming, at least—surprising enough. "*What* it is," he says (58), "gives me insight into the *nature* of the thing: *That* it is gives me not the mere notion, but something quite beyond it, *existence*." Admitting that the *general* plant has been proved to him, he goes on to say (59), that he "is still not beyond the notion of the plant." Such (general) plant is still "not the *actual* plant, definitely existent in this point of space, in this moment of time."

One wonders, I say, that Schelling should think to tell us this, and, above all, as something so unexpected, so

far-reaching, deep, and new that it would take us all by surprise. Is it now, then, that we are for the first time to learn that *elephant* does not exist, but only—say, Barnum's Jumbo! Has Schelling been caught by Kant's familiar common-place, "*This* individual, *a priori* understood to exist as it may, can never be maintained by reason without *experience of sense*"—that "experience of sense" so perpetual in Kant, and so "*beloved*" as such by Noack? But what then? even so!—is Schelling going to give us *experience of sense*, an actual *Dass—written*? That, indeed, would be to get the better of Hegel at last! He (Hegel) did naïvely, in point of fact, rather cry off when the sly Dr. Krug only asked him for such a simple sleight-of-hand as the "*deduction*" of no more than his writing-pen. Schelling seems to remember and to allude to this here: "The very ground-thought of Hegel," he says (60), "is that reason refers only to the *An sich* of things, that philosophy can go no further than their *Was*." That, then, we are to understand here, from page after page, is, as against Hegel, the special and peculiar *tuft* of Schelling, and of Schelling's *own*,—the *Dass*! Not that by any means he seeks to hide or evade that the sole source and initiative of the Dass is the Erfahrung, and Erfahrung (experience of sense) alone. No; he is even profuse in the acknowledgment that actuality, the Dass, "is no longer an affair of reason, but, on the contrary, of Erfahrung"—"of that I must convince myself only from experience." And so, in the midst of it all, one cannot help thinking to oneself, But what of God? God is the ultimate of all philosophical speculation,—is that, *too*, a matter of Erfahrung? Nor even from as much as that does Schelling shrink. "We demand from philosophy," he cries (154), "the *actual* God,—not the mere idea of God!"

What! we too cry, the *actual* God!—*empirically*!—like a specimen in the hand!—this in a book!

Can there be anything empirical whatever in relation to God, but in the proof from the Effect to the Cause?

Yes, says Schelling,—in the proof from the Cause to the Effect.

And so he proceeds to open his "Positive Philosophy."

He begins with what he calls "The systems of the higher (supersensible) Empirismus"; for there is an Empirism, he declares (115), in which "the supersensible can become actual object of an experience of sense." But this experience "self-evidently," he adds, "cannot be of merely sensible nature—rather, it must have something mysterious in it"; and he names it, accordingly, "Mystic Empirism." No doubt, simplest examples of this mysticism would have (1) been "calls," as of Joan of Arc, say; but he passes at once to (2) the "irresistible feeling" of Jacobi, and from him to (3) Jacob Böhme and the Theosophy peculiar to him. And it is in such writing, or bye-writing, that Schelling, with erudition, with information, and with sallies, redeems his book from dulness or from ridicule. Its purport here, as said, is to give itself, in name of second philosophy, a certain basis and breadth of already existent historical position; not but that, he somewhat self-contradictorily, all the same, will take the credit to himself of a "discovery"!

But the conclusion is that there is a "philosophical empirism," a "positive philosophy," which, as peculiar to himself, Schelling now expounds; and we are prepared to find demonstrated in it, somehow empirically *un*-empirically, the *dass* of an *actual* God.

It will not prove satisfactory. It is so beset with suppositions and presuppositions, it so passes and escapes away into such evanescent sinuosities, that it

is a pain, and a penalty, and well-nigh an impossibility to follow it. In a broad way, *x* shall be a first and an absolute; creation flows from it; and by this creation *x* shall be empirically proved to be God. I really submit seriously that it all comes to that, and that it is but a self-deception and a delusion. Schelling's own words leave no doubt, so far, of the *order* to be given to the elements in proof: "The absolute prius is what has no prius from which it is known"; it is "*per posterius*, through its consequent, that the prius is known."

That, then, is the *order*. For the things themselves, the elements, in proof, we have to know how each, whether prius or posterius, is constituted, and how each, whether prius or posterius, is made good.

Naturally, the *prius*, as that from which all comes and on which all depends, must be the one all-important consideration: all-conditioning, it is, if we may say so, the single πού στῶ, in fact. There can be no doubt that it is that, and intended to be that; but nowhere in these chapters is it to be found as anything, but in name! In name it is the prime beënt, and the all-beënt, and the sole beënt, and in name, or verbally, it is given constitution enough, but otherwise it is a non-ens, a gratuitous presupposition, a fiction in the air, a crude invention!

In the said fourth chapter so much seems to be referred to, preparatorily as it were, that one is led to surmise that we are expected to find in the *conclusion* of the negative philosophy (under Kant and the rest) what *deduction* we want of a *premiss* to the positive philosophy. That conclusion is, "That reason is the infinite potence of all knowledge"; and this, in other words, means that reason as reason has a content, and that content is the unlimited potentiation of all perceptive knowledge

(knowledge of things). Then, with an intermediate to and fro, we are brought to a second step, namely, that to all knowledge there must correspond the *Seyn*, the *Being* of all knowledge. Again, by further intermediation, we are required to see that this content has (say) a *shot* quality. It has one look to the reason (as subject, say), and another look to the Seyn, the Being (say, again, as object). Schelling now dwells on this double nature of the content with a perfect rationale of inferences, as movement, principle of movement, etc., almost, it may be, with eventual extrication of the actual Seyn (Being, Existence) itself! And it is here, and in all other such speculation as here, that one has it given him to see and to know the *ächt* Schelling—that power of inward looking into evanescent (or say, *shot*) distinctions that is peculiarly his own.

I think we may not unrighteously assume, however, that it is in the chapter 7 that he completes and finishes and gives us in whole what to him is this *Positive* of his.

From the above we know the reason of Schelling's dissatisfaction with the *Was* of what he calls "rationalising dogmatism," or "dogmatising rational philosophy"; and insists on the necessity of a *Dass*. He freely admits, as said, Dass to be the fruit, the product, of experience (Erfahrung) alone. Nor less freely does he admit that (62) "there comes a point where Erfahrung ceases—for, that God exists: in that respect, reference to Erfahrung, special sense, there can be none." And so, as has also been already said, it is solely by a peculiar manipulation of the process of proof that God's existence is to be established not only in the "discursive" or "attributive" *Was*, but also somehow in the actually *empirical* Dass!

We pass to chapter 7, two

pages 126–130, there will be found a complete statement of the whole business.

Positive philosophy, then, as opposed to negative philosophy, is to have an empirical position, but not by any means an empirical first starting-point or direct empirical premiss. This premiss, if a Seyn, existency, is still to be beyond and independent of any one such empirical fact. But more, it is to be also before or beyond all thought. I quote:—

"Positive philosophy cannot deny that it is in some way and in some sense *empirism*; but it starts not from any *Seyn* whatever that is presentant in the experience of sense—it starts from the *Seyn* that is before and beyond all thought. If positive philosophy starts from what is beyond all thought, it cannot start from what is merely relatively beyond thought, but only from the *Seyn* that is to be found *absolutely* beyond thought. This Seyn out of all thought is now, too, as much above all experience as it precedes all thought: it is *the directly transcendent Seyn.*"

This, then, is the all-important *Prius* in regard to which it is essential that we make no mistake. And, of course, it is a very difficult matter. A Seyn, a being, an existency, a something that is before and beyond both thought and sense: how are we to conceive that! —how are we to *think* that! For we must still *think* it, albeit that it is *beyond thought*—we must still think it, give it some presence, even in supposition, if we are to follow our author at all.

I take it that this Seyn is just Seyn absolutely, that there is being at all, existence at all, just that there *is*. Such Seyn we *can* grant to be before all thought and outside of all thought. Such Seyn we can grant, too, to be beyond sense, and yet to be so far empirical—empirical in this way, that it is existence as such—total empirismus, as it were—the totality of empirism. *We*, at least, say so; but, for his part, Schelling does y so. He contents himself with the bare general

terms, and leaves it to us to make all these glosses in explanation.

This Seyn, he says, is a Seyn on its own account, "else it would fall back into the negative philosophy." So, then, we have here what is at first hand, and we must not as a first of it refer to anything in the foregoing—in what is said from chapter 4. And so—

"The beginning of the positive philosophy cannot be the relative Prius; it must be the absolute Prius that has no necessity to move into das Seyn." Seyn that is Seyn, but still that is not to move into Seyn, is verbally odd: but the former Seyn means general Seyn, Seyn as Seyn; the latter, only empirically actual Seyn.

"Goes it" (the former) "over into the Seyn" (the latter), "then this can only be the consequence of a free act, of an act which then, further, can be itself only something purely empirical, altogether only *à posteriori* cognisable, as every act is nothing *à priori* intelligible but only *à posteriori* intelligible."

This movement sounds strange; but we must not think of it as anything yet accomplished: we must think of any movement of a Seyn, such and so situated, as not possibly movement of anything but itself. That, then, to a spectator, is but an abstract act, an abstract act which—so far—he can only abstractly see.

"So, then" (Schelling continues), "the positive philosophy goes not out *from* the Erfahrung, but nothing hinders that it go *to* the Erfahrung, and so *à posteriori* prove, what it has to prove, that its Prius is God (*i.e.* the Superens). For *à priori* is that wherefrom it goes out—*à priori* it is not God, only *à posteriori* is it God. That it is God is not a res naturæ, something of itself clear; it is a res facti, and can therefore also be only factually proved.—It is God. This proposition has not the meaning: the notion (idea) of said Prius is = the notion (idea) God; its meaning is: said Prius *is* God, not in idea, but in reality. . . . It is not the absolute Prius *itself* that is to be proved (that is above all proof, it is the absolute beginning, certain [illegible] and so it is not itself (the absolute

Prius) that is to be proved; but the consequent from it, that must be proved as *fact*, and so the *Godhood* of said Prius—that it is *God*, and therefore God exists. . . . This factum—the *existence* of such a consequent, shows us that as well the Prius itself *exists* so as we have *apprehended* (*begriffen*) it, that is, that God exists. *You* (his students) see that in this mode of argumentation the Prius is always the point of start, *i.e.* always remains Prius. The Prius is understood from its consequent, but it is not so understood that this consequent *precede*. The preposition *à* in *à posteriori* does not mean here the terminus *a quo*; *à posteriori* means here *per posterius*, through its consequent is the Prius understood. . . . The positive philosophy is empirical *à priorism*, or it is the empirism of the *à priori*, in as far as it proves the Prius *per posterius* as existent God."

All this is very strange; but, really, it *is* pretty well *all*; and, really, also, it ought to be quite as intelligible in the translation as in the original. Perhaps, if we will bear in mind that, to Schelling, before there can be anything else (intelligence, say), there must be first an *Is*, a something that as first of all is no more than *Is*—perhaps if we will bear this in mind it will assist intelligence. But also this, That reason is the *Is*, reason as yet only with an *implicit* content, a content that is an implicit all knowledge, and a knowledge to which there corresponds an implicit all Seyn, into which Seyn (existence) it, as Begriff, is *im Begriff* to pass over! A passing over which, as said, is an absolute act, with actual Seyn for result as sign and testimony that, as *it* is, God *is*. Reason as "potence of all knowledge"—we might almost say for "potence" *nisus*, and so almost fancy, then, that this nisus to know all was, just as such, pretty well already all Seyn!

But fancy what we may, and say what we may, surely we can neither fancy nor say aught but fatuity of the whole business! Reason and the content of reason, are we to grant such mere presupposition as, just so, a solidly given and proved first premiss, or, if not that,

at least as a clearly self-evident first principle? All that involves infinite preliminary of search and research into indispensable material of proof. Where do you get that reason? what do you know of its content?—what but what you know only from looking round you? Your so certain Prius, that your absolute Prius, is but an *x*! In algebra, we say we do not know the answer, but call it *x*, and then apply the facts: and so you, not knowing the answer, say, call it Prius, but you have not a single fact to apply to it—unless from the thought you call negative, or the experience you call positive, but both of which, negative or positive, you will here—arbitrarily—supersede! In last resort with you, as with others, it is alone the *Posterius* that is guarantee and source of the *Prius*. And you, how, from your *Prius*, do you even feign to draw your Posterius?

5. The Negative Philosophy

What Schelling means by that is pretty well seen by this time. The whole constitutive assertion is that it is impossible to get at the *Dass* of actual existence *vi rationis*—by any consideration of its *Was*. Now, plausible and specious as spoken, that is really *pro ludibrio*, when honestly looked at—in its *intention*! Reason as you may to any *fact* of experience, it is only *idea* till *stamped*—stamped into reality by sense. And that is only our common sense! Leverrier reasoned *Neptune*: but Galle of Berlin saw it. Schelling, of course, knows this, and says this; but he takes on him further, as though to generalise it into a universal, all-conclusive principle—negative of much! Still, we ask, are there not Truths that cannot be submitted to sense, but must be realised by thought alone—truths, then, in reality, utterly insusceptible of the *Dass* at all?

From an article in *Mind* (No. xxxvi.) I quote thus:—

"Certain quantitative truths (as Euclid, i. 32, 47) can evidently be regarded in two ways, now sensuously (as "matters of fact") *measured* say, and again intellectually (as "relations of ideas"). But there are a great many truths that admit of being regarded only in one way. Some intellectually alone, and some sensuously alone. Suppose I were to establish the truth of the existence of the soul, or of that of God, I could not bring forward, in either case, actual sensible perception of actual sensible fact. I cannot hold up an actual soul—I cannot *show* God. Nay, even in much that is material, we are precisely similarly situated: who, for example, will show me an atom or put an atom into my hands? Proof in regard to the soul, or in regard to God, consists in argument from facts; and proof, in regard to atoms, or in regard to sulphur in the sun, or sodium in Sirius, consists, precisely similarly, *in argument from facts.* I cannot *show* the sulphur or the sodium."

Reasoning in regard of facts—that is the whole. Whether I reason *from* facts *to*, or *to* facts *from*—that is, in the nomenclature of Schelling, whether I reason from the *Was* to the *Dass*, or from the *Dass* to the *Was*, neither the one nor the other is apart and alone, but both are together. It is really to the *Dass* of God, and to the *Dass* of Substance, that Descartes and Spinosa respectively reason. Nor, when *they* reason, is it, in the distinction, different with either Plato or Aristotle,—or any other! This *Dass* of Schelling is but a maggot of his own nutrition. In "relations of ideas" there is no direct *Dass*; but not the less, for all that, is it present in the core. To explain Man, the World, God, that is the *Was*: and what else can philosophy attempt? What else *does* Schelling himself attempt? Where *is* the *Dass* of God—where *is* the very article he makes such a clamour to show? The "distinction" itself is already in Aristotle, who (*De Cœlo*, ii. 13) speaks of seeking λόγους πρὸς φαινόμενα, or φαινόμενα πρὸς λόγους: is it just the antichthon, then, which shall have misled Schelling?

6. The Bearing on Hegel

Our great interest all through is, of course, the answer to the single question of our title; and how Schelling is in that regard, is at once placed beyond a doubt by what understanding he assumes to himself as concerns the principle, the Begriff, the Notion of Hegel.

Now, that principle, we may say generally, the principle of Hegel, is to Schelling, by far and away, for the most part, simply *Logic*: he blames Hegel for that, with no other principle to support him, he actually presumes to go beyond Logic! Hegel's whole philosophy is to him "attributive" only, "negative"; he is never done pointing, emphatically express, to the blunder, and the consequent failure of Hegel, in attempting to make existential, positive, what is and can be only attributive, negative. *Begriff*, by very name, *can* be to Schelling logical only, and never existential. So far, indeed, as his every direct expression is concerned, it would actually astound Schelling to be told that Hegel's Begriff, Hegel's Notion, was, technically taken, taken in its purity, only a specific one, and solely logical when considered in the dialectic that lay in it, and which was then used as principle of development — development to an entire system of philosophy in explanation of the world of God, and in guidance and direction of the world of man. And yet Hegel himself has been, often enough, particular enough in his declarations at times. Take the very last thing he wrote, his Preface to the second edition of his *Logic*, signed by him, "Berlin, the 7 November 1831," only seven days before his death. There we are told (p. 20) that what is to be made "*object*" of "logical consideration" is "not the things," but the "content" of things, the "*Begriff*" of things, the "*Sache*," the one, single, sole, essential and substantial reality. Of "*the*

Begriff itself (*des Begriffes selbst*)," we hear (p. 21) that it is " the basis, the foundation, the principle of the definite and particular notions (it is die Grundlage der bestimmten Begriffe)"; and, so, as in notions generally there is (p. 18) " the distinction of a soul and a body (der Unterschied einer Seele und eines Leibes)," it is *the* Notion, *the* Begriff, that is the soul.

Schelling's general regard of what constitutes the specific nature or element of anything called Begriff, Notion, is just that it is logical, that it belongs to thought as thought. " The notion," he says (2, 1. 565), " is only contemplative (der Begriff ist nur contemplativ)" —" in thinking (im Denken) there is nothing practical (nichts Praktisches)": what concerns etwas Praktisches concerns etwas Gewolltes; what is practical is an affair of the will.

Speaking of his own first philosophy, which is to him now the negative one, *Vernunftwissenschaft*, mere Rational Science, namely, he says (2, 3. 65):—

" This science—just in this, that it deduces the content of the existent actual, and so far, therefore, is parallel with experience, there lay for many the misleading idea that it had to do not merely with *the actual*, but also with *actuality*, or that the actual *arose* in this way, that a mere logical process was one also of actual origination."

There is much more in the same neighbourhood in which Schelling insists on making emphatic the fact that all the notions of his earliest philosophy were only logical; but if that be the state of the case with himself, much more, he cannot help remarking in passing, is it the state of the case with Hegel:—

" What Rational Science deduces, no doubt, with whatever else, is just that which appears in experience, under the conditions of experience, as a certain individual particular, in space and time, etc.; but it itself, this science, moves only in thoughts, though the

contents of each thought or *Begriff* are not again mere *Begriffe*, as in the Hegelian Logic."

Any Hegelian product is never existential, but always only attributive to Schelling:—

"Whatever we have in experience, we can produce *à priori* in mere thought; but even so it is just *only* in thought. If we would have, however, something existent out of thought, outside of thought, then we *must* start from a basis that is absolutely independent of all thought, that, beforehand with all thought, is of all thought anticipant. Of any such existential basis the Hegelian philosophy knows nothing; for any such *Begriff* it has no place" (2, 3. 164).

I daresay we all know pretty well by this time what to Hegel *triplicity* is—what an entirely new place, what an entirely new force and intensity of meaning it has taken on in the hands of Hegel—what an apotheosis fell upon it, indeed, when Hegel, from the hands of Kant, took it into his own. Well, here it is fallen—fallen into the hands of Schelling:—

"Since Kant introduced in all notions the typus of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, and, subsequent to him, another gave it the widest possible application, what is called *trichotomy* has become, as it were, a standing form, and there has been no one who did not believe it a matter of necessity to begin in philosophy with three ideas (however ineffective), although now all this counting and calling of three is for the thing in hand quite indifferent" (2, 1. 312).

It was simply on the mere abstract *Begriff*, he says, that Hegel founded his dogmatism; and what he so founded was only a logical dogmatism:—

"The word dogmatism comes to us with an evil sound in it,—even from before Kant, indeed,—but now altogether so, since that logical dogmatism which Hegel wanted to found later on the mere abstract notion, and which, as the poorest of all, is the most odious of all, whereas the dogmatism of former metaphysic had always something great in it" (2, 3. 82).

"Hegel, who is so sharp in partic
so much as by the artistic feeling, ca

whole ; else he would have been sensible of the break in his movement that intervened between his *Logic* and his *Philosophy of Nature.* From the way in which the latter, is pieced on to the former—from that alone he ought to have become aware how far he had strayed from the right direction" (2, 3. 88).

We know that Hegel describes the transition from Logic to Nature in this way, that the Idea, in the absolute truth of itself, *sich entschliesst*, as it were, uncloses itself to let go freely, out of itself, *as nature*, the moment of its particularity (that is, in its first determinateness, otherness, finiteness, of form). In order to make use of every term that will realise his image, Hegel heaps his words in such a way that it is difficult to make a plain grammatical meaning out of them. Nevertheless, in the very heaping of his words, and still more in the double senses of his words, the initiated reader can only see in Hegel what is simply and perfectly admirable. The Idea *entschliesst sich* ; that is, unshuts, uncloses, unlocks itself—*entschliesst sich*, that is also, resolves, takes resolution (say, *quasi*-re-solves, etc.), to let go from itself *nature* : but nature, so, is only the second moment of the Idea—nature, so, is only the second stroke of the bell. The first stroke of the bell was the Idea in its *internality* ; and it is only in obedience to its own constitution, rhythm, and law that the second stroke of the bell should be the Idea in its *externality.* One might easily say more here ; for there are more expressions in the original on which one might —or, indeed, ought to—dwell ; but perhaps what has been said may, so far, suffice.

Schelling, then, as we see, finds the transition in question only a blunder, a blot, and a botch. Further, he simply mocks and laughs at it as thus (121) :—

"Hegel looks down upon Böhme, and declares against the well-known Franz Baader, who had ascribed to the Hegelian philosophy, "d it, that it made matter immediately emerge from God, " eternal emergence of God was for it the condition of

his eternal re-immergence or return into himself as Spirit,—against this accusation, then, Hegel, *sehr vornehm* (much *à l'aristocrate*), declares that the emergence of things from God is no category of his, that he does not use it, that it is not a category at all, but only a figurative expression. Hegel, at all events, however, has the wonderful category *des Entlassens* (of the dismission, discharge, release, of the letting go, the letting go out or away). This *Entlassen* (this letting out of a thing) is not, surely, a figurative expression? What it matters with this Entlassen is not said. But to this *Entlassen*, to this letting out on the part of God, there must necessarily correspond, one would think, an emergence, an issue of what is let out (of that, whatever it is, that God does let out), a letting out, issue, emergence, therefore, of nature, and, consequently, of matter as well, from God: just as—if God, according to Hegel, in the *Logic*, is *shut in as yet* to his eternity—this same God must in actual, extra-logical nature, be there *emerged* from his eternity."

No doubt, all this will appear very witty and very telling to many, or to most, people, and the general text or tenor of it has been repeated scores of times. There is a dangerous pass or step in the Alps, it seems, that is called the *Mauvais Pas*; and *Mauvais Pas* has been thought a felicitous denomination to apply to this somewhat critical step or stride of Hegel's from Logic to Nature. My Lectures on Law, however, were published more than a quarter of a century ago; and, at page 6, I have entered there a Note in which, from its first words —"the moment the idea of externality *as* externality is seized, the great difficulty will be found at an end"—I go on to such further explanation as I trusted would prove, on the special point, in a general way, satisfactory. The particular sentence in the text to which the Note is appended runs thus: "Altogether, I must acknowledge myself to find Hegel's plan of externalisation the happiest ever yet proposed—a plan necessary even when we say, as we *do* say, and *must* say, God *made* the world; for it answers the question of *how*—precisely that question how God, how though[illegible]nite, for example."

That is still my opinion—that, to no first philosopher that ever lived, to no Plato, no Aristotle, did a happier idea ever occur than this of externalisation that occurred to Hegel. As the Ego involves the Me, so does the *internalè* involve the *externalè*. Evolve the I-Me into the whole of its vitals, so to speak, of its intestinary, of its inward organisation ; and it is simply by the necessity of the I-Me, that the I, the subject, being complete *within*, the Me, the object, should also be similarly complete *without*. The categories being complete, thought as thought is complete ; and thought as thought externalised — the externalisation of the categories — that is nature, that is the externality of things. When did Schelling, or whoever else, see as much as this ?

In his resolution that Hegel shall be only negative, only attributive, only logical, or in his denial, namely, of any principle in Hegel that shall be existential in its nature, Schelling has (2, 3. 164) this :—

"If we want something *Seyendes* (existential), apart from, independent of thought, then we *must* start from a *Seyn* (an existency) that is absolutely independent of all thought, that precedes all thought. Of this *Seyn* (existency), the Hegelian philosophy knows nothing, for this notion (*Begriff*) it has no place."

Schelling is not a little put about with the *un*reason that he finds in the world. *Un*reason is to him an actual factor, actually prevalent, dominant, or at least extant and functioning, in the universe. He expatiates at considerable length (2, 4. 23 sqq.) on this difficulty ; and, with equally considerable complacency, allows corners, every now and then, of his own superior wisdom in explanatory reconciliation to extrude—

"If reason is *all* being (and, reciprocally, all being reason), then it gives not a little difficulty to win admission for the unreason which, for any explanation of the actual world, is still necessary. For everybody sees *that*—that, side by side with a great and

powerful reason which certainly seems in some way to guide things, there is still present everywhere a vast and most potent unreason. But reason can only eternally be reason; it can never make itself into another than itself, or into the contrary of itself." Schelling (at greater length) remarks then that "some say God, being of reason, cannot go *beyond* reason: but that is to give God less than man; for man, at all events, can go *beyond* reason. . . . If reason is, heroism is not, everybody's affair. To do good to one's enemy, nay, to love him, that is *beyond* reason. The supreme commands of an exalting moral purity, man could never realise were he unable to exceed reason. And why, then, should not God be privileged over reason? It is nowise unreasonable to say, the mysteries of Christianity, or, rather, that one mystery which is the object and, consequently also, the source of Revelation, the will of God in regard to men as alienated from him—it is nowise unreasonable to say that that, and these, and all, are beyond reason. . . . Nothing is more pitiable than the business of the rationalists of every description to seek to make rational what gives its own self as beyond all reason. The boldest of the Apostles, in whom there is to be seen also a profound dialectician, speaks plainly of the *foolishness* of God, of the *weakness* of God—as his words are, of the foolishness of God that is wiser than men, and the weakness of God that is stronger than men (1 Cor. i. 25). Only he who is strong can or dare be weak. Those tender souls who will absolutely have a reasonable God after their own hearts—we might give these the answer of J. G. Hamann: Had they never remarked that God is a genius who does not seek much after what they name reasonable or unreasonable. It is not given to every one to comprehend the deep irony of all God's acts. . . . It must surprise that, uno eodemque actu, one and the same personality affirms and denies, in opposition to the principle of contradiction as it is generally understood; and yet just that is the relation of God in the Creation, that he precisely affirms what he, even immediately, again, as well, denies. . . . The Godhood (that is, the absolute freedom) of God just consists in the nerve of this contradiction - this absurdity, if you will, to be at once affirmator and negator, and yet not to sunder in twain, but to remain He that He is. Nay, not only in God, but even in man. . . . Not in different moments, but in one and the same moment, to be at once drunk and sober, that is the heart of true poesy. It is by that that the Delphic intoxication distinguishes itself from the Bacchic."

Not a little that is Schelling comes to the surface and

is seen here; but our special purpose with it at present is the evidence it offers of ignorance in regard to the philosophical principle before us. "Reason can only eternally be reason; it can never make itself into the contrary of itself." Possessed of the I-Me, we know that we have always two—we know that we have always the possibility of difference. In a world where there must be subject *and* object, there cannot but be difference; but difference is specially in evidence on the part of the object. Schelling would not have been brought to a stand in front of the idea that reason must remain reason, reason cannot give opening and opportunity for unreason, reason cannot become unreason, had he been possessed of the philosophy of contingency—which the one basal principle brings with it. Whether personally thinking, or personally living, Hegel has always the contingent in mind; and not in ignorance, but only in knowledge, of all that, was it possible for Schelling to have access to Hegel. Ignorance of externalisation on Schelling's part was, on Schelling's part, ignorance also of what contingency was; for the latter is but the consequence, the necessary result, of the former. We refer again to the same Note in the Lectures on Law (p. 6), which we quoted—just in this reference, indeed. There we read:—

"The moment the idea of externality *as* externality is seized, the great difficulty will be found at an end. One ought to ask one's self what *must* the *idea* of externality—what must *externality* itself—be? Or, suppose you have *internality* completed—an ego a boundless intussusception of thoughts, all in each other, and through or thorough each other, but all in the same geometrical point,—what must *its* externalisation—and its externalisation is accurately externalisation as externalisation—be? *Its* externalisation—it being externalisation—must plainly be the opposite of its own self: tion *is*, externalisation will be *not*; just as cisely what light and heat are *not*. Or,

taking it from the other end, we *see* that ***externality*** is infinite *out and outness*, infinite *difference*, under infinite ***external*** necessity (or, what is the same thing here, *contingency*); while ***internality***, again, is, and must be, infinite *in and inness*, infinite ***identity***, under infinite *internal* necessity (or, what is the same thing here, ***reason***)."

One wonders (as one cannot help saying here) when one reads again this note, which one wrote, as has been said, more than a quarter of a century ago—one wonders that what we name *κατ' ἐξοχήν* Philosophy has proved so unintelligible—let us just say to the *public*—that it (the public) seems, on the whole, as one man, to have turned from it. And yet I know not that, for what is to be done, there is very much more required than to *realise*—observe! to *realise*—this note.

But be that as it may, what occupies us at present is contingency: and it is in what is said to be thought in that note that the birth of contingency lies. What *is* externality *as* externality? An infinite out and out of infinite externalities, each external even to its own self, as it were, *atomically* external even to its own self—void, full—ethereal, aërial—solid, liquid—mechanical, chemical—magnetic, electric, galvanic—metalline, alkaline, acid—vegetable, animal—vital, psychic: an infinite chaos, that may be—so, or otherwise—infinitely qualified—*that* is *externality*! And there is not a physical atom in it that is not a radiating centre in infinite lines of influence. It requires but the data of any one centre to have the calculable elements of an infinite external necessity—so far! But if the lines of influence, direct enough in themselves, are infinite, they must also infinitely *cross*. Now, each *cross* is a *contingency*; for each cross is a *tingency con*, a touching together of the lines. Now, such contingencies, in an infinite time and space, can only be infinite, and, if infinite, then incalculable. It is absurd, therefore, to talk only of a physical *necessity*, as though such were

monarch of all, and its very will calculable. That, then, is the *un*reason of the world, the physical *necessity* that is at the same time only physical *contingency*. And physical contingency, in an infinite space and an infinite time, is no more *than*, is nothing *but*, infinite—*difference*! Like everything else, man is exposed to this infinite *contingency*, this infinite *difference*, as to an infinite *fate*. But is man, therefore, unfree withal? By no means. Man wills to take a walk. Oh, say you, the pleasure of the walk was the motive that moved him. That is true; but was he unfree because he acted on motive? How would it have been had he acted without motive? Why, so to act, blind action on man's part—why, that is but the physical action of things at the will of a mere mechanical necessity wholly from without! If a man takes a walk for his pleasure, he at least moves for the pleasure of *himself*; whereas when a stone moves, it moves at the pleasure of *another*. That is a difference; and it is really the difference of Liberty and Necessity. Movement *with* motive is liberty; *without* it, it is necessity. An ego can only act from motive. True, one motive is not always as an other motive. To take a walk—*pleasure* may be the motive; but it may also be *health*. A man who moves at the call of *pleasure* is not in the same way free as a man who moves at the call of *health*. A man may move also at the call of science—botany, geology, astronomy, chemistry, etc. Or he may move to an ethical call—succour the afflicted, rescue the drowning, feed the hungry, clothe the naked, etc. Nay, he may even yield to a political motive, and die—he may die in battle for his country. These motives are not all alike; still, in *one* thing they are not different: they all give freedom. What acts from itself, and for itself, and by itself, is free. Man is a self, and has a self; but he can be, and he can have, only *one* true self; and that is

Reason. When a man's motive is of sense, he is bound; but when a man's motive is of reason, he is free. And to man it is given to rise to reason, if he will. Medical motives, scientific, ethical, political motives, may hold of reason; and, holding of reason, they may give freedom.

But contingency suggests itself, again, with the question of the possibility of freedom in such a realm—in such a welter at once of necessity and accident. Now, does not man himself produce contingencies? Among the lines of movement that come to him, does he not himself *cross* many of them, and—*by reason*—in his own interest? Why, a man's life is nothing else than that—a daily, hourly crossing of or into contingencies. What are the sanatory measures of the municipality—what the swallowing of a dose of *iron* on the part of the individual? I know not that I have any reason to apologise for these remarks on the fact of free-will, on the rationale of free-will; for it is a subject on which, even in high quarters, much confusion reigns, and it is a subject which is immediately suggested by this of contingency. But for contingency, indeed, there would be no free-will: contingency is the possibility, and the condition, and the battle-ground of free-will. It is partly on account of this relation, if for nothing else, that contingency has its extraordinary importance. But it is its cosmical rôle that is really its true one, and that really gives it its place, and its importance in chief. It is as in that rôle, and in that place, and in that importance, that here, in respect of Schelling, we propose it in proof of his ignorance of what he pretends, even by his superiority of insight, to refute, confute, expose, and destroy. "Reason can only eternally be reason; it can never make itself into the contrary of itself." This seems an insuperable difficulty in regard to an omniscient God that is reason, and [illegible] reason. Schelling's expedient to meet

is, in that he assumes unreason as a privilege in man, equally to assume unreason as a privilege in God. God is to him, as he is to Hamann, a very peculiar "genius." It is not given to every one," he says, "to comprehend the deep irony of all God's acts"! If the unreason that is in the universe is to Hegel, as it ought to be, simply the contingency of externality *as* externality (which evidently, at least, coheres with the Finite of Leibnitz and the rest), this same unreason is to Schelling but an irony that is a peculiarity in God!"[1]

Had Schelling been really at home with the principle of Hegel, he would also have been at home with the peculiarities of his writing—or, at least, so at home with them that he would hardly have mocked his writings

[1] Further on in the same volume (p. 130) Schelling makes very plain, by instances, what he at least includes in what to him is the unreason of God. After having remarked that "the temptation of Abraham, nay, even the temptation to idolatry, is ascribed to the Elohim," he continues: "Revelation itself must permit this principle and give it free scope, even as in nature it has free scope; for there are many things which, according to our ideas, are unworthy of God in nature, as equally there is such unworthiness in much that, in the Mosaic writings, we see ascribed to Jehovah, who shall be, on the one side, vindictive, jealous, cruel, pitiless, and, on the other, merciful, long-suffering, all-forgiving. Consider, in the former reference, only such things as are related in the Book of Joshua (chap. vii.), where the children of Israel committed a trespass in the accursed thing, that is, in the portion of the spoils which had been reserved for Jehovah,—then the anger of the Lord was kindled against the children of Israel, nor was any victory over the enemy allowed them until he who had sinned (the thief) was discovered, and all Israel had stoned him with stones, and burned him with fire after they had stoned him with stones." (Of course, this is bad, and very bad, and bad as bad can be; but, still, there is really no reason for all that holy horror of yours, Friend Aufgeklärter! against that "book of lies"! What you call lies are susceptible of quite another colour; and, however *they* be, it is quite certain that that horror of yours is an absolute anachronism, and quite out of place.)

generally in the blind way that is usual with him. Had he in truth known what they meant, it is impossible to suppose that he would have so spoken of them. This that we refer to obtains throughout the latter Schelling, and a mere illustration must suffice in proof:—

"The True is nowise of that nature that it can be got to only by unnatural struggle and stress. Most men directly baffle for themselves their entrance into philosophy through the unnatural stretch and strain which they think the right movement of mind whereby to reach it. It is with many in philosophy as with men who have been long used to live with their equals, and so, when they have to appear among their superiors, or in presence of a so-called lord of creation, they conduct themselves awkwardly and unnaturally. Nay, there are those who opine that, for philosophy, such a demeanour is so much the right thing, that at last the very degree of relative mastery is judged by them according to the degree of contortions and distortions into which they find a philosophy to fall. Those who have come to philosophy in a forced, perverted fashion, find precisely what is simple and unforced hard; just as a man who has been all day on the treadmill is unable, when released from it, to find himself at home in any other step. If I see in philosophy, then, the cure for the disorder of our times, I naturally mean thereby not a weakling philosophy, not a mere artefact; I mean thereby a *strong* philosophy" (2, 3. 18, 19, 20, 11).

Speaking of geniuses, Hegel is certainly a very peculiar genius; and if it is only by struggle and strain that his ordinary student can contrive to reach him, even let it be no further than what "reach" in each case means, there is still the consolation that, whether he spoke or whether he wrote, struggle and strain was the natural movement of mind for Hegel himself. Still, that Schelling lays so much stress on the outside, goes, it is perhaps fair to say, a long way to prove that he allowed himself to be blind to the inside. That inside was only an artefact and weakling; while his own was a reality and strong! Just to think, says Schelling elsewhere (2, 3. 14)—just to think how, after Kant, after

Fichte himself, "after, to use an expression of Goethe's, a very heaven of knowledge seemed let down—how, after all that, a new darkness fell upon us, and what began so big ended so small"! "That so much of Germany should have had no anxiety for meat, but should have been quite pleased and satisfied with the clatter of the mill-wheels"! (2, 3. 53). "That, by accident, an arid formalism should, for a time, have struck philosophy into stupor"! (2, 2. 7).

Schelling (2, 3. 15) will not even allow Hegel to run off with his notorious fruit-illustration, as though it were a prize: "The difference of philosophical systems is not to be shirked by the mere remark that every kind of philosophy is philosophy, just as every kind of fruit is fruit, and that it would be a strange thing to find a man refusing grapes, on the plea that it was fruit he wanted, and not grapes"! And what an unhappy state of mind must have been poor Schelling's, when he cannot help sneering at Hegel's reference to Thomson the chemist, and to the advertisement of the English barber: "That philosophy meant physics in England scarcely required to be proved from the titles of the latest chemical journals or from hairdressers' newspaper advertisements; directly at hand lay easy reference to England's best known, two hundred years' old periodical work, the *Philosophical Transactions*" (111). In Hegel, according to Schelling, at most we are just as we were in Fichte! but it is impossible to quote here all that, relatively, may be quoted. The reader who is curious on the matter may consult for himself as below;[1] at the same time, that many other [illegible] at Hegel are to be found in the Cousin Preface, the *History of Later Philosophy*, and, not rarely,

[1] [illegible] 312; 2, 2. 7, 115, 488, 557, 672; 2, 3. 8, 11, [illegible] 59, 65, 82, 88, 106, 111, 121, 163, 164, 173; 2, [illegible] 104, 215, 364.

in the letters of Schelling which occur in his *Life*. Indeed, almost, it would seem, as though he had called his own philosophy negative and invented a new positive one, simply out of spite to Hegel, and only to have ample room and verge enough to crack for ever his whip at him.

It is really something very remarkable this rooted rancour with which, after the death of Hegel, Schelling, during the whole of his subsequent twenty-three years, snatches at every slightest chance, remorselessly to deride the ghost of Hegel.—It seems to have been the product of an instant. That the two men had been on terms the friendliest at Tübingen, where they first met, is beyond a doubt: their correspondence, taken up in 1795, proves that. It is there that, in his very first letter, Schelling cries to Hegel: "Here, my hand, old friend; we will never be strangers to each other." Then how it was with them at Jena—that is well known: they were brothers in battle, and most familiarly united. Parted again, and at a distance from each other, they still remained in friendly communication. "Farewell, thou old, dear friend: go where I may, I shall always from time to time write to thee." Such had been the parting words of Schelling, and his very last letter but one or two to Hegel is as frankly, open-heartedly affectionate as any one of all the others that preceded it. Some ten months later, however, the final letter of all of Schelling's contains these ominous words to Hegel: "versöhnen, lässt sich freilich Alles, Eines ausgenommen,—all may be reconciled, One thing excepted!" What that one thing was I have already, in the Lecture (at p. 258), suggested.

What Schelling thought of Hegel before that last letter, too, is easily in evidence. Ever, in his earliest correspondence, he stirs him on to effort; and he has comfort and strength [illegible]. He chuckles at that Doct[illegible]

and the consternation of his readers, "just, on the whole, a quite all-too categorical man that will not stand on ceremonies where philosophy is concerned"! He tells Fichte of him, too: "Only to-day there has appeared a book from a very capable head, that has for title 'Difference of the Fichtian and Schellingian System of Philosophy.'" Hegel, himself, he does not hesitate to tell of how he is on "the tenterhooks of expectation to receive that first of his so solid and, as it were, timeless works." Ah, he cries, "what must result, thy very maturity still taking time to itself to mature its fruits!" He writes from Würzburg pressing Hegel to contribute to a new periodical he is starting, assuring him that "even detached thoughts will be welcome from his hand," and that he can offer him ein beträchtliches Honorar! Altogether, though, externally, the relation between the two men at Jena was that of the Professor and his Assistant, say, internally, both knew—if one only felt unconsciously a shadow that he named not—that the reverse was the truth. Schelling could divine the up, over, and above the whole field of these papers, *Glauben und Wissen*, on Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, *al.*, even if he could not—what it is to understand—understand them. Even if he could not understand that "Differenz" on himself, he very well understood what it was to him in the lifting-up of him, young as he was, into the very first rank of the functioning philosophers of the day, side by side with Fichte and the rest. Hegel's unceremonious, unhesitating "*Liar!*" to the Stuttgart man who had as good (or as bad) as called him Schelling's *bully* must have given its own startle to the mere tender bookman that almost certainly Schelling was, and greatly strung his respect for him. Still, socially, he was so far under him, and he ling) could almost order him (Hegel) about, as—benefit of Mme. Schlegel!

As said, it was not till after the death of Hegel that Schelling ventured, as it were, publicly to *proclaim* him. Even privately, it is only after the death of Hegel that allusions to him in letters of Schelling swarm. Still, there *are* earlier notices. The first I find chronicled, however, occurs, as already said, in the letter to Schubert, some two years and a half after the final letter to Hegel, and runs thus: "Right delightful it was to me to see how truly and well you have handled Hegel. The ridiculous side is really the best, though not the only one. Such a pure example of inner and outer prosa must, in our hyperpoetic times, be held sacred. Sentimentality comes over us all here and there; and against it such a negative nature as his is a capital corrective, as, on the contrary, it is diverting so soon as it will take its flight above the negative." And this on that side will suffice; the rest of these spiteful fleers and flouts I leave to the reader of all these letters.

The offence of Hegel, as we have seen, is his jeer at the expeditious conversion of some mere unprofessional dabbler in drugs into a regular university *Medicinæ Doctor*. I have been explicit enough in blame of Hegel here. But, after all, he had right on his side; and Schelling, if he forgave the jibe at *formalism* (as well he might), might very well too, in the long-run, have seen the whole business in its absurdity, and so rubbed it all out. But, during the career of a lifetime, and after the consecration of a death, too, which usually passes all the poor blacks of time into the one black of eternity, still relentlessly to persecute the Manes of one's friend, and for so peculiar a cause—surely that is scarcely human! Some mitigation, for his part, has been allowed Hegel in consideration of the *de haut en bas* style of his friend, especially in orders as to that Mme. Schlegel; and, in equal fairness to Schelling, we may suggest these "*Sides* of Mr. Hegel," who undoubtedly did throw from

time to time a shell at Schelling, and so keep up feeling —though surely Schelling only speaks from a dream when he writes Cousin: "Pour faire grand leur maitre il faut avant tout, qu'on me fasse petit; c'est le mot d'ordre, que leur a donné leur chef, qui, semblable au *vieux de la montagne*, sans jamais sortir de son réduit, sut faire agir ses instruments!—vous en entendrez de belles choses, si un jour j'en parlerai publiquement!"—Schelling surely speaks only from a dream when he writes to Cousin this, in 1834, for then Hegel was three years in his grave! One would like to have heard these "fine things" which Schelling was one day publicly to tell—above all, those orders which the Old Man of the Mountain, Hegel, their chief, had, from his retreat, given his *Séides*, his Assassins, for the paying out of Schelling! His *Séides*, that heard Hegel, in his *History of Philosophy*, specially lecture on Schelling—had they, then, any very dreadful orders, or indeed any very dreadful "mot d'ordre," against the subject of it?

But, really, these said prosecutions or persecutions of the Manes of one's friend did pass into such emphatic exiguity!

No doubt, that "*Hegel*" in Schelling's *Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* is about the meanest thing I know in print; but just fancy what a small thing these "grapes" were, or the "advertisement" of that "English barber"! Surely exiguous enough the exiguity of these. And there are others quite as small. Why, he actually opines (2, 3. 26) Hegel's *Logic* to have begun with Quality rather than Quantity, "perhaps only because it did not know how to begin with Quantity"! He has read so widely in Hegel as to be able (2, 2. 488) to sneer at his translation Andacht for Yoga (which means, say, absorbed devotion). "A Denk-Andächtiger," he says, "to me almost comes as a so-called Denk-Gläubiger"—which means, we may suppose, "Hegel, with his Andacht, has

of a devotee only made a free-thinker!" And then (557), in disapproving of Hegel beginning history with China, he cannot help the jibe at a philosophy "which, in its forms, is itself something *Chinese-ish*!" He scoffs (672) at "a philosophy that, in place of the real connection, sets the mere filigree of the Begriff," and (2, 3. 11) at "a weakling philosophy that is a mere artefact"; but he only betrays therein the Cimmerian darkness of his own ignorance both as to the evolution of the Begriff and as to the Begriff itself. And is not this small? Former metaphysic (38) "has been called by Hegel *understanding's* metaphysic—slightingly. It were greatly to be wished that as much could be said of *every* philosophy—namely, that there is understanding in it!"

Surely, as I say, all these scoffs are unutterably small! but, here is a smaller: for, with hate, there is in it envy! Of course, in his knowledge of Greek, Schelling was just known as simply in his rights to quote it; and of course, too, as we know now, Hegel did quote Greek. Schelling, then, was naturally proud of his Greek; and (2, 1. 322), in that regard, he writes thus:—

"But now in the first place to find the proper expression, we shall look about us among the Ancients. Certain designations of philosophical ideas and methods, as they have been invented by the Ancients, have easily in later times propagated themselves; but not just as easily has the true sense been received; and so, then, they stand at the command of every one who extends a hand to them, perhaps to garnish with such illustrious expressions something wherein scarcely even a distorted image of the thing in hand is to be discerned. *It would be easy to name more than one usurpation of the kind.*"

I hardly suppose any one will doubt the meaning or application of this: not but that, as it comes, of course, just every one is free to do so if he will. We would only add that, let Schelling's Greek have been as it may, Hegel's Greek was still good enough to enable him to understand G[illegible]ast, it may be, a

little better than Schelling! In one way, in fact, nothing can more completely differentiate the two men *than* their Greek. Schelling has not taken together and realised any one philosopher or any one philosophy in Greek; he deals only in disconnected fragments of sporadic allusion. The ornament of a mere allusion as such may, here and there, not be wanting in Hegel; but mastered wholes constitute his quality.

7. Schelling in Conclusion

How Schelling states his case, in connection with Kant and Fichte, for himself, and against Hegel, shows points which are intimately determinative in reference to character. That whole episode freighted with the fatal "distinction" between the philosophies, positive of *him*, and negative of *them*, the *Dass* and the *Was*, is only there that he may get his story out, his story that will redress his wrong, and restore him to his place, not above Hegel—that would be a small matter!—but even, it may be, above Fichte, above Kant, as, in philosophy, the most fecund and conclusive foreman! (That this is no exaggeration will be immediately seen.[1])

[1] Schelling's own words will presently prove this; but, meantime, let me quote from Noack (ii. 469): "Philosophers, for more than two thousand years, have lived, thought, and given to the world of the fruits of their thought and their life; but, since the times of Thales and Pythagoras, the history of philosophy has not an example to show that ever one of its priests had taken his mouth so full of vainglory and brag as here this the *miles gloriosus* of modern speculation,—trumpeting himself forth as the philosophical redeemer of the century, and, in trust of the inability to judge and ignorance of the mass, claiming, with effrontery of unhesitating common-place and assertion, the admiration of the world, as though all now were intelligible of itself!" Noack may well see in this the outcome only "of a high-strung self-feeling (eines hochgeschraubten Selbstgefühles)."

Men, when caught wrong, may name, or more often silently admit, a casualty that misled: like Othello, *they* must *not* "go in"; *they* "must be *found*"! *Women*, on the contrary, so caught, have a thousand *ambages* on this side, and on that, and on all sides, to prove the gross injustice of any blame to them, in act, in word, or in thought! *Womanish men*, again, in any such straits, fire up at once at the very name of blame, and, agitatedly eager, breathlessly stuttering, hysterically gloze themselves out of the very tint of guilt. These are men that, *un*like Othello, *would* "go in," and must *not* be "found"! Even good men may, through false glory, or pride, or otherwise, be made unduly slow or unduly quick, and so feel it to be theirs, to speak dreamfully, or heatedly at times, like a Coleridge of Schelling, or a Hamilton of Hare.

Possibly, never was there a story more illustrative of that womanish—shallowness, is it?—or depth?—than that story of Schelling's.

Now, discounting all that is to be said for the annoyance to the Court of the cry of Pantheism (or rather, I fancy, of the Halle Year-books!), these last four volumes of Schelling, at least as honestly *I* think, have nothing at the bottom of them but the one thought—Hegel! Introductorily, no doubt, they quite bristle, we may say, with the names of those that preceded him. Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Böhme, Malebranche, Spinosa, Leibnitz, Jacobi: scarcely a page is dull without them. Still, it is what we may call the great German *quadrilateral*—Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel—that constitutes to Schelling the focus of concern, as indeed to us here no less. In fact, it is in the repeated rehearsal of the successive relation of these men, the one to [illegible] the progressive connection of the common [illegible] which we allude is

found. In fact, it is that rehearsal that is the story; and Schelling himself must be allowed to take good care that we shall not have to complain of any want on his part of the most strenuous exertions to get us to hear it. Nor is it wonderful that this should be so, seeing that it is no more at bottom than a single passionate petition, on the part of the true prince to his people, for restoration and return to his throne, from which he had had the mortification to find himself, he knew not how, extruded, and only that an odious "later comer," who had, after all, but filched his vestments, might, for a moment, usurpingly possess it!

But we allow Schelling, so far, to tell his own story—a story, however, that, as marked, ought to be read at full:—

"Kant (for we willingly refer to him all that has come to be of importance in philosophy since) began a matter that must be carried to its end.—Fichte had no aim but to raise this of Kant's into science. He failed, however, to make his exposition objective. This another who followed him did.[1]

"The fault into which philosophy in those latter days fell, is to be ascribed to the want of said *distinction* [already named] that left all as merely in *thought* and no more than *logical*.—To Kant, God was only a *necessary* last notion by way of crowning close to knowledge, but, as that, still a notion only *assumed* or *presupposed*. To his followers this notion was—a step higher—a notion *known*; but the result was still the same—no more than notion, and without transi-

[1] *W. W.*, 2, 1. 368 sqq. There are here but scattered expressions. Of course, by the "other" that followed Fichte, Schelling means only himself. One ought, very specially, to read at full here; where there are many expressions, most instructive as regards the proceedings as well of Kant as of those that followed him. "It is the glory of Fichte that he shall have emancipated himself from the mere natural cognition which was basis to Kant, and conceived the thought of a science due to pure thinking alone—deductive of the whole world from the Ego—demonstrative of the world, as pictured without us, not to exist, but to be a mere appearance within us." Schelling has it elsewhere that "to Fichte only the human race exists; all else exists in the necessary ideas of the Ego."

tion to *actual* existence.—Here in the non-distinction between the negative and the positive philosophy, and that with a philosophy which, rightly understood, can have only a negative force, we would attain to what is only possible to positive philosophy,—in this there lay the ground of the error—an error that actually prevented said *distinction* from being better understood.—Only the negative philosophy opens the way to the positive; and the latter, again, is only possible as opposed to the rightly understood negative. Indeed, the negative philosophy, if confined to its limits, first brings the positive to cognition, and then not merely as possible, but as necessary.—As first through my public lectures something of the positive philosophy oozed out [*when* was that oozing, O Schelling! and how *much* was it?], there were several found who believed it obligatory on them to take up the negative philosophy against me, supposing that its entire abolition was contemplated, seeing that I certainly spoke of the Hegelian in that sense. This, however, was done on my part, not because I held the Hegelian to be the negative philosophy: I cannot do it that honour; I cannot by any means allow it to be the negative;—its essential fault, rather, just consists in this, that it will be positive. The difference between Hegel and me is not a whit less in respect of the negative than in respect of the positive philosophy. The philosophy which Hegel presents is, etc. etc.—Already, soon after the Kantian Critique, there began talk to be heard of a *critical philosophy*. But soon, again, it came to be asked, Is, then, this critical philosophy all,—besides it, is there no philosophy else? For myself, I permit myself to remark that, directly I had completed my study of the Kantian philosophy, it became evident to me that this so-called critical philosophy could not, possibly, be *all* philosophy—I doubted, indeed, if it could be even philosophy *proper*. In this feeling, already in 1795, I, etc. etc.—If already I had, thus early, the clear idea that, behind this *Kriticismus*, which had destroyed the dogmatising philosophy, there lay another dogmatic philosophy unreached by it, it is easy to think how,—there standing before my eyes, said rational system achieved by Kant, but now carried forward into a pure actual system freed from everything contingent,—it is easy to think how there must necessarily have appeared to my mind the same idea, but only with increased vividness. The clearer the negative was set up, so much the more clearly must the positive show over against it, and there seemed nothing to be done so long as the latter was not discovered too. Perhaps we can account from this, how, almost immediately after the first appearance of this system (that

improved, as I say, on the Kantian), this very philosophy, as though deserted by its originator, was for the time left free to every one who stood ready to turn to it, and (to speak with Plato), lured by the lustre from the spot left empty, to throw himself with greed upon it. For me said philosophy had really been only a medium of transition ; to speak the truth, I had in that philosophy sought just only the next possible step after Kant's, and was in my own mind far—no one will ever prove the contrary—far from taking it for the *whole* of philosophy in the sense in which it was afterwards taken ; and if, for the positive philosophy, even after it was discovered, I gave notice of it mostly only by hints (among others by the well-known paradoxes of a polemical writing against Jacobi), it is my belief that as well this reserve was rather for praise than blame : for by that means I have, to a movement with which I would have nothing in common, given full time to develop and declare itself, so that now nobody can be any longer in doubt as to it itself and my relation to it,—at the same time that it might seem, withal, that I had never left it. All, indeed, that I did do, in the way of precaution against it, was only to leave it to itself, assured in myself that it would go forward so with swift steps to its own ruin and disappearance [how could any one so egregiously deceive himself with such very palpable special pleading, such very shallow stammer ?].—There have been, for the most part, as regards the relations between us, quite false ideas. It has been believed that the one has taken it ill, to have been passed by the other. But just the contrary. The one that was first, who had still much to do, of which in these days there is no longer anything known, and to reduce to order the entire material, which the other found already subjected to the notion—he could very well afford to take a correction from the other. However unable I was to conceal from myself, indeed, the elements in the entire way of Hegel which were peculiarly hostile to all that is gifted and genial, I saw, on the other hand, that he stood up against much that was false, etc. etc.—But it is not every one that is called to be the creator of a system—and of nothing had Hegel less than of artistic feeling [against the clumsy Hegel, that at least would go down !].—The system before his could not set itself up as an *unconditioned* system like his ; but no one could reproach it as not system. It did not need to be made system, it was a born system ; its specialty just was, that it was system.—Had he been in earnest with the pure logical nature of the science, he would never have made of logic a *Part*. That whole philosophy, and as well his predecessor's philosophy of nature and

of mind, must have been to him logical—consequently Logic; and what he specially gave as logic would not have been such a failure as by him it is. Instead of taking true and real logic as ground and basis for further advance, he hypostasises the notion with the intention of giving an objective meaning, nay, even that of a *process*, to the logical movement, which, however independent of all that is subjective it is taken, can still only be in the element of *thought*" (2, 3. 71–89).

Looked at closely enough, Schelling is particularly amusing in his shifts, now on this side and now on that, in order to vindicate and make good *both* of his philosophies, the *first* not less than the *second*, and the *second* not less than the *first*, although the one, as is argued, too, is but the contrary of the other, and a failure in consequence. It is as this failure that it is thrown at Hegel—and it remains as this failure so long as Hegel is in view. Schelling never forgets to declare that Hegel only borrowed from him everything—system and all—that he afterwards put his name to. But, on the top of the wave of his wrath, he ever forgets the hollow he has left; and for the destruction of Hegel he would even sacrifice himself; but still, when he sees the positive philosophy complete, with its necessarily fatal consequence to the negative, he is struck with rue and regret. Must he, then, lose his own firstling of the brain, his system, his own primal philosophy? Was he, really, just in the act to commit unwitting suicide? Yes, death to Hegel, that was all very well! But there must be life to himself! We recollect how tenderly his son speaks of it—how very close it lay to the heart of his father—this first philosophy. And so we see that it was found possible to claim at last both, but the one now only as necessary preparation for the other. There it lies, this new form, in its own place, within that second philosophy; and naturally we ask, is it still system,—for we cannot forget the emphasis of system

that lay on its first form? If it is to be preparatory to a second system, surely it must be even more system than the emphatic system of which it is itself the re-cast. But is there a single trace in it of system at all? Can we see aught in it but some dozen or more miscellaneous lectures, in which the talk, mostly, seems really to circle round these names that have Plato and Aristotle at the head of them? Negative or positive system there is none: with whatever remark, there is, strictly speaking, not even exposition. Virtual *excursuses* ever and anon occur to interrupt whatever continuity there may be — not always philosophical, either, but sometimes philological, *e.g.*, with much curiosity, about Greek compounds in *Ma*! Did the privileged Academicians who heard these *excursuses* first, really contrive to keep awake—say, when XI. and XII. were concerned?

When one *knows* Hegel, one is surprised to hear Schelling find in him, say, only "an arid formalism that dried up the sources of true knowledge, and struck philosophy for a time into a sort of stupor" (2, 2. 7). One, in one's own knowledge, is surprised, I say; but still, it is quite evident that Schelling, so little did he understand, really believed this. Hegel, for Schelling (2, 3. 89), only "hypostasised the Begriff in order to give, instead of its own subjective (logical) movement, an objective *process*"!

That is the story, then. Kant having done this, and Fichte having done that, he, for his part, gave objectivity to the latter; but presently, seeing the insufficiency of the whole negative philosophy, he had gone on to the positive philosophy, and—with a chuckle!—left the negative as a vacant spot for Hegel to settle himself on and ruin himself on, if he chose; while he, for his own great part, simply re-modelled and re-made, reconstructed and reconstrued, philosophy itself for them all! And

yet how much he was behind at last can be seen in a moment from single points, such as Logic and the Begriff, or the Indifference-Point and the Ego, or just Denken alone. We have seen already that thought, which was to Descartes the *substance* of the soul, was to Schelling only a *state*—one state of it among others; and (2, 3. 64) he speaks of *Denken* as only a function of *Vernunft*. "Thought," he says, "is the function (or act) of reason when it turns on its own content." Altogether, he has often at his best—in his distinctions, namely, some that are very peculiarly hair-split; as (1, 7. 357, 358) where he distinguishes between *ground* of existence and *existence* itself. The *ground* as *prius* precedes *existence* in God; but there could not be ground of existence in God unless existence *were*; there could not be the *first* without the *second*, nor the *second* without the *first*. To all intents and purposes *the egg and the hen*—a difficulty which, *looked at*, as it never *is*, unless with a laugh, is the easy overthrow of all the *physical* explanation so much in vogue at present. And yet *metaphysically* the solution is in front!

As is, surely, not by any means disguised in the preceding, it is really very remarkable how, through the whole of Schelling's latter volumes (as 2, 1. 178, 229, 230, 232, 337, 245, *al.*), there seems to lie one single brooding thought under all—Hegel; which, then, for the character of Schelling, is simply a *crisc*. We are without *animus* in these regards. Even as ministers of justice and servants of truth, we cannot but be soft to excellence wherever we find it; and there is much that is excellent in Schelling, as well with regard to his excellent original gifts as to his excellent acquired accomplishments. We have already noted the attraction of his by[illegible]ing; and we find ourselves saying, in the [illegible]in, [illegible]ken of, that we are not sorry to

translate so many passages at full from him; for they always interest through the alert thought and the skilled penmanship. And, as is bare fact, what concerns Hegel can excite no feeling unless one of regret, not for Hegel, but for Schelling alone. His flouts to Hegel are all unworthy of him; and, happily, they are valueless in themselves—casual blacks from the air when a chimney is foul!

Still, one wonders how Schelling, after his first instinctive respect—almost obedience—to Hegel, should have allowed himself to fall into such blind, inconsiderate, unreasoning hate—childishly, as it were, because, after all, of only a general expression in a book!

We cannot but speculate on the *intensity* of that *self* of Schelling! And I should say we have to do no more than to look back to see at once in long perspective the very *genesis* of that same said intensity. Suppose now we try to realise this!

What we have to strike us first in Schelling is the extraordinary precocity and brilliancy of his talent, not only as student at the university, but even as the mere schoolboy whether at home or abroad. His Latin, his Greek, while still not more than ten, is there in proof; as are his published philosophies at the university before he was twenty. He was scarcely more than a boy when, as tutor to two young nobles, he was initiated into French, dress, manners, and all the ready ways of formed existence. If not more than a boy then, he was really not yet much more, when, at Jena, he became, as we may say, a professor to men. Then his success, the enthusiasm of his students, the admiring expectations, the friendship of the very greatest men at that time, we may almost say, in Europe—the Schlegels, Fichte, Steffens, Schiller, Goethe, and quite a host of others.

'T cannot be said that Hegel was at this time much;

but still there was that in the birth and bearing of the man, and in his position externally, as, on the whole, mere claque to himself, which must have been source to Schelling of welcome assurance and contented complacency. But, "for all this came a ruin"! That is, on all this a sudden cloud fell. It was still success that carried Schelling to Würzburg; but Hegel sent him there his *Phaenomenologie*, and he read the *Preface*!—read, too, the stuttering, stammering blunder of a letter in which Hegel assured him that it was not him he meant, but only his imitators!

There is a sad stop here—of a kind; but the perspective of success runs out and on its straight line still. Würzburg was but succeeded by Munich, and Erlangen, and Munich again; and he was overheaped by honours. Professorships, Directorships, Secretaryships, Presidentships but followed each other; and, what was never thought of for a Kant, a Fichte, or a Hegel, the privilege was given him to write before his name *Von*,—he was ennobled; and, among others, to quote a long German word, he was—zum Wirklichen Geheimen, Oberregierungsrathe ernannt! Last of all, among the strangers where he died, a king raised to him a monument of fame.

I mean to say that such a career as this, and in such a nature, could only result in the production of the single and intense feeling of a single and intense *self*. This self could feel, and see, and provide for itself; but it was no more than that: it cast no reflexion from within out, and it took back no reflexion from without in; whereby it might—sanely, and considerately, and circumspectively—give others their place, as take to itself its own. It had no ray but Bacon's "direct ray";[1] it could not turn round. So it is that to me Schelling's nature was a simple and linearly direct one:

[1] This ray can be seen first in (for one) Duns Scotus, by the bye.

on and on as he felt straight, on and on straight he remained. And this is my rationale and psychology for the Hegelian hate of Schelling. After the crisis there was scarcely a letter, there was scarcely a work of Schelling's but was instinct, as his very soul was—with Hegel. And how simply silly, how simply weak—(think only of the letters to Cousin !),—without a misgiving, without a single look round, the whole self-exposure was !

In point of fact, this simplicity that is in case here, is it not a bottom element in the very nature of Schelling ? In his representations that concern his differences with Fichte, he speaks (1, 7. 116) in this way :—

"Can I possibly be surprised myself that I have been the butt of falsehood, malignity, and personal persecution ? Have I not richly deserved all that ? Have I not, according to occasion and circumstance, done much hurt to the wicked and worthless, never spared Pharisees and Hypocrites, but stripped off the sheep's clothing and unmasked the baseness of many a one of them ?—The man, to whom my ear and my door are closed, may go and openly slander me, and he may know that I know it, and yet be without a call to blush before me. Another, as a crazy author, with words and ideas borrowed from me, may have kept himself, and still keep himself, in existence, and yet, when the time for it seems come, always, for all that, with the same ideas, write a book full of abuse against me ; and this shall bring him no disgrace, nor even ridicule, but do honour rather to his courage and fearlessness of speech. I, for my part, have, to my own knowledge, never troubled the public with my person, seeing that I have been always silent about it ; but just this is another proof of my hardenedness, and so every one must be allowed to think and say the worst of the man who has never made the public a witness of his heart and of his personal feelings, but has always only coldly and dispassionately held speech for or against the matter itself."

There may be in this whatever there may, but these semi-conscious, semi-deceitful, semi-plausible *propos* are at least semi-innocent, and not a little womanish.

But the simple element is not to be denied, we think, as simply eminent in most of his successive stadia.

What could be more simple than to suppose, as Schelling apparently without doubt did, that these mere Fichtian *removes* on his part were *entrées* of his own? But the calenture of his brain continued, and in his Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism the young man sees all through the same fiery vapour of absolute belief in himself, till his very editors, alarmed at his ὕβρις, cannot but for safety interfere in the astonishing chariot-ascent of their rash student-Dædalus to the moon, or the very regions beyond it. But he is not content, this Dædalus, to have whipped his horses beyond Fichte. He casts his eyes around and queries, Is this all? cannot I do more still? is there not more in Kant that is to be completed into science? And so he sees Nature, and compares Nature with the Ego, to which he has been as yet confined. Why, Nature, he thinks, if it has been deduced from the Ego, must so far contain the Ego, must so far *be* the Ego! And so there are the two, and the Absolute is equally in each! There could only suggest itself as a first action now—the *Naturphilosophic*.

There cannot, then, be the slightest hesitation as to what was the genesis of this philosophy in the mind of Schelling. He has just told us himself, indeed, that, as Fichte, for his part, had no object but to make Kant's work science, so he, again, for his part, was in search of just only the next possible step to Kant's. Now, in what respect did Kant differ from Fichte, or in what respect did Fichte fall short of Kant? By and by Schelling took advantage of the fact of an *Æsthetic* in Kant; but, in the meantime, it was to the earlier *Metaphysical First Grounds of a Science of Nature* that he turned. Altogether, in view of what was there on the part of both, it was not difficult to s[illegible]ted for Kant

was the supplement of an antitype to Fichte. "The external world lies before us, thrown open, in order that we may find in it the history of our mind." This is said (1, 1. 383) in his early elucidations to Fichte, and even at the word there may have sprung up before him the very vista in point.

Schelling, writing this at Leipsig, while as yet but twenty-one, was already in full study for his *Naturphilosophie*; and, of all his works, it alone, as original to him, is specially to be called his. Nor is that less than the truth, though it was Hegel, doubtless, that opened the eyes of Schelling to all that lay in his work—even the reach, through the Indifference-Point, to the Absolute that was Geist, not but that to said opening of the eyes there went actual *telling*, too, on the part of the eye-opener. Schelling's *Naturphilosophie*, to a large extent, certainly was original to him, but it can hardly be said to be in existence now: whole strata have overlapped and overwhelmed it since. Still, the enthusiastic young man was very earnest in his application at Leipsig to the study of mathematics and physics. He was in familiar intercourse, too, with the living masters, there at the time, of science. Nor is it less to be considered how, with excitation still, the very greatest men in Germany then had turned themselves somewhat heatedly to empirical speculation. Such men as Kielmeyer and Eschenmayer may be more particularly regarded as specialists, perhaps; but still there was actual work at the hands of such men again as Schiller and Goethe. That Schelling had a very real knowledge of the actual facts of science cannot for a moment be doubted; neither can it be doubted that he threw into them many quick suggestions and brilliant ideas of his own. Still, it is in these that his simplicity shows: for the most part they had not the substantiality of fact in them; they were but chimeras of the brain,

and with extremes at last which could only provoke reaction and denial. We are here, say in 1796;—and, positively, we do not hear much of *Naturphilosophie* in Schelling after 1807 and his quarrel with Hegel. He must still, however, from time to time, cast back a melancholy regard upon it, as in these boasts which we have seen already about discoveries:—

"How, after a time of glad movement (when, with the happy removal of the contradiction between real and ideal world, all the barriers of knowledge hitherto seemed to have fallen), *one* law was realised throughout the world of nature and of mind,—how then nature herself seemed to come forward and meet the new knowledge in that series of brilliant and revealing discoveries which followed the first appearance of galvanism,—how then, I say, to use an expression of Goethe's, a very heaven of knowledge seemed to be let down upon us!" (2, 3. 14).

These "brilliant discoveries" after that of galvanism may refer to others empirically in galvanism itself (as of a Volta or a Davy); but we can scarcely be wrong in thinking, in their regard, more nearly of Schelling himself. J. W. Ritter, who was Schelling's personal friend at Leipsig, had already become famous for his researches in galvanism, and was then and there writing informatively on the subject. So it is, perhaps, that it is to the credit of Schelling that he (Schelling) would have encouraged an alliance between magnetism and electricity, though (unfortunately for himself) his contemporary, the famous Englishman, Thomas Young, as I rather think, somewhat peremptorily forbade the banns. Allowing, then, to Schelling all that can be allowed to him on the merits of his *Naturphilosophie*, must we not, with whatever else, point to these "brilliant discoveries" as proofs of his simplicity?

To the same effect, too, is his rush of hurry and haste always to announce and declare, but with apologies for incompletion through interruption, etc. etc. etc., and

promises of speedy reward in prompt and copious sequels; which—remain words only! Sometimes he prints a first volume, but forgets a second. Or he suddenly throws out a whole volley of rapid sheets, as suddenly to stop the press and recall them again. Ever learning and learning, he is nevertheless always forgetting and forgetting. It would reward a comparison of periods to observe how often the later is all unconscious of an earlier—without restriction to the Christian religion either! Quite generally, there can be no doubt of the truth in that regard; it was as though, from work to work, oblivion fell upon him. In fact, as with many only in the *house* then, it was perhaps with him on the *stage*. Things, ideas, substantialities, were not gone into: there was but a babble of empty catch-words in the air, as Subject, Object, Nature, Geist, God, Begriff, Idee, a Prius, the Absolute, of which the most sacred, probably, as used, was the emptiest. Gans does not hesitate to speak of this that we call the *house* as "that honour-deserving class which, rather through mere instinct than through clear consciousness, feels itself drawn to the great forms of Philosophy, and, without giving itself any further account, just trustfully and willingly remains in its circle." This, as we see, is to the effect that there may be a philosophy which is but a traffic of *outsides*; and if Schelling can be imagined to have gone into that, I do not know that it will prove any scathe to his simplicity.

Allusions, sallies were natural enough to Schelling; but he could not originate—at least wholes, without a basis first of all; and we need only suggest here Fichte, Böhme, and the rest. Why, he had even such a basis for his own so very peculiarly proper Positive Philosophy! To say nothing of Kant and the *Erfahrung*, Jacobi, exposing, on one side, all rational philosophy as negative, had found foothold for himself on the other, only in a

positive philosophy of feeling. Schelling shall have been, in truth, simply one of those singularly *catching* natures that instantly *take on*. He could not help himself: he caught up from Hegel rapidly, as we know; and Bardili, his cousin, loudly accused him of possessing more than one of his chief distinctions in philosophy only by theft. And so it was that he was called unscrupulous. These preternaturally quick-articulating natures are always peculiar. I dare say we have all met at times young Brontës, brilliant brothers of "Jane Eyre," who know all the short cuts by this or that bye-street in London without having been there; whose eyes have a brain that is living phosphorus behind them; who flash up, with the lightning of their speech, the entire table into themselves, but, soured at a word, collapse. It would be an indignity, it would be gross exaggeration, seriously to parallel with a young Brontë, Schelling. We do but suggest what quickness may go hand in hand with a spontaneous straight simplicity that may seem a little wryed at times. If we compare Hegel to the seed that fell on good ground, and came to its fruit duly, we may at least liken Schelling to the seed that, falling where there was not much earth, sprang up at once, and at once was scorched. There goes with the much earth, substantiality.

If a fiasco can denote simplicity, what greater simplicity can any fiasco denote than the "Positive Philosophy"? With that, a whole new philosophy, Schelling shall have put his foot on Hegel—Schelling shall have risen higher than even Fichte and Kant! Was there ever such simplicity of a fiasco?—was there ever such simplicity of pride? And these Lectures! That Philosophy of Mythology, so much a fiasco is it that it is scarcely credible that any human being should have ever minted it. Nor can more be said for the Philosophy of Revelation—is it, then, a *Philosophy*, and

of what? More than once, when thwarted or wounded in his sensibility, Schelling broke off his lectures: he broke off these! His various polemics, too, with Fichte and others, had but a similar etiology.

Rosenkranz gives us a lively picture of Schelling in his Lecture-Room at Munich in 1838:—

"A compact figure; a high forehead; white hair; about his mouth and chin, loose, originally soft, features; the glance sharp rather than warm, rather sanguinely restless than melancholily deep. Elegant toilette, but suitable, without any affectedness; black cravatte, brown short upper-coat, blue trousers drawn tight by straps. A silver snuff-box, which, with his left hand, Schelling set up and down in frequent movement, was the symbolical decoration of the lecture. This latter I had imagined to myself as the free stream of eloquence represented by Steffens. But it was not like that. Schelling stood in vigorous pose, drew a small note-paper from his breast-pocket, and read from it, but so that we followed him in a full freedom of delivery. He stopped from time to time, too, and gave extemporarily paraphrastic elucidations, in which a poetic colouring was visible. The form of the discourse quite absorbed me: the quietude, assuredness, simpleness, originality, caused one to overlook the presence of the egoism that not unfrequently showed. The Swabian idiom hung over the pronunciation rather than, as was the case with Hegel, gave it full accentuation, and, for me at least, gave the voice a peculiar charm. He expressed himself with cutting scorn against Hegel's philosophy. He said that he had given his hearers an example of the real speculation which pervaded the world and the positive powers of it, so that they had in the fact itself the best measure for that artificial 'filigree of the notion' which so often passed now for true philosophy. But, he added, with a venomously contemptuous glance that pierced my soul—this philosophy is waste product of a 'hectic consumption that dies away into itself.'"

With this portrait of Rosenkranz, we may contrast Steffens':—

"Schelling's appearance (1798) was youthful, and there was in the way in which he stood up something very determined, or even defiant: he had broad jaws, wide temples, a high forehead, energetically concentrated countenance, somewhat upturned nose; and in the large, clear eyes there lay an intellectually masterful force."

We can understand, from what Rosenkranz says of his elegant toilette and trigly strapped trousers, how another might speak of "the gentleman-like, elegant man in gala." There might be a little natural dandyism in this; but there is in it also the tendency to *take on*. For the aristocratic society of the guardians of his young barons, French is necessary; and he throws himself on French—even writes his brother Karl in French, mon cher Carl, and signs himself Frédéric! To take on, he shows himself quite apt elsewhere too. Later in life, as at Munich, among Royalties, and Princes, and all manner of Court-mightinesses, he is quite a man of address: He becomes a favourite with them, gets titled himself, is profusely decorated, wealthily promoted, and, as we know, is royally remembered for a monument at last. Address, at times, may even go a little too far with Schelling. He does not hesitate to insinuate himself into the goodwill of the Roman Catholics, for it is with them in Bavaria that the power lies. In this reference, Görres, in a letter to his daughter, has a word, but preceded by a remarkable portrait in full:—

"It is peculiar about Schelling: the natura naturata in him is precisely not pleasant. There is something animal, passionate, unsubdued in it, and yet, with that, again, something slovenly, worn down, loose, passive, and old fashioned, rack in a black-lackered Japanese dish; but he is sensible, apt, repressed, shrewd, and has an honest blue eye which pleases me best in him. In want of a better, the Protestant party has submitted to him, but only with great hesitations and precautions."

It *must* have been *peculiar* (sonderbar) about Schelling to Görres; for he is evidently in great difficulty for words to hit him with: so much so, indeed, that one is never sure about the translation of them! It was no wonder that the Protestant party was not by any means at ease as regards the Protestantism of Schelling. For when the Catholics would clear the University at Munich

of Protestants, they made exceptions of him and his friend Schubert, "because both, though Protestants by formal, external confession, they laboured in their sentiments and in the spirit of their teaching to the like end with the True Believers." "Hegel," says Noack (ii. 442), "was at least a Protestant; but of Schelling there at Munich, one scarcely knew whether he was the more flesh or the more fish. . . . The situation of Protestantism was no trouble to the Geheim-Hofrath Schelling: he philosophised over Peter and Paul away out into the Utopia of his Johannine Church."

Of Schelling, Noack has still one thing to say that one likes to hear the least of anything that has been said yet. While Schelling was at Erlangen there was there also a young professor of Philosophy, Christian Kapp by name, who, unfortunately, had printed a good word for several of those with whom Schelling was at that time at feud—Fichte, Solger, Jacobi, even Hegel. "That was not the man that spoke in unison with the heart of Schelling," says Noack (ii. 326), "who put Hegel side by side even with Napoleon." "With the energetic, enthralling discourses of his young colleague, the petted master could not in *his* lectures rivalise; and so," says Noack further, "he abandoned them: but he could not forgive to his fortunate young rival this success at his side; he stirred him up to the publication of a fragmentary pamphlet on 'the Church and its Reformation,' whereby his position under King Ludwig was sapped."

Now, I do not believe this. I do not for a moment credit it that Schelling was ever so wily and unscrupulous a man as to plot and plan such a calculated wickedness as this. I have had enough to bring against Schelling; but I cannot, for any such incredible delinquency, wholly give up my esteem, or say, just my liking, for him.

Schelling, to me, was but as a student, a bookman, all his life,—unmixed, pure; and never had a second thought. What he was, that he was straight—and in straight simplicity. Not but that—straight also—there must have been the natural movement of his heart when stung. My plea for Schelling is simply—his hate to Hegel! It is impossible to think of anything more weak, or of anything more genuinely single. It was so absolutely indiscriminating, so absolutely unreasoning, so absolutely unregarding. And so it is that this insinuation of Noack's, against Schelling, and in respect of Kapp, can only be for me a palpable misconstruction. For certainty in this regard, surely, we have only to draw into view his various relations with his kind—parents, brothers, wives, children, grandchildren, friends. These relations were always warmly affectionate and loyally true. That "he hath ever but slenderly known himself," and that he always leaped to the goad—that is Schelling, and that is all Schelling. He must have been a kindly-disposed and single-hearted man. That he, a bookman, when admitted to the great, could bend to please, is not a contradiction, but quite naturally in order. Lastly, as for Hegel, I know not but that he who shall read all Schelling's letters to Hegel, except the last, and shall note the perfectly undoubting naïve affection in them—I know not but that he will be almost inclined to find *that*, the hate, in natural order too: the shock of the *Phaenomenologie*, so absolutely unexpected, so absolutely undreamed to be possible,—after all that has been said, and can be said, —must have been simply mortal!

Of the philosophical four in Germany, that Schelling, whether in himself or in his doctrine, is, it may be, the least known in Britain, may prove an excuse for the length of our statement in either respect.

CHAPTER XIV

HEGEL

How it is with Hegel in this connection must, by this time, be pretty well understood. We may name it at once. Kant's *Reine Apperception*, cleared into Fichte's *Ego*, is Hegel's *Begriff*. The Reine Apperception in Kant is but a focal unit somehow behind the twelve categories. Fichte develops *from the Ego* these Categories—scarcely more in amount, but with much improvement of rigorous consistency and intellectual richness. For principle of movement, however, Fichte has no expedient but a *mechanical externality* of *Limitation*. Schelling is not different in this, if with a suggestion in regard to Nature. What is specially HEGELIAN is solely due to what new principle of movement Hegel himself, and of himself, has alone introduced.

But that is a new world!—Essentially an entire new philosophy (if, from the discoverer of the primitive spore, still to be called Kantian)—perhaps the beginning of the end of philosophy at all!

Hegel's *Begriff* (*Notion*) is the *Immanent Dialectic of the Ego's own self*. He that can realise this in the reading of Hegel will find that he *can* read: all lies in the *I-Me*! And Hegel has this principle just so.

There is, then, but one principle of explanation *in* this universe *of* this universe; and to this principle, as

we have seen, the history of philosophy has been but the rise: That principle is the I-ME.

This principle, self-evidently, is the principle, the root, of man as man,—not that there can be even a moment's dream of men as men being else or more than the perishable finites which, here below, we alone are. No, not of men as men, but of man as man, "God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness"!

We have already seen numerous declarations of our own in this respect (from the *Secret of Hegel*, etc.); and it only remains for us, in proof, relatively, of the position of Hegel, to adduce on his part declarations from himself. And if we begin with a quotation where the assumed declaration may appear neither literal nor explicit, our purpose is—and such purpose may repeat itself elsewhere—not only particularly to report, but, as may also be desirable, generally to explain. From a Lecture of Hegel's immediately before his death (*W. W.*, xii. 546), we quote as follows:—

"In der Sphaere der offenbaren Religion ist zuerst der abstracte Begriff Gottes zu betrachten; der freie, reine, offenbare Begriff ist die Grundlage: seine Manifestation, sein Seyn für Anderes, ist sein Daseyn, und der Boden seines Daseyns ist der endliche Geist: diess ist das Zweite; der endliche Geist und das endliche Bewusstseyn sind concret."

And this in English runs thus:—

"In the sphere of the revealed religion there is first to be considered the abstract notion of God. The free, pure, open Notion is the ground and basis of it. Its manifestation, its being for other, is its sensible *existence*; and the seat of its existence so is the finite Spirit: this is the second point; finite Spirit and finite Consciousness are concrete."

Such words as these—to readers, or even students, of Hegel—prove so often, as it were, but syllables in the

air, that, for the most part, we pass them, if only hazily contented as with a mere snatch at the meaning. Still, a sense of discomfort, of dissatisfaction, even with our own selves, follows us; and we turn to the rest of the paragraph with the half-conscious hope of (with more light) increased contentment.

"The main thing in this religion is to come to see this process: namely, that God manifests himself in the finite Spirit, and is therein identical with himself. The identity of the Notion and existence is the third point. Identity is here properly a defective expression, for what is meant is essentially livingness in God."

With this we have the paragraph complete before us; and in view of the very importance of the interests that loom through the mist, so tantalisingly bright at times, if only in an instant to fall dark again, we remain unrescued still from a condition of considerable chagrin.

But let us make up our minds and go quietly to work in order to discover what it all amounts to.

Well, in the first place, it is evident that in some way or other there are three points concerned: What are they?

(1) There is first the abstract idea of God; (2) there is finite Spirit as the seat of manifestation; and (3) what is called Notion (*Begriff*) is identified with existence (meaning by *existence* mundane or empirical existence as such).

But, even naming these three points, we are still in very considerable doubt as to what they mean. By "*abstract* notion of God," we are only to understand what we formally define God as God to be; but that definition is not yet given us. Then, though we somehow understand that the finite Spirit (man) is to be the medium in which the manifestation of God is to be found, it is not, after all, God that is spoken of as manifested. What is so spoken of as manifested is only a certain *Notion*: but

that Notion is not God—no, only the ground and basis of the notion of God. Now, this Notion, that is the ground of the notion of God, has its *being-for-other*, its manifestation, its sensible existence in the finite Spirit, an actual man. Then in the conclusion of the paragraph we are told that the main thing to know is this, that God manifests himself in man, and in man is identical with himself; as, lastly, that there is "Identität des Begriffs und des Daseyns," identity of notion and actual existential state, this identity when reached being further declared to be a "Livingness in God."

It must be admitted in general here that, while the clauses are in themselves only very clumsily and confusedly expressed, they are also very badly arranged, very badly put in connection. On the whole, however, we may hold the continuity of sense to run somewhat thus.

The manifestation of God takes place in man; and in man, God is in identity with himself. But in this consummation we must also understand that the intermediation of a certain Notion is to be taken into account. This Notion is to be regarded as in all respects the one original ground and basis of all. In immediate connection with the abstract notion of God it is spoken of as its *Grundlage*; and finally, it is referred to as the *Grundlage* also of sensible existence, and specially of the sensibly existent finite Spirit (man).

Now, this Notion is "Der freie, reine, offenbare Begriff (the free, pure, open Notion)," and when we come upon it in the midst of the words: "In der Sphäre der offenbaren Religion ist zuerst der abstracte Begriff Gottes zu betrachten; der freie, reine, offenbare Begriff ist die Grundlage: seine Manifestation, sein Seyn für Anderes, ist sein Daseyn (in the sphere of the open religion there is first to be considered the abstract notion of God; the free, pure, open Notion is [redacted]nd of it: its manifest

tion, its being for other is its sensible existence),"—when, in the midst of these words, I say, we come upon this "free, pure, open Notion," we know no more of what it is than the letters that name it do. It is, again, but one of those fine Hegelian phrases that are spoken prophetically into the air, only to stumble us.

Now, for all that, that phrase is the *Roc's Egg*, the one secret of the entire Mystery! Der freie, reine, offenbare Begriff, the free, the pure, the open Notion, is the Ego—the "I-Me"!

"Der freie, reine, offenbare Begriff ist der Grundlage"—Gewiss! wie immer! That is it! The free, pure, open Notion—that is the *First*: very certainly so as always! It is worth while turning back upon the passage in the new light. Its manifestation—that of the Notion—is its sensible existence,—its externalisation, namely, into empirical existence. Then how truly is a *manifestation* but a beingness for another on both of its sides! A manifestation is certainly a beingness; but it is only a beingness for another—only for that, namely, and for no more than that, which it is there to manifest. Still, the manifestation has not only this internality of direction; but it has also an externality of the same. That, namely, which the manifestation is *of*, is internal; but that which the manifestation is *to* or *for*, is external. We do perceive, and we can only perceive, an *internalè* by an *externalè*. That is, a manifestation, if it is *for* another —its own true self—on the inside, is equally *for* another on the outside.

Now, the Begriff, the Notion, is actually empirically *existent* in man, and man is the finite Spirit. Man is the only actual *existent* (*i.e.* sensible existent) that says I to itself, or can say I to itself. But if every *singular* self-consciousness is only a *particular* self-consciousness to the *universal* self-consciousness, then God *is*. God *is*

—not sensibly, mortally, finitely *is*, but absolutely, immortally, infinitely *is*. Let there not be one single existent "I" within the compass of this whole huge universe, and still there will be—absolutely—the one I—I Am That I Am—alpha and omega, the first and the last, Dynamis, Energeia, Entelecheia.

But it is not of Ego as the Spirit *into* which—if also at the same time not less *out of* it evolved—*into* which, I say, the whole vast material circumference collapses, that we speak at present, but of the abstract Ego that is existentially present *to*, or *is*, each of us in fact; and if it is the Begriff, the Notion, that is the principle of Hegel, it is that Ego that is the meaning of the Begriff; it is that Ego that is the Notion; or, if it is not literally that Ego, it is at least that Ego's exemplar, analogue, and type.

He who looks into the various volumes of the works of Hegel, as I possess them, will find pencilled on the margin of the leaves occasionally an x, frequently an x^1, sometimes, but much less frequently, an x^2. By x I signalise a "Denken" that is no more than the *Denken, Denken, Denken* generally of such German writers as are constantly telling us about Denken—that *Denken* is all, and that *Denken* is the whole. By x^1, again, I indicate a passage in which the Ego, *as it is peculiarly looked upon by Hegel*, is very certainly present, though *only less or more betrayingly so*. Lastly, by x^2 I distinguish expressions which seem at least to approach to mean the cardinal position or proposition of the present writing, namely, that what I call the ratio of the Ego as Ego, the I-Me, is precisely, expressly, literally *Thought*—Thought as Thought, Thinking as Thinking. To speak of x further there is no call. Nor, by speaking of x^2, would I wish to be supposed to enter at present on the general question of what was to Hegel literally thought.

There remains the x^1, and I proceed by quotation of certain passages which I find so marked to prove my allegation that Hegel's Begriff means no more than Ego, and just as it is understood, not specially by an expert, Fichte, or another, but by—simply, to say so—*the reader*.

Not following any calculated order, I begin and continue as suggestions occur to me.

Passages strikingly significant I seem to remember to have observed in the beginning of the *Geistesphilosophie* (say vol. iii. of the *Encyklopädie*). As thus:—

"The soul is the *existing* Notion (Begriff), the *existence* of the *Speculative*" (of that act, fact, principle, or element that we name speculative) (p. 150). "This relation" (he is speaking of the Fœtus) "has in it something wonderful for—*an understanding unable to comprehend the Unity of the Differentiated*" (p. 159). The soul is spoken of as struggling "to make itself that which it is *in itself* or in its *notion*, namely, the self to self referent *single subjectivity* that is existent in the Ego" (p. 148). "Why it is that we have precisely the known *five* senses,—no more and no less, and just *these*, and just differentiated so,—of that, in a philosophical treatise, the rational necessity requires to be demonstrated. This is effected if we take the senses to be so many realisations of the moments of the Notion. These moments are, as we know, only *three*. But the 5 quite naturally reduces itself to 3, with just so many classes of senses in regard," etc. (p. 123). "The three chief forms of the subjective Spirit are—(1) the Soul; (2) Consciousness; (3) the Spirit as such. As Soul, the Spirit has the form of abstract *Universality*; as Consciousness, that of *Particularity*; as personal Spirit, that of *Singularity*" (p. 42).

"In Logic the Categories demonstrate themselves to be nothing else than the series of the successive evolutions of the Begriff (Notion),—not of any one indiscriminate Begriff, but of *the* Begriff *in propria persona* (an ihm selbst)—the development of it into *extension* at the same time that it deepens its own *intension*. Logic develops this progression of the Begriff in its necessity; each step it describes is the rise of a category of finitude into its infinitude; it equally constitutes, therefore, a metaphysical notion of God, and, as this movement appears in its necessity, a proof of his Being. Logic is, so far, Metaphysical Theology, which considers the evolu-

tion of the idea of God in the aether of pure thought" (*Phil. of Rel.*, ii. 433 sq.).

"The difficulty of the philosophical knowledge of the Spirit consists in this, that we have thereby no longer to do with the comparatively abstract, single and simple Logical Idea, but with the concretest, most developed form to which the *Idea*, in the actualisation of itself, arrives. As well the finite, or subjective Spirit—not alone the absolute—must be understood to be an actualisation of the Idea. The consideration of the Spirit is only then in truth philosophical when the notion of it is seen and known in its living actualisation and disenfoldment; that is, when the Spirit is comprehended as an ectype of the eternal Idea. It belongs to Spirit, however, to know its own notion. And so the summons to self-cognition issued to the Greeks by the Delphian Apollo has not the meaning of a commandment externally given to man by an authority without; the self-cognition ordaining deity is nothing else, rather, than the absolute law proper of Spirit itself. Every act of Spirit, so, is but a comprehending of itself, and the end and aim of all true science is only this, that, in all that is in heaven or on earth, Spirit shall recognise itself. An out and out other is for Spirit not, in any way, anywhere existent. Even the Oriental does not wholly lose himself in his prostration before the object; but it is the Greeks who first expressly conceived as Spirit what they set above themselves as the Godhead. Yet not even, they, whether in philosophy or religion, reached knowledge of the absolute infinity of Spirit; the relation of the human Spirit to the Divine Spirit is with the Greeks, therefore, not yet an absolutely true one; it was only Christianity first succeeded, through the doctrine of God become man and of the presence of the Holy Spirit in the community of believers, to give human consciousness a perfectly true relation to the Infinite, and to make possible thereby the ultimate cognition of Spirit in its absolute infinity" (*Encyk.*, iii. 3).

This passage may seem to be, and is, rather wide of the special interest that lies for us in the Ego as Ego; nevertheless, of exact relation to that Ego it is pretty well full, while in regard to Hegel's main position in the general reference it is most instructive.

To readers generally, *Idee*, Idea, will appear but another form of what is meant by *Begriff*, Notion. *Idee* strictly, however, [redacted]ation intellec-

tually of the *Begriff*. The principle of the universe is, as *Denkendes* (subjective Thinking), *Begriff*; but, as *Gedachtes* (objective Thought), it is *Idee*. The logical *Idee* proper is the system of the categories; but when used more generally, as underlying, for example, not only Logic, but Nature and Spirit, *Idee* is then, so to speak, the diamond (intellectual, ideal) net of all the three. Again, really, when quite popularly used, as in poetical wise or prophetical wise, it is best taken to mean *that whole spectacle*—heaven and earth, and land and sea, and man and beast, and what we think into them! The Idea is what the Son of God saw when the Tempter took him up into an exceeding high mountain, and showed him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them,—only, however, as in its broadest and most figurative sense. To call Spirit an ectype, a copy of the Idea, may seem out of all harmony with Idea in its widest sense; and even as called an actualisation of the Idea, what we conceive as Spirit may be somewhat difficult to realise. Nevertheless, the Spirit that *thinks* the Idea may be allowably named actualisation of it when it is *logical*, and ectype, or copy of it, when it is *real*. At the same time, Hegel's freedom or looseness of speech at times is not to be denied. The passage translated is the opening paragraph of the Zusatz to the short first section of the Philosophie des Geistes; and it is eminently characteristic of Hegel that in only twice as many lines he has no fewer than actually seven synonymes for the single thing that is to him *Geist*. It is *Geist*—it is *Wesen*—it is *das Wahrhafte*—it is *das Allgemeine*—it is *das Substantielle*. And we have just seen that the same thing has at least two names more: it is not only the *Idee*, but it is also the *Unendliche* (the Infinite). Of course, it is to be acknowledged as quite possible for some readers even yet to be honestly

puzzled to comprehend how it is that such a familiar cognition as "I" or as "I-Me" should constitute, in germ, in seed, or in spore, the kernel, and the core, and the substance that is the meaning and the import of all these fine names. We continue our extracts:—

"Zur nähern Vorstellung hiervon" (*i.e.* In completion of the picture as above), "we will refer to the relation that Nature has to Spirit. Nature is held of the Spirit, created by it, and, despite the appearance of its immediateness, that is, despite its seemingly spontaneous, independent self-subsistentness (literally, its independent actuality), it is *in itself* only a consequent, a thing *created*, a thing *ideal* in the Spirit. When, as we advance in the process of knowledge from nature to Spirit, the former appears to be no more than a moment of the latter, this involves no veritable pluralness, no substantial two, whereof one were nature and the other Spirit, but the *Idea*, which is the substance of nature, deepened to Spirit, retains in this infinite intensity of ideality said substance within itself, and is richer by the very element of this ideality which is in and for itself Spirit" (*Phil. of Rel.*, ii. 412).

"This appropriation (absorption, ablation) of the externalè, which belongs to the notion of Spirit, is what we have named its *ideality*. All the faculties of Spirit are nothing but the various modes of the reduction of the outer to the inner, the externalè to the internalè; and only through this reduction, this idealisation or assimilation of the outer, the externalè, is it that Spirit comes to be and is. If we consider Spirit somewhat closer, we find its first and simplest qualifying character to be this,—that it is Ego. Ego is a perfectly simple something, *unal* something (Einfaches), universal something, generic something, all-common something (Allgemeines) [that is, it is of the nature or element of a general idea]; inasmuch, however, as every one is Ego, we name by it only something quite general (Allgemeines). The general nature, generic nature, of the Ego makes (renders it possible) that it can abstract from all and everything, even from its own life. Spirit, however, is not just, like light, this abstract simple singleness, oneness, which it was when we had under consideration the oneness of the soul in contradistinction to the compositeness of the body; Spirit, rather, despite its oneness, is within itself a di[illegible]s: for Ego sets itself over against itself, makes a
out of this—certainly on[illegible]

tion, difference, returns back into unity with itself. This self-unitedness of the Ego, even in its distinguishedness within itself, is the infinity or ideality of it. This ideality, however, first realises itself in the reference of the Ego, in the relation of the Ego, to the infinitely manifold matter that is opposed to it. In that the Ego possesses itself of this matter, it (this matter) gets at the same time to be imbued and transmuted by the universality of the Ego, loses its individualised, self-dependent impenetrability, and assumes a spirituality of existency. Hence, by the endless multiplicity of its flitting ideas, Spirit gets so little distracted or dispersed into a space-like disunitedness out of its own oneness, its own self-identifiedness, that, rather, its indiscerptible Self passes over to penetrate and pervade, in untroubled clearness, said multiplicity, and leaves to it nothing of its apparent independent self-subsistency" (*Encyk.*, iii. 18 seq.).

Nature seems a spontaneous, solid independency there on its own account, and, so to speak, a *First*; nevertheless, it is but secondary and an output of the Spirit. However external and isolated, alien and opaque, nature is still held, as it were, in solution of the Spirit.

No doubt, Hegel's expression must often seem but puerile imbecility, or crude, unaccustomed, inarticulate babble; nevertheless, that expression is as the very aqua regia that penetrates with irresistible causticity into the very core of metaphysic. That, indeed, is simply the new power that Hegel has brought to us.

More than any quotation yet, the last probably will tend to convince of the truth of what has been said about the Ego as the one special and peculiar principle of Hegel. And yet, as we shall see, he would turn his back upon it!

Hegel's peculiar use of the expressions finite and infinite requires to be signalised. Finite is what it is, because it is not all, because it is not alone, but is only partial, only one amongst others. In such position it is *ended*, on all sides *ended*. If, now, infinite is just *not* what is finite, then evidently it must be—simply—*whole*

and sole. Infinite means no more than what is unended: and what is unended is, in one word, *Totality.* That is the word that will most often convey Hegel's *Unendliche* or *Unendlichkeit.* An infinite is totality—totality, self-complete within itself, and left to itself. The reference to matter in nature, as confronting the Ego, will seem brought in unexplained; and as only in an extract it is, so far, no more. Still, it will be seen that there is really some attempt to choose extracts that will more or less suggest Hegel's conjunct survey of his own whole position. Details of Logic, details of either Philosophy of Nature or of Spirit—these are avoided; how we are to look at this entire universe as a whole, that is alone contemplated, and only at the same time in connection with the doctrine proper of the Ego. Even the paragraph of the text that follows next seems, not in any too obscure adumbration, though necessarily briefly, at least to suggest as much:—

"Spirit, however, contents itself not with this—As *finite* Spirit, by means of its inward proper concipient activity, as it were, to transfer the things without into the locale of its internality and take from them their externality only thus in a way that is still itself external; but, as *religious* consciousness, it penetrates through the apparently absolute self-dependentness of things even to that, in their own inner movements and force, the all-comprehending, one, infinite power of God, and completes, as *philosophical* thinking, said idealisation of things in this way that it comprehends the actual manner in which their common principle, the eternal Idea, realises itself in them. Thus the idealistic nature of Spirit, that already acts in the finite Spirit, comes to its completest, concretest form—or thus Spirit itself comes to, and becomes, in comprehending its own self, the actual Idea, and so the Absolute Spirit. Already in the finite Spirit the ideality has the import of a movement that returns to its beginning, through which Spirit, proceeding forward out of its undifferentiatedness—as its first position—to another, the negation of this position, and, by means of this negation of the negation, returning to its own self, demonstrates itself as absolute negativity, that is, as absolute affirmation of itself. And, in agree-

ment with this its nature, we have to see finite Spirit, firstly, in its immediate unity with nature; secondly, in its contrast, contrariety, antithesis to nature; and lastly, in that, again, its unity with nature, which contains within itself said antithesis as withdrawn, and is, through this withdrawn antithesis, mediated,—realised. So taken, finite Spirit comes to be recognised as totality, as Idea, and that as the actual Idea which out of said antithesis returns into itself and is so *for* itself. But in the finite Spirit this return has only its beginning; in the absolute Spirit alone is it completed. For only in it the Idea comprehends itself, neither only in the one-sided form of the notion or subjectivity, nor yet in the equally one-sided form of objectivity or actuality, but in the complete unity of these its separate moments, that is, in its absolute truth" (p. 20).

It is to be confessed that this is meant by Hegel as an adumbration of the whole course of his treatment of the Philosophy of Spirit that is now in hand—from Anthropology and Psychology, through Ethics and Politics, to Religion and Philosophy; but it is capable, for all that, of a perfectly general application, and it is in this perfect generality of view that we should wish that the serpent of eternity, which self-consciousness is, should be seen as the underlying, prescriptive, and determinative form of all. We confess also that, in all probability, it is only a long familiarity of use that will avail in the end to recommend, not only to the intelligence but even to the admiration of the reader, statements so extraordinary as these, couched, too, in a phraseology so unusual, and evidently conveying a meaning at the same time so much more unusual still. To the unaccustomed reader that must be so, and he will find himself quite unable to believe that any man of common sense should ever trouble his head to look at any such things twice. The fact is, however, that precisely such things are so incisively descriptive that it almost requires force to tear oneself away from the translating more of them, of which this Introduction

(Hegel's) is most temptingly full. But our present business is with the simple Ego as precisely the principle of Hegel, the constructive principle of his entire system, his Begriff, and what he calls *the* Begriff. There can be no completer unity than the unity of the Ego; and yet in the midst of that unity there is an invisible dividing-line. When you say "I," you do not name, as it were, an ace, an abstract oneness, a bare, dry, rigorous unit. An ace is an ace, an x is an x, a dot is a dot, a book is a book; each of them, ace, x, dot, book, is an absolutely single. But "I" is double; "I" means "I"-"I," or "I"-"Me." Now, it is the invisible hair-split in that duplicity, or *quasi*-duplicity, that is the centre of movement in the universe. The Ego is fabled to feel that dividedness in itself, and, in seeking to remove or level out the contradiction of it, really to create—not God—not the Absolute Ego, which never was not and always will be—but you and me, and the world within, and the world without. It is that hair-split, too, that is the source of all evil in the universe, evil physical, evil moral, pain, sin—but then *to* this—that is, that this be seen and understood, the hair-split, the contradiction, must be suitably *dressed*. "This determination belongs to Spirit as such; it holds good of it, therefore, not only so far as it simply relates itself to itself, is Ego that has itself as object, but so far also as it steps out of its abstract Selfness, and sets into itself a determinate difference, another than it is" (27).

In the article "Glauben und Wissen," in the *Critical Journal* of 1802, there occurs this (*W. W.*, i. 13): "The Kantian and Fichtian Philosophies have certainly reached the Notion, but not the Idea." Many years—at least a quarter of a century—afterwards Hegel will presently appear to have made the same reference. We put a sufficiently telling expression first:—

"Ego, as this absolute negativity, is *an sich* the identity in the otherwiseness [of its object]; Ego is it itself, and grasps over the object [its content] as what is taken up into it, is *one side* of the relation and *the whole relation*,—*the light* that manifests itself and at the same time the other" (the object lit). "The Ego must be conceived as the individually determinate universal—the universal that, in its determinateness, in its *dif-ference*, relates, refers itself only to its own self. In this it already lies that the Ego is immediately *negative* reference to itself,—consequently, as abstracted from all determinateness [as of content], the direct immediate or unmediated counterpart of its universality,—and that is therefore the equally *abstract*, *simple* (unal) *singleness*. Not merely *we*—the lookers-on—distinguish the Ego in this manner into its opposed moments, but,—by force of its own—*within itself* universal (allgemeinen)—consequently, *from itself* distinguished—singleness, the *Ego itself* is this *Self-from-self distinguishedness*; for as referent of itself to itself, its exclusive singleness excludes itself from itself,—from the singleness, then;—and sets (realises) itself thereby as, immediately closed together with it, the contrary of itself, as Universality (Allgemeinheit). The qualification that is essential to the Ego of abstractly all-general singleness [of being the abstractly universal singular] constitutes, however, its *beingness* [As in reference to *universal*, *particular*, and *singular*, very evidently, the very *isness* of the Ego is that it is the general, the universal, the all-common *Singular*]. I and my being [my beingness, my am-ness, the fact that I am] are therefore inseparably united with each other; the distinction of my being from me is a distinction that is none.—The Ego is therefore being, or has being as moment within it. If I set this being as *another* to me, and at the same time as *identical* with me, I am *Wissen* [knowing, knowledge, cognition], and have the absolute *Gewissheit* [knownness] of my being." [If the *act* of me is that I think, and the *fact* of me is that I am, then *act* and *fact*, though *different*, are also *identical*.]—Only in that I come to know myself as Ego does the other become objective to me, put itself over against me, and at the same time become ideally *set* or realised in me, and consequently brought back to unity with me. So it is that Ego has been compared above to *light*. As *light* is the manifestation of its self and of its other, the *dark*, and only thereby *can* manifest *itself*, that it manifests its other; so also the Ego only is in so far as it manifests itself, in so far as to it its other becomes manifest in the shape of a something *Independent of it*."

"**The Kantian philosophy** regards the Ego as a Referring to a

Something elsewhere that in its abstract designation is termed the Thing-in-itself, and only in the like finiteness does it regard as well intelligence as will. When, indeed, in the notion of the *reflecting* judgment, it comes to the Idea of Spirit, of subject-objectivity, of *a percipient understanding*, etc., as also to the Idea of nature,—why, then, this idea itself gets reduced again to a mere supposition, namely, to a subjective maxim.—The Fichtian philosophy has the same standpoint, and non-Ego is determined only as *object* of the Ego, only as in consciousness. Both philosophies show, therefore, that they are not come to the Notion (Begriff) and not to the Spirit (Geist), as it is *in and for itself*, but only as it is in reference to another. In reference to Spinosism, on the other hand, it is to be observed that, in the judgment whereby it constitutes itself as *Ego*, as free subjectivity counter determinateness [any determining content], Spirit steps out of *Substance*; and Philosophy, in that to it this judgment is absolute determination of Spirit, steps out of Spinosism" (*Encyk.*, iii. 249–254).

Accentuating the marvellous pregnancy of what is said (triply) here, we remark of the *two* references to Kant and Fichte, so wide apart in time as they are, that there is a certain *difference* between them. The last allegation is that neither Kant nor Fichte had reached the *Notion*, while what we saw first (see p. 340) was the admission that the same philosophers *had* reached the *Notion*, but not the *Idea*. Now, if we assume that, when Hegel admitted for both of them the *Notion*, he had in mind the start of Kant as well as of Fichte from the Ego, as also that, when again he denied as much, he meant such development from the same principle on his own part as converted it into something different,—if, I say, we assume this, we shall see that denial of the Notion as development at last was quite on a par with denial of the Idea, the realised, developed Notion, at first. From the apparent differences of the statements, then, there can be no conclusion as to difference in principle at either period; while the remark at each throws its own light on two such cardinal and essential terms as Notion and Idea.

It is to be feared, however, that there is not as yet in the passages translated any satisfaction for the unaccustomed reader. There is still this to encourage him, that at least somebody else has thought so much of these extraordinary, almost evanescent, distinctions, as to have spent years and years in the following of them out. Our one object at present, however, is to illustrate the fact that the Notion, the principle of Hegel, is simply the Ego; and to that we shall draw closer and closer.

Already, in said early article of 1802, Hegel will be found (as p. 23) to be perfectly aware that it is from "the original unity of apperception," which in other words is the "original unity of self-consciousness" (and that is the Ego)—that it is from this unity as principle that Kant takes his start; while a year earlier, in Fichte's reference, he spoke thus (*W. W.*, i. 163): "The pure thinking of one's self, the identity of subject and object, in the form Ego = Ego, is principle of the Fichtian system."

In respect to earliness of date, we may quote an expression or two from the *Phaenomenologie*:—

"The understanding is thought (Denken), the pure Ego.—It comes all to this, That the truth be recognised and expressed, not exclusively as substance, but equally as subject.—The process, the mediation, is nothing else than the self-actuating self-identity with self, or it is the reflection into itself, the moment of the self-dependent Ego, the pure negativity.—In such propositions the truth is popularly put as subject, but not expressed as the movement of the self-into-self reflection.—The absolute form, the *immediate certainty* of itself.—It is the energy of thought, of the pure Ego.—They regarded the principle of movement as the negative indeed, but not as the self.—Space is that existency in which the Notion inscribes its differences [its three dimensions].—Time is the Notion itself, sensibly existent" (pp. 11, 14, 16, 17, 20, 25, 28, 33, 35).

In general we may say of the celebrated, deep-going Preface to the *Phaenomenologie*, that it is full of the declaration that the Notion is Ego; but still this

declaration, in the main, is hardly quite literal or direct. As come to, or personified, in some one or other of its later realisations, the Ego is always, even when named, really only metaphorically put, and that is, misleadingly put.

In the above quotations, limiting themselves, as they do, to the mere reference to the Notion as Ego, or the Ego as Notion, it will occur to suggest itself that consultation of the original will throw a much ampler light. For example, it is said (*W. W.*, i. 23) that the answer to Kant's cardinal question, "How are synthetic judgments *à priori* possible?" is this: "They are possible through the original absolute identity of differents"—and that is simply the Ego.

"The having a design (an intention, a purpose), just as *state* of the Subject, is against the Totality [as the Subject's Whole]; so the Subject will remove this form: it will *realise* the design. But now the realised design is possession of the Subject; the Subject has itself in it—its own self it has objectified—it has given itself remission from its oneness, but yet in the resultant pluralness maintained itself. This is the notion of design."

"Kant says, this proof exhibits God only as an Architect, not as a Creator; it applies only to the *contingency* of the forms, not to the *substance*. This quality, says Kant, is only form, and the agency at work were one only that dealt in forms, not one that created matter. The distinction is of no account. The production of form is utterly impossible without the production of matter. Once we have the *Notion* we are far above the difference of form and matter; we know then that absolute *form* is something *real*" [namely, the Ego]!

"The *content* of this form is, The world is designful; *particular* designfulnesses concern us not. Design is the Notion, not as in the finite things only—it is *the absolute determination of the Notion*; it is God's Notion, God's quality. God is power, self-determination; and that is, He determines Himself—designfully."

"The Notion is the inmost nature of the Subject."

"Finitude implies this, That *the* difference is difference generally."

"Then is the true universal, when, through the particular, it unites itself with itself—when it unites itself with itself through interposition of the particular, of its determi- as of its stepping

out of itself, and through suppression of this particularity returns again to itself. This negation of the negation is the absolute form, the veritably infinite subjectivity, the reality in its infinitude."

"God is this: To distinguish Himself from Himself, to be object to Himself, but in this difference to be absolutely identical with Himself—der Geist."

"This infinite elasticity of that which is, To sunder itself within itself, to make itself object to itself—this is the Notion, the Notion of the Idea, the absolute Idea, the reality which is now the Spirit for the Spirit. Self-manifestation belongs to the very being of Spirit. A Spirit that is not manifested, is none. Spirit is just this to *appear*—to or for itself *appear*. This is its act and its livingness: it is its one act, and Spirit itself is only its own act" (*Phil. of Rel.*, ii. 27, 36, 40, 57, 72, 183, 191, 197, and so on here *passim*).

"The world of partialities, temporalities, mutabilities, perishablenesses, is not the *Truth*. That, the Truth, is the infinite, the eternal, the immutable. These, the divine ground-lines,—infinity, eternity, immutability,—are at least the æther in which God dwells" [such expression as this enables us very vividly to realise—what generally is rather perplexing—the position of the Eleatics] (427).

"Speculative unity is where the necessity is concrete, at once through self and another that is self" (470).

"One's own inner conviction is independent of others agreeing with it. It, conviction—be it belief, be it cognition of thought—does indeed take its beginning from without, from authority, from instruction and the learning of things; but it is essentially a *self-re-innering*, a *self-re-MEMBER-ing* of Spirit within itself; that itself be satisfied is *formal* freedom, and the one moment before which all authority sinks. But that it be satisfied *in the thing itself*—that is *real* freedom, and the other moment before which equally all authority sinks: these are in truth inseparable" (403).

"The Notion requires for its actualisation no spur from without. Its own proper nature, in unrest from this that it holds within it the contradiction of unity and disunity (identity and difference)—its own proper nature impels it to realise itself, impels it, as regards the difference that is present only idealiter (that is, that is present in it only in the contradictory form of difference-lessness)—impels it to explicate this difference into an actual difference, and, through this removal of its oneness as a want, a one-sidedness, actually to make itself the whole, of which, as at first, it only implied the possibility." "In philosophical science the Notion itself sets a

limit to its self-development in this way, that it gives itself an actuality fully correspondent to it. In the living things without we already see this self-limitation of the Notion. The embryo of the plant—this sensibly existent Notion—closes its evolution with an actuality that is like to it, with production of the seed. It is the same with the Spirit; it, too, in its development, has reached its goal when the notion of it has perfectly realised itself, or—what is the same thing—when the Spirit has attained to complete consciousness of its notion. This self drawing together into unity of its beginning with its end—this, in its realisation, coming of the Notion to itself appears, nevertheless, in a completer form in the case of Spirit than in that of the mere external living things; for, while in these the produced seed is not the same with the one from which it was produced, the produced Spirit in the self-cognising Spirit is one and the same with the producing one" (*Encyk.*, iii. 10).

"Spirit, despite its oneness, is also within itself difference; for Ego sets itself over against itself, makes itself object for itself, and from this its difference from itself returns again into unity with itself" (19).

"Only completed philosophy is the cognition and recognition of the universe as within itself an organic whole which, developing itself out of its own notion and, in its self-referent necessity, returning to the totality within itself, closes itself with itself as a *one* world of truth."

"The general *ground* is illustrated by this, that the *Beautiful* has come to be recognised as one of the mediating ideas which resolve and restore to unity the contrariety and contradiction of Spirit and nature as individually apart. It was the Kantian philosophy that had already not only a feeling in regard to this uniting point in its necessity, but had even definitely recognised it and brought it to be currently thought of. Just in general, Kant, as well for intelligence as for will, made the basis to be self-referent reason, freedom (free-will), consciousness that knows itself as totality within itself; and, indeed, this recognition of the absoluteness of reason within itself, which, for philosophy in these days, has constituted the turning-point—this absolute starting-point is to be recognised and not rejected, as on the part of the Kantian philosophy however otherwise excepted to. But in that Kant fell back again into the fixed antithesis of subjective thinking here and objective things there, of abstract universality of the will on the one hand, and its sense-singularity on the other, it was specially he who accentuated morality as what was highest, putting generally, indeed, the

practical side of mind before the theoretical. In consequence of this fixedness of the antithesis assumed by the understanding, there was nothing left him but to propose, as well unity only in the form of subjective ideas of reason (for which any adequate reality were incapable of proof), as also postulates which, truly, were to be deduced from practical reason, but whose substantial validity was for him unreachable of thought, and whose practical fulfilment remained a mere *should-be* and *was-to-be* perpetually put off into infinity. And so Kant certainly brought the reconciled contradiction into view, but could neither scientifically explicate its true principle nor yet demonstrate it as what was alone and in very truth actual. Kant, indeed, pressed still further forward, in so far as he recovered the desired unity in what he called *the intuitive understanding*; but even here, again, he remains standing by the contradiction between the subject and its objectivity in such manner that he certainly mentions the abstract solution of the antithesis between notion and reality, universality and particularity, understanding and sense, but again treats this solution and reconciliation as merely *subjective*, and not as in itself absolutely true and real. In this reference his *Critique of Judgment*, that considers that faculty as æsthetically and teleologically applied, is instructive and remarkable. The beautiful objects of nature and of art, the designful products of nature, through which Kant is brought up to the notion of organisation and life, are considered by him only from the point of view of a Reflection that subjectively regards them. In fact, Kant expressly defines judgment 'as the faculty that thinks the particular as subsumed under the general,' and terms judgment a *reflecting* one 'when there is only given it a particular for which it has to find the universal.' For this, judgment requires a law, a principle, which it has to give itself; and as this law Kant sets up *Design*. In the case of the notion of free-will in practical reason, fulfilment of the end-aim remains standing in the mere *To-be-to*; but in the teleological judgment, again, as in respect of objects animate, Kant comes so to consider the living organism that the notion, the universal, holds under it the particular, and as end-aim, purpose, determines the particular and external, the disposition of the members, not from without, but from within out, and in such wise that the particular of itself shall correspond to the end, the purpose, the design. Still, with such judgment, again, the objective nature of the thing in regard is not to be supposed realised, but only a state of subjective reflection announced. Similarly, Kant conceives the *æsthetic* judgment *so*

that it proceeds neither from the understanding as such (as faculty of notions), nor from sense-perception and its complex variety as such, but from the free play of understanding and imagination together. In this harmony of the cognitive faculties the object is referred to the subject, and the subject's feeling of pleasure and satisfaction."

"Der Schein selbst ist dem Wesen wesentlich—Appearance, show, is essential to essential being" (*Aesthet.*, i. 32, 72–75, 12).

What regards Kant in the above is so fine in its incisiveness and so complete in its truth that one has a special pleasure in quoting it, and all the more when one considers what is concerned. Several of Hegel's most peculiar ideas are there salient, and with acceptable reference to their source. The necessity of *Schein* to the *Wesen*, of the particular to the universal, is genuinely Hegelian.

"The *Infinite Reflection* consists in this, that I refer myself, not to anything else, but only to myself,—that I am my own self's object. This *pure* referring of myself to myself is the Ego, the root of the Infinite Being's Self. It is complete abstraction from everything that is finite. Ego *qua* Ego, Ego as such, has no matter of content, that is *immediate* (sense-immediate, sensibly immediate)—that is given by nature: for matter of content it has only itself. This pure *form* is to its own self at the same time its *matter* (of content). Every matter of content (object) given by nature is limited; but the Ego is unlimited. Object of nature is *immediate* [a thing there directly, as it were, individually and of itself, face to face before sense]; but the pure Ego has no immediate matter of content,—and for this reason, that it only is by means of the abstraction from everything else, from everything that is other" [and so, I may add, is the *pure negativity*] (*Propaedeutik*, 20 sq.).

We saw, *à propos* of *Encyk.*, 253 sq., the remark of Hegel, that neither Kant nor Fichte had come to the Begriff, though both in effect started from the Ego; but it would be an error to construe this into a denial on the part of Hegel that the Ego and the Begriff were one: Hegel's Begriff is conditioned, so to speak, by the

personality of the Ego, and neither Kant nor Fichte had ever risen to that.

From the early pages of the *Philosophy of History* we may extract as follows:—

"The deficiency that Socrates saw in the principle of Anaxagoras does not concern the principle itself, but the want in the application of it to nature, that nature was not understood, comprehended from the principle, that the principle remained abstract, that nature was not conceived as a development from it, not as an organisation produced from reason" (16).

"Reason is thought that in perfect freedom determines its own self" (17).

"The opinion now, the inveterate prejudice, that it is impossible to know God!" (19).

"God has revealed himself in the Christian Religion—given us to know what he is: so that he is no longer something secret, something hidden from us. With this possibility to know God, there is now imposed on us the *duty* to know him" (14).

"If gravity is the substance of matter, freedom it is that is the substance of Spirit—Spirit is just that that has its centre within itself—Spirit is within itself and by itself. Matter has its substance outside of it; Spirit is that which has its dwelling-place in its own self. Precisely that is freedom, and freedom of will; for if I am dependent, then I relate myself to another than myself, to another which I am not. I am free when I am by and to myself alone" (22).

"Only in Christianity came we to the consciousness that man *as* man is free, that the freedom of the Spirit constitutes his inmost, own-most nature. This consciousness first took being in religion, in the innermost sanctuary of the Spirit, but to infuse this principle into the world without, that was an other work which to realise and carry out demanded the long hard schooling of civilisation and culture" (23).

"Spirit conscious of its freedom, that is the end-aim of the universe.—This end-aim is alone what achieves itself and accomplishes itself, the sole stability in the vicissitude of all events and conditions, as well as what veritably moves in them. This end-aim is what God wills with the world" (24 sq.).

"Subjectively to know and to will is to think. But if I thinkingly know and thinkingly will, then it is the universal that I will, the substantiality of reason itself" (61).

"Inasmuch as the metaphysical coherence—that is, the coherence

in the Notion—of these forms belongs to Logic, we cannot discuss it here. Only the main moments concerned require mention.

"In philosophy it is shown that the Idea proceeds to *the* Infinite Antithesis. This is that, first, to the Idea in its free generality, in which it remains by itself, and, secondly, that of the Idea as purely abstract reflection into itself, which is formal selfness, Ego, formal freedom (free-will), which is only appurtenant to Spirit. The Idea is thus as substantial filling on the one side, and as the *abstract* moment of self-will on the other side. This reflection into itself is the individual self-consciousness, the other to the Idea, and so in absolute finitude. This other is just so finitude, determinateness, for the one all-common absolute: it is the side of its empirical existency, the stage of its formal reality, the stage also of the honour of God. To apprehend the absolute plan of this antithesis is the deep task of metaphysic. Further, with this finitude there is implied all particularness. The formal will [will just as the *form* that will as will is, *matter* apart] wills its own self; this Ego shall be in all that it purposes and does. This extreme, existent *per se* in difference from the absolute, universal Wesen [call it *Ens*] is a particular, knows the particular, and wills it; it is on the standpoint of the appearance, the manifestation. It is here that the particular ends and aims fall, in that the individuals lay themselves into their particularity, full-fill it and realise it. This standpoint, then, is also that of fortune or misfortune. He is fortunate who has his existence in agreement with his particular character, general purpose, and personal wish, and so, consequently, in the state appointed him, enjoys himself. History is not the stage of fortune (fortunateness). The periods of good fortune (happiness, peace) are blank leaves in it; for they are the periods of accord, of the failing antithesis. The reflection into self, this freedom, is abstractly the formal moment of the *action* of the absolute Idea. This action [activity, principle that acts] is the middle term of the syllogism, whose one extreme is the universal, the Idea, which rests in the inner adytum of the Spirit; the other is externality as externality, confronting matter. The principle that so acts is the middle that renders the universal and inner into objectivity" (33 sq.).

We give this last passage with considerable apprehension and doubt, for one sees in it so many of these phrases that must fail of their mark, and any mark, to any one who is unaccustomed to carry them home to their true import. Never [illegible] as a summating passage,

it is at once full and incisive; and, what is in place here, it takes its explanation from the Ego. It has been translated literally, but, the reader may depend upon it, meaningly. There shall follow now a number of very striking and unmistakable passages from the *History of Philosophy*:—

"To take up science as it is there given, and form oneself into it, and just thereby form *it* further, and so raise it to a higher standpoint—that is the position of our and every other age: even in that we make it for ourselves ours, we make out of it also, or we make just it itself, something new, compared with what it was."

"What is most essential here, then, is to know that the One Truth is a thought determined within itself, and not merely a blank single one." "The product of thought is thought; but a *thought* (Gedanke) is still merely formal; *notion* (Begriff) is the more specialised Gedanke; *Idea*, again, is the Gedanke, thought in its totality and specific element, and absolute characterisation proper."

"An act or action is just this, to have in it or within it the opposed moments. These are *initself*-ness and *for-its*-self-ness (Ansichseyn and Fürsichseyn), potentiality and actuality. This unity of opposites is what the concrete is. The whole is concrete; but this opposite that is the subject, and that other that is the product—they, too, are, each of them, concrete."

"The Infinite Form is what we name *thinking*. As this thinking is, as subjective, firstly, mine (seeing I think), and secondly, the universality (Allgemeinheit) as well, which holds in it the intellectual substantiality: so it is, thirdly, the forming activity (the principle of determination)."—"In that thought is this universality, the element of substantiality, and at the same time Ego (thought is the *Initself*, and exists as a free subject), so the universal has immediate existence and presence."

"Here it were in place now to consider *the speculative idea* (of the Universal with the Singular), how it is authenticated as absolute unity; but this, truly, is not found to have occurred to the Ancients —to apprehend the Notion itself (to *be-grip* the *Begriff* itself). The understanding, organised as a universe, that realises itself into a system, this pure Notion (Begriff), we have not to expect on their part."

"With the νοῦς we have now the principle of the understanding, a self-determining, self-realising principle: that was wanting to

Heraclitus, whose principle—Becoming, which is no more than process—was as mere destiny, fate, not yet that that self-subsistently determined itself" (vol. i. 14, 32, 36, 163, 164, 354, 355).

"Thought, as but the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras, had not as yet any filling (matter of content, realisation), seeing that that [the actual world] stood on the other side, . . . but in Philosophy this is important, that, though the Ego is the principle that creates and realises, yet the created and realised content [materialisation] of thought in its process is the absolute object."

"The notion (Begriff), which *reason* (in Anaxagoras) had discovered as the absolute principle, is the simple (unal) negative in which all that is determinate, all that is existent and individual, sinks and disappears" [the Ego, namely].

"This is the notion of the true universal in its movement: the *Genus*, which in its own self is its own process, in that, what it becomes *for itself*, it, beforehand, already, *in itself*, is;—a movement in which it does not quit itself: this absolute genus is the Geist (Spirit), whose movement is the constant return into itself; so that there is nothing *for* it which is not already *in* it."

"Just as the body no longer exists if we take from it gravity, so the soul no longer exists if we take from it thought. Thought is the act of the universal, which, however, is not an abstractum, but the reflecting of itself into itself, the setting of itself equal to itself, and this takes place in all our conceptions and general ideas."

"The self to self referent negativity, the negation of the negation, and so the infinite affirmation" (vol. ii. 4, 5, 179, 182, 475).

"Philosophy reaches now the standpoint that self-consciousness in thought knows itself as the absolute. . . . This idea that had come into men, that the Absolute Being is not for self-consciousness anything alien, that nothing for it is substantiality in which self-consciousness has not its immediate self, this principle we see now appear as the universal principle of the World-Spirit, as the general belief and knowledge of all men; it alters at once the entire aspect of the world, cancels all that has hitherto been, and brings into being a new birth of the universe. . . . Men abandon the world because they can no longer find anything in it—that, reality, they find now only in themselves. As all the gods assemble in a one Pantheon, so all religions precipitate themselves into a one religion, all ways of thinking absorb themselves in one; it is this, that ***self-consciousness***—an actual man—is ***the Absolute Being***. . . . The true emancipation of Spirit is realised in Christianity, for in it Spirit comes to its Wesen, to its true inner being. What the Absolute

Being is, is now revealed to men : it is a man, but not yet the man or Self-consciousness as Self-consciousness. . . . This knowledge that self-consciousness is the Absolute, or that the Absolute is self-consciousness, is now the World-Spirit. . . . With Aristotle the *ἐνέργεια*, as the Thinking that thinks its self, is the Concrete. . . . God now is no longer known as that abstract God, but as concrete within Himself, and this concrete is precisely Spirit. God lives—is the one, and the other, and their unity in their difference ; for what is abstract is isolatedly one ; but a life has within its own self the difference, and yet is one with itself. . . . In Christianity the name of God is not restricted to the Supreme Substance ; but the Son is a necessary element in the true being of God. What God is, then, He is only as Spirit ; and that is the unity of the moments named [God, Son, Spirit]. . . . This is not to be understood so that, as is usually said, God is a Spirit that is outside of the world and outside of self-consciousness, but that His existence, in that He is self-conscious Spirit, is simply the actual self-consciousness itself. . . . The Absolute Being in Thought is Thought itself : God is not outside—a Beyond—of consciousness. . . . Those who are convinced that the Absolute Being in Thought is not Thought itself, always assert that God is outside—a Beyond—of consciousness, that the thought of Him is the notion of Him, but that His existence or actuality is quite another thing : just as when we think of or figure to ourselves an animal or a stone, our notion of it, or our current idea of it, is something quite other than the thing itself—as if that, the thing itself, were the truth. But the question is not of this sensible animal, but of its true being ; and that is the notion of it. The true being of the animal, its universal, is not present in the animal as its true being, its universal, but only as in union with its sensible individuality, as a mode of the universal : as universal it is our notion that in fact is alone true, while what is of sense is negative. So our notion of the Absolute Being is that Being's self, if it is the notion of the Absolute Being, and not of anything else. But in this Being God is not summed ; for He is not only Wesen, or His notion, but His existence. His existence, as pure Wesen, is our thinking of Him ; but His real existence is nature. In this real existence Ego [is only *ego*] is only a single thinking individual, appurtenant to this existence as moment of it, but not constitutive of it. Transition must be made from the existence of the Wesen as Wesen to existence, to real existence as such. As such existence God is certainly a Beyond of the individual self-consciousness, and that, first, as Wesen or pure thought, and, again, in so far as He, in respect of

actuality, is nature. . . . The νοῦς is precisely the finding of its self for its self: it is the pure duad—its self and its object; it contains all that is thought; it is this differentiatingness, but pure such, that remains at the same time identical with itself [and that is Ego]. . . . That for man, in that he is recipient of the Divine, there must be also as existent fact the identity of human and divine nature—that in Christo has been made known to men in sensible-wise; in Him the divine and the human nature being implicitly One. In the world, then, this itself has taken place, that the Absolute has been revealed as the Concrete: and that, too, not only in thought in universal-wise as intelligible world, but in that it has proceeded to its final intensity within itself: and so it is an absolute Self, Ego—the absolute universal, the concrete universal, that God is. . . . This error springs from this, that we think only of a form of the second kind, and not of the necessary, first, and eternal form which is form of all forms, and of all forms source. . . . Ego has here the sense of Thought, not that of the individuality of self-consciousness, . . . and Thought is the absolutely universal, but not merely because I can abstract, but simply because Ego is this unity, this identity with itself. . . . In Descartes there was not yet any thought of the need to develop the differences from the '*Ich denke*'; it was Fichte was the first to go to that—out of this punctum of absolute certainty of knowledge to derive all the determinations. . . . Development from the Begriff was initiated by Fichte. . . . From it (the Kantian Philosophy) sprang the Fichtian Philosophy, which speculatively conceived the Wesen (the primitive principle) of self-consciousness as concrete Egoity, but never got out of this subjective form of the Absolute. From this Schelling's philosophy starts, then presently throws it out, and sets up the Idea of the Absolute. . . . This want shows itself in Spinosa and Schelling in this way, that the necessity fails to appear, whereby the Notion, as the implicit negative of its unity, sets (realises) its sundering into the differences; so that from the unal universal the Real itself gets to be understood. . . . God, then, though only felt and believed, is still the Universal quite abstractly taken,—even in His personality the absolutely universal Personality. . . . The unity is still in itself difference and, despite its difference, still unity: like Ego. . . . The absolute Notion, that thinks itself, that goes into itself—it is that we see, through the Kantian philosophy, appear in Germany; and *so* that all essentiality and truth falls into self-consciousness. Synthetic *à priori* judgments are nothing else than a union [illegible]ugh themselves, or the Absolute

Notion.—In demonstrating that thought has synthetic *à priori* judgments, which are not derived from perceptions of sense, Kant demonstrates thought to be concrete within itself. . . . The first faculty to him is Sense; the second, Understanding; the third, Reason. This he just rehearses so; taking it up quite empirically, without developing it from the Notion, and proceeding only with necessity. . . . The principle of connection is Ego—this is a great consciousness, a most important recognition. That I am the unity, and, as thinking, the principle that reduces to unity—this, however, is not exactly discussed, rigorously demonstrated by Kant. . . . It is a true instinct of the Notion leads Kant to say: The first category is positive; the second, the negative of the first; and the third, the synthetic unity of both. Triplicity, this ancient form of the Pythagoreans, of the Neo-Platonists, and of the Christian Religion, though here a merely external schema, conceals in itself the absolute form, the Notion.—Kant, then, takes up the Categories quite empirically, without a thought of developing them with necessity as *the* differences of *the* unity. Fichte set up the Ego as absolute principle, and so that from it the whole burthen of the universe was to be developed —nowhere does there exist anything further than the Ego, and Ego exists because it exists: what exists is only in the Ego and for the Ego. Still, Fichte has only proposed the Notion: he has not brought it to the realisation of science (knowledge) out of its own self. . . . This concrete Idea is the result of the labours of the Spirit through almost two thousand five hundred years of its most earnest endeavour to become objective to itself, to come to know itself. . . . Self-consciousness thinks itself and attains to the knowledge that *the Absolute Being is self-thinking self-consciousness*. . . . The Absolutely Pure, Infinite Form is "declared to be *Self-consciousness, Ego*" (vol. iii. 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 20, 30, 39, 40, 88, 207, 308, 310, 328, 349, 412, 486, 502, 506, 508, 513, 514, 555, 557, 618, 620, 621).

However numerous these citations from the *History of Philosophy* may appear, they might have been easily, many times, augmented, and quite righteously followed by a *passim*. So far as evidence is concerned, they will probably prove exhaustively complete, too. Still, we think it right to add, by way of confirmation, some other citations from other works:—

"**From the Notion (Begriff)** in the speculative sense there is to be **distinguished what has been** ordinarily named notion (Begriff). . . .

When I say *I*, I mean me as this single, perfectly distinct, one person. In effect, however, I intimate thereby nothing special of myself. 'I' is equally also everybody else, and even in designating myself as '*I*,' though I mean of course me, this single individual, I name, nevertheless, at the same time, what is completely a universal (Allgemeines, All-common). I, Ego, is the pure personality (Für-sichseyn) in which every particular is negated and absorbed, this ultimate, singleness, and pure oneness of consciousness. We may say that Ego and Thought are the same, or more precisely that Ego is Thought as the thing that thinks. . . . All things are particulars where each Particular closes itself together as a Universal in unity with the Singular; but then, the impotence of nature is such that it is unable to represent the logical forms in purity.—It is the business of a Philosophy of Nature to enable us to perceive the true forms of the Notion in the things of Nature.—We usually fancy that the Absolute must be in a far-away Beyond from us; but it is precisely that which is just present to us, what, as thinking beings, but without, so to say, any express consciousness of it, we carry with us and apply. . . . God alone is the true agreement of the Notion and the reality; all finite things have in them an untruth—they have a notion and an existence; but their existence is incommensurable with their notion. So it is that they must perish; for in their perishing the incongruity of their notion and their existence gets manifested. The animal as an individual has its notion in its genus, and the genus frees itself from individualness by death. . . . Finite, formally expressed, is what has an end (finem), what *is*, but ceases there where it comes into touch with another, and so is bound, limited, restricted by it. The finite has being, therefore, in relation to its other, which is its negation, and bears itself as its limit. But thought is by and to itself, relates itself to itself, and has itself for an object. When I have a thought for object, I am by myself (chez moi-même). I, Ego, Thought, Thinking, is accordingly infinite [and that just means totality, while finite correspondently means partiality], because, in thinking, it refers itself to an object that is itself. An object as such is an other, a negative, to me. If thought thinks its own self, it has then an object which is at the same time none, that is to say, one which is neutralised and only is ideal-wise. Thought, then, as such, has in its purity no limit within itself. . . . Kant's allegation, then, is that the categories have their source in the Ego, and that, accordingly, it is the Ego gives the forms of universality and necessity.—That, then, is what Kant calls Pure Apperception. . . . All finite is this, and only

this, that its existence is different from its notion. It is expressly God that can be thought 'only as existing.' That unity of notion and being it is which constitutes the notion of God. . . . The conception of an *intuitive understanding, inward* design, is the *Universal* thought at the same time as itself *concrete*. In these conceptions alone shows itself, therefore, the Kantian Philosophy speculative. Many, for example, Schiller— . . . As result of Kant's reflections over the various stages of consciousness, it is there intimated that the outcome of what we know is only appearance in manifestation. This result is so far to be agreed with as finite thinking has certainly only to do with appearances, manifestations (of something else). But with this finding of appearance (mere manifestation), all that is to be accomplished is not yet accomplished; but there is a still higher land, which, however, for the Kantian Philosophy, remains as yet an inaccessible Beyond. Whilst, at best in this philosophy, the principle has been proposed that thought determines itself out of its own self, but the *how* and the *how far* of this determination of thought has not yet been demonstrated by Kant; it is Fichte, on the other hand, who has seen this want, and in speaking out the demand for a deduction of the Categories, has at the same time made the attempt really to accomplish as much. The Fichtian Philosophy makes the Ego the starting-point of the philosophical development, and the categories shall yield themselves as the result of its action. But now the Ego here is not really as free, spontaneous principle of action, inasmuch as it is considered to be called into action only by an obstacle (Anstoss) from without. Against this obstacle, now, then, the Ego shall be supposed to react, and so, by this reaction, attain to a consciousness over its own self.—The nature of this Anstoss remains, withal, an unknown Without, and the Ego is always a conditionedness which has another opposed to it. And so Fichte remains standing by the result of the Kantian philosophy that only the Finite is to be known, while the Infinite is beyond thought. What to Kant is the Thing-in-itself, that is to Fichte the obstacle, the Anstoss, from without, this abstractum of another, of something that is other than the Ego, which has no other province than that of the negative or the non-Ego generally. Ego is in this way considered as standing in relation with the Non-Ego, through which its Self-determination is first awakened into action, and that *so* that Ego is only the continuous effort of the freeing of itself from the Anstoss, without attaining, nevertheless, to any actual freedom, inasmuch as, with the surcease of the Anstoss, the Ego, which, in fact, in what it is, is no more than its action,

would itself surcease. Further, now, the matter of content to which the action of the Ego gives rise is no other than the usual one of experience as such, only with the addition that this matter of content is merely Appearance (as in manifestation). . . . When the Singular (individuality) as Ego, *Personality*—that is, so far as it is not an *empirical* Ego, a *particular* personality that is understood—especially when the Personality of God is before consciousness, the question then is of *pure personality*, that is, of the (as within its own self) *Universal Personality*: and that is a thought, and only comes to thought. [Thus *Personality* to Hegel is here a direct declaration: there is to him an '*in sich allgemeine Persönlichkeit*,' but necessarily, as not possibly any actual James or John, or who else, only for *thought*, not for eyesight, not for any literal perception of special sense; one may add in this reference a citation or two more]. . . . The simple religious consciousness speaks of the eternal and inviolable decrees of God, His determinate counsels. In his difference from God, man, with his personal opinions and volitions, follows humour and caprice, and so then it happens to him that there eventuates from his actions something quite different from what he intended or wished, whereas God knows what He wills, is not determined in His will by inner or outer chance, and accomplishes what He wills resistlessly. . . . The fullest is the concretest and most *subjective*, and what withdraws itself into its simplest depth is the mightiest and the most prevailing. The extremest, most pointed of points, is *The Pure Personality*. . . . In all the higher religions, especially in the Christian, God is the Absolute One Substance, but He is at the same time Subject, and that is further. As man has personality, so there is in God the attribute of Subjectivity, Personality, Spirit — Absolute Spirit. . . . The eternal life of the Christian is the Spirit of God, and the Spirit of God is just this, that He is conscious of Himself as this Spirit. . . . In the religion of the Absolute Spirit the form of God is not taken from the human. God Himself, in the true idea, is, as Absolute Self-Consciousness, Spirit, produces Himself" (*Encyk.*, i. 15, 47, 50, 52, 63, 91, 112, 117, 124, 129, 294; *Log.*, iii. 349; *Phil. of Rel.*, i. 392, 394, 452).

We have just seen it said that "Kant's allegation is that the categories have their source in the Ego, and that it is the Ego gives the forms of universality and necessity"; and I know not that Hegel has ever said anything else in the same reference. Two pages earlier (at p. 89) he had already expressed himself thus: "This

(Kantian) philosophy specifies the *Original Identity* of the Ego in Thinking (the Transcendental Unity of Self-consciousness) as the special ground proper of the Categories." When, however, one casts a thought back upon that part of the *Kritik of Pure Reason* that concerns the Psychological Idea, and the Paralogisms of Pure Reason that are alleged to flow from it, one is apt to feel somewhat surprised to find so substantial a rôle, as this is of Ego to Hegel, attributed to what was so airy and evanescent as the mere breathing, the mere dot on the *i*, of Ego to Kant. Although the Ego, however, is to Kant—when he expressly refers to it in the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, sec. 24, Remark, and afterwards in connection with the Paralogisms—no more than is said in the translation of Schwegler (Note), namely, That "the simple reflection, 'I Am' or 'I think,'" as Kant himself names it, "is neither perception nor notion, but a mere consciousness falsely converted into a thing,"—although this is true, yet, when all is compared, there can be no doubt that it is right to allow Kant to make of the Ego in the particular reference all that Hegel says he makes of it. Every act of judgment, and the categories are all judgments, implies the synthetic function of Apperception. And so, consequently, the categories can be called, if not functions of Apperception, at least functions of judgment under the unity of Apperception.

"Thus the principle of Selfness fully develops itself. I, as unal, allgemein (all-common, universal), as thought, am relation or correlation as such; in that I am for me, self-consciousness, the relations (between) shall also be for me. To the thoughts, conceptions, which I make to belong to me, to them I give the quality which I myself am. I am this single point; and that which is for me, I will, in this singleness of unity, distinguish. . . . Speculative philosophy is the consciousness of the Idea in such wise that all is apprehended as Idea; the Idea, however, is the Truth in Thought, not in mere perception or conception. That truth is this, that it is ***concrete***; what is is within itself double, and so that the two sides of it

are *opposed categories*, as *unity* of which the Idea is to be seen. Speculatively to think is to resolve some actuality, and so to oppose it to its own self that the differences are mutually opposed as *en suite* of categories, and the object is recognised as unity of both [see the original further]. . . . That, summarily, is the business of speculation, that it apprehends all the objects of pure thought, of nature, and of the Spirit, in the form of thought, and so as *unity of the difference*. . . . Whilst what is finite requires another for its quality, what is true has its quality, the limit [the other, the scission], its end within itself, is not limited by the other,—on the contrary, the other falls within it. . . . In philosophy the highest is named Absolute, the Idea. . . . If we begin, now, with the current mere impression we have of God, it is the business of a philosophy of religion to consider the significance of it—that God, namely, is the Idea, the Absolute, in thought and notion the *Wesen* (*Ens verum*), and that it has this in common with the logical philosophy. The logical Idea is God as He is *in* Himself; but God is this not only to be *in* Himself (*implicit*), He is just as essentially *for* Himself (*explicit*), the Absolute Spirit, the primal principle that has itself not only in thought, but is that also which *appears*, by manifestation appears, gives itself *existence objectively*. In this philosophy, then, that considers the Idea of God, we have at the same time also before us the manner in which He personates His own self; only for Himself He puts Himself in appearance there. This is the side of existency, of the outwardness of the Absolute. In the philosophy of religion we have thus the absolute for object, but not merely in the form of thought, but also in the form of its manifestation. The universal (allgemeine) Idea is to be taken, then, in the quite concrete import of *essentiality*, as also, therefore, of its actuality of action to set itself out, to *appear*, to *reveal* itself. We say in a popular way, God is the Lord of the natural world, and as well of the spirit-kingdom; He is the absolute harmony of both, producing and actuating it; neither the thought nor the notion failing therein, nor yet the manifestation of it, its existence. This *existent* side, however, is itself again (inasmuch as we are in philosophy) to be taken in thought. Philosophy considers, then, the Absolute, firstly, as Logical Idea, Idea as it is in thought, as its import [what it holds in solution, as it were] is itself determinations of thought; further, it shows the Absolute in movement in its productions [Nature and Spirit], and this is the way of the Absolute to become *for* itself, the way of the Absolute to Spirit; but God is not to be regarded as but in this way result, result of philosophy, but as what precedes,

and is first, and eternally brings forth itself. The one-sidedness of the result becomes in the result itself negated and removed. . . . God is not blank vacuity, but Spirit; and this attribute is no mere word or superficial phrase: Spirit uncloses itself in that God is recognised as essential Tri-unity. It is so that God is understood as He makes Himself object for Himself; which object remains still—even in this disjunction—identical with God, and in it God loves Himself. Without this attribute of Tri-unity, God were not Spirit, and Spirit were an empty word. But God being understood as Spirit, then this notion includes in it the subjective side. . . . The Spirit of God is not a Spirit beyond the stars, without the world, but God is present, all-present, and as Spirit in all Spirits. God is a living God, that moves and acts. Religion is a birth of the Spirit of God, and not an invention of men. . . . Morality and law are only from this, that I am a thinking being, that I regard my free-will not as that of my empirical person, as coming to me only as this individual, when then I might make a slave of another through fraud or through force, but that I hold free-will to be an Absolute, a Universal. . . . Here knowledge is not the direct sense-knowledge of some corporeal object, but of God, and God is the absolutely universal object, *the Universalest Personality*, not, certainly, any one single particular—knowledge of God is the thinking of God, for thought is that act for which the universal is. . . . I am absolutely concrete Ego, thought that determines itself within itself—I am as the Begriff (Notion). . . . That is always what is substantial—that I have always in any reference *consciousness of the Begriff*—that I have in it so truth *as* truth, truth in the form of truth—in the form of the absolutely Concrete, and of what is directly and purely coincident within itself. . . . Both sides of the relation (the antithesis) disappear into mere moments, and that only which *is* and *abides* is *Unity* of both, which neutralises both. . . . Ego, through its own proper reflection, brings to goal the self-resolving contraries. . . . What is the idea and true is completely so, only as *movement*. God is this movement within Himself, and alone by that a living God. The moment of the finite, however, is not to be held fixed, but to be absorbed and assimilated: God is the movement to the finite and, through it as sublation of Himself, to Himself. In Ego, as that which is finite sublates itself, God turns back to Himself, and only as this return is God. Without a world, God is not God.—The result is that we must rid ourselves of the bug-bear of the antithesis between finite and infinite" (*Phil. of Rel.*, i. 15, 23, 24, 25, 27, 32, 34, 62, 117, 149, 150, 180, 181, 194).

"To come to see the *negativity* immanent in the universal or in the identicalness (im Allgemeinen oder Identischen), as in the Ego, was the further step which the speculative philosophy had to make" (*Rechtsphil.*, p. 39).

The intention of these quotations, as already said, has been not only to identify the Ego as the Notion, but also to give some idea of the general result of the whole as a philosophy that is explicative of the existent universe. One has only to cast the slightest glance back, however, to become aware of the hopelessness to expect more than one reader here and there to make anything whatever of these uncouth and apparently, perhaps shallow, single words or phrases, and even entire sentences. Nevertheless, there is really the possibility to understand from them, at all events, something of what is proposed as the triple concrete, the triple unity of Man and Nature with the Spirit that is God.

In particular explanation—looking back, it may be remarked that what I allude to in the "roc's egg" will, of course, be understood from the Aladdin story, where it (said egg) was the sole unit that controlled the Genii.

Of the association of the nature of Ego with the Being of God, there is more elsewhere.—What is said about the rationale of the five senses will throw light on what is meant by the Notion, as will also the reference to the three dimensions of space. Connection of Notion and Categories will doubtless be understood too, as likewise the respective meanings and relations of Begriff and Idee. Pregnant reference will have been remarked as concerns Christianity.—On Hegel's use, which is a constant one, and a peculiar one, of the word *immediate*, a further remark may profit. All things of the senses are *immediate* to Hegel; and the reason is that the relation of object to subject is, in special sense, *direct*, face to face, directly or immediately in contact (in touch !), as it were,

without a vestige of interposition, intervention, mediation, —process, between. But that is not so where an act of intellect is concerned: there can be no such act without process, without mediation. All in the region of thought, not sense (in a way), is *vermittelt*. And so it is that *Vermittlung* is a very usual word with Hegel, and a word for which in its full meaning it is impossible to find a correspondent other in English. Vermittlung means, namely, not only *mediation*, but *realisation* as well; the latter, in fact, is the ordinary application of the term, and mediation, or intermediation, as the means of the result has got lost from view: to *vermitteln*, quite generally, is *to bring about*. If we will but see Hegel's principle, however, we shall have no difficulty in seeing also what it was that determined for him his use of the word. In the Ego, namely, there are three units,—the subject I as one, the object I (or Me) as another, and the conjunct I-I (or I-Me) as a third. Now, each unit by itself is "*abstract*," but in combination "concrete" (—hence, equally, the use and meaning of these terms, too). Again, it is not in abstraction, but in concretion, that the "I" is "I"—the I is fully *vermittelt* into itself through itself, or the I is fully vermittelt into the I through the I. Hence the I is the Notion; and the Notion is what the universe is to be, an I *vermittelt* into an I through an I. In presence of no more than this, we are in presence also—at least potentially—of quite a mass of terms and quite a mass of ideas which have at last reached their explanation.

Aufheben, Finite and Infinite, will pretty well be understood now. Bei sich selbst.—To say that the Ego is by its own self does not quite convey the intromitting closeness, the pervading, penetrating closeness, which Hegel sees into the conjunction of the Ego with itself when he talks of Beisichselbstseyn.

And now we shall proceed to our final extracts here,

not without reference to the peculiar reticence of Hegel in regard to his own secret.

Of date March 22, 1812, it is simply his precise principle that Hegel (*Log.*, i. 7) describes thus (preceding words in footnote):[1]—

"Es kann nur die *Natur des Inhalts* seyn, welche sich im Wissenschaftlichen Erkennen bewegt, indem zugleich diese *eigne Reflexion* des Inhalts es ist, welche seine Bestimmung selbst erst setzt und erzeugt.—It can only be the *nature of the content* (the thing itself) which is to be recognised by science as the principle in movement, inasmuch as it is this *reflection proper* of the content (the thing itself) which first sets and produces its distinctive character."

The proposition here is that if we are to understand anything, we are to watch the thing itself in a supposed movement of its own; and no doubt it is just so we are accustomed to act when we would see into the rationale of a steam-engine, or of the human body, or of the human mind. Here, however, this is to be applied to Logic, and, so applied, it is characterised by Hegel as "a new principle (Begriff) of scientific exposition." *Understanding*, he says, attends to the separate parts, and to each merely separately; whereas *Reason*, in regarding only what is in union, dialectically negates the understanding, and produces the concrete universal of the truth. "This," so the words run, "the immanent evolution of the principle itself, is the absolute method of knowledge, the immanent soul of the thing itself: and in this self-constructing method alone do I maintain it to be possible for philosophy to become objective, demonstrated science."

Now, what Hegel is only telling of here is that when

[1] "The essential point of view is, that what is concerned is a new idea of scientific procedure. If philosophy is to be science, it cannot turn for its method to any subordinate science (mathematics), any more than it can satisfy itself with categorical assertions of inner intuition, or trust itself to mere raisonnement from grounds of external reflexion."

you take I-subject and I-object, each separately, you understand; whereas, when you see the I and the Me, both together into the single concrete I, you have made use of your reason. Further, what you have before you then is simply yourself—Geist: you are Geist to Geist, Spirit to Spirit. Further, too, you have full light on *Gesetztseyn.* The I, namely, *sets* the Me, implies it, or rather ex-implies it, *states* it, posits it, ponates it, flings it, springs it, starts it, stakes it, radiates it—and this simply in that the I itself is, simply in that the I states itself, ponates itself. The I *sets* the me: that is Gesetztseyn; and what is Gesetztseyn is clear the moment you think of the Me in relation to the I. Nay, the equally constantly recurring *Versöhnung* is capable of being equally easily domesticated to the understanding. In the case of any *concrete,* where you have always a correlation of sides, if you *abstract,* if you fix each side apart, you produce the contradictions of the understanding, das Unglückliche Bewusstseyn; but if you restore again the sides to the unity, the abstractions to the Concrete, then you have brought about *Versöhnung. Versöhnung* differs very widely on the various stages of the Notion; but it always means, so to speak, return of the estranged object to the reconciled subject—return, it may be, of the rebellious Particular into the bosom of the all-accepting Universal.

And if we have light here on such difficulties as Gesetztseyn and Versöhnung, we can turn in the same direction for similar light on others—say at once, for example, on Hegel's very peculiar use of Urtheil, which is to him at once *original parting* and *judgment*—why? Because he has in his eye the *parting* of "I" at once into "I" and "Me," which is also the *judging* of "Me" by "I." Or say, on the constantly recurrent Unity, Identity of Contradictories, as well as on its companion association of Mediateness and Immediateness (Vermitteltseyn and

Unvermitteltseyn). Ego, glaringly, the moment it is thought of, is at once seen, as regards either alternative in either opposition, to be but the type of both and in both. "Of Being and Nothing there must be said," as the *Logic* has it, "what has been already said of mediacy and immediacy (the former of which, as implying the reference of *one* thing to an *other*, implies evidently as well negation), namely, that no where, whether in heaven or on earth, is there anything to be found that does not contain both." But these, obviously, are much too important matters to be discussed further at present here. All that we would point to at present is that Hegel, when, as constantly in his Introductions and Prefaces, he refers to this, that he brings to the treatment of philosophy a perfectly new method, a principle of *form* (creative and distributive), namely, that is identical with the *matter* (created and distributed), means only the Ego, as do equally also these other references to the unity of contraries and the omnipresent fact that there is nothing in heaven or on earth that is not at once mediate and immediate.

It is precisely the same views that condition this:—

"The weighty negative result in which understanding of the general scientific advance finds itself, namely, that, by the way of the finite notion, no junction is possible with the truth, is rather apt to have the opposite result to that which directly lies in it" (*Encyk.*, i. 13).

The "finite notion" is any one moment, separately and by itself, of the two that constitute the concrete Notion on any stage. The "finite notions," each one by itself, are but "the contradictions of the understanding." Here, plainly, we are told that to get the truth we must always see the objective side and the subjective side of the Notion (Ego) on any of its stages, not apart, but together. The "opposite result" that is meant is that said unsatis-

factoriness of the finite Categories is apt to mislead to neglect of the very thing that is required, comprehensive and all-sided investigation of the Categories as a whole. We may remind here of a citation (*Phil. of Rel.*, 433) which we have already seen (p. 333); where, in the extrication of the Categories from *the* Notion (Ego), it is said that every new step is the rise of a finite Category into its infinitude, the result then being but another of the metaphysical notions of God, with proof, even in the necessity of it, necessarily, also, of the existence of God. And these, surely, are pregnant findings, crucially critical, too; not without a light from them in which what to Hegel was Notion, Category, God—all are express.

Hegel, after all that startling description (*Log.*, i. 7) of a new principle of method that is to revolutionise philosophy; where *Understanding* fixedly determines, *Reason* dialectically negates, but *positively* produces, etc. etc., ends partly thus: "This spiritual movement, which, in its identity, gives itself its difference, and, in its difference, its identity with its own self."—Now, what is that? Why, this! I, my identity, give myself my Me, my difference; and in my difference I am still my identity—in my Me I am still I! This "spiritual movement," he says, "is the immanent movement of the Notion," and we cannot well doubt it! "This spiritual movement which, in its identity, gives itself its difference, and in its difference its identity,"—which, therefore, is the immanent movement of the Notion,—"is the absolute method whereby to know, and at the same time the immanent soul of what is to be known." That is, pretty well, a revelation of the whole! It is wonderful how often Hegel tells on himself, and needs only to be taken at his word! In the *Encyklopaedie* (i. 112) he says this: "In fact, what is finite is just this, and only this, that its *existence* is different from its *notion*. But God is expressly determined as that which can only

be "thought as existing.—This unity at once of notion and existence constitutes the Notion of God." What is that which *is* only because it is *thought*? Why, Ego! What is that where its existence and its notion are not identical? Why, everything but Ego! Did any reader, when he read these words at p. 112, even, even for a moment, dream that they meant—just simply what they meant? And Hegel?—Has he done anything to *lead*? Or, only smiling grimly, has he done everything to *mislead*? "This unity of notion and existence constitutes the Notion of God"—the words that directly follow are these.

"This, truly, is still but a formal definition of God, which, simply for that reason, contains, in point of fact, only the nature of the *Notion* (*des Begriffes*, in italics). But that it, already in its quite abstract sense, includes in itself *existence*, is easy to be seen. For—the Notion, however otherwise characterised, is at least the—resulting through suppression of mediation—the, consequently, *immediate reference* to itself; and being, existence, is nothing else than that." These words, and the whole page of them that follows, are hardly adapted to do more than just shut up for a reader any the least chink of even a possibility of light. The page is worth reading. But we shall presently come to more matter in the same connection.

So far, we see pretty well the secret of Hegel formally expiscated, and it is under the burthen of that secret that he writes all his Prefaces and Introductions, even the earliest, as at Jena, when he joined Schelling. Writing, in 1812, his Preface to the *Logic*, for example, he looks back on twenty-five years of an entire revolution in philosophy, with a new and higher standpoint of self-consciousness for result. To his half-dozen students at Jena even, in concluding what, presumably, was then

and there (1805–6) his last course, he expresses himself thus:—

"A new epoch has dawned upon the world. The World-Spirit has now succeeded to relieve itself of all alien formations of the past, and at last to recognise its own self as Absolute Spirit, and, not less, what becomes objective to it—to develop that out of its own self, and in its own power peacefully retain it. The struggle of finite Self-consciousness with the Absolute Self-consciousness that appeared other to it, and away from it, ceases," etc. (Rosen., *Life of Hegel*, p. 202).

Of Hegel's implicit faith in this new epoch, as in the discovery that brings it, we cannot for a moment doubt. He has twenty laborious volumes built upon the latter (the discovery)—which, too, now we see. It is the Begriff, the Notion; and the Begriff, the Notion, is nothing but the Ego. The Begriff is self-consciousness, and the evolution of self-consciousness, the evolution of its own nature, namely, the evolution of its own duplicity—that is the absolute method, that is the immanent soul of the thing itself. And philosophy has become at last objective, demonstrated science. That this science is further characterised as "speculative" depends upon that in the Ego that its *one*, if a one of identity, is also a one of difference. A stone is a stone, and an "I" is an "I"; but no "I" is an "I" that is not twice "I," while the stone remains single. Opposition in identity, difference in identity; that is the law.[1] An eye is an eye only once, but an "I" is an "I" twice!

[1] The late Professor Veitch, in his *Institutes of Logic*, has a chapter on Hegel in this connection, in which much that is inapposite is almost always remarked, as: "It is said in regard to limit in thought, that the consciousness of limit transcends limit—that limit itself is destroyed. My answer to this is, that so far from consciousness of limit destroying limit, this consciousness of limit is essential to consciousness itself." Why, this is just what Hegel this very

If Hegel's principle of method, his unity of contraries, his mediateness and immediateness, his speculativeness, were conditioned by the Ego, so also his freedom or free-will, which is withdrawn from the other of sense into the certainty of one's self, from the that of the particular into the this of the universal, from the limit of partiality into the il-limit of the totality. The objective notion of things is the thing itself. The negative of woof to warp, or of warp to woof—and both are *threads*—is the vitality of the unity that is the web. Or, so placed, the negative (the contention) really is the *Bestimmung*, the *species*, the quality, the nature of the what that is there and then concerned. The negative that the notion has in itself is the dialectic root-principle. It is this negative is the fount of movement and conditions the progress. Inner negativity is the self-acting soul, the inner immanent principle of all natural and spiritual life. This is what speculative is, this dialectic of opposites that will negate the one the other, and yet affirm themselves, and

moment has himself said. Can any man transcend limit—can any man be conscious *beyond* limit, without being conscious *of* limit? And in a much wider reach, can any man be conscious without *a* consciousness? Would not the illimitable in consciousness be simply a blank without a *limit*-ing consciousness? The infinite itself without a finite would be null. Professor Veitch says again: "The knowledge of opposites is one, but the opposites known are not therefore one. These are two wholly different propositions." Why, if opposites are *not* opposites, I should like to know where the very proposition would at all be, which he thinks he explodes by the simple device of repeating Hegel's own words that opposites *are* opposites! Only by this, that they *are* opposites, is it that their unity is not abstract, dead, motionless, but concrete and alive. I think we may depend upon it that Hegel had for his wear both right shoes and left shoes, and—that he knew perfectly well the one from the other. Good [illegible] was wonderfully poetic,—the amphitheatre of the Manor [illegible] typed on his brain,—nevertheless, he was absolutely prosaic.

so both. Simple Apprehension, Judgment, Syllogism. Unity, Parting (the *Part*ing Ur-theil), Reunity. Nature, Man, God. Hegel's own expressions, for felicity of naming, are about the best possible. "This Begriff," he says (*Log.*, i. 68), may be regarded as the first, purest, *i.e.* abstractest, definition of the Absolute." But what is that Begriff? It is, he says, "die Einheit des Unterschieden- und des Nichtunterschieden-seyns, oder der Identität und der Nichtidentität (the unity of the distinguishedness and of the undistinguishedness, or of the identity and the non-identity)." And where is it to be found, this Begriff that is at once unity and disunity? Why, the Ego is that—at once unity and disunity, at once subject and object, at once I-Me.

It is certainly quite in order, then, that Hegel should make use of that exclamation, "Dass es nichts *giebt*, nichts im Himmel oder in der Natur oder im Geiste oder wo es sey, was nicht ebenso die Unmittelbarkeit enthält, als die Vermittelung, so dass sich diese beiden Bestimmungen als *ungetrennt* und *untrennbar* und jener Gegensatz sich als ein Nichtiges zeigt.—There is nothing in heaven, or in earth, or in the Spirit, or be it wherever it may, that does not equally imply both mediateness and immediateness, so that these two distinctions are *unseparated* and *unseparable*, and their antithesis shows itself as null." This duplicity may suggest itself to entail a certain little difficulty of its own. "A such," says Hegel (*Log.*, i. 70), "that within itself is a *one* and an *other*, implies at once a certain gone-forward-ness." But just so constituted is every concrete; no concrete, consequently, can supply a beginning. For the relation already existent within it is tantamount to a presupposition of a brought-about-ness, of a process that has been effected, of a beginning that is past. "It is *thoughtlessness*," as we have it in the *Encyklopaedie*

(i. 138), "not to see that the unity of opposites is no mere purely immediate, *i.e.* quite unqualified and bare oneness, but that it is just presupposed thereby that the distinctions mediate the one the other, or that each mediates the other into the truth of the term.—It is only an ordinary, abstract *understanding* takes mediacy and immediacy each apart and by itself, as though fixedly secure not to be mixed. So it only raises to its own self the insurmountable difficulty of conceiving them united at all—a difficulty which exists neither in fact nor for the speculative notion."

We remark in passing, that here light is thrown upon that other constant crux of Hegel, the unaufgelöste Widerspruch, the unresolved contradiction. Why, that again is but the work of the understanding that will hold apart the abstract differences of the concrete identity; whereas reason would unite them. Of course, the type again is the Ego. Take the woof apart and the warp apart—where is the web?

But not so much this as what concerns a beginning, as a beginning is it that we have in mind at present. It follows from what has been said that a bare beginning cannot be begun with any concrete. There is no concrete that does not imply so much gone-forward-ness. But that being so, and so much emphasis being laid on this, that everything in heaven or in earth is a concrete, a *Vermitteltes*, how is it possible to conceive the very possibility of a beginning? In ultimate generalisation; all is an amalgam at last of thought on the one side and matter on the other. There is no example in the universe of either the one pure or the other pure. Die Einheit der Idee mit dem Seyn—that is alone the truth. Evidently, then, a beginning being impossible with a concrete, there is no resource but to question the abstract. And this is what Hegel does.

Of his concrete he had either of his two abstract sides to make choice of. Shall I begin, he could say to himself, with the subject-side, the "I"? or shall I begin with the object-side, the "Me"? In the first instance he began with the latter, and he produced the *Phaenomenologie*. Beginning with Seyn, Esse, Being, Existence, he naturally turned first to the first in the cognition of it—the sinnliche Gewissheit, the conviction of knowledge which is given us by sense. This knowledge it was his cue to develop and develop, cleanse and cleanse, purify and purify, till it was the reine Wissen, pure knowing, the crystalline Wesen (*I*). The initial position here was that of everyday consciousness, where the two sides of consciousness (subject and object) were independently in opposition the one to the other. It is important to know the application here of the terms Scheinen and Erscheinen, etc. Here Hegel says the Geist is as erscheinend: it shines, it shows, it appears, it manifests itself; but it is not in itself, what we have is only its manifestation—not itself. It shines, it shows, it appears; but as it only shines, and shows, and appears, it only also *seems*.

Its object, all its own pebbles in its bed, only appear with the shine of the Ego on them. This is the force of the German Schein. Have you a passport, have you a receipt, have you a something with the shine, the reflection, of authority, of attestation, and validity on it? That is what a German means, in regard to a passport, a receipt, etc., when he asks you, Have you a *Schein*? The *Phaenomenologie* has to do with the Spirit, then, only as it is in its Schein, and not as it is purely in itself. To erscheinen, then, is very intelligibly, to make itself good by shining, to come out into view, into sight, to show, to appear; but also, as what is concerned is only vicarious, to *seem*. Geist, Spirit, as erscheinend, is Geist, Spirit, referring itself as subject to another, a

object—Geist, then, as it operates *on*, as it is *in*, the Erscheinung. And so the proper name of the world, of what we see around us, is the Erscheinung.

The position, as we see,—Spirit and Erscheinung (manifesting *show*), subject and object in common consciousness,—is one of *relation*. The relation, too, in a way, is that only of substance and shadow. The object is but the reflection of the subject, and we see the former only as the reflection, only as the *shine* of, the latter, only as its image back.

One fancies to oneself that Emerson would like to have said, The world is the reflection of the soul, or, in the world, the soul sees itself in reflection. Still, it is a relation that is before us; and it is the subject and the object, the I and the Me, that are in relation. They are two, and they mutually refer: they are two together in consciousness, and they are so there as reflected, the one into the other. Mind, to generalise the position, is here as it is in reflection, and, consequently, in relation. The relation, too, can only become more and more complex, the more and the more, between the two, the consequent comparison proceeds. There is here reality and there ideality, for example. So in an equilateral triangle there is implicit, to call it so, the ideality of the equal angles. Little is implicit in great, short in long, light in heavy, cold in hot, effect in cause, father in son, etc. etc. Referring to this, as he calls it, "absolute method" of allowing the situation, by its own movement, to develop itself, Hegel says (*Log.*, i. 8):—

"In this way I have attempted to expound *consciousness* in the *Phaenomenologie des Geistes*. Consciousness is der Geist, the Spirit, as concrete Wissen (knowing, knowledge, cognising, cognition), so, too, as caught in, committed to, externality; but the movement-form of this object rests alone, as does the development of all natural and spiritual life, on the nature of the *pure essentialities* which constitute the matter of Logic. Consciousness, as the erscheinende Spirit, which in its progression frees itself from its immediacy

and external concretion, attains to the pure knowing (cognition, cognisingness) that gives itself for pure object said *pure essentialities* as they in themselves absolutely are. They are the pure thoughts of Spirit thinking its Being. Their self-movement is their spiritual life—that whereby science constitutes itself, and of which it is the exposition and the statement."

"In the *Phaenomenologie des Geistes* I have delineated consciousness, in its movement from the first immediate antithesis of itself and the object, on or up to the absolute knowledge. This progression proceeds through all the forms of *the relation of consciousness in respect of its object*, and has the *Notion of Science* for its result. This Notion, therefore (apart from this, that it issues in the *Logic* itself), requires no other deduction," etc.

"Absolute knowing or knowledge is the *Truth* of all the forms of consciousness, because, as produced by said procedure, only in the absolute knowledge it is that the separation of the *object* from *the certainty of itself* has completely accomplished itself, and the truth has become identical with this certainty, as this certainty with the truth. Pure science, consequently, presupposes the elimination of the antithesis of consciousness" (*Log.*, i. 33–35).

"In this science (the *Phaenomenologie*) the beginning is made with empirical, *sensible* consciousness; and that consciousness is das eigentliche *unmittelbare* Wissen, *immediate* knowing proper. This idea has for result determined itself to be the Gewissheit become the Wahrheit, certainty of knowledge become truth,—knowledge to self, which, on the one side, is not now opposed to the object, but has made it inward, knows it as its self, and which, on the other side, has given up the knowledge of itself as of what is opposed to the object and is only its negation, has renounced this subjectivity, and is unity with its renunciation (its Entäusserung—its renunciation being, in effect, an externalising of itself). There is only pure *immediacy* in presence. This pure immediacy is *pure being* (das *reine Seyn*)" (*Log.*, i. 61 sq.).

We surely have adduced now ample evidence that the Notion, the Begriff, of Hegel is the Ego, and nothing but the Ego. Nevertheless, this has not been at all seen; and that it should *not* have been at all seen—the reason is that Hegel himself has done his best to render any sight of it impossible. He has done his best to efface his own footsteps, to cancel his vitality, to

obliterate himself. If any one will have the patience to look carefully into the whole introductory section with which Hegel commences his *Logic*, I am confident that he will have little difficulty, with his eyes open, of coming to discover this. The very *drift* of this section, every foundation that is brought forward in initiation of the subject, just, in fact, the very plan and purpose of the writing, is towards concealment of the one special principle that is alone in *petto*. Why, listen to this: "An original beginning of philosophy can, however, not be left altogether unnoticed, which in recent times has made itself famous—the beginning with the Ego!" (*Log.*, i. 70).

And this is followed up by three or four pages of objections which are precisely meant to shatter what we have in Fichte, his beginning with the Ego. Hegel's own reine Wissen shall not be the Ego—oh, no, something quite else! Of this peculiar wile, that *may* plausibly assume just to have spoken to lead, but, as we see in the case of Fichte, only avails to *mis*lead, let us quote this other example from the *Logic* (iii. 13):—

"I confine myself here to a remark which may assist the understanding of these notions, and facilitate the putting of oneself at home in them. The Notion, Begriff, so far as it has progressed into such an *existence* as is itself free, is nothing else than Ego, or pure self-consciousness. I indeed *have* notions, that is to say, such and such particular notions; but 'I,' Ego, is the pure Notion, Begriff, itself, which, even *as* notion, has come actually to *exist*. If, therefore, we would exemplify the special quality that distinguishes the nature of the Ego, no doubt it is allowable to take for granted that we can use in that regard what as familiar will be easy to be conceived" [to wit, the ordinary Ego].

But then, we are given to understand that between the Ego that *we* know, and the Ego that *he* knows, the Begriff, there is all the world of difference; and then there follow the usual abstruse, recondite particulars that go to make up that mystical object of all objects, the

reine Wesen. "Ego is pure, self-to-self-referent Unity, that is not in immediacy, however, but in abstraction, rather, from all particularity and content, and withdrawn, as it were, into the free play of measureless equality with itself. As such, this unity is *Allgemeinheit* that, in negativity and abstraction, is unity with itself, and implies thereby all determinateness as resolved into it. Again, it is equally immediate, as the self-to-self-referent negativity, *Einzelnheit, absolutes Bestimmtseyn, individuelle Persönlichkeit*," etc. etc. The general misleading that is present is brought to its point, perhaps, by an allusion to Kant. "Kant, too, referred to the Ego. It belongs to the deepest and truest insights which are to be found in the *Kritik of Pure Reason*, that the *Unity* which constitutes the *principle of* the *Begriff* is recognised as the *original synthetic unity of apperception*, as the unity of the '*I think*,' or self-consciousness."

Surely all this is sufficiently strange and misleading —surely, again to say it, it is sufficiently strange and misleading only casually and by the bye, as it were, to be reminded to mention a certain "original beginning," that, namely, "with the Ego," seeing that it is with the Ego that he himself begins, that it is with the Ego that he himself ends, and that it is with the Ego, very certainly, that he himself *mediates*. It is as if he said: I am engaged on the difficulty of a beginning as a beginning, and on the various ways in which only it can be realised, or at least attempted to be realised; and so, just before quitting the question, charity brings me with a smile to extend to that ridiculed beginning of Fichte's, the dole of a word![1] And, after all, one

[1] "Ridiculed beginning": "Man hat sich darüber aufgehalten"; and Fichte's Preface to his *Grundlage*, pp. x, xi, is *noted*. This shows that how Fichte's beginning was commonly looked at was well in Hegel's mind (*W. W.*, 15–557).

would like to know in what respect the Ego of Fichte, even as described by Hegel himself, is not Hegel's own.

"Fichte has made good the defect of the Kantian philosophy, the unthinking inconsequence through which the whole system fails of speculative unity. It is the absolute form Fichte has taken possession of, the absolute personality, the absolute negativity, not the singular, but the notion of the singular, and withal the notion of actuality; Fichte's philosophy, accordingly, is the completion of the form within its own self. He set up the Ego as absolute principle, and so that from it, as that which immediately to its own self was at the same time certainty and knowledge, the whole burthen of the universe must be represented as product.—Nowhere does there exist anything further than the Ego, and Ego exists because it exists: what exists is only in the Ego and for the Ego" (*Hist. of Phil.*, iii. 555–557).

We have only to look honestly into and fairly realise every member of that description to wonder where the want can be—where the want can be, that is, if we compare it with any similar exposition in his own regard of Hegel's own. The reference to Kant's original unity of apperception which we saw, had a similar stringency of consequence; and here is another, at least more thoroughgoing, if not more stringent still. Hegel (*Phil. of Hist.*, 531) is speaking in it of free-will:—

"It (free-will) has been made theoretically good in Germany by the Kantian philosophy. For to it the single unity of self-consciousness, Ego, is the irrefragable, directly independent free-will and the source of all the categorising thought-terms (theoretic reason), and equally, as well, the highest of all practical prescripts (practical reason, as free and pure will); and the rationality of will is just to maintain itself in pure freedom, in every particular only to will it (freedom), right only for right's sake, duty only for duty's sake."

That, surely, is no more than the assignment to Ego of the universal rôle which is alone here the matter of our argument, and it must have been one of the things that, as said where it is, Hegel was heard last to say.

Further, we get sight here of another very important point, this, That Hegel may be held to have given in the end the name of Kantian Philosophy to the whole general movement that culminated in himself. And that is the truth. What Kant did, what was the node and nodus of his action, was to develop the categories under the unity of apperception; and not one of the three who came after him but followed his example in this —with this difference only, that they developed not simply *under* that unity, but *from* it, substantially *from* it. This we have seen Hegel to say of Fichte, and pretty well of Schelling also, with this addition only, that the latter by and by left the common standpoint in chase, through Nature, of the Idea of the Absolute. It is not to be denied, however, that every one of the three—and perhaps Hegel especially—stood up for his own originality, and, said originality being in question, not always without injustice to Kant. Fichte was provoked, as we know, to dub Kant "a three-quarters head"; Schelling can be found (*W. W.*, v. 13, p. 14) to speak of the Kantian *Criticism* as "by experts in philosophy, hardly known and still less understood, and, in particular, as having lost all influence on the great questions of life"; while Hegel, in his *Logic* (i. 52), remarks of his frequent mention of Kant, that, "to many it may appear superfluous," and, in his *Proofs for the Existence of God* (p. 437), talks of the Kantian Philosophy—but only on the Proofs—as being considered "something that has been long done with, and something, consequently, that is not again to be named." How it is with all such cries, nevertheless, one is not without ample occasion to know: periodic occultation, that gives rise to them, is the law of every brightest associate of the sun, be his name Plato, or Aristotle, or Kant, or Hegel. But this we have to

carry with us now, that, of the whole of philosophy in Germany from Kant to Hegel, inclusively, the true name is Kantian.

Hegel's only excuse for himself in regard to the Ego, is the intimation which we read in the passage quoted (p. 376) from the *Logic* (iii. 13). This is to the effect that, by way of *illustration*, when "erinnert wird" (reference is made) "an die Grundbestimmungen" (to the basal characteristics) "welche die Natur des Ich ausmachen" (which constitute the nature of the Ego), then it is allowable to refer also to ("zu erinnern auch an") our own so current and familiar conception "I"; but even then we must recollect the signal measures that require to be taken before there can be any possibility of the profane *conception* being apotheosed into the sacred *Notion*! And so, as said, there is, in this place itself, evasion of any such impious confusion; but the paragraph which immediately leads to, and ushers in, this doubtful and questionable suggestion at all, of—you and me, say! is so strikingly in point that even duty compels us to make use of it. It runs thus:—

"What has been just propounded is to be regarded as the *notion* of the *Notion*. If it appear to differ from what is generally understood by notion, explanation may be desirable of how what is here notion may be found to comport itself elsewhere. For one thing, there cannot be reference made to any support that founds only on the *authority* of what is customary understanding: in the science of the Notion, *immanent deduction* is alone the necessity. For another thing, what has been here deduced as the notion must certainly be recognised as identical with what has been considered such by others. But it is not so easy to discover what others have said of the nature of the notion. For they mostly occupy themselves with no such object at all, and just suppose that every one will of himself perfectly well understand when it is the notion that happens to be spoken of. Lately, indeed, one might conceive oneself dispensed from any trouble with the notion, the rather that—even as it was long tone to say every possible disparage[illegible]f imagination and

again of memory—it has been the custom in philosophy, for a considerable time now, and partly still is, to heap all bad language upon the *notion*, to traduce it—*it*, which is what is paramount in thought!—and to set up in its stead, as the highest height, as well scientific as moral, das *Unbegreifliche* und das *Nichtbegreifen* (the *unintelligible* and the *non-intelligence*)."

It is hardly possible to suppose that any reader will require *exegesis* of the true meaning of all that—so far as the throwing of dust into the air is concerned—dust, too, capable of a *species* of defence—on the part of Hegel for the hiding—or the justifying—of himself.

It is true that Hegel does abstract and abstract, refine and refine, to the production at last of what is in name the reine Wissen and the reine Wesen; but is not that still the Ego? Or divest it of the Ego, and what then is it? We have light upon this in the Introduction to the *Phaenomenologie*. The final result of that work is "pure essentiality," "pure immediacy," "das reine Seyn," "the elimination of the antithesis of consciousness," of "the separation of the object from the self-assurance of Self," "the ultimate of thought, the absolute concern, the Logos, the reason of that which is, the truth of that which bears the name of things." Now this, as pure essentiality, is at least objectless object, ideal objectivity, so to speak, or objective ideality,—what Hegel himself says he would name "if the word matter were at all allowed him,—die wahrhafte materie, veritable matter." Now, if it be said that Spinosa's result is pure materiality, while that of Hegel, on the contrary, is—at least so far—pure ideality, one would like to know in what the one differs from the other, or how the ideality of the one is to be saved from the materiality of the other.

That, then, if it is the conclusion of the *Phaenomenologie*, is—on that understanding—not quite satisfactory for the book itself. And this is one reason why I object to the *Phaenomenologie* being considered as in any way

a necessary integrant of the System. No doubt Hegel himself has a word to say in his *Logic* to the advantage of his earlier work, with careful naming of its title, publishers, etc.; but what author is ever indifferent to the sale of his own books? He himself, moreover, in saying (*Log.*, i. 34) that the *Phaenomenologie* has "den Begriff der Wissenschaft zu seinem Resultate," adds of this Begriff that "it produces itself within the *Logic* itself." In which case, so far as the System is concerned, even as a *preliminary*, the *Phaenomenologie* is evidently unnecessary. No doubt it is from their own experience that Erdmann and Rosenkranz, Hegelians *par excellence* both, declare their belief in the superiority of the student who issues from the *Phaenomenologie*; but that does not hinder the latter of them from the groan over how "sehr schwer" the book is, at the same time that he intimates the burden of it to have a place within the System itself. And that is the truth. All that the *Phaenomenologie* is specially good for reappears early in the *Philosophie des Geistes*, at the same time, too, that there is another abstract of it in the *Propaedeutik*. If one considers that both the historical and philosophical expansions within the volume itself await the reader in the formally full and express works on the State, History, Aesthetics, Religion, etc., I have no hesitation in asserting the *Phaenomenologie* to be even much worse than superfluous so far as the student of the system is concerned. During generations, as is the testimony of Haym, readers, or attempting readers, of the book were only "zermartyrt," martyred piecemeal. "Hegel is impenetrable, almost throughout, as a mountain of adamant": these words of Professor Ferrier would be perfectly in place, for me at all events, as regards the *Phaenomenologie*. Indeed, I am used to warn all students against both of the first two volumes of the olutely, the

matter of both of them is to be found elsewhere in the complete collection of the relative writings, and in an infinitely more accessible form. Ah me, it is pitiable! There are students who, after years and years consumed in these two volumes, or only in one of them, have written books that even in what they reported from that one were unreadable failures. It is not meant that the one volume or the two volumes are never to be read; but let them be read only when, say, the three volumes of the *Encyklopaedie* can be currently read and understood everywhere at a glance.

So currently well known, as it is, that the writing of Hegel, just as the writing of Hegel, is something out of all measure difficult, it will not be readily credited that, even in that regard, the *Phaenomenologie* is a signal exception, and cannot, for difficulty, by any other work of Hegel be surpassed. If any one, however, will but take up the *Propaedeutik*, he will, if only capable of comparing the two books, find, perhaps to his surprise, that he actually can read, and actually admire in reading, a veritable example of the writing of Hegel's. There is some temptation, indeed, to go further here, and to sketch out a plan of arranging the works of Hegel in such wise that ability to read them would be best attained. But for that this is not the place.

What, as regards the interest in hand, is the example of Hegel himself?

If ever he expected to have produced, as is not an uncommon opinion, a complete statement of philosophy in the *Phaenomenologie*, he must have been led to think, probably by the particulars of its reception, that he had failed. Considering the embarrassed circumstances in which he remained for some considerable time after the Jena catastrophe, it is evident that it could [illegible]een long before he turned to another

and a very different statement of himself in his *Logic*.

We had already (pp. 371 sqq.) occasion to see how it was situated with the question of a beginning, That a beginning, for instance, was impossible with a concrete, and that there was no resource, consequently, but to turn to the abstract. That Hegel did this, we saw also; for he produced the *Phaenomenologie*, and to that the premiss was that in the concrete Ego of the 'I' and the 'Me,' it was the latter he selected to begin with.

If ever he had any hope that by so doing he was securing for himself a chance at once of the praise of originality and of the prestige of success: success in that he followed the method of the day, which was induction and generalisation; originality in that his method was the *à posteriori*, while that of his predecessors, all three of them, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, had, very purely and perfectly, been the *à priori* solely,—if ever, I say, he had nourished the hope of any such chance, he must have been forced by the result to confess to himself that he had been altogether mistaken.

So he began now from the other strand, the abstract "I": he returned to the *à priori* method of his predecessors, and would deduce, as they—the heart of the enterprise—the categories from the Ego. This was the *Logic*.

Of the reine Wissen, or the reine Wesen, we have asked, Is not that still the Ego? And truly, that still *is* the Ego; but in the *Phaenomenologie* the Geist is only the vehicle and the interest in and for which the "pure essentialities," which are the reine Wissen and the reine Wesen, are produced. They have a movement of their own, these essentialities (*Log.*, i. 8): "Ihre selbstbewegung ist ihr geistiges Leben (their self-movement is their spiritual life), and is that through which Wissen-

schaft, science, constitutes itself, and of which (life) it is the expression." But, certainly, at the same time, it is only true—and "is not that still the Ego!"—that these essentialities "are the pure thoughts—der sein Wesen denkende Geist (Spirit thinking its own inner being)." But then there is a directness in the *Logic*; the categories are to be supposed to be developed straight from the Ego. "Pure science, consequently (*Log.*, i. 35), presupposes enfranchisement from the antithesis of consciousness. It contains den Gedanken (the Thought), in so far as it is equally the thing itself, or the thing itself in so far as it is equally the pure Thought. As science, the truth is the pure self-developing self-consciousness, and has the form of *Self*, that what in absolute truth *is*, is conscious Notion, and that the Notion as such is what in absolute truth is. . . . Logic, accordingly, is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of the pure Thought. This realm is the truth as, without veil, it in and for itself is. And so it can be said that this matter of content is die Darstellung Gottes (the expression of God) as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature or a single finite Spirit."

Rosenkranz is known as "the Hegelianer par excellence"; and I fancy that, if I were to assert that Erdmann had at least the next claim to the same, or no less a distinction, no one would dispute it with me. Now, Rosenkranz is unwilling to take quite literally, and feels it necessary to make a modifying explanation of, this, so far as words go, express deification of Logic: he even calls it figurative, as I remark elsewhere (*Secret of Hegel*, p. 52). Nor is it different with the other of the Arcadian or Hegelian twain. Erdmann, in the Preface to the second edition of his *Logic*, decides, in regard to Hegel's expression in the case, that it is only "metaphorical, and not even very happily chosen." The con-

sensus of two such authorities is pretty well definitive; but still I, for my part, feel compelled, as it were, by the directness of the language, to give more heed to a literal interpretation than either of them. Of course, Logic as Logic is not Ego as Ego; but Logic is in vital relationship with Ego: and Ego as Ego, the Absolute Ego, is the everlasting God. I think the whole of this Note on Hegel can only tend to recommend to the reader a somewhat *more* literal meaning of what is in question than either the one or the other of them, Rosenkranz or Erdmann, could allow his master. After all the many extracts which we have seen from the works of Hegel in accentuation—as indeed we may say—of the very absoluteness of the Ego, it is impossible for us to doubt of his belief, not only in Logic as its vital development, its essential explication and expression, but in other capital interests and functions as belonging to it as well. In his criticism of Ohlert's *Idealrealism* (xvii. 242), for example, after having quoted this author to remark of Fichte's proposition, Ego sets itself: "And so it knows that it is Ego—*of* itself it knows *nothing*—a dead, wholly fruitless knowledge, this, that Ego *knows only of itself that it exists*," he (Hegel) adds: "If the Herr Verfasser (author) had reflected that this abstract cognition of the Ego of itself, this wholly abstract existence of the cognition into which the Ego can set itself, constitutes the basis and foundation of *personality and free-will*, and of all that thereon depends, as of *the immortality of the soul*, then this proposition would certainly not have continued to appear to him only dead and fruitless." And surely there is here on Hegel's part what cannot be called inexplicit! As surely this (from the *Phil. of Rel.*, ii. 191) is even categorically or peremptorily explicit—

"*God is t* [illegible] *distinguish Himself from Himself, to be for Him* [illegible] *difference, to be absolutely*

identical with Himself—Spirit (*der Geist*)." And what is that but Ego?

It is still a question, however, in what manner Hegel conceived thought to *belong* to the Ego. That he *identified* Ego and thought—there cannot be a doubt of that. We have seen expressions to that effect already. In the *Propaedeutik* (p. 93) we have this: "Ich heisst überhaupt Denken—Ego is Thought. If I say, I think, then that is some thing identical—Ego is always the simple identity with itself, and that is thought. So far as an object is thought, it gets the form of thought; it is made *gleich* (equal, like), to the Ego; that is, it is *thought*." Still, thought takes to Hegel generally, even as with any of us, the form of a function. I hold that Hegel cannot be affirmed to have either seen or said that the ratio implied in, or constitutive of, the triplicity of the Ego, was, just as such, and at once, thought. We say thought, thought, thinking, thinking, and we think only of a peculiar operation, as to add or subtract, to count, might be—it is an act and an action, really just as much as to cut with a knife is. To see or say that the triple strand of the Ego, just as the triple strand it is —just that the ratio of that triplicity—just that that triplicity, is thought: it will be difficult to make out that Hegel ever explicitly came to that. And yet I have marked an x^2 all through my copy of his works wherever I have seen a meaning that seemed relatively to approach to this. Rosenkranz, whom by Christmas 1864 we saw, in the *Secret of Hegel*, to talk of "the obscurities and incongruities which the Hegelian Logic has generated *through its doctrine of the notion*, has certainly come to a much better relative consciousness when in 1870 he edits and writes *Elucidations* to v. Kirchmann's re-issue of Hegel's *Encyklopaedie*. Nevertheless, [redacted] the greater part of his life, and in his more important

works, he may be said to have always regarded—to use his own words in his Preface to the *Propaedeutik* at p. xv—thinking or a notion "als einen *Act* des Geistes." In short, a notion, just as a conception, may be considered to have been generally understood as that mental unity in which the perceptive many of an object are ideally held. That, doubtless, was the general understanding of Kant; and that is precisely the understanding of the term which Hegel (*Log.*, iii. 24) specially describes as Kant's. Nay, when (*Log.*, i. 21) Hegel himself talks of *the* Begriff itself as "only object, product, and content of thought," not only a notion, but *the* notion, he has come to say no more than what Kant and everybody else thought in the case of it. But if *the* Begriff is only product of thought as a function des Geistes, a function of the mind, then it is not different with the Ego itself. It, too, is no more than a product of thought as a function of mind. Indeed, here is a passage (*Log.*, i. 53) where Hegel seems actually to say so:—

"If, as regards the determination of an *object* by the Ego, certain Kantians have expressed themselves in this way, that the objectivising of the Ego is to be considered as an original and necessary act of consciousness, but so that in this original act there is not yet the idea of the Ego itself—which were a consciousness of said consciousness, or just an objectivising of said consciousness—then this objectivising act, in its freedom from the antithesis of consciousness, is, being more closely defined, that which may be taken for *thought* as such. This act, however, is not any longer to be named consciousness; consciousness implies the antithesis of the Ego and its object, which antithesis is not existent in said original act."

Here, plainly, Hegel conceives the possibility of an act of thought in which there were no presence of the Ego to be got. When, therefore, we find him in another work (*Hist. of Phil.*, iii. 436), saying, "An die Stelle des Denkens sehen wir den Begriff eintreten (in place of thought we see the Notion enter)," we may hold that so

far we have another proof of a certain generalness and laxity on the part of Hegel in the way in which he regarded the relation between the Ego as Ego and Thought as Thought. We can hardly suppose, with all the circumstances before us, any reality of perception, that that wonderful thing which we call *thought* was due to, and constituted by, the ratio of "I-Me" in the single self-consciousness, "I." Of course this may surprise. Any thing more frail, and flitting, and unsubstantial than this "I" of any one of us is not possible to be conceived, and yet it, and it alone, shall be what it all comes to—it, and it alone, shall be the ultimate of the universe! It, and it alone, as it is the *last* of *induction*, shall be the *first* of *deduction*! And what, then, is God?

On that head, shall it be said that we have already seen enough to give, not less, but more, definiteness to the idea of God? God shall be the Absolute I—*I Am That I Am*—and all the rest His! But more of this elsewhere.

Absolutely, quite generally, why should this absolute soap-bubble of a universe be an "I," or why should an "I" be the first of it, and, all through, the principle and secret of it? Why, too, nay *how*, should an "I" "constitute the wonderful thing we name *Thought*"?

Has any one ever thought of what it is to be *determinate*? That there should be a determinate is the very condition that there *be*. And now there cannot be a determinate unless what shall be such as is at once affirmative and negative. Now, that is precisely what determination, Bestimmung, is. It is the expansion, the body, so to speak, between affirmation and negation, the web between the opposing warp and woof. That is the source of, that is what is the constant *Bestimmung* of Hegel. It, too, is the determinateness that lies in the negation of the "I" to the "Me," and of the "Me" to the "I," in the single "I."

It is so, then, we may see that the principle of determination lies in the "I-Me," as also this, that it is in the affirmativo-negative determination of the "I-Me" that we have the principle of thought. And now the last question of all—Why is it that there *is*? That is just the one *ἀνάγκη*: existence as existence must be! If you explain the existence of the world by God, how do you explain Him?

As regards Hegel himself, we may ask finally: Why did he conceal himself—why did he refuse to speak? One reason may have been, that he grudged to show himself *conditioned*, like the rest, and in the same way as the rest. Another reason may have lain in his own success,—why interfere with it? he may have thought. A third motive may have been a doubt of the result, were all revealed: it was quite possible that this Ego of his might prove anything but satisfactory, and be even laughed at. This last suggestion, however, cannot for a moment be entertained, in face of the fact that conviction in the principle is the vitality in every page.

That, then, is the state of the case, and the whole of that vast movement called German Philosophy from Kant, through Fichte and Schelling, to Hegel is this. There was but one movement, and every one of the four accepted it—literally, accepted it, and knew no other. This movement is to be called Kantian, and Kantian alone; for it was Kant began it, and throughout its whole course the one, simple, and single pivot of it was expressly and exclusively Kant's. That pivot was this: The synthesis of cause and effect has for the principle of it, apodictic necessity. Apodictic necessity is no possible quality of *à posteriori* matter. That virtue, therefore, even when *à posteriori* present, must be *à priori* come to. Causal necessity, which cannot have its source in sensation, must have it in intellection. It is *a category*.

There is a whole system of categories; and their single originating point is primary apperception, the unity of self-consciousness. This is, at least virtually, Kant; it is explicitly Fichte; it is, for long (in his Fichtian era, to wit), no less explicitly, Schelling;[1] and, as we know now, it is absolutely Hegel. From first to last not one of the four but substantially developed—with whatever further consequence—the many of the categories from the unity of self-consciousness. That is German Philosophy, and the whole of German Philosophy. And so we are not left in any difficulty as to the order of sequence in the relative operations. Hume stated his problem so that Kant was driven to the *à priori*. Kant, in turn, with his Pure Apperception and his artige Betrachtungen ueber diese Tafel der Categorien, drove Fichte to his Ego and his Dialectic. Fichte, again, with his one-sidedness that developed Nature from the Ego, drove Schelling, who had otherwise absorbed him, to the natural *vice versâ* of a development of the latter from the former. Hegel completed all, as the student of all, by converting Ego, and the Dialectic of the Ego, into the Begriff and the Dialectic of the Begriff.

But what I should like to add here is—a most interesting point: how and where Hegel himself first caught sight of this Notion or Begriff!

Well, I have to confess that I am disposed to find the very first initiative and source of what, as regards principle and dialectic, is most vital and essential in Hegel,—I am disposed, I say, to find that already *implicitly* within view as early as certain of the very earliest philosophical words of Schelling.

[1] We have seen that Hegel himself notes Schelling's *deviation*. *We*, too, may note his apparent abandonment even of the Natur-philosophie (*after* Hegel's in the *Encyklopaedie*!), and his final *deviation*—to his second, so-called *positive* philosophy.

Now, such words—a letter apart, as we shall see presently — can only refer to Schelling's very first philosophical pamphlet, *Of the Possibility of a General Form of Philosophy*; and we may take them to concern a philosophy in which the Matter would determine the Form, and, equally, the Form the Matter, in that the very Ground of this should be a Principle in the human mind itself.

Of course this proposition is not Schelling's, but Fichte's. As much as that is not difficult to find. It occurs again and again in Fichte's earliest writings, his *Recension of Aenesidemus*, his *Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre*, etc. In the latter (*W. W.*, i. 49) there is expressly mentioned the necessity of the single "Grundsatz," as also the necessity that "the Matter should determine the Form and, reciprocally, the Form the Matter: this Form can only suit that Matter, and this Matter only that Form." Nay, in a general reference here, Fichte himself puts the special stone of foundation further back still—back even to the "Satz des Bewusstseyns," which is the property of Reinhold. "After Kant," says Fichte (i. 20), "Reinhold has done himself the immortal merit to demonstrate that entire philosophy must be founded on a single Grundsatz."

On that showing, evidently, it would seem, so far as the special words referred to go, more correct to assign any question that concerns a suggestion to Hegel rather to Fichte than to Schelling, who was only a borrower. It so happens, however, that when, from Tübingen on the 4th of February 1795, Schelling's words were sent to him, Hegel knew referentially only his Kant. In his first letter to Schelling he can, indeed, *name* Reinhold and Fichte, and in his second, January 1795, he can speak, and speak well, of Fichte's *Kritik der Offenbarung*, as well as tell of Hölderlin writing him from

Jena of Fichte as "a Titan who fights for humanity, and whose arena will certainly not remain within the walls of the Auditorium"; but, for the rest, he reports himself as only situated thus:—

"Since some time I have taken up again the study of the Kantian philosophy, in order to learn to apply its important results to many an idea still current with us, and work up the latter in accordance with the former.—With the more recent strivings to penetrate into deeper deeps, I am as little acquainted still as I am with those of Reinhold, for these speculations only seem to me of more consequence for theoretical reason, than of greater applicability to more general, useful notions. So it is that I do not so well know these attempts in their precise aim; I only uncertainly guess at it."

Schelling dates his pamphlet concerned, "September 9, 1794," and it is only in said letter of January 1795 that Hegel regrets to Schelling that he (Schelling) has not communicated it to him (Hegel); while, again, it is only in his letter from Tübingen, of Feb. 4, 1795, his second in the correspondence, that Schelling writes: "I send thee the desired sheets, and beg a strict judgment thereon." That letter and that pamphlet, then, were the first intimations to Hegel of that whole loud, and long, and changeful *sequel* to Kant which, in rapid alternation, rang with the names of Jacobi, Reinhold, Schulze, Maimon, Beck, Fichte, Schelling, *al.* Here, then, also, was it that Hegel got his first word of the whole Fichtian element; and it was from now on that he developed himself in succession to Kant (all these others, supposably, lying suggestively before him)—gradually, at least, and from time to time—as the event pretty well proved.

Just a word on this development before I return to what I had specially in mind, not that Hegel himself, indeed, allows us, in this reference, even a word!

Hegel, then, we are to understand, gets his first hint of the Fichtian afterpiece to Kant, to call it so, only in

and through letter and pamphlet of Schelling's early in February 1795.

Let Hegel be always as reticent as he may, and conceal what he may, he is on this occasion (April 1795) even *gushing* in his thanks and almost flattery to Schelling, in return. Having given one excuse for the retardation of his answer, he continues, for example, thus:—

"But to answer sooner I was still more hindered by the wish to write thee an adequate judgment on the writing which I thank thee very much for sending me—so to show thee at least that I had quite caught thy ideas. But to a thorough study of it I had not time. Only, so far as I have understood the main ideas, I see in it a *completion of science*, which will yield us the most fruitful results. I see in it the work of a mind, of whose friendship I may well be proud, who to the mighty revolution of the system of ideas throughout Germany will add his own great contribution. To call to thee to carry out thy system in full would be an insult: the faculty that has seized such an object has no need of that."

This, which concerns the first pamphlet, is no less flatteringly followed by what concerns the second (sent July 21, 1795):—

"The gifts thou hast sent me have, with thy letter, afforded me the liveliest pleasure and yielded me the richest enjoyment, and I am exceedingly obliged to thee therefor. It is impossible for me to write thee all that I felt and thought thereby. . . . What floated dark and undeveloped before me, thy writing has cleared up most perspicuously and most satisfactorily. Thanks to thee, therefore, for myself; and every one who has at heart the welfare of the sciences and the good of the world, will, if not just yet, still in time, thank thee. . . . The troubled outlook for philosophy which thou findest in thy letter has filled me with melancholy. As for the consequences which misunderstanding of thy teaching may have for thee, thou art above them. . . . Thy system will have the fate of the systems of all those men whose spirit has outgone the beliefs and prejudices of their times. . . . As was said to me, thou art only *too far ahead for this century*—in the next, it may be, thy ideas will be in place. . . . Remarks on thy writing, thou canst not expect from me—I am only an apprentice. . . . Before all, for the sake of thy friends, spare thy

health. Be not too greedy with the time that thou hast for recreation."

He who knows that Schelling's two pamphlets in allusion are, on the whole, to be regarded but as simply repetitions from Fichte, will be astonished that such extravagance of praise should have been heaped on them by such a man as Hegel; but, than such praise to Schelling, there cannot be a more glaring proof of Hegel's then ignorance of Fichte, as of all in the general relation here that Fichte stands for. We see, however, the enormous start that has been given to Hegel by these revelations of Fichte and the rest in the pamphlets of Schelling; and it is not difficult to realise to ourselves how, from this start in 1795, Hegel continued to develop himself till, in his early appearances of 1801 at Jena, he seems pretty well to have reached his *own*.[1]

In his acknowledgment of the effect on him of Schelling's first pamphlet, he refers to Fichte as but suggested to him there: "In the study of the postulates of Practical Reason I had already had dawnings of what thou distinctly settest out in thy last letter, of what I found in thy essay, and of what the *Wissenschaftslehre* of Fichte will fully disclose to me." In his next letter to Schelling he notes it twice over, that he is engaged in the *attempt* to study the *Grundlage* of Fichte.

Evidently, the impulse to put himself at home with what we may call the Kantian *sequel*, on from Reinhold to Fichte and further, comes to him from Schelling.

[1] Coming back here, I find I have not said half enough of the effect which the pamphlets and letters of Schelling must have had on Hegel. Hegel knows Kant—he knows nothing of Reinhold, nothing of *Aenesidemus*, nothing of Maimon, nothing of Fichte—and here suddenly he is told of all that, here suddenly he sees the Absolute opened to his astonished eyes by what to him is the thrillingly original panorama, cosmorama, of his friend;—no wonder he gushed! *I say, it made him!*

Nay, Hegel must have derived his whole first knowledge of that *sequel*—exclusively, we may almost say—from these two first pamphlets of Schelling. We see their effect upon him—that he seems suddenly and all at once, as I say, to have had his eyes opened, as it were, to a new, and a startlingly new, turn of the Camera.

It does not follow, however, that this new and startlingly new removes for him Kant. We have it from Rosenkranz that he had repeatedly occupied himself in Switzerland with the *Kritik of Practical Reason.* When Kant, again, in 1797, published his *Rechtslehre* and *Tugendlehre,* Hegel subjected both works, along with the *Metaphysic der Sitten,* to a rigorous study. Behind all that is new, then, we have to bear in mind, with a Hegelianly profound study of religion and politics, a no less Hegelianly exhaustive study of the philosophy that preceded it. That is, under whatever may be new, and startlingly new, there is still in Hegel a Hegelianly assimilated content of Kant.

The new, then, came to Hegel in his solitary Patmos at Berne, first of all, and altogether, from the two Fichtian pamphlets of Schelling. No wonder that he was struck, and no wonder that he received them with such homage of words so lavish and so gratifying to personal vanity that—*till the shock came*—they remained determinative of Hegel to the mind of Schelling. No doubt, in the pamphlets themselves, there was much, as the Grundsatz of Identical Form and Matter, that must and did influence Hegel; but it was in the accompanying letter of Schelling that I seem to see words which, as there and then, and so placed, are infinitely more important than any words in the pamphlets themselves, and constitute, perhaps, the fruitful root and the foundation, really,—of all that Hegel afterwards did. What particular words I mean are (Schelling's *Life*, i. 76) these:—

"And now an answer to thy question, if I believe that we do not, with the moral argument [Kant's is meant], attain to a personal God? I confess, the question has surprised me; I should not, from an intimate of Lessing's, have expected it—but, no doubt, thou hast put it only to learn, whether it is with me a quite decided one: with thee, very certainly, it is long ago decided. For us, too, the orthodox conceptions of God no longer exist.– My answer is: We do go still further than a personal God. I have become a Spinosist meanwhile. Do not be surprised. I will tell thee, how? To Spinosa, the world (the Object, as in express opposition to the Subject)—was *All*: to me it is the Ego. The special difference between critical and dogmatical philosophy seems to me to lie in this—that the former begins with the absolute (not yet by any object conditioned) Ego, the latter with the absolute Object or Non-Ego. The one, in its ultimate consequence, leads to the system of Spinosa, the other to that of Kant. From the *Unconditioned*, philosophy must start. So the only question is, Where does this unconditioned lie—in the Ego, or in the Non-Ego? If this question is decided, then *All* is decided. To me the highest principle of all philosophy is the pure, absolute Ego,—that is, Ego so far as it is *mere* Ego, unconditioned as yet by any object, but of itself existent—*fact*. The alpha and omega of all philosophy is [in such sense] *freedom* [self-action].—The absolute Ego embraces an absolute sphere of absolute being. In this sphere there form finite spheres, which arise through *Limitation* of the absolute sphere by an object—(spheres of the finite, theoretical philosophy). In these is mere conditionedness, and the Unconditioned leads to contradictions.—But we are *bound* to break through these conditions; that is, we are bound to come out from the *finite* sphere and into the *infinite* one—*practical* philosophy. This, then, demands extinction of the *Finite*, and thereby leads us into the supersensible world. (What was impossible to theoretical reason, as precluded by *the object*, is realised by practical reason.) But in this latter we can find nothing but our absolute Ego, for only it has described the infinite sphere. There is no supersensible world for us but that of the absolute Ego.– God is nothing else than the absolute Ego, the Ego in so far as it has theoretically abolished all: that is, in theoretical philosophy, this Ego is=0. Personality comes through unity of consciousness. But consciousness is impossible without an object, and for God, that is, for the absolute Ego, object at all there is *none*, for this Ego would cease thereby to be absolute.– Consequently, there is not a personal God, and our highest task is destruction of our personality,

entrance into the sphere of absolute being, which, however, in eternity, is not *possible*—hence only *practical* approach to the absolute, and hence—*Immortality*. I must stop. Lebe wohl. Answer soon—Thy Schelling."

Of course, in a way, there is no more here than what we are accustomed to everywhere in Fichte. Still, the *where*, and the *when*, and the *by whom* it is said, must be allowed to give to it a most impressive peculiarity for the *to whom* it is said. And there is more than that. The *what* is said has in itself a most peculiar character. It is Fichte—yes! but it is an altogether concentrated Fichte. It is a Fichte, moreover, that is spoken out in the first familiar expressions that come naturally to the lips. It is the short outside hint in a word of all that has been going so long on inside. If ever there were utterances that *could* bring the Ego home to Hegel, these were they. It is not necessary to suppose either that all that took place at once. It was only after having come to a full knowledge of Fichte in the usual way that they could take on meaning for Hegel. To him, only knowing Kant, they would prove unintelligible at first. But they were not lost: they exist now; and so they must have remained with Hegel always. Let us figure him as reading them from day to day, or from week to week, or from month to month, or from year to year, and so acquiring from them, even as he read, ever new and newer light. A comment will perhaps support this.

And first, before the Ego itself is come to, of Schelling's surprise at a question of Hegel's. Now to thy question, says Schelling, whether we get with the moral argument to a personal God. I confess, he continues, that the question has surprised me; I should never have expected it on the part of an intimate of Lessing's, but, I suppose, thou art only *trying* me as to whether I have yet come to be decided on whi[illegible] doubt,

thou hast long been decided; so my answer is at once this: We do not get so far as a personal God: we, too, are beyond the orthodox ideas of God.

To examine Hegel's letter, however, is not to find oneself precisely in Schelling's state of surprise. Neither the letter itself nor the circumstances in which it was written will at all warrant any such feeling. Hegel puts his question so, cursorily as it were, at the very end of his letter. The words that immediately precede the question are: "May the Kingdom of God come, and our hands not lie idle on our lap." Those, again, that immediately follow run thus: "Lebe wohl! May reason and free-will remain our watchword—our rallying-point the invisible Church." In the body of the letter, too, he had already said: "Had I time, I would seek more closely to determine it, *how far we, after establishment of moral belief*, might allowably use regressively *the so legitimated idea of God, e.g.*, in demonstration of the relation of design, etc., and so, in full assurance, carry it over with us from ethico- to physico-theology, finally now to dispose and determine in accordance with it there."

With that *peitschen* passage[1] before him, we can scarcely blame Schelling if nothing led him to divine another reach in Hegel, however cursorily and however correlatively his question was put. Nor, situated so as to the letter itself, was he any way better situated as to the circumstances in which Hegel's letter was written: he knew, and could know, nothing at all about them. There was no biographer's information for him, as there is abundantly for us.

Rosenkranz, namely, spares no detail in his communication of Hegel's daily studies at the time. We have, for example, no less than five-and-twenty pages named

[1] Where (Schelling's *Life*, i. p. 67) Hegel would have certain 'flogged." See here also at p. 222.

"Fragments of Theological Studies" in the Appendix to his *Life of Hegel*, whilst in the text these Fragments receive actually fifteen pages of comment. Now, if we say that the titles of these Fragments run thus: "1. The History of the Jews; 2. Fate and its Reconcilement; 3. Love and Shame; 4. Son of God and Son of Man; 5. The Last Supper; 6. Miracle; 7. Baptism,"—will it not occur to the most of us to say to ourselves, Surely this is a somewhat reflective Aufgeklärter? The person of Christ would seem to have entered into the very inmost of the thought of Hegel. It is in that reference that he recalls a saying of Plato's—this, namely, "That were Virtue ever to appear personally, all men would of simple necessity love it." So Hegel is not contented with himself till he has written for himself a whole life of Christ: "In the end, from 9th May to 24th July 1795, he worked out, nineteen sheets long, a Life of Jesus, which is still entire, and in which a multitude of previous efforts were at last united." Hegel, as we learn here, saw the absolute idea of love in Christ as the "God-Man." What for Hegel was proper and peculiar in the fate of Christ was "his *elevation* above all fate, the sin of sinlessness." "The group of ideas," we hear, "guilt and penalty, law and destiny, sin and the forgiveness of sin, occupied him on all sides most earnestly." "He could not escape the problem, attainment of *unity of thought* in both reason and faith at once: it is the necessity of mind to *suffer no dualism* between its religion and its philosophy—the individual must have the assurance of being reconciled with God."

No doubt there is, in a certain sense, Aufklärung in all that; but it is an Aufklärung that would find a positive, and is already weary and sick of the negative. It is not the Aufklärung of a Thomas Buckle or a Thomas Paine: not the Aufkl[illegible] the Aufklärung

No. 2. Even of the student Hegel at twenty-three, Rosenkranz chronicles it, that "he carefully studied the New Testament," but that the "Romantik of Orthodoxy, in its dead literality, as little satisfied him as the moral narrow-mindedness of the Aufklärung." That narrow-mindedness alone is most admirably significant of the whole general position of the Aufklärung—even as we have it still. No starched white neckcloth signalises a smaller man than—ah well, let the reader say!

Schelling cries: "Oh, these moral Kantians; they pull the string, and the *deus ex machina* jumps up, that sits aloft in the sky!" Hegel asks quietly: "Do you believe, then, that we do not go so far?" And Schelling answers: "I am surprised at this, and would never have expected it of an intimate of Lessing's." When, however, we know what the Moral Argument was at that very moment to the student of Kant, it is impossible for us to sympathise with surprise at his question, even if, at the same time, he was an intimate as well of the eye-opened but thinking, and in every way kindred, Lessing.

A main point in this present writing has been this, that the Ego is the Absolute, the Ego is the Unconditioned, and its own internality is the dialectic to which all thought is due, and its own internality, by consequence, not less, is the spring to which creation itself is due. People will hold up their hands at this—people will be astonished that any man of common sense, Hegel or other, should have been misled into such extravagance—should have been so rash, misguided, and imprudent as to have staked himself and his whole reputation in the future—himself, and with himself Philosophy—on such a venture—on anything so forced and far-fetched, on anything so inconceivable and incredible, on anything while and out of all proportion!

the man is spoken of! It is on his

understanding—expressly on his *understanding*, that his very enemies never weary of heaping compliments. Why; to them, and quite seriously too, his understanding is not simply a mighty one, but, actually, an "all-mighty" one, "behind which there stood a solid knowledge and a sober sense!" Others, too, quite as hostile, put him in the best of companies, and for the sensiblest of purposes. For so grave a care as philosophising before the public, there was, they say, to Kant, to Aristotle, to Hegel, the necessity, first of all, "of a wealth of knowledge and experience, and of a critical discipline of thought itself."

But to the difficulty of complimenting so grand a faculty with so trumpery a *propos*, there comes the further difficulty that this so grand faculty was so very serious—so very much in earnest with this same so incredible—with this same so very trumpery *propos*! It was on this *propos* that Hegel rose from the mere commonness of simple *sensation*—an odour, a savour, a touch, a sound, a colour (green, yellow, red)—through *perception* and *understanding*, through *consciousness*, and *self-consciousness*, and *reason*,—up, up in *cognition*, to the *absolute* itself—surely with PAINS enough! Was there ever in this world a vaster mountain of *pains* for Hegel to raise, or for us to level, than that single volume, *Die Phaenomenologie des Geistes*? And what of the *Logic*, and the *Encyklopaedie*, and the *Philosophy of Law*, *Morals*, and the *State*,—the *Philosophy of History*, the *Philosophy of Religion*, the *Philosophy of Art*, and, too, the *History of Philosophy*? Surely, there be *pains* enow! It *may* be a fog-bank; but we cannot deny it to be real, if to be earnest, if to be serious, if to spare oneself not one single, conceivably possible, pain—if that is to be real.

But it is just possible that a little further consideration of our ext itself—the extract from Schelling—may lighter " . or even enable us to exalt

into the empyrean—as though a Crab into the Zodiac—the trumpery *propos* itself!

Schelling, when he writes his letter, is still a student at Tübingen, and at the date (Feb. 4, 1795) is only eight days more than twenty years of age. How aufgeklärt the lad is! He is not to be caught—not he! He was surprised for a moment by the question; but he is awake now, and sees it to be but a try-on! He will let this Lessing's man know that his eyes are quite open to the truth—and the trick too! This Lessing's man, however, has in reality not yet got his eyes opened that width. He was twenty-four and five months old when Schelling was twenty; and almost that whole difference of age was expended by him in the deepest brooding, boring, and burrowing of studies, political partly, but greatly more theological, with the Old and New Testaments constantly in his hands. Even at the same age, at Tübingen, as Schelling was volatile, Hegel was, in *his* Aufklärung, grave: "if he quite acknowledged the right of the Aufklärung to subjective freedom, he still had objectively no satisfaction at all in the actuality it dominated." It was so he bade farewell to Tübingen; and, when three years younger, he wrote there his *Dissertation pro magisterio*, if sterner than Kant himself for the authority of duty in itself and as such, he showed, for all that, "that its fulfilment had quite another motive when it was thought as the expression of the necessity of a supreme will—for only on the presupposition of an infinitely powerful, wise, and good God, who manifests himself in the order and laws of nature, and guides all that happens with the exactest knowledge—only on this presupposition can man regard All as a *completed whole*, and himself as a subject in the kingdom of the best and greatest sovereign."

But Schelling knew nothing of "the theological hing, most probably, of the contents of the

Pass-Dissertations; he knew only, by recollection say, of an admirer of Lessing's,—and so he was surprised. And then he tells him of his own "advance" through Spinosa and through Kant, specially in regard of a personal God. "God is nothing but the absolute Ego"; "consciousness is not possible without an object"; "for God, *i.e.* for the absolute Ego, there can be *no object*, inasmuch as it would cease thereby to be absolute." He has become a Spinosist. "To Spinosa the world (the object as directly counter the subject) was *All*—to me it is the Ego." The special difference between the critical and dogmatical philosophies lay for him in this, "that the former starts from the absolute Ego, unconditioned as yet by any object, while the latter, again, takes its start from the absolute object or Non-Ego: the latter, in its ultimate consequence, leads to the system of Spinosa; the former, similarly, to that of Kant. From the unconditioned, philosophy must start. The question, then, is only this, Wherein does the Unconditioned lie—in the Ego, or in the Non-Ego? Is this question answered, then All is answered." Then Schelling goes on to say that for him the Answer is Ego.

There is no doubt a great deal of philosophy in the above. If philosophy is to be absolute—if a man is absolutely to explain existence, then he *must* start with an *unconditioned*; which unconditioned, plainly, *can* lie only either in the *object* or in the *subject*. It is quite certain that Spinosa does start with the object; and it is not, in the least, less certain that Kant, seen through to the very principle of his base, does, on the contrary, begin with, or start from, the subject. All that is certain.

But what, then, of this subject—what, then, of this Ego, in which Schel[illegible]s his answer and conclusion? As it is there d[illegible]h conviction, by Schel

ling himself, is it, after all, such an Ego as will commend itself to Hegel—to the deeply brooding, boring, burrowing, lonesome, secluded, stranger-man that beside the Bears at Berne taught the boys of Herr Steiger von Tschugg? Hardly. The recluse is already too logical for that: he must have his own ideas of what an Ego should be—of what an Ego only *can be*. An Ego that, though an Ego, is an unconscious Ego!—an Ego that, though an Ego, is without the consciousness of an Ego! Schelling was surprised at Hegel in what he mooted for *his* God; but if Schelling's own God were no more than that Ego, was there not vastly more reason why Hegel, because of such a God, should be surprised at Schelling? One cannot help thinking, indeed, that Hegel must have felt not only a little surprised, but even not a little puzzled. *Could* there be an Ego without consciousness? What was an Ego? What was consciousness? If God as an Ego said *I* to himself, he must have thought *Me*. *I* was subject, but *Me* was object. And *I* and *Me*, subject and object, in any Ego, in any *I*, in any *Me*, were one—one and the same. Was God, then, though an Ego, not to be his own—*object*? Consciousness depends on an object, and there can be no object beside an absolute,—Ergo, God, as an absolute, is without consciousness! No object!—no object for an absolute!—no object for God! Why, a God without a consciousness would be at once all object, nothing but an object! Not a shred of subjectivity would be left him—he would be nothing but a thing—possessed only of the objectivity of a stone—at best, as more general than that, but the Substance of Spinosa! Simply and solely, a thing—literally, the Substance of Spinosa—surely that was peculiar! At the very moment that he actually made believe to reject substance, Schelling actually, ; very moment, was proclaiming it! And Kant!

At the very moment that Kant was set as the diametrical opposite to Spinosa, at that very moment he was set also as the same with him,—at the very moment that they were absolutely differentiated, at that very moment they were absolutely identified![1]

I contend that for a Hegel, even in 1795 at Berne, such a course of thinking as I have figured was alone natural—why, as late as February 1823, Hegel tells the Minister of Education that "in his twelfth year he had learned the Wolfian definitions of the so-called Idea clara, and, in his fourteenth, all the various figures and rules of the syllogism, and that even now (when he is fifty-three) he still knows them as from then." It is not at all likely that Logic failed him when he came to consider these Schellingian ideas as to an Ego and consciousness, an absolute and God. At the same time, it is not for a moment to be supposed that I conceive Hegel to have seen all this at once. That letter of Schelling's remained with Hegel from *its* date on to *his* last; and I only figure to myself what is natural when I see Hegel as he gathers more and more light—from his study of Fichte, say—discern also more and more light in these *propos* of Schelling's, with all the meaning and the relations that they bear to Kant, Spinosa, or simply philosophy.

And now, let it be considered what the thoughts which we have figured above were, in time, likely to

[1] Since writing the above, and having Noack in hand for Schelling, I was glad to find that the former, in his book on the latter (i. 143–45), had come to quite a similar understanding: "An Ego without consciousness—is in truth not an Ego at all, and Schelling's pure, absolute, or unconditioned Ego is only the Christian baptismal name for Spinosa's Substance." Of course, Noack has no object before him—no thought of any one but Schelling here: my bringing in of Hegel is quite another matter—it is Schelling's *book* that Noack has alone bef[illegible] *the letter to Hegel.*

have issued into, as concerns, say, firstly for Hegel, his dialectic. But at once in this respect, what thoughts more than these, suppose Hegel to have had them, could have tended to suggest a concrete interior in the Ego itself—a concrete matter, filling, almost, as it were, an organisation within it? Schelling would have the absolute Ego, necessarily, as absolute, without an object, that is, wholly alone—abstract: Hegel, on the contrary, or we for him, would have it concrete. With him, as we put it, there would be the *I—Me—*I, in full force—an absolutely concrete subject-object at once, an absolute concrete of difference and identity at once, and at the same time an absolute actuality, a reality, a reality actually in existence. In comparison, think of poor Schelling here, with his misfortune of an Ego without an object, a monstrosity, a non-ens, an impossibility! "God is the Ego, in so far as it has annihilated all that is theoretic"—all that exists for perception, cognition —"And so far, therefore, is = 0!" "For God, for the absolute Ego, aber, giebt *es gar kein Oject*, denn dadurch hörte es auf absolut zu sein—Mithin giebt es keinen persönlichen Gott!"

For this that concerns the dialectic, there is yet to be signalised, in this extract from the letter of Schelling, another side, or another vein of suggestion. "The absolute Ego embraces an absolute sphere of absolute being. In this sphere there form finite spheres which arise through *Limitation* of the absolute sphere by an object (—spheres of the finite, theoretical philosophy). In these is mere conditionedness; and the unconditioned leads to contradictions."

This that is meant here is simply the movement of Fichte in deduction of his categories, which are the "finite spheres" named. When Hegel got at length to the Fichte, he could not have been long of observ-

ing—with his profound inquest into Kant in his head —that the former had given the latter but a simple modification of *form*. Kant's Unity of pure Apperception, Self-consciousness, was not at all definitely put, rather more or less miscellaneously and at random, as it were, more or less as though in a by-the-bye mention. His categories, too, notwithstanding his "artige Betrachtungen" over their Table, were more or less unconnected and irrelative the one to the other. Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality—Universal, Affirmative, Categorical, Problematic, etc. etc.—they stand beside each other, undeduced the one from the other. To this *matter* now, in its more or less of miscellaneousness, Fichte would, in unity of the whole and in connection of the parts, give the logical rigour of *form*. Hegel, perceiving this, must have perceived also that Fichte had no expedient for the effecting of all that he contemplated, but *Limitation*, *Limit*. Kant's Apperception should be Fichte's Ego, and Kant's Categories should, as Fichte's Categories, ravel out from the Ego, mutually connected, organically together, by *Limit*, the principle of *Limit*. Probably, then, it was only after an independent study of Fichte that Hegel's eye fell with relevance on that word *Limitation*, Einschränkung, as used above by Schelling. "In the absolute sphere of absolute being, finite spheres of finite existence form (themselves)—form through limitation of the original infinite — limitation through an object." Studying Fichte, Hegel, year after year, month after month, week after week,—at least in all likelihood, we should say,—must have deeply, deeply pondered, nearly, nearly looked into, all this. How if he ended by saying to himself—and his thoughts could have been only all the clearer when to the *Wissenschaftslehre* of Fichte he added the Transcendentale Idealismus of his friend Schelling, where, too, *Limit* is the spring—

how if he ended by saying to himself, what is there not from the outside in all this, from the outside and merely external; Limit is but as a screw from the outside, and put into external application—or this *Object*, this *Non-Ego*, which has been feigned, and figured, and fancied to act, what is it but an artificial lever, invented from without, and applied from without: there is no natural logic that takes from an Ego to a Non-Ego,—because there is *a* God, it does not follow that there is *no* God. In the setting up of the Non-Ego there is, even to Fichte, no possibility of proof: the act that sets it up is an absolute and so an arbitrary act. In short, in the whole procedure of Fichte, with his three propositions, which have to do with Identity, Difference, and the Union of both, there is nothing at work but artifice and externality—nothing but external artifice.

If Hegel thought thus, he must have thought also, how remedy this, how reverse the spell,—change externality into internality, transform the artificiality of *make* into the naturality of *growth*? It is at bottom, after all, with the problem of difference and identity that Fichte has really to do. And must that problem be only external—is it impossible to make it internal? In Fichte, the Ego and the Non-Ego are wholly external. Each is wholly external, the one to the other. Is it impossible to make them internal—ay, and internal, quite as much also, the one to the other? According to Schelling, God, the Ego, is to have no object. But what if God—what if the Ego is to have its own object? What if subject and object are to be in one?—difference and identity, two, each one—a separate, independent, abstract one, each—but still, each with the other, both together, and so together a concrete one both? And what is that but the Ego, call it you, call it me, call it him—call it God? In God, as in the Ego, subject and

object are together, then? Even so as it has always been! There is but God *and* his Universe. The Universe is but He; and He is but the Universe! *Properly* —in *essential* speech, in *substantial* speech, in *true* speech, there IS but God! There is but one *etymon*, in this world, one *eteon*, but one that ὄντως IS—***ΕΓΜΙ***, I Am —I AM THAT I AM.

Now, that that is, is not an abstract: it is a concrete —*the* concrete. It is an *I*, but an *I* of the *Me*—a Subject, but a Subject OF the Object. That is, there is here a two and a one—a two which is the one, and a one which is the two. Both are a relation, then. There is a ratio between them both—a ratio that binds the one to the other. God is the principle that creates the universe, and that ratio is the law according to which the universe is created.

It is so, then, that we would feign the brooding of Hegel over the words of Schelling to have in the end issued—to have in the end kindled these words themselves into the life of the Notion and into the movement of his Dialectic, which, united with the whole laborious Concrete of History, Science, and Experience, issued in —his System! Schelling, indeed, could turn to his own profit—Schelling, indeed, could make his own, or did make his own—whatever he took up; but whatever he took up, he kept as he found it. So in him, too, for movement, no principle of movement, but, as in Fichte himself, "Einschränkung." Had Hegel fallen into this, and remained in it, and, like Schelling, never escaped from it,—why, then, Hegel would never have been Hegel. But Hegel saw that if movement were to be given to the Ego, it must be by its own nature from within, and not by an artifice from without; it must be really a *principle*, and not an *expedient*, an *in*ternality and not an *ex*ternality. The Ego was a one: just so much transparent elemental

water, but even into its own depths there fell the shadow of its own self—Me. The object was already there darkening up upon the subject: and it was their embrace that was to make thinking; and it was that thinking that, by its own necessary reverse, in its own necessary dialectic, was to make things. I—I-Me—I. That might not have been to Hegel—*just in so many words—Thinking*; but—*potentially so*—that was to Hegel his *Dialectic*. Ego was the Notion; and its constitutive Ratio was the Dialectic.

It is thus—thus as explained—that we find in this remarkable extract from that early boyish letter of Schelling's, the spore that, though with much else, may have been struck by Hegel into his entire philosophy. Nay, are there not even nearer words in the extract that have still also a nearer place in the philosophy? "The alpha and omega of all philosophy is *Freiheit*—the Ego is to be *durch Freiheit gesetzt*!" Freiheit is all that to Hegel also—Liberty: but a very different Liberty from John Stuart Mill's—a Liberty that is self-action certainly, a self-action, however, that is the self-action not of the particular as the particular, but, on the contrary, of the particular only as the universal.

These "finite spheres" in Schelling's infinite sphere are still in Hegel, too. If for Schelling there is in these spheres the mere Conditioned, and if the Unconditioned leads to contradictions, there is still some analogy to Hegel there, though to him it is the Conditioned brings the contradictions, and the Unconditioned solves them. The duty, however, that is here for Hegel is still here also for Schelling: "we are to come from the finite sphere to the infinite one." And here we are in the "practical" world. "For the supersensible, the finite is to be destroyed." "It is the sensible gives nce." "There must be transition into the

absolute sphere of being—destruction so far of *our* personality"—the finite one.

These latter words of Schelling, so put, have taken on the purgation of all colour as in the highest *Ethik* of Hegel. I know not that any mere man in this world did ever so deeply and persistently labour to abolish in himself the finite as Hegel did: it was the universal always, the universal alone, that was in his eye. For to him there was quite another conclusion than the conclusion of Schelling. "Consequently," says Schelling, "there is no personal God": on the contrary, says Hegel, "there *is* a personal God"! And of this God, Hegel made all: throughout his whole philosophy it is the mighty limbs of this God stretch.

And, on this level, where now is the "trumpery *propos*"? May we not conceive it as Schelling's now, as Fichte's now, even as Kant's now, but not as Hegel's? Kant owned a thing-in-itself, which certainly had its own privilege of—as Jacobi said wittily—an *otium cum dignitate*, but which, like some other such dignities, was, for the rest, null. Fichte has but so much externality of a Non-Ego and Ego as of a blackboard and chalk. And Schelling has a subject that is impossibly a subject, and only a thing. These *may* be trumpery *propos*. But an Ego that was a living Ego—a dialectic that was the living internality of an Ego: *That* was no trumpery *propos*; and that was Hegel's.

And then the life—the living labour of the man—the work, the thought—the little else in life than work—the little else in life than thought! How staunch he was, how silent, and how he held on—held on in the dark! "The planful working out of a design, the thorough finishing of an idea, the development and resolution of a theme,"—that, says Rosenkranz, was "the quality proper" of the man.

Hegel, without a thought that was unctuous, without a word that was *patelin*, lived—indeed we may say it—*in* God and *to* God.

I Am That I Am—I Am That I Am—I Am That I am:

That to Hegel was all.

Men of genius are personally double. They are at once genius and ordinary man; and it is in the latter respect mainly that their differences of character lie. Hegel, if admirable as genius, was perfectly estimable as man. *Anstand*, order and propriety, from all in that well-placed, official family, must have been reflected on him from the first; and so it was a diligent reflective schoolboy that, in the Gymnasium, walked with the Masters. At the University he had—what has often the most promise in it—the respectable place of *third*; which, too, as little fervid, being threatened to lose it in his *quasi*-indifference, he had, under his nightly lamp, to fight for. Still, out of doors, he could be a merry and even a genial boon companion, true-blue, and a lad of mense, nor less of grit, to be respected and relied on. He carried himself through life with vigorous self-trust and a perfect sense of duty. He knew his place, and could present himself, hat in hand, quite respectfully to his Excellency the Minister von Altenstein. Not quite unsubdued in manner, he could keep on the best of terms with the enshrined and ennobled Goethe; but he knew his man, and could speak quite meaningly of "our eighty years' old Jüngling." All that comes to this, that, in his social intercourse, he was never less than man to man with his fellows. He shows, as we exhibit him, only questionably by Schelling; whom, no doubt, for his

own interest, he first courted, and then, at last, yielding somewhat perhaps to a little latent grudge, though, of course, that of him is neither said nor seen,—he pretty well turned his back upon him in the *Phaenomenologie*. There are his letters, however, and these all show him to have been the friendliest and the realest of men—especially those to his wife when on his travels to and fro Vienna, Paris, etc. These latter are very valuable, so affectionate as they are, and uninterruptingly minute and full: it is only a most excellent man always, and perfect father of a family, that we see there. In short, what Schwegler says just gives the man: "The relaxation of social intercourse he sought rather among plain and unofficial people than in the company of the great; he had no liking to shine in *salons*." (In his *Tour in the Netherlands*, read what he says of his "Engländer.)

Schwegler, to these words, adds another suggestion. "In the year 1830"—just a year before his death, but when he was, at sixty, still not old—"Hegel was made rector of the university, and (says Schwegler) fulfilled the duties of the office in a more practical manner than previously Fichte." That of "fulfilling duties in a practical manner" is what we desire to accentuate, and that, too, as in opposition to some few who smile at Hegel as an old dreamer, and really believe their smile. Now, there are such things as "dreamers" and "old dreamers" too. Others may recollect, as I do, of gaunt old angular students from the hills who talked in Essays in Moral Philosophy class-rooms of "confluxes and refluxes" that made the class laugh. These *were* dreamers, simply unfortunates in mists of their own misconceiving. But Hegel was really the most practical of men; he only *grübelt* in those Swiss theological studies of his. There *was* the *dialect*, but it came legitimately *from* him, just as it had come legitimately *to* him from Kant and the



rest. The dialect itself is, as a dialect, legitimate enough; *it only wants to be learned.* No one will read these letters of his to his wife, or see him as rector in the academy at Nürnberg, without having in front of him, very obviously and clearly, a man of *nous*, wide awake, and with his eyes open—a man who could see and at once act. *Understanding*, in fact, as all that speak of him cry, was emphatically—the man.[1]

[1] Asked why Hegel said never Ego, always Begriff? I say this: *Im Begriff* suggests at once *the* Begriff as of the Begriffe (Categories), and the *beginning*—not that he meant to mislead; but he died suddenly of the *cholera*.

CHAPTER XV

Conclusion

Explanation of the universe,—that that, in all these chapters, has been assumed as the aim of philosophy, must have been plain throughout.

Science, no doubt, has also attempted the problem, but always only with such presuppositions as at once to negate the enterprise. If we have always not only Time and Space, but, in whatever tenuity of form, Matter itself, might we not just as well begin with all quite as it is there before us: suns, planets, satellites in an infinite void, with an infinite past behind, an infinite present around, and, correspondently, an infinite future in front?

The ancients tried their best with *thickenings* and *thinnings*: the moderns have scarcely done more with *eddyings* and *swirlings*, *heatings* and *coolings*. There are those, of course, who cry, It is mere rubbish to attempt to account for either matter or life; but then *their* faith is—That, out of an accidental proteine compound, where or when one knows not, wind and weather have, in course of time, sufficed to form all the infinitely concerted complexity and all the variegated beauty, as well of our fauna as of our flora!

Metaphysicians, with a similar purpose, may not have done perfectly or even well; but have they not done better?

They *have* a First, a First that is in *rerum natura*,

and so constituted also that, by virtue of its own *ratio*, it develops into an entire *internalè*; which, in turn, and by virtue of the same *ratio* continued (but necessarily only *implicitly*), is an entire *externalè*. The virtue *within* is the necessity of *reason*: the virtue *without* is the necessity, *necessarily*, of its own *contingency*.

Man is the living centre, but, as without, he is in the element of contingency. So it is that he finds himself in such a mere out-of-the-way planet, under such a mere out-of-the-way sun. All that infinitude of *externalia* around is but the Necessity and Contingency of Externality in Quantity (which is itself but a direct necessity of externality)—there, however, for man to make his own of it. We cannot further follow here a Philosophy of Nature in the *Particular* and in the *Singular*.

But God, we say at once, is, necessarily to us, alone in all this, the actually, livingly, and personally *bëent* UNIVERSAL.

For to philosophise through the Ego is not to presume to measure the infinitude of God.

It is in this way rather:

There can no Supreme Being be, but that must to Himself say *I*: I AM THAT I AM.

Man, again, it is said, is made "after the likeness" of God: "a man is the image and glory of God."

It is the very heart of the Christian Religion that the Infinite God, become Finite, is a Man.

And Man is *I*. Even by the privilege of having been made like unto God, Man is I.

It is that that he has of God in him.

So, then, even to realise the privilege—even to realise the *I*—for that it is, that he is here.

We are sent here to think.

To realise *I*—that is the purpose, and that is the history of the universe.

Thus, as it were in a dew-drop, is a vista of the universe: a Kosmorama *Ouranothen*, a Kosmorama *Theiothen*—the Kosmorama of God.

If it were but something motionless—a picture on the wall!

But just look at it—through that *Kent's Hole*!

That slowly forming lime-drop that falters to its fall through thousands, and thousands, and thousands of years! And so—with long perspective, interminably in the light of it—such shapes, in mist, of lands and seas, and men and beasts!

What philosophy—what mere thinking can stand against that?

That is the infinitude of Time. And in it every highest height or deepest depth—every mightiest name of empire or of man—(*every book*)—perishes!

Well now, Space is given quite as infinite as Time—Say, then, can we not set the one against the other—abolish both?

Has any one, at any time, by any chance, been minded to take his *Pasear* in Space? Has he wandered among the stars—outgone Aldebaran—or, in the spangles of Orion, stumbled?

Here is an extract made (*W. W.*, 4. 401 sq.) by Kant from a book:—

"One evening, by my lamp, as I made up accounts and scored off profits, sleep overtook me. . . . Methought an irresistible hand took me, and bore me suddenly aloft, into, and through the shining stretches of Creation. With inconceivable speed I left uncounted worlds behind me—on, and on! Soon, I drew near the utmost verge of nature, and saw the shadows of the illimitable voids sink into the depths before me. Eternal stillness, loneliness, and the dark! Inexpressible terror seized me! One by one, I lost the stars from sight, till at length the last glimmering spark, in the utter gloom, died out. The mortal agony of despair, with every moment, grew upon me, even as every mom [redacted] and

more of distance to my separation from the world of worlds. With keener and keener anguish of heart the dread thought pierced me then that, when thousands and thousands of years had borne me beyond the bounds of all createdness, I should, for ever, still be plunging forward into the immeasurable inane, without a help as without a hope of the possibility of return!"

Well now, even such your *Pasear* shall be! You are in infinite space. That is, space never ceases. You proceed and proceed, and still there is space: You go on for ever, and still you cannot exhaust it. Go on as you may, slow or swift, or swifter and swifter, still there is space, space after space, interminably space—spaces, spaces, countless. Bethink you now! Would there be—one after the other—in all these spaces, ceaselessly—*such a sky as this above you?* Is there such a sky now, with stars, away, away—stars, stars, stars, endlessly?

Are we to conceive the externality of creation so?

We can talk, but, let us talk as we may, we can not always conceive. We can *not* conceive an everlasting space, with stars, stars, still stars, interminably.

And Time, then? Shall it be otherwise with time? Shall we not rather say this—As, even by its own excess, an infinite space is inconceivable; so, too, even by its own excess, an infinite time is equally inconceivable?

Dates, and dates, and dates for ever are as inconceivable in time, as stars, and stars, and stars for ever are inconceivable in space.

Can we verify our dates?

I read, not long ago, an admirable book on geology; and, in these perpetual wearings down and heavings up, that seem really intimated there to go on and on, and round and round for ever, I had a most vivid picture of an eternal life even on the part of this little Earth of

Yet how, in their estimates that would describe
periods, our very best, whom we admire and

honour *in excelsis*—differ! They separate themselves, the one from the other, by millions and millions—by tens of millions—by hundreds of millions—of years: they might quite as well separate themselves by infinitude! It is just to be said here, as it is said elsewhere, —De non apparentibus et de non existentibus, eadem est ratio. It all comes to that.

What we want, we humans, is the repose of an eternal *now*. And it is that that our religion guarantees to us: *An Eternal Now.*

In this position that one of our clearest could only see a "dilemma"—a dilemma that, even self-confessedly, was, as against religion, to make him untrue to what in science he himself owned—was there ever a more inveterate bigotry in religion than this bigotry that named itself science?

But what, by any possibility, was it that could have made such a man prefer—it was really that—sciolism to science?

Well, in one word, as it was not difficult to see, it was —the *discrepancies*, and that is the *Aufklärung*![1]

Under either term there lies, in truth, that collision between faith on the one side and thought on the other which is simply a rending agony in the depths of the soul. Outside of the Church men have sought refuge from it in suicide; and by suicide men have sought refuge from it within the Church. But the position is still human, and surely it is possible for it to yield itself —to reflection—reflection that is human. And just here and so it is that the Aufklärung No. 2 presents itself.

[1] See explanations almost *passim* in the *Secret of Hegel*, especially, perhaps, at pp. lxiii, 165, 176, 177, 728, 747. There are other passages sufficiently in place, as at pp. xxii, xxviii, xxxi-v, lii-viii, lxi, 74, 100, 194, 589 sq., 692 sq., 732 sq.; *Darwinianism*, p. 185; and other works, just generally.

If we owe the Aufklärung No. 1 to French infidelity, and as well the continuance of it to the critical protestantism of Germany, I have no hesitation in saying that it is to the great German *Quadrilateral* in philosophy that we owe the Aufklärung No. 2. For even Kant, however he may have regarded the negative, was a Kant of depth, and not a Kant of shallowness; while, after him, not one of the three that followed but did bring reflection to the front. Schelling mocked at the *Auf*klärung as the *Aus*klärung—at the clearing up as the emptying out. With the frank, open-souled Fichte there is no difficulty in knowing either what he thought or what he said; and for testimony the sacramental sermon he preached at Warsaw, very much, as it appears, to the satisfaction of his evangelical audience, will probably suffice. Poor Fichte, when on that occasion he mounted the pulpit stairs, book in hand, had never a thought that what he knew as a *People's Book* was only a "lie." After the various express discussions in the *Secret of Hegel* there is no call to speak again of Hegel. In his Philosophy of Religion the attitude he took up to his *critical* countrymen is again and again very decisively to be seen. Nay, in these pages alone that are there, before us the evidence is ample. We may remember, too, that he positively declares himself "a Lutheran, and always will remain one." But he has an open sense, and is loyal to speak. Of the life of Pythagoras, I quote him to say, for example, that it is written "in early century manner, more or less in the style in which the Life of Christ is narrated to us, from the point of view, namely, of common reality." Now, that refers to the popular style of the New Testament, which, with all its advantages in a wide sense, is the seat of the *discrepancies*. But the *discrepancies* were nought to Hegel, and they ought to be nought to us. It is the person of Christ

concerns us, and the Revelation that that involved—how Christianity opened so the higher concrete truth to us, and even so, in that higher truth, made for us a new world. Mr. Gladstone said: "I build upon historical Christianity, the great world-fact of 1800 years"; and that position of Mr. Gladstone is precisely the position of the Aufklärung No. 2—as it is precisely the position which No. 1 *never knows*! To No. 2, namely, the popular statement disappears in the light that overflows from it. The material body imports to it not, but alone the living spirit. It is the ointment itself that is the salve, and not the fly in it.

There is nothing in this world more simply silly than that, because of the discrepancies, science itself should become sciolism, and then believe, and inculcate the belief, that that sciolism is the "advance"—that nothing can be "advanced" unless it sees, proclaims, placards the "discrepancies."

I know not that I have anything to say more here as regards the contents of the foregoing. Perhaps I might desire to chronicle, what bears on its main theme, this word of Tennyson's:

"You never, never can convince me this *I* is not an eternal Reality."

For the rest, I need not, I think, add anything now to what has been said of Fichte, or Schelling, or Hegel; at the same time that I may be a little disappointed if nothing *new* should be found, at least in the latter references.

But it appears to me, that with what has been all, somewhat amply, put before us, we can *not*—"return to Kant."

Can we return to this, for example, that any ordinary thing—a shoe—has an extraordinary unseen *double* of itself in a—Thing-in-Itself? Or that the *time* that the

one-o'clock gun fires in, and the *space* André's balloon mounts in, are, neither the one nor the other of them, there where we think they are, *outside* of us, but both, on the contrary, *inside*? Or that *cause*, with each of its other fellow-categories, is not, by any means, a something on its own account without, but, really, a simple secretion of the cells or pigeon-holes of our own brains? Or that the I—whatever I may possibly think the I I am—I am not at all that I—hardly even an *i*—only the dot on it?

All that being,—and all that is—surely,—if we must return—foundationally—and do return to his Apperception and his Categories—we can *not* return to his *theoretical* philosophy as a whole, much as we may rise to the truths in his *practical* philosophy. Nor do I know that we can return to his *religious* philosophy, though I do know that we can return to his spirit of religion, whether catholic or Christian. Whatever there was of the Aufklärung in Kant, he was not the Aufgeklärter that only sneers and jeers.

And so, finally, now, I may take to myself these words of Schelling's son:

"I conclude this last word of the entire work with the noble two letters which Schelling was accustomed to set at the end of his manuscripts: Θ. Σ. (Θεὸς σῶσον); in German—

Das Walte Gott!"

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